THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD - MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN , K,G

940.933 K78m

Montgomery

Memoirs

67-65573
6.00

PLAZA

THE MEMOIRS

OF FIEU£KM»ARSHAL MONTGOMERY

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* SEP'5<%

The author when Chid" of tin* linprnal Grnerul Staff, 1947*

The Memoirs

OF
FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT

MONTGOMERY

OF ALAMEIN, K.G.

THE WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY

CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK

Published by The World Publishing Company
West Jioth Street, Cleveland z> Ohio

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 58-9414

FIRST EDITION

The quotation on pages 72 and 73 is from The Hinge

of Fate by Winston S, Churchill, copyright 195° by

Houghton Mifliin Company.

The quotation on pages 186 and 187 is from The

Struggle for Europe by Chester Wihnot, copyright

3952 by Chester Wilmot* reprinted by permission of

HarpcT and Brothers.

The quotations on pages afifi, 267, and 281 an* from

Operation Victory by Sir Francis de Cmngand, copy

right 1947 hy Charity Svribnt*r\H Sons, reprinted by

]>(*nnissiou of the publisher ;md tb<» author,

The letters from Bernard Shaw are reproduced by

permission of the Public TruMee and the Stxnely of

Authors.

Kxeerpts from this hook appeann! in Life, in the isMies

of October 13, October 20, ,uul October ^7, i^S^»

copyright 0 i<)5& by liernanl Law, Vi.seouut Mont

gomery of ALuttein.

w 1*8 58

Copyright &) 1958 l»y

Bernard Law, VLscount Motitgimiory «»f Alanunti.
All rights reserved Nft> part of this book nuy IH» roprmluwi in
any form without written permission from the publi.sh<?r» itxcttpt
for brief passages inehuU^l m u r4»vu*\v ap{UMriitg in a news
paper or magazine. Printed in tlu* tTni(<(<t States of America.

Jet man is born unto trouble, as

the sparks fly upward

JOB 5, 7

Contents

FOREWORD 15

1. BOYHOOD DAYS 317

2. MY EARLY LIFE IN THE ARMY 23

3. BETWEEN THE WARS 36

4. BRITAIN GOES TO WAR IN 1939 46

5. THE ARMY IN ENGLAND AFTER DUNKIRK &*
0. MY DOCTRINE OF COMMAND 74

7. EIGHTH ARMY 84

8. THE BATTLE OF ALAM HALFA 9#

9. THE BATTLE OF ALAMEIN 106

10. ALAMEIN TO TUNIS 1*7

11. THE CAMPAIGN IN SICILY

12. THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY

13. IN ENGLAND BEFORE D-DAY

14. THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY

15. ALLIED STRATEGY NORTH OF THK SHINE

ILLUSTRATIONS

The author when Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1947.

(Sylvia Redding photo) FRONTISPIECE

THE FOULOWING PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS W3UL BE FOUND
INT SEQUENCE AFTER PAGE 2QO.

1. My father at Cape Barren Island, on a missionary tour in 1895. (Beat-
ties Studios, Hobart, Tasmania, photo)

2. My mother, in the 19305. (Lafayette Ltd. photo)

3. What I looked like when aged 9.

4. Three Old Paulines in Arras in 1916. Left, my brother Donald, in the
29th Bn Canadian Expeditionary Force. Centre, Major B. M. Arnold
in the Artillery. Right, the author who was Brigade-Major 104 Inf. Bde.
in the 35th (Bantam) Division.

5. The author and his Brigadier, back from a tour of the trenches on the
Arras front, 1916.

6. ist Bn, Tlie Royal Warwickshire Regiment, in camp near the Pyramids
outside Cairo in 1933. The author, the C.O., mounted in front of the
battalion.

7. My wife and her three sons, April 1930. Left to right— Dick Carver,
David, John Carver.

8. My wife and David in Switzerland— January 1936.

9. The author and David in Switzerland— January 1937.

10. Lord Cort and Mr. Hore-Belisha visit the 3rd Division area in France.
General Brooke can be seen behind and to the left of Hore-Belisha.
The author is on the right in battle dress— the first General Officer
ever to wear that dress. Date— 19 November 1939, (Imperial War
Museum photo)

11. In the desert, wearing my Australian hat, greeting the Commander of
the Greek Brigade in the Eighth Army (Brigadier Katsotas)- August
1942. The officer by the car door is John Poston. (Imperial War Mu
seum photo)

12. Map of Battle of Alam Haifa.

13. The deception plan for Alamein. Dummy petrol station, with soldier
filling jerry cans.

Illustrations

14. Map of the Battle of Alamein— Plan on 30 Corps Front.

15. Address to Officers before the Battle of Alamein.

16. Map of the Battle of Alamein-The Break Out.

17. Battle of Alamein; observing operations from my tank. In rear, John
Poston. (Imperial War Museum photo)

18. Battle of Alamein; having tea with my tank crew. On right, John
Poston. (Imperial War Museum photo)

19. Map of the Pursuit to Agheila.

20. A picnic lunch on the sea front in Tripoli with General Leese, after
the capture of the town— 23 January 1943. (Imperial War Museum
photo)

21. The Prime Minister and General Brooke outside my caravans near
Tripoli. (Imperial War Museum photo)

22. The Prime Minister addresses officers and men of Eighth Army H.Q. in
Tripoli. (Imperial War Museum photo)

23. Map of the Battle of Mareth.

24. Map of end of die war in Africa.

25. Addressing officers of the New Zealand Division on 2 April 1943, after
the Battle of Mareth. (Imperial War Museum photo)

26. The Prime Minister inspecting troops of the Eighth Army in Tripoli.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, 30 Corps, in the back seat with the P. M.
John Poston driving. (Imperial War Museum photo)

27. Eisenhower comes to visit me in Tunisia, 31 March 1943. On right,
John Poston. (Imperial War Museum photo)

28. Map of operations in Sicily.

29. Speaking to the nth Canadian Tank Regiment near Lcntini, Sicily—
25 July 1943. (Imperial War Museum photo)

30. A lunch party at my Tac H.Q. at Taormina, after the campaign in
Sicily was over-29 August 1943. Seated, left to right-Patton, Eisen
hower, the author. Behind Patton is Bradley, On extreme right, Demp-
sey. (Imperial War Museum photo)

31. Map of the invasion of Italy.

32. With General Brooke in Italy— 15 December 1943. (Imperial War
Museum photo)

33. At Tac H.Q. after my farewell address to the Eighth Army at Vasto—
30 December 1943. Left to right— de Guingand, Broadhurst, the author,
Freyberg, Allfrey, Dempsey.

34. Map of mounting of Operation OVERLORD.

35. Calling the troops round my jeep for a talk near Dover— 2, February
1944. (Imperial War Museum photo)

3& The Prime Minister comes to dinner at my Tac H.Q. near Portsmouth—
19 May 1944. (Imperial War Museum photo)

37. The King comes to my Tac H.Q. to say good-bye before we go to
Normandy— 22 May 1944. (Imperial War Museum photo)

38. The King lands in Normandy to visit the British and Canadian forces—
16 June 1944.

39. The Prime Minister at my Tac H.Q. at Blay, to the west of Bayeux,
on a wet day— 21 July 1944. (Imperial War Museum photo)

40. Map of German Tank Deployment on eve of breakout in Normandy.

Illustrations

41. Map of how the Army Plan worked out.

42. Map of Eisenhower's Broad Front Strategy. Map of my conception
of the Strategy.

43. Map of Plan for Operation MARKET GARDEN (the Battle of Arnhem).

44. Leaving the Maastricht Conference with General Bradley— 7 December

1944. (Imperial War Museum photo)

45. Map of Battle of the Ardennes.

46. In the Siegfried Line with General Simpson, Commander of the Ninth
American Army— 3 March 1945. (Imperial War Museum photo)

47. Lunch on the east bank of the Rhine, with the Prime Minister and
Field-Marshal Brooke— 2,6 March 1945. (Imperial War Museum photo)

48. The Germans come to my Tac H.Q. on Liineburg Heath to surrender—
3 May 1945. (Imperial War Museum photo)

49. Reading the terms of surrender to the German delegation— Luneburg
Heath, 4 May 1945. Chester Wilmot is just to the right of the left-hand
tent pole. (Imperial War Museum photo)

50. Photo of the original surrender document that was signed by the
Germans at 1830 hrs on 4 May 1945.

51. Scene in the Champs Elys6es when I visited Paris on 25 May 1945.
(Imperial War Museum photo)

52. Field-Marshal Busch comes to my Tac H.Q. to be ticked off— 11 May

1945. (Imperial War Museum photo)

53. In the Kremlin with Stalin, after dinner on 10 January 1947.

54. David receives the Belt of Honour from his father, having passed out
top from the OCTU. (P.A.-Reuter pJwto)

55. Isington Mill, when purchased in February 1947. (R. Bostock plioto)

56. Isington Mill in 1955, having been converted to a residence. (Taken
by the author)

57. The garden and mill stream at Isington Mill. (Taken ly the author)

58. A joke with Ernie Bevin at the Bertram Mills Circus lunch— 17 Decem
ber 1948. (Keystone Press Agency Ltd. photo)

59. David when at Trinity College Cambridge in 1950. Laying "the smelT
for the Varsity Drag. (London News Agency Limited photo)

60. A walk in Hyde Park with Mary Connell, who married David on
27 February 1953. (Daily Graphic photo)

61. The author enjoying the evening of life at Isington Mill. (J. Butler-
Kearney, Alton, photo)

Foreword

THIS BOOK does not owe its inception to any personal inclination to
authorship, or to any wish to achieve further publicity* I write it
because of many suggestions that such a book of memoirs is needed.
I aim to give to future generations the impressions I have gained in a
life that has been full of interest, and to define the principles tinder
which I have considered it my duty to think and act.

Every word of the book was written in the first instance in pencil in
my own handwriting. That being done, and the chapters typed in turn,
they were read by three trusted friends whose opinions I value. The
chapters were re-drafted by me in the light of their comments and
suggestions. Finally, the complete book was read through by the same
three, for balance and accuracy.

Chief among the three was Brigadier E. T. Williams, Warden of
Rhodes House, Oxford— frequently referred to in the book as Bill
Williams. I owe him a great debt of gratitude for the time he gave to
reading and comment.

Next was Sir James Grigg, also referred to in the book; his com
ments and suggestions were invaluable. And last was Sir Arthur Bryant;
this great historian gave much of his time to reading the chapters.

To these three I extend my grateful thanks.

I am grateful to those who typed the chapters and helped in
organising the maps and photographs. Again, I extend my gratitude
for permission to publish extracts from letters and books, and I apolo
gise in any case where such permission has been overlooked.

I recognise— by the quotation which is at the beginning of this book
—that I have often been a controversial figure. But my thoughts, actions,
mistakes have been but human. Throughout my life and conduct my
criterion has been not the approval of others nor of the world; it has
been my inward convictions, my duty and my conscience. I have never
been afraid to say what I believed to be right and to stand firm in that

15

16 Foreword

belief. This has often got me into trouble. I have not attempted to
answer my critics but rather to tell the story of my long and enjoyable
military life as I see it, and as simply as possible. Some of my com
rades-in-arms of the Second World War have told their story about
those days; this is mine.

I have tried to explain what seems to me important and to confine
the story to matters about which my knowledge is first-hand. What
ever the book may lack in literary style, it will therefore have, it is my
hope, the merit of truth.

_. P.M.

Isington Mill,
AIion> Hampshire
September 1958

CHAPTER 1

Boyhood Days

I WAS born in London, in St. Mark's Vicarage, Kennington Oval,
on 17th November 1887.
Sir Winston Churchill in the first volume of Marlborough, His
Life and Times wrote thus about the unhappy childhood of some men:
"The stern compression of circumstances, the twinges of adversity,
the spur of slights and taunts in early years, are needed to evoke that
ruthless fixity of purpose and tenacious mother-wit without which
great actions are seldom accomplished/'

Certainly I can say that my own childhood was unhappy. This was
due to a clash of wills between my mother and myself. My early life
was a series of fierce battles, from which my mother invariably
emerged the victor. If I could not be seen anywhere, she would say—
"Go and find out what Bernard is doing and tell him to stop it" But
the constant defeats and the beatings with a cane, and these were fre
quent, in no way deterred me. I got no sympathy from my two elder
brothers; they were more pliable, more flexible in disposition, and they
easily accepted the inevitable. From my eldest sister, who was next
in the family after myself, I received considerable help and sympathy;
but, in the main, the trouble had to be suffered by myself alone. I
never lied about my misdeeds; I took my punishment. There were
obvious faults on both sides. For myself, although I began to know
fear early in life, much too early, the net result of the treatment was
probably beneficial. If my strong will and indiscipline had gone
unchecked, the result might have been even more intolerable than
some people have found me. But I have often wondered whether my
mother's treatment for me was not a bit too much of a good thing:
whether, in fact, it was a good thing at all. I rather doubt it

17

18 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I suppose we were an average Victorian family. My mother was
engaged at the age of fourteen and married my father in July 1881,
when she was scarcely out of the schoolroom. Her seventeenth birth
day was on the 2#rd August 1881, one month after her wedding day.
My father was then Vicar of St. Mark's, Kennington Oval, and my
mother was plunged at once into the activities of the wife of a busy
London vicar.

Children soon appeared. Five were born between 1881 and 1889, in
which year my father was appointed Bishop of Tasmania— five children
before my mother had reached the age of twenty-five. I was the fourth.
There was then a gap of seven years, when two more were bom in
Tasmania; then another gap of five years still in Tasmania, when
another boy arrived. The last, my youngest brother Brian, was bora
after we had left Tasmania and were back in London.

So my mother bore nine children in all. The eldest, a girl, died just
after we arrived in Tasmania, and one of my younger brothers died in
1909 when I was serving with my regiment in India. That left seven,
and all seven are alive today.

As if this large family was not enough, we always had other children
living with us. In St. Mark's Vicarage in Kennington were three small
boys, distant cousins, whose parents were in India. In Tasmania,
cousins arrived from England who were delicate and needed Tas-
manian air. In London after our return from Tasmania, there was
always someone other than ourselves.

It was really impossible for my mother to cope with her work as the
wife of a London vicar or as a Bishop's wife, and also devote her time
to her children, and to the others who lived with us. Her method of
dealing with the problem was to impose rigid discipline on the family
and thus have time for her duties in the parish or diocese, duties which
took first place. There were definite rules for us children; these had
to be obeyed; disobedience brought swift punishment A less rigid
discipline, and more affectionate understanding, might have wrought
better, certainly different, results in me. My brothers and sisters were
not so difficult; they were more amenable to the regime and gave no
trouble. I was the bad boy of the family, the rebellious one, and as a
result I learnt early to stand or fall on my own. We elder ones cer
tainly never became a united family. Possibly the younger ones did,
because my mother mellowed with age.

Against this curious background must be set certain rewarding facts.
We have all kept on the rails. There have been no scandals in the
family; none of us have appeared in die police courts or gone to
prison; none of us have been in the divorce courts. An uninteresting
family, some might say. Maybe, and if that was my mother's object
she certainly achieved it But there was an absence of affectionate

Boyhood Days 19

understanding of the problems facing the young, certainly as far as the
five elder children were concerned. For the younger ones things always
seemed to me to be easier; it may have been that my mother was
exhausted with dealing with her elder children, especially with myself.
But when all is said and done, my mother was a most remarkable
woman, with a strong and sterling character. She brought her family
up in her own way; she taught us to speak the truth, come what may,
and so far as my knowledge goes none of her children have ever done
anything which would have caused her shame. She made me afraid of
her when I was a child and a young boy. Then the time came when
her authority could no longer be exercised. Fear then disappeared, and
respect took its place. From the time I joined the Army until my
mother died, I had an immense and growing respect for her wonderful
character. And it became clear to me that my early troubles were
mostly my own fault.

However, it is not surprising that under suoh conditions all my
childish affection and love was given to my father. I worshipped him.
He was always a friend. If ever there was a saint on this earth, it was
my father. He got bullied a good deal by my mother and she could
always make him do what she wanted. She ran all the family finances
and gave my father ten shillings a week; this sum had to include his
daily lunch at the Athenaeum, and he was severely cross-examined if
he meekly asked for another shilling or two before the end of the week.
Poor dear man, I never thought his last few years were very happy;
he was never allowed to do as he liked and he was not given the care
and nursing which might have prolonged his life. My mother nursed
him herself when he could not move, but she was not a good nurse. He
died in 1932 when I was commanding the ist Battalion The Royal
Warwickshire Regiment in Egypt. It was a tremendous loss for me.
The three outstanding human beings in my life have been my father,
my wife, and my son. When my father died in 1932, I little thought
that five years later I would be left alone with my son.

We came home from Tasmania late in 1901, and in January 1902
my brother Donald and myself were sent to St. Paul's School in
London. My age was now fourteen and I had received no preparation
for school life; my education in Tasmania had been in the hands of
tutors imported from England. I had little learning and practically
no culture. We were "Colonials," with all that that meant in England
in those days. I could swim like a fish and was strong, tough, and very
fit; but cricket and football, the chief games of all English schools,
were unknown to me.

I hurled myself into sport and in little over three years became
Captain of die Rugby XV, and in the Cricket XL The same results
were not apparent on the scholastic side.

20 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

In English I was described as follows:

1902 essays very weak.

1903 feeble.

3.904 very weak; can't write essays.

1905 tolerable; his essays are sensible but he has no notion of
style.

1906 pretty fair.

Today I should say that my English is at least clear; people may
not agree with what I say but at least they know what I am saying.
I may be wrong; but I claim that I am clear. People may misunder
stand what I am doing but I am willing to bet that they do not mis
understand what I am saying. At least they know quite well what they
are disagreeing with.

After I had been three years at St. Paul's my school report described
me as backward for my age, and added: "To have a serious chance
for Sandhurst, he must give more time for work."

This report was rather a shock and it was clear I must get down to
work if I was going to get a commission in the Army, This I did, and
passed into Sandhurst half-way up the list without any difficulty.
St. Paul's is a very good school for work so long as you want to learn;
in my case, once the intention and the urge was clear the masters did
the rest and for this I shall always be grateful. I was very happy at
St. Paul's School. For the first time in my life leadership and authority
came my way; both were eagerly seized and both were exercised in
accordance with my own limited ideas, and possibly badly. For the
first time I could plan my own battles (on the football field) and
there were some fierce contests. Some of my contemporaries have
stated that my tactics were unusual and the following article appeared
in the School magazine in November 1906. I should explain that my
nickname at St. Paul's was Monkey,

OUK UNNATU1UL HISTORY COLUMN

No. i— The Monkey

"This intelligent animal makes its nest in football fields, foot
ball vests, and other such accessible resorts. It is vicious, of unflag
ging energy, and much feared by the neighbouring animals owing
to its xmfortunate tendency to pull out the top hair of the head.
This it calls 'tackling/ It may sometimes be seen in the company
of some of them, taking a short run, and, in sheer exuberance of
animal spirits, tossing a cocoanut from hand to hand! To foreign
fauna it shows no mercy, stamping on their heads and twisting
their necks, and doing many other inconceivable atrocities with a
view, no doubt, to proving its patriotism.

To hunt this animal is a dangerous undertaking. It runs strongly

Boyhood Days 21

and hard, straight at you, and never falters, holding a cocoanut in
its hand and accompanied by one of its companions. But just as
the unlucky sportsman is expecting a blow, the cocoanut is trans
ferred to the companion, and the two run past the bewildered
would-be Nimrod.

So it is advisable that none hunt the monkey. Even if caught
he is not good eating. He lives on doughnuts. If it is decided to
neglect this advice, the sportsman should first be scalped, so as to
avoid being collared."

I had little pocket money in those days; my parents were poor; we
were a large family; and there was little spare cash for us boys. But
we had enough and we all certainly learnt the value of money when
young.

I was nineteen when I left St. Paul's School. My time there was most
valuable as my first experience of life in a larger community than was
possible in the home. The imprint of a school should be on a boy's
character, his habits and qualities, rather than on his capabilities
whether they be intellectual or athletic. In a public school there is
more freedom than is experienced in a preparatory or private school;
the danger is that a boy should equate freedom with laxity. This is
what happened to me, until I was brought up with a jerk by a bad
report. St. Paul's left its imprint on my character; I was sorry to leave,
but not so sorry as to lose my sense of proportion. For pleasant as
school is, it is only a stepping stone. Life lies ahead, and for me the
next step was Sandhurst. "When I became a man, I put away childish
things"— some of them, anyway.

And so I went to Sandhurst in January 1907.

Looking back on their boyhood, some people would no doubt be
able to suggest where things might have been changed for the better.
Briefly, in my own case, two matters cannot have been right: both
due to the fact that my mother ran the family and my father stood
back. First, I began to know fear when very young and gradually
withdrew into my own shell and battled on alone. This without doubt
had a tremendous effect on the subsequent development of my char
acter. Secondly, I was thrown into a large public school without having
had certain facts of life explained to me; I began to learn diem for
myself in the rough and tumble of school life, and not finally until I
went to Sandhurst at the age of nineteen. This neglect might have had
bad results; but luckily, I don't think it did. Even so, I wouldn't let
it happen to others.

When I went to school in London I had learnt to play a lone hand,
and to stand or fall alone. One had become self-sufficient, intolerant
of authority and steeled to take punishment.

By the time I left school a very important principle had just begun

22 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to penetrate my brain. That was that life is a stern struggle, and a
boy has to be able to stand up to the buffeting and set-backs. There
are many attributes which he must acquire if he is to succeed: two
are vital, hard work and absolute integrity. The need for a religious
background had not yet begun to become apparent to me. My father
had always hoped that I would become a clergyman. That did not
happen and I well recall his disappointment when I told him that I
wanted to be a soldier. He never attempted to dissuade me; he accepted
what he must have thought was the inevitable; and if he could speak
to me today I think he would say that it was better that way. If I had
my life over again I would not choose differently. I would be a soldier.

CHAPTER 2

My Early Life in the Army

IN 1907 entrance to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, was by
competitive examination. There was first a qualifying examination
in which it was necessary to show a certain minimum standard of
mental ability; die competitive examination followed a year or so later.
These two hurdles were negotiated without difficulty, and in the
competitive examination my place was 72 out of some 170 vacancies.
I was astonished to find later that a large number of my fellow cadets
had found it necessary to leave school early and go to a crammer in
order to ensure success in the competitive entrance examination.

In those days the Army did not attract the best brains in the country.
Army life was expensive and it was not possible to live on one's pay.
It was generally considered that a private income or allowance of at
least £100 a year was necessary, even in one of the so-called less
fashionable County regiments. In die cavalry, and in the more fashion
able infantry regiments, an income of up to £300 or £400 was de
manded before one was accepted. These financial matters were not
known to me when I decided on the Army as my career; nobody had
explained them to me or to my parents. I learned them at Sandhurst
when it became necessary to consider die regiment of one's choice, and
this was not until about halfway through the course at the college.

The fees at Sandhurst were £150 a year for the son of a civilian
and this included board and lodging, and all necessary expenses. But
additional pocket money was essential and after some discussion my
parents agreed to allow me £2 a month; this was also to continue in
die holidays, making my personal income £24 a year.

It is doubtful if many cadets were as poor as myself; but I managed.
Those were the days when the wrist watch was beginning to appear

23

24 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

and they could be bought in die College canteen; most cadets acquired
one. I used to look with envy at those watches, but they were not for
me; I did not possess a wrist watch till just before the beginning of
the war in 1914. Now I suppose every boy has one at the age of seven
or eight.

Outside attractions being denied to me for want of money, I plunged
into games and work. On going to St. Paul's in 1902, I had concen
trated on games; now work was added, and this was due to the sharp
jolt I had received on being told the truth along my idleness at school
I very soon became a member of the Rugby XV, and played against
the R.M.A., Woolwich, in December 1907 when we inflicted a severe
defeat on that establishment.

In the realm of work, to begin with tilings went well. The custom
then was to select some of the outstanding juniors, or first term
cadets, and to promote them to lance-corporal after six weeks at the
College. This was considered a great distinction; the cadets thus
selected were reckoned to be better than their fellows and to have
shown early the essential qualities necessary for a first class officer in
the Army. These lance-corporals always became sergeants in their sec
ond term, wearing a red sash, and one or two became colour-sergeants
carrying a sword; colour-sergeant was the highest rank for a cadet

I was selected to be a lance-corporal. I suppose this must have gone
to my head; at any rate my downfall began from that moment The
Junior Division of **BW Company, my company at the College, contained
a pretty tough and rowdy crowd and my authority as a lance-corporal
caused me to take a lead in their activities. We began a war with the
juniors of "A" Company who lived in the storey above us; we carried
the war into the areas of other companies living farther away down
the passages. Our company became known as "Bloody B," which was
probably a very good name for it. Fierce battles were fought in the
passages after dark; pokers and similar weapons wore usx>cl and cadets
often retired to hospital for repairs. This state of affairs obviously could
not continue, even at Sandhurst in 1907 when the officers kept well
clear of the activities of the cadets when off duty.

Attention began to concentrate on "Blocxly B" and on myself. The
climax came when during the ragging of an unpopular cadet I set fire
to the tail of his shirt as he was undressing; he got badly burnt behind,
retired to hospital, and was unable to sit down with any comfort for
some time. He behaved in an exemplary manner in refusing to disclose
the author of his ill-treatment, but it was no good; one's sins are
always found out in the end and I was reduced to the ranks.

A paragraph appeared in College Orders to the effect that Lauco-
CoqDoral Montgomery reverted to the rank of gentleman-cadet, no
reason being given. My mother came down to Sandhurst and discussed
my future with the Commandant. She learnt that it had been decided

My Early Life in the Army 25

at one time to make me the next colour-sergeant of "B" Company. But
this was all now finished; I had fallen from favour and would be lucky
to pass out of the College at all. My Company Commander turned
against me; no wonder. But there was one staunch friend among the
Company Officers, a major in the Royal Scots Fusiliers called Forbes.
He was my friend and adviser and it is probably due to his protection
and advice that I remained at Sandhurst, turned over a new leaf, and
survived to make good, if he is alive today and reads these lines he
will learn of my debt to him and of my gratitude. I have often won
dered what the future would have held for me if I had been made
colour-sergeant of TT Company at Sandhurst I personally know of
no case of a cadet who became the head of his company rising later
to the highest rank in the Army. Possibly they developed too soon and
then fizzled out.

That was the second jolt I had received and this time it was clear
to me that the repercussions could be serious. A number of selected
cadets of my batch were to be passed out in December 1907, after one
year at die College; my name was not included in the lucky number
and I remained on for another six months. But now I had learnt my
lesson, and this time for good. I worked really hard during those six
months and was determined to pass out high.

It had for some time been clear to me that I could not serve in
England for financial reasons. My parents could give me no allowance
once I was commissioned into the Army, and it would be necessary
to live entirely on my pay. This would be 5s. 3d. a day as a second
lieutenant and 6s. 6d. a day when promoted lieutenant; a young officer
could not possibly live on this income as his monthly mess bill alone
could not be less than £10.

Promotion was not by length of service as it is now, but depended
on vacancies, and I had heard of lieutenants in the Army of nineteen
years' service. In India it was different; the pay in the Indian Army
was good, and one could even live on one's pay in a British battalion
stationed in that country. I therefore put down my name for the Indian
Army. There was very keen competition because of the financial
reasons I have already outlined, and it was necessary to pass out within
the first 30 to be sure of a vacancy; on very rare occasions No. 35 had
been known to get the Indian Army.

When the results were announced, my name was No. 36. I had
failed to get the Indian Army. I was bitterly disappointed. All cadets
were required to put down a second choice. I had no military back
ground and no County connection; but it was essential to get to India
where I could live on my pay in a British battalion, so I put my name
down for the Royal Warwickshire Regiment which had one of its
two regular battalions in that country. I have often been asked why
I chose this regiment. The first reason was that it had an attractive

26 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

cap badge which I admired; the second was that enquiries I then
made gave me to understand that it was a good, sound English County
Regiment and not one of the more expensive ones. My placing in the
final list at Sandhurst was such that once the Indian Army candidates
had been taken, I was certain of the regiment of my choice, provided it
would accept me. Accept me it did; and I joined the Royal Warwick
shire, the senior of a batch of three cadets from Sandhurst I have
never regretted my choice. I learnt the foundations of the military
art in my regiment; I was encouraged to work hard by the Adjutant
and my first Company Commander. The former, Colonel C. R. Mac-
donald, is now retired, being well over eighty, and he has always been
one of my greatest friends; I hope that I have been able to repay in
later life some of the interest and kindness received from him in my
early days in the regiment. The future of a young officer in the Army
depends largely on die influences he comes under when he joins from
Sandhurst I have always counted myself hicky that among a some
what curious collection of officers there were some who loved soldier
ing for its own sake and were prepared to help anyone else who
thought the same.

And now I am the Colonel of my regiment, a tremendous honour
which I never thought would come my way when I joined the ist
Battalion at Peshawar, on the North- West Frontier of India, in Decem
ber 1908. I was then just twenty-one, older than most newly joined
subalterns. The reason was that I had stayed on longer than most at
school because of idleness, and did not go to Sandhurst till I was over
nineteen; and I had stayed on an extra six months at Sandhurst, also
because of idleness. Twice I had nearly crashed and twice I had been
saved by good luck and good friends.

Possibly at tlxis stage of my life I did not realise how lucky I was.
I had come from a good home and my parents had given me die best
education they could afford; there had never been very much spare
money for luxuries and that taught us children the value of money
when young. I had no complaint when my parents could not give mo
an allowance after I had left Sandhurst and joined the Army; it is very
good for a boy when launched in life to earn his own living. My own
son was educated at a first class Preparatory School, at Winchester,
and at Trinity, Cambridge; it had always been agreed between us that
on leaving Cambridge he would earn his own living, and he has done
so without any further allowance from me.

From the time I joined the Army in 1908 until die present day, I
have never had any money except what I earned. This I have never
regretted. Later on when I was Chief of the Imperial General Staff
under the Socialist Government and worked closely widi my political
masters in Whitehall, I sometimes reminded Labour Ministers of this
fact when tfiey seemed to imagine that I was one of the "idle rich,"

My Early Life in the Army 27

They knew I wasn't idle; but I had to assure them that I wasn't rich
either.

Life in the British Army in the days before World War I was very
different from what it is now. Certain things one had to do because
tradition demanded it When I first entered the ante-room of the
Officers' Mess of my regiment in Peshawar, there was one other officer
in the room. He immediately said "Have a drink" and rang the bell for
the waiter. It was mid-winter on the frontier of India, and intensely
cold; I was not thirsty. But two whiskies and sodas arrived and there
was no escape; I drank one, and tasted alcohol for the first time in my
life.

All the newly joined officers had to call on all the other units in the
garrison and leave cards at the Officers' Messes. You were offered a
drink in each mess and it was explained to me that these must never
be declined; it was also explained that you must never ask for a lemon
squash or a soft drink. An afternoon spent in calling on regimental
officers' messes resulted in a considerable consumption of alcohol, and
a young officer was soon taught to drink. I have always disliked alco
hol since.

I remember well my first interview with the senior subaltern of the
battalion. In those days the senior subaltern was a powerful figure but
has nowadays lost his power and prestige.

One of the main points he impressed on us newly joined subalterns
was that at dinner in the mess at night we must never ask a waiter for
a drink till the fish had been served. I had never before attended a
dinner where there was a fish course in addition to a main meat course,
so I wondered what was going to happen. Dinner in the mess at night
was an imposing ceremony. The President and Vice-President for the
week sat at opposite ends of the long table which was laden with the
regimental silver, all the officers being in scarlet mess jackets. These
two officials could not get up and leave the table until every officer had
left, and I often sat as a lonely figure in the Vice-President's chair
while two old majors at the President's end of the table exchanged
stories over their port far into the night. Sometimes a kindly President
would tell the young Vice-President he need not wait, but this seldom
happened; it was considered that young officers must be disciplined
in these matters and taught to observe the traditions. Perhaps it was
good for me, but I did not think so at the time.

At breakfast in the mess nobody spoke. Some of the senior officers
were not feeling very well at that hour of the day. One very senior
major refused to sit at the main table; he sat instead at a small table
in a corner of the room by himself, facing the wall and with his back
to the other officers. Then there was the senior officer who wanted to
get married. When he had located a suitable lady he would spend
what he considered was a reasonable sum in her entertainment. His

28 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

limit was £100; that sum spent, if the lady's resistance was not broken
down, he transferred his amorous activities elsewhere.

The transport of the battalion was mule carts and mule pack animals,
and as I knew nothing about mules I was sent on a course to learn. At
the end of the course there was an oral examination which was con
ducted by an outside examiner. Since there appeared to be no suitable
officer in die Peshawar garrison, an outside examiner came up from
central India; he had obviously been very many years in the country
and had a face like a bottle of port He looked as if he lived almost
entirely on suction; nevertheless he was considered to be the greatest
living expert on mules and their habits.

I appeared before this amazing man for my oral examination. He
looked at me with one bloodshot eye and said: "Question No. i: How
many times in each 24 hours are the bowels of a mule moved?"

This question was not one which I had expected, nor did it seem
to me at the time that it was a problem which need receive any great
attention by an ambitious young officer who was keen to get to grips
with his profession. But I was wrong; it did matter. There was an
awkward silence. My whole future was at stake; I had hoped that one
day I might be a major with a similar crown to his on my shoulder; I
saw my army career ending in disaster. In desperation I cast my mind
back to the mule lines, with the animals patiently standing in the hot
sun. How many times? Would it be three times in the morning, and
three in the afternoon? And at night possibly the bladder but not the
bowels?

The examiner said: "Arc you ready?" I said: "Yes: six times/*
He said: "No; Question No. i failed; no marks/'
I said: "What is the right answer?*' He told me it was eight times.
I then said: "It doesn't seem to me, Sir, to matter very much whether
it is six or eight."

He replied: "Don't be impertinent, Question No. 2?
I passed the examination in the end, and returned to my regiment
with that crown seeming after all to be just possible but also with the
firm hope that there would be no more hurdles of that sort to be
jumped

Soldiering in India seemed to me at that time to lack something.
I saw a good deal of the Indian Army. The men were splendid; they
were natural soldiers and as good material as anyone coxJd want The
British officers were not aU so good. The basic trouble was a beastly
climate and the absence of contact with Europe; they tended to age
rapidly after about forty-five. An expression heard frequently was
that so-and-so was a "good mixer/' A good mixer of drinks, I came
to believe, for it soon appeared to me that a good mixer was a man
who had never been known to refuse a drink. My observations led me
to think that a British officer would need to be a man of strong charac-

My Early Life in the Army 29

ter to spend, say, thirty years in the hot climate of India and yet retain
his energy and vitality. Some did so and emerged as fit for the highest
commands in peace and war; such a one was Slim.

Overall, by the time I left India in 1913 I was glad that fate had
decided against my passing high enough out of Sandhurst to be elected
for the Indian Army.

It was true that those who passed the highest out of Sandhurst were
taken for the Indian Army; but all of those were not necessarily the
best cadets. The good ones had to be supremely good to survive the
conditions of life in India, and the climate, and few did so; I feel
certain that I should not have done so myself.

The battalion left Peshawar at the end of 1910 and moved to Bombay
for the last two years of its foreign service tour. I had now begun to
work hard and seriously. Looking back, I would put this period as the
time when it was becoming apparent to me that to succeed one must
master one's profession. It was clear that the senior regimental officers
were not able to give any help in the matter since their knowledge was
confined almost entirely to what went on at battalion level; they had
little or no knowledge of other matters. When the battalion arrived at
a new station the first question the C.O. would ask was: "How does
the General like the attack done?"

And the attack was carried out in that way; whatever might be the
conditions of ground, enemy, or any other factor. At this time there
did seem to me to be something lacking in the whole business, but I
was not able to analyse the problem and decide what exactly was
wrong; nor did I bother unduly about it. I was happy in the battalion
and I had become devoted to the British soldier. As for the officers, it
was not fashionable to study war and we were not allowed to talk
about our profession in the Officers' Mess.

While in Bombay I got mixed up in a row at the Royal Bombay
Yacht Club. An officer in the battalion, Captain R. Wood, a bachelor,
gave a dinner party at the Club to three young subalterns, of whom
I was one. Wood, being an old and staid captain, went home early and
left us three subalterns to it. The next morning the senior of our party
received the following letter from the Secretary of the Club:

"It has been reported to me by several members of die club
that last evening after dinner you and your friends behaved in a
most ungentlemanly and uproarious way in the bar of the Royal
Bombay Yacht Club between the hours of 10.30 p.m. and 2 a.m.,
shouting loudly, beating the brass topped bar tables and drum
ming on them. This conduct caused great annoyance and disgust
to members who were playing billiards and to other members
playing cards upstairs. I am informed that your shouts and cries
and drummings could be heard all over die club building. When

30 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the Hall Porter of the Club went to you, pointing out the rule
which prohibits such disgraceful and unseemly proceedings in
the Club, you apparently paid no attention to him but continued
as before. The Hall Porter then reported to me. When I arrived
I found that the officers concerned had left and the disturbance
had, for the time, ceased.

I have to refer you to By-Law VII which you have broken.
The occurrence will be reported to the Committee of the Club
and will be dealt with. The officer chiefly concerned in the up
roarious proceedings, in addition to yourself, was Lieut. B. L.
Montgomery/*

The battalion returned to England in 1913 and an officer of our 2nd
Battalion was posted to it who had just completed the two-year course
at the Staff College at Camberley. His name was Captain Lefroy. He
was a bachelor and I used to have long talks with him about the Army
and what was wrong with it, and especially how one could get to real
grips with the military art. He was interested at once, and helped me
tremendously with advice about what books to read and how to study.
I think it was Lefroy who first showed me the path to tread and
encouraged my youthful ambition. He was killed later in the 1914-18
war and was a great loss to me and to the Army.

All this goes to show how important it is for a young officer to come
in contact with the best type of officer and the right influences early
in his military career. In the conditions which existed in the British
Army between the South African war and the 1914-18 war, it was
entirely a matter of luck whether this would happen. In my case the
ambition was there, and die urge to master my profession. But it
required advice and encouragement from the right people to set me
on the road, and once that was forthcoming it was plainer sailing.

In August 1914, 1 was a full lieutenant of twenty-six. It was to take
die experiences of the 1914-18 war to show me what was wrong in
the Army. My battalion mobilised at Shorncliffe, The mobilisation
scheme provided, amongst other tilings, that all officers' swords were
to go to the armourers' shop on the third day of mobilisation to be
sharpened. It was not dear to me why, since I had never used my
sword except for saluting. But of course I obeyed the order and my
sword was made sharp for war. The C.CX said that in war it was
advisable to have short hair since it was then easier to keep it clean;
he had all his hair removed with the clippers by the regimental barber
and looked an amazing sight; personally I had mine cut decently by
a barber in Folkestone. Being totally ignorant about war, I asked the
C.O. if it was necessary to take any money with me; he said money
was useless in war as everything was provided for you, I was some
what uncertain about this and decided to take ten pounds with me in

My Early Life in the Army 31

gold. Later I was to find this invaluable, and was glad I had not
followed his advice about either hair or money.

We crossed over to France as part of the 4th Division. We missed
the battle of Mons by a few days, and moved forward by march route
up towards Le Gateau. On the early morning of the 26th August 1914,
the icth Brigade to which my battalion belonged was bivouacked in
the cornfields near the village of Haucourt after a long night march.
One battalion was forward on a hill, covering the remainder of the
brigade in the valley behind; we could see the soldiers having break
fast, their rifles being piled. That battalion was suddenly surprised by
the Germans and fire opened on it at short range; it withdrew rapidly
down the hill towards us, in great disorder.

Our battalion was deployed in two lines; my company and one
other were forward, with the remaining two companies out of sight
some hundred yards to the rear. The C.O. galloped up to us forward
companies and shouted to us to attack the enemy on the forward hill
at once. This was the only order; there was no reconnaissance, no
plan, no covering fire. We rushed up the hill, came under heavy fire,
my Company Commander was wounded and there were many casual
ties. Nobody knew what to do, so we returned to the original position
from which we had begun to attack If this was real war it struck me
as most curious and did not seem to make any sense against the
background of what I had been reading.

The subsequent days were very unpleasant and the story of them
is contained in what is known as the "Retreat from Mons/' For my
part, the two forward companies which had made the attack I have
just mentioned received no further orders; we were left behind when
the retreat began and for three days we marched between the German
cavalry screen and their main columns following behind, moving
mostly by night and hiding by day. In command of our party was a
first class regimental officer, Major A. J. Poole, and it was due entirely
to him that we finally got back to the British Expeditionary Force and
joined up with our battalion. We then heard that our C.O. had been
cashiered, as also had another C.O. in the Brigade, and Poole took
command. Our C.O. was Lieut.-Colonel Elkington; on being cashiered
he joined the French Foreign Legion, where he made good in a
magnificent manner.

Such was the beginning of my experience of war. But it was not yet
the end of the beginning. After some minor engagements on the Aisne
front, the battalion was transferred with the remainder of the B.E.F.
to the northern flank of the Allied front in the West. Some grim fighting
then began and on the isth October the battalion was launched to the
attack for the second time; but now Poole was in command, and
there was a plan and there were proper orders. Two companies were
forward, my company on the left being directed on a group of build-

32 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

ings on the outskirts of the village of Meteren. When zero hour arrived
I drew my recently sharpened sword and shouted to my platoon to
follow me, which it did. We charged forward towards the village;
there was considerable fire directed at us and some of my men became
casualties, but we continued on our way. As we nearcd the objective
I suddenly saw in front of me a trench full of Germans, one of whom
was aiming his rifle at me.

In my training as a young officer I had received much instruction
in how to kill my enemy with a bayonet fixed to a rifle. I knew all
about the various movements— right parry, left parry, forward lunge.
I had been taught how to put the left foot on the corpse and extract
die bayonet, giving at the same time a loud grunt. Indeed, I had
been considered good on the bayonet-fighting course against sacks
filled with straw, and had won prizes in man-to-man contests in the
gymnasium. But now I had no rifle and bayonet; I had only a sharp
sword, and I was confronted by a large German who was about to
shoot me. In all my short career in the Army no one had taught me
how to loll a German with a sword. The only sword exercise I knew
was saluting drill, learnt under the sergeant-major on the barrack
square.

An immediate decision was clearly vital. I hurled myself through
the air at the German and kicked him as hard as I could in the lower
part of the stomach; the blow was well aimed at a tender spot, I had
read much about the value of surprise in war. There is no doubt that
the German was surprised and it must have seemed to him a new
form of war; he fell to the ground in great pain and I took my first
prisoner! A lot of fighting wont on during the remainder of the day,
our task being to clear the Germans from the village. During these
encounters amongst the houses I got wounded, being shot through
the chest But we did the job and turned the Germans out of the
village. It was for this action at Meteren that I was awarded the D.S.O.
I was still only a lieutenant. My life was saved that day by a soldier
of my platoon. I had fallen in the open and lay still hoping to avoid
further attention from the Germans. But a soldier ran to me and
began to put a field dressing on my wound; he was shot through the
head by a sniper and collapsed on top of me. The sniper continued to
fire at us and I got a second wound in the knee; die soldier received
many bullets intended for me. No further attempt was made by my
platoon to rescue us; indeed, it was presumed we were both dead.
When it got dark the stretcher-bearers came to carry us in; the soldier
was dead and I was in a bad way. I was taken back to the Advanced
Dressing Station; the doctors reckoned I could not live and, as the
station was shortly to move, a grave was dug for me. But when the
time came to move I was still alive; so I was put in a motor ambulance
and sent back to a hospital. I survived the journey and recovered, I

My Early Life in the Army 33

think because I was very fit and healthy after two months of active
service in the field. I was evacuated to hospital in England and for
some months I took no further part in the war. I had time for reflection
in hospital and came to the conclusion that the old adage was prob
ably correct: the pen was mightier than the sword. I joined the staff.

I returned to the Western Front in France early in 1916, this time
as a brigade-major. During the Somme battle that summer an infantry
brigade, which had better remain nameless, was to be the leading
brigade in a divisional attack. It was important that the Brigade
Commander should receive early information of the progress of his
forward troops since this would affect the movement of reserves in the
rear. The problem then arose how to ensure the early arrival of the re
quired information, and intense interest was aroused at Brigade H.Q.
when it was disclosed that a pigeon would be used to convey the news.
In due course the bird arrived and was kept for some days in a special
pigeon loft. When the day of the attack arrived the pigeon was given
to a soldier to carry. He was to go with the leading sub-units and was
told that at a certain moment an officer would write a message to be
fastened to the pigeon's leg; he would then release the pigeon which
would fly back to its loft at Brigade H.Q. The attack was launched
and the Brigade Commander waited anxiously for the arrival of the
pigeon. Time was slipping by and no pigeon arrived; the Brigadier
walked feverishly about outside his H.Q. dugout. The soldiers anxiously
searched the skies; but there was no sign of any pigeon.

At last the cry went up: "The pigeon/' and sure enough back it
came and alighted safely in the loft

Soldiers rushed to get the news and the Brigade Commander roared
out: "Give me the message.*'

It was handed to him, and this is what he read:

"I am absolutely fed up with carrying this bloody bird about
France"

When the war broke out I was a platoon commander. When it
ended I was Chief of Staff (GSO i ) * of a Division and rising thirty-one,
well able to think clearly, although my mind was still untrained. To
an ambitious young officer with an enquiring mind, many things
seemed wrong.

There was little contact between the generals and the soldiers. I
went through the whole war on the Western Front, except during the
period I was in England after being wounded; I never once saw the
British Commander-in-Chief, neither French nor Haig, and only
twice did I see an Army Commander.

The higher staffs were out of touch with the regimental officers
and with the troops. The former lived in comfort, which became
* General Staff Officer.

34 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

greater as the distance of their headquarters behind the lines increased.
There was no harm in this provided there was touch and sympathy
between the staff and the troops. This was often lacking. At most
large headquarters in back areas the doctrine seemed to me to be that
the troops existed for the benefit of the staff. My war experience led
me to believe that the staff must be the servants of the troops, and that
a good staff officer must serve his commander and the troops but
himself be anonymous.

The frightful casualties appalled me. The so-called "good fighting
generals" of the war appeared to me to be those who had a complete
disregard for human life. There were of course exceptions and I suppose
one such was Plumer; I had only once seen him and had never spoken
to him. There is the story of Sir Douglas Haig's Chief of Staff who was
to return to England after the heavy fighting during the winter of
1917-18 on the Passchendaelc front. Before leaving he said he would
like to visit the Passchendacle Ridge and see the country. When he
saw the mud and the ghastly conditions under which the soldiers had
fought and died, he was horrified and said: "Do you mean to tell me
that the soldiers had to fight under such conditions?" And when he
was told that it was so? he said: "Why was I never told about this
before?"

The fact that the Chief of Staff of die British Armies in Europe had
no idea of the conditions under wliich the troops had to live, fight,
and die, will be sufficient to explain the uncertainties that were passing
through my mind when the war ended.

I remember a leave period spent in London. I went to a music hall
one night and the big joke of the evening was when a comedian asked
the question: "If bread is tile staff of life, what is the life of the staff?"

He then gave the answer: "One big loaf."

There was tremendous applause, in wliich I joined. In fact, the
staff worked hard. Btit the incident made me think seriously, and
from my own experiences I know sometliing was wrong.

One further matter should be mentioned before leaving the First
War period. For the last six months of the war I was GSO i of the
47th (London) Division* I devoted much thought to the problem of
how to get to Divisional Headquarters quickly the accurate informa
tion of the progress of the battle which is so vital, and which enables
a general to adjust his dispositions to the tactical situation as it devel
ops. We finally devised a system of sending officers with wireless sets
up to the headquarters of the leading battalions and they sent messages
back by wireless. The difficulty in those days was to get reliable sets
which could be carried by a man and would give the required range.
Our system was very much a make-shift and often broke down; but
it also often worked, and overall it produced useful results. This was
the germ of the system I developed in the 1939-45 war, and wliich

My Early Life in the Army 35

finally produced the team of liaison officers in jeeps operating from
my Advanced Tactical Headquarters, a technique which Sir Winston
Churchill describes in his Triumph and Tragedy, Book Two, Chapter 5.
In 1918 in the 4/th Division we were groping in the dark and trying
to evolve ideas which would give increased efficiency to our operations.

I have said enough to make it clear that by the time the 1914-18
war was over it had become very clear to me that the profession of
arms was a life-study, and that few officers seemed to realise this fact.
It was at this stage in my life that I decided to dedicate myself to my
profession, to master its details, and to put all else aside.

It was not clear to me how all this would be done and I knew none
of the top leaders in the Army. I was certain that the first step was
to get to the Staff College; this was re-opened when the war ended
and the first course was a short one in 1919, for which I was not
selected. I fastened my hopes on the second course which was to
assemble in January 1920, and to last for one year. When the names
were announced for this course I was not selected. But all was not
yet lost.

The Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of Occupation in
Germany at the time was Sir William Robertson. I did not know him.
He was fond of tennis and I was invited one day to play at his house
in Cologne; I decided to risk all and tell him my trouble. He had
struggled a good deal himself in his youth and had a kind heart for
the young; this I knew and I hoped for the best

Shortly after that tennis party I heard that my name had been
added to the list and I was ordered to report at the Staff College,
Camberley, in January 1920. The C.-in-C. had done what was required.
The way now seemed clear. But it was not to be so easy as all that.
The story of my further progress in the Army, as subsequent chapters
of this book will reveal, is one of constant struggle linked to many set
backs and disappointments. I think that I can say now that the story
has a happy ending, for me, anyhovg.

CHAPTER 3

Between the Wars

Up TO this point in my career I had received no training in the
theory of my profession; I had beliind me the practical experi
ence of four years of active service in the field, but no theo
retical study as a background to that experience. I had read somewhere
the remarks of Frederick the Great when speaking about officers who
relied only on their practical experience and who neglected to study; he
is supposed to have said that he had in his Army two mules who had
been through forty campaigns, but they were still mules.

I had also heard of a German general who delivered himself of the
following all-embracing classification about officers, presumably those
of the German Army. I understand that he said this: "I divide my
officers into four classes: the clever, the stupid, the industrious and the
lazy, Eveiy officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who
are clever and industrious are fitted for high staff appointments; use
can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever
and lazy is fitted for die highest command; he has the temperament
and the requisite nerve to deal with all situations. But whoever is
stupid and industrious is a danger and must be removed immediately/'

I went to the Staff College at Camberley in Januaiy 1920 with no
claim to cleverness. I thought I had a certain amount of common
sense, but it was untrained; it seemed to me that it was trained com
mon sense which mattered.

I must admit that I was critical and intolerant; I had yet to learn
that uninformed criticism is valueless.

My fellow students at Camberley were all supposed to be the pick
of the Army, men who were destined for the highest commands; very
few of them ever reached there. The instructors also were picked

36

Between the Wars 37

men; but only one reached the top and that was Dill, who was a very
fine character. Among my fellow students I was greatly impressed by
one who had a first class brain and was immensely able, and that was
the late George Lindsay in the Rifle Brigade; he was eventually retired
as a major-general and I never understood why such an able officer
was allowed to leave the Army.

The "good fighting generals" of the war were in all the high
commands. They remained in office far too long, playing musical
chairs with the top jobs but never taking a chair away when the music
stopped. Milne was C.I.G.S.* for seven years, from 1926 to 1933.
After him the Army was unlucky in its professional chiefs. Milne was
succeeded by Montgomery-Massingberd, who was in office at a most
vital time in Army affairs, 1933 to 1936; his appointment was in my
judgment a great mistake and under him die Army drifted about like
a ship without a rudder. The right man for the job at that time was
Jock Burnett-Stuart, the most brilliant general in the Army. It has
always been a mystery to me why this outstanding soldier, with a
quick and clear brain, was not made C.I.G.S. in 1933 instead of
Montgomery-Massingberd. The Army would have been better pre
pared for war in 1939 if he had been.

Deverell succeeded Montgomery-Massingberd in 1936 but he had
a very raw deal from the Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha,
and was turned out after 18 months in office; he would have achieved
something if he had been allowed to stay there. But Hore-Belisha
preferred Gort. He was entirely unsuited for the job but he remained
C.I.G.S. until the outbreak of war in September 1939.

The result of all this was that the Army entered the Second World
War in 1939 admirably organised and equipped to fight the 1914 war,
and with the wrong officers at the top.

Truly the ways of the British politicians in the days between the
wars were amazing. It always seems to me that a political leader must
be a good judge of men; he must choose the right men for the top
Service jobs. In peace time he has to judge by character, ability, the
drive to get things done, and so on. Between the wars they chose
badly by any standard, if indeed they understood at all what standards
were required.

I passed out of the Staff College in December 1920. I believe I got
a good report, but do not know as nobody ever told me if I had done
well or badly: which seemed curious. However, I was sent as brigade-
major to the i7th Infantry Brigade in Cork and went straight into
another war— the struggle against the Sinn Fein in Southern Ireland.
In many ways this war was far worse than the Great War which had
ended in 1918. It developed into a murder campaign in which, in
the end, the soldiers became very skilful and more than held their
* Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

38 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

own. But such a war is thoroughly bad for officers and men; it tends
to lower their standards of decency and chivalry, and I was glad when
it was over.

It was during this period that the Geddes axe began to operate in
the Army, and every officer had to be reported on as to his fitness to
remain. Opportunity was taken to get rid of a great deal of inefficient
material in the lower ranks, but in the higher ranks much dead wood
was left untouched. My own feeling now, after having been through
two world wars, is that an extensive use of weedkiller is needed in the
senior ranks after a war; this will enable the first class younger officers
who have emerged during the war to be moved up. This did not
happen after the 1914-18 war. I was in a position to see that it did
happen after the 1939-45 war.

After the Sinn Fein war was over in 1922, I held various staff ap
pointments in England until January 1926, when I was sent as an
instructor at the Staff College*

The preceding five years had been for me years of hard work and
intense study. I had served under some good and sympathetic generals
who had encouraged the development of my ideas and had given me a
free hand in carrying them out; these included General Sir Charles
Harington, and Brigadier Tom Hollond, both good trainers. In this I
was lucky, for it could so easily have been otherwise. Under them
I was taught a high sense of duty; I also learnt that the discipline
demanded from the soldier must become loyalty in the officer. I
imagine that it was during this period that I began to become known
as an officer who was studying his profession seriously, and this led
to my appointment to the Staff College. I was glad as I felt the Cam-
berley appointment put a hallmark on my Army career and my foot
was now at last a little up the ladder. I doubt if I was right, but that
is how it seemed to mo at the time.

At certain moments in life an opportunity is presented to each one
of us; some of us are not aware of the full significance of what has
happened, and the moment is lost. Others, alert and enthusiastic, seize
the opportunity with both hands and turn it to good advantage; these
have ambition, as every man who is worth his salt should have— not
too much, but rather the determination to succeed by his own efforts
and not merely by stamping on other people who get in the way,

In my case it seemed that here was an opportunity for three years
of hard study; I knew enough by then to realise that the teacher learns
much more than his students. And these three years would be spent
working closely with certain other instructors already there, ones who
were known to me as some of the best officers in the Army: Brooke
(now Lord Alanbrooke), Paget, Franklyn, and others. And by teach
ing I would myself learn; I was conscious that I needed that learning,

Between the Wars 39

as a solid background which would enable me to handle bigger jobs
later on with confidence.

I must pass quickly over the next few years of my military life
since they have no significant place in this book of memoirs. As the
sparks flew upwards I was often in trouble, due to my habit of saying
what I thought in no uncertain voice. But in 1930 I was selected by
the War Office to re-write the manual of Infantry Training. This was
a considerable compliment and I decided to make the book a compre
hensive treatise on war for the infantry officer. All my work had to
be approved by a committee in the War Office and some heated argu
ments took place; I could not accept many of their amendments to
my doctrine of infantry war. We went through the manual, chapter
by chapter. I then recommended that the committee should disband
and that I should complete the book in my own time; this was agreed.
I produced the final draft, omitting all the amendments the committee
had put forward. The book when published was considered excellent,
especially by its author.

Here I must turn aside to deal with something much more important
than my military career, the ten short years of my married life.

During the time I was an instructor at the Staff College, Camberley,
I fell in love. We were married on the 27th July 1927. My son David
was born on the i8th August 1928, My wife died on the igth October
1937. 1 would like to tell the full story.

In January 1926 I went to Switzerland for a holiday before begin
ning work at the Staff College at the end of the month. I was then
thirty-eight years old and a confirmed bachelor. Women had never
interested me and I knew very few. I disliked social life and dinner
parties. My life was devoted almost entirely to my profession and I
worked at it from morning to night, sometimes taking exercise in the
afternoon. I believe some ribald officer once said that the Army was my
wife and I had no need for another! However that might be, I was
intent on mastering my profession and was determined to do so. I
was very certain that my country would be involved in another war
and I had seen what had happened the first time. I was determined
that whatever else might happen next time, at least I myself would
be prepared, and trained, and ready when the call came. I had at times
a kind of inward feeling that the call would come, to me personally,
and in my prayers morning and evening I used to ask that I might be
given help and strength so that I might not fail when put to the test.
In Switzerland, at Lenk in the Bernese Oberland, I met Mrs. Carver
and her two boys aged eleven and twelve. I have always been devoted
to young people and I like helping them: possibly because of my
own unhappy childhood. I soon made friends with the boys and with
their mother, and the holiday passed pleasantly. Another friend I

40 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

made that winter was Sir Edward Crowe; this acquaintance developed
and he is now one of my most valued friends, though considerably
older than I am.

I decided to visit Lenk again in January 1927, with Sir Edward
Crowe and his family and their friends. Mrs. Carver was there again
with her two boys. Her husband had been killed in Gallipoli in 1915
and the boys were taught to hate war and anything to do with soldiers.
This time I saw a great deal of Betty Carver and by the time the
holiday was over I had fallen in love: for the first and only time in
my life. My love was returned in full measure, although I was a
soldier, and we were married in Chiswick Parish Church on the 2/th
July 1927. A time of great happiness then began; it had never before
seemed possible that such love and affection could exist. We went
everywhere, and did everything, together. We were parted only twice,
the first time when I took my battalion to Palestine in January 1931
and she followed later, and the second time when I had to send her
and David home from Quetta after the earthquake in May 1935. On
both occasions the parting was only for a short time. My wife was
forty when David was born and she was never very strong afterwards;
but she was always energetic and happy, and was never ill.

She was a very good "Colonel's lad/' when I was commanding the
ist Battalion of my regiment in Palestine and Egypt. I always remem
ber how amused she was at one incident. In order to keep the soldiers
happy and contented in the hot weather in Egypt I encouraged hob
bies of every kind, and one of these was the keeping of pigeons; this
was very popular and we kept some ourselves. One day the quarter
master accused a corporal of having stolen one of his pigeons; the
corporal denied the accusation and said the pigeon was his. I had to
give judgment I asked both parties, the quartermaster and the cor
poral, if a pigeon when released would always fly direct to its own
loft; they both agreed this was so. I then ordered the pigeon to be
kept for 24 hours in the Battalion Orderly Room. The next day at
10 a.m. I released the pigeon; the whole battalion had heard of the
incident and some 800 men watched from vantage points to see what
would happen. The pigeon, when released, circled the barracks for a
few minutes and then went direct to my own pigeon loft and remained
there! This result was accepted by both parties, and the quartermaster
withdrew his accusation.

In the spring of 1934 the battalion was stationed at Poona in
southern India and while there I was ordered to hand over command
and go as Chief Instructor at the Staff College, Quetta, being promoted
colonel. We spent three happy years in Quetta, except for the earth
quake in May 1935, and I was then given command of the gth Infantry
Brigade at Portsmouth. On anival in England we had two months'
leave. David was at his preparatory school at Hindhead and my wife

Between the Wars 41

and I went on a motor tour in the Lake District and visited our friends
in the north of England. She seemed to be weaker than formerly and
easily got tired; but she was always cheerful and happy. On return
from the north I had to go into camp on Salisbury Plain with my
brigade towards the end of August, and I sent Betty and David to a
hotel at Burnham-on-Sea for the remainder of his school holidays.

One afternoon when they were both together on the sands, Betty
was stung on the foot by some insect; she could not say what sort of
insect it was, and this was never known. That night her leg began to
swell and became painful; a doctor was called in and he put her at
once into the local Cottage Hospital, and sent for me. She got worse
and the pain increased; at last came the time when the pain became
too great and she had to have constant injections and was seldom
conscious. By then I had moved into our house at Portsmouth; David
had gone back to his school at Hindhead. I spent all the time that
was possible at the Cottage Hospital; there were times when Betty was
better and other times when there was cause for serious alarm. I
was summoned frequently in the middle of the night and made many
motor journeys to Buraham-on-Sea; the road became very familiar.
The poison spread slowly up the leg. Then came the day when the
doctors decided that the only hope was to amputate the leg; I agreed,
and gained hope. But it was no good; nothing could stop the onward
move of the poison; we could only wait. The doctors did everything
that was possible; the nurses were splendid; but the septicaemia had
got a firm hold. Betty died on the igth October 1937, in my arms.
During her illness I had often read to her, mostly from the Bible. The
last reading, a few minutes before she died, was the zycd Psalm.

I buried her in the cemetery at Burnham-on-Sea. I would not let
David attend the funeral and, indeed, would never let him come and
see his mother at any time when she was in great pain and slowly
dying. I could not bring myself to let him see her suffering. He was
only nine years old and was happy at school; after the funeral I went
to his school and told him myself. Perhaps I was wrong, but I did
what I thought was right.

After staying with David for a while I went back to my house in
Portsmouth, which was to have been our home; I remained there
alone for many days and would see no one. I was utterly defeated.
I began to search my mind for anything I had done wrong, that I
should have been dealt such a shattering blow. I could not under
stand it; my soul cried out in anguish against this apparent injustice.
I seemed to be surrounded by utter darkness; all the spirit was knocked
out of me. I had no one to love except David and he was away at
school.

After a time I began to understand that God works out all these
things in His own way, and it must be His will; there must therefore

42 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

be no complaint, however hard it may seem at the time. I had duties
to others, to my brigade and as the Commander of the Portsmouth
Garrison. I realised that I must get on with my work. There was also
David to be considered; we were now alone in the world, just the
two of us, and he must be visited regularly at his school and well
cared for in his holidays.

And so after a few weeks I began to live again. I was much helped
all this time by my brigade-major, an officer called Major F. W.
Simpson; he was a tower of strength and took from my shoulders
everything he could. "Simbo" was my Chief of Staff when I was a
Corps Commander after Dunkirk, and he became my Vice-Chief when
I was C.I.G.S. He developed into one of the most able and efficient
staff officers in the Army. He is now General Sir Frank Simpson, and
is retired. Helped by Simpson and others like him, I recovered.

David had been handled in his early years almost entirely by his
mother and he had at times somewhat resented any interference on
my part in this procedure. He had a strong will and his mother was
always defeated by him. Remembering my own boyhood, it was our
plan that I should become the predominant partner in his upbringing
when he went to his preparatory school. We had just started on this
plan and the sparks used to fly when I insisted on obedience; then
suddenly his mother died. He and I now had to make a new life to
gether; the old troubles ceased very soon and he transferred his love
and affection to me. We had some happy holidays together and became
close friends; he was nine when his mother died and I was fifty.

My friends were delighted that I began a normal life again and
some even said that I would marry again. They little knew what they
were saying. I do not believe a man can love twice, not really, in the
way I had loved.

I was now alone, except in the school holidays when David was
with me, and I plunged into my work again with renewed vigour.
I made the gth Infantry Brigade as good as any in England and none
other could compete with us in battle on the training area. We were
selected to carry out the special exercises and trials needed by the Wai-
Office in 1937 and 1938, and generally were in the public eye a good
deal.

During the years since the war ended in 1918, 1 had worked under,
and with, very able officers at the Staff Colleges at Camberley and
Quetta. By hard and continuous work, and by the experience gained
in command, I had acquired a certain mastery of my profession; this
gave me confidence in my ability to be able to handle most situations
which might come my way. Maybe I was too confident, and showed
it But I had received many rebuffs and there is no doubt they were
good for me; they kept me from kicking over the traces too often
and saved me from becoming too overbearing. I have a feeling that

Between the Wars 43

by the time I took over command o£ the Brigade at Portsmouth in
1937 the worst was over; I had learnt my lesson and was sailing along
with a fair wind.

I had always lived a great deal by myself and had acquired the
habit of concentration. This ability to concentrate, and to sort out the
essentials from a mass of detail, was now made easier for me than
formerly because of the intense loneliness that descended on me after
my wife's death. I became completely dedicated to my profession.

During my time at Portsmouth I got into severe trouble with the
War Office and at one moment things began to look awkward for
me. It occurred in this way. My Garrison funds were in need of a
substantial increase because of certain improvements which were
needed in the welfare services for the married families. I therefore
decided to let the Clarence Football Field on Southsea Common to a
Fair promoter for August Bank Holiday week; he offered me £1000
and I finally closed with him for £ 1500. The Portsmouth City Coun
cil heard of my plan and refused to agree to a Fair on Southsea Com
mon. I then went privately to the Lord Mayor of Portsmouth and
offered to give him £500 of the money for a pet project which he
was promoting if he would get my project through the Council; he
agreed. I concluded the deal, collected the £,1500, gave £500 to
the Lord Mayor and spent the £ 1000 quickly on the Garrison welfare
services. Then the War Office heard about it and pointed out that I
had broken an Army Regulation in letting War Department land;
they were prepared to overlook this provided I handed over the
£1500 at once. I replied that the £1500 had been spent; £500 had
been paid to the Lord Mayor, and £1000 had been spent on the
welfare of the married families. I produced all the receipts. The fur
then began to fly. The Major-General i/c Administration Southern
Command, Salisbury, came to see me and said that this incident had
mined my chances of promotion in the Army. But General Wavell,
G.O.C.-in-G* Southern Command, took a different view; he was really
rather amused that I had improved the Garrison amenities, at the
expense of the War Office, all square and above board. He backed
me and kept the file on the move between the War Office and Salis
bury. The file was growing rather large. Then I was suddenly pro
moted, and I have never heard any more about that file since. But I
was "dicky on the perch" for a while.

In October 1938, after little more than a year at Portsmouth, I was
ordered to Palestine to take command of the Army units in northern
Palestine engaged in quelling the Arab rebellion; I was to form them
into a new division, the 8th Division with headquarters at Haifa. This
was a task greatly to my liking. I was now a major-general, in spite
of my misdeeds at Portsmouth. But the journey to Palestine meant
* General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

44 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

leaving David, and some kind friends at Portsmouth took charge of
him for me. My son had an unsatisfactory life from then onwards,
since war broke out in 1939 very soon after I had left Palestine. I was
never able to make a home for him again until 1948. Two main factors
play the major part in the moulding of personality and character:
heredity and environment. David had the first one without any doubt;
he came from a long line of ancestors who served either the church
or state and did their duty. In environment he was unlucky after his
mother died. For a few years he often had to spend his holidays in
'laoliday homes for children/' It was not until I went to Africa in
August 1942 that he was finally placed with Major and Mrs. Reynolds
at Hindhead, and those two noble people brought him up and helped
to mould his character while I was away fighting. Major Reynolds was
headmaster of David's preparatory school at Hindhead; he was an
old and valued friend of many years' standing and from 1942 to 1948
that school building became David's home and mine. Major Reynolds
died in 1953; he and his wife were responsible for developing the
character of many boys on the right lines, and the nation lost in him
a man of sterling character. I owe them much. And so does David;
they developed his character in the difficult formative years and cared
for him as if he was their own son.

During the winter of 1938-39 while fighting in Palestine, I was
informed that I had been selected to command the 3rd Division in
England. This was a regular division, with headquarters on Salisbury
Plain, and it contained the gth Infantry Brigade which I had com
manded at Portsmouth before going to Palestine. I was delighted.
The 3rd Division was port of the British Expeditionary Force to go to
Continental Europe in the event of war. The war clouds were banking
up and it looked as if it might begin to rain; it was necessary to ensure
that our military umbrella was in good condition and that was a task
I would enjoy. I was to take command of the 3rd Division in August

1939-

But now a crisis arose and in May 1939 I suddenly became very ill;
I was taken on a stretcher to the military hospital in Haifa and, since
a patch was found on my lung, it was commonly supposed I had
contracted tuberculosis. I got no better and finally demanded to be
sent home to England. I was confident that once I got away from
the hot and humid climate of Haifa, I should recover. I was sent to
England in the charge of two nursing sisters and two men nursing
orderlies, as I was judged to be desperately ill. I was.

The sea voyage put me right and I walked off the ship at Tilbury
in good health. I went direct to Millbank Hospital in London and
asked for a thorough medical overhaul; this took three days and the
verdict was that nothing was wrong with me. I asked about the
patch on my lung; it had disappeared.

Between the Wars ^ 45

After a period of leave, I went to the War Office and asked if I
could now go and take over command of the 3rd Division. The war
clouds had indeed banked up and the Army was about to mobilise.
I was told that on mobilisation all appointments made previously
automatically lapsed, and those actually in the jobs remained there.
The commander of the 3rd Division at the time had been selected as
a Colonial Governor, and was even to go off to his Colony veiy
shortly; he was now to remain in command of the division.

I then said I would return to Palestine and resume command of
the 8th Division; but the answer was "No," as a new commander had
taken over that division. I was told I was to go into the pool of
major-generals waiting for employment. This did not suit me at
all; Britain was mobilising for war and I was in a pool of officers
waiting for employment. I pestered the War Office. Eventually the
general was sent off to take up his Colonial Governorship, a job for
which he was well fitted and in which he rendered good service. I took
over the 3rd Division a few days before war was declared.

CHAPTER 4

Britain Goes to War in 1939

I HAP taken over command of the 3rd Division on the 28th August.
Partial mobilisation was then in process and full mobilisation was
ordered on the ist September, the day on which the Germans
invaded Poland and an ultimatum was sent to Germany.

In this chapter I shall confine myself solely to the actions of the
British Expeditionary Force which went to France soon after the war
began, and in which I was a Divisional Commander. I know nothing
about what happened in other theatres during this period, e.g. Norway,
except what I have heard or read.

The full story of the transfer of the B.E.F. across the Channel to
France in September and October, of the first winter of the war, and
of the operations that began on the loth May 1940 and ended in
June, has been told in the book entitled The War in France and
Flanders 1939-1940, by Major L, F. Ellis, and published by the Sta
tionery Office in 1953. It is a very good publication and the story is
well told. But it is a large volume and contains a great deal of detail
which will not be read by the general public. Furthermore, of neces
sity it omits certain fundamental factors affecting the final issue; to
raise them will be to place the responsibility for much of what hap
pened squarely on the shoulders of the political and military chiefs
in the years before the war.

In September 1939 the British Army was totally unfit to fight a
first class war on the continent of Europe. It had for long been con
sidered that in the event of another war with Germany the British
contribution to the defence of the West should consist mainly of the
naval and air forces. How any politician could imagine that, in a
world war, Britain could avoid sending her Army to fight alongside
the French passes all understanding.

46

Britain Goes to War in 1939 47

In the years preceding the outbreak o£ war no large-scale exercises
with troops had been held in England for some time. Indeed, the
Regular Army was unfit to take part in a realistic exercise. The Field
Army had an inadequate signals system, no administrative backing,
and no organisation for high command; all these had to be improvised
on mobilisation. The transport was inadequate and was completed on
mobilisation by vehicles requisitioned from civilian firms. Much of
the transport of my division consisted of civilian vans and lorries from
the towns of England; they were in bad repair and, when my division
moved from the ports up to its concentration area near the French
frontier, the countryside of France was strewn with broken-down
vehicles.

The anti-tank equipment of my division consisted of 2-pounder guns.
The infantry armament against tanks was the '8-inch rifle. Some
small one-pounder guns on little hand-carts were hurriedly bought
from the French and a few were given to each infantry battalion.
Apart from these, a proportion of the 25-pounders of my Divisional
Artillery was supposed to be used in an anti-tank role, firing solid shot.

There was somewhere in France, under G.H.Q., one Army Tank
Brigade. For myself, I never saw any of its tanks during the winter
or during the active operations in May. And we were the nation
which had invented the tank and were the first to use it in battle,
in 1916.

It must be said to our shame that we sent our Army into that most
modern war with weapons and equipment which were quite inade
quate, and we had only ourselves to blame for the disasters which
early overtook us in the field when fighting began in 1940.

Who was to blame? In my view, successive British Governments
between the wars and especially those from 1932 onwards, in which
year the need for rearmament on a modern scale began to be discussed.
Until 1938 it never got much beyond the range of discussion, and by
the spring of 1939 it was still proceeding only on a small scale. Know
ing the precise situation regarding the British Field Army in France in
general, and in particular in my division, I was amazed to read in a
newspaper one day in France in October 1939 the speech of the
Secretary of State for War (Hore-Belisha) in Parliament when he was
announcing the arrival of the B.E.F. in France. He gave Parliament
and the British people to understand that the Army we had just sent
to France was equipped "in the finest possible manner which could
not be excelled. Our Army is as well if not better equipped than any
similar Army."

Now we must turn to the organisation for command and control in
the field; in the last resort it is on this that everything depends, given
adequate equipment and a good standard of training. Owing to the
speed of operations, with a faulty command set-up all may well be
lost in modern war.

48 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Probably three of the most important officers in the War Office at
the outbreak of the war were the following. The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff (Lord Gort), the professional head of the British Army.
The word "Imperial" was added to the title in 1909; it now has no
significance. 'The Director of Military Operations and Intelligence
( Major-General Henry Pownall), who was responsible for all war
plans, and for the Intelligence on which they were based. In those days
one major-general was in charge of both branches, Operations and
Intelligence; now they have been separated, each under a general
officer. The Director-General of the Territorial Army (Major-General
Douglas Brownrigg). This Army had been doubled in March 1939
by a Cabinet decision taken without the advice or knowledge of
the C.I.G.S. Gort, who was C.I.G.S. at the time, told me that he
knew nothing about it until he saw it announced one morning in the
Press.

All of these three officers left the War Office on the day war was
declared.

Gort to become Commander-in-Chicf "]

Pownall to become Chief of the General Staff t of the B.E.F.

Brownrigg to become Adjutant-General j

It is almost unbelievable that such a thing should have been allowed
to happen. But it did. I understand that the War Office emptied in a
similar way in 1914.

It had always been understood in the Army that the G.O.C.-in-C.
Aldershot Command was the C,-in-C. Designate of any British Army
to be sent out of the country in war-time, and he was selected accord
ingly. General Dill was at Aldershot in September 1939, and we all
thought, and hoped, that ho would get the top command. But rumour
had it General Ironside had been promised the command in the event
of war, as some recompense for being passed over by Gort as C.I.G.S.;
he was at that time Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces, a post
that does not now exist. I heard a vague rumour that he had actually
gone to Camberley and had begun to form his G.II.Q. in the buildings
of Sandhurst a few days before war was declared. These two candi
dates, Dill and Ironside, must have been astonished when a third
candidate got the job: Gort, who was C.I.G.S. The Army was certainly
amazed. And it was even more amazed when Ironside was made
C.I.G.S., in place of Gort; in May 1940 he was removed from his
appointment

Now let us look at the C.-ta-C. and liis General Headquarters.
Gort was a most delightful person, a warm-hearted friend, sincere in
his dealings, and incapable of anything mean or underhand. He was
the perfect example of the best type of regimental officer; he knew

Britain Goes to War in 1939 49

everything there was to know about the soldier, his clothing and
boots, and die minor tactics of his battlefield. The highest command
he had ever held before had been an infantry brigade. He was not
clever and he did not bother about administration; his whole soul
was in the battle and especially in the actions of fighting patrols in
no-man's-land.

Gort established his G.H.Q. in and around Habarcq, the head
quarters of the various Branches and Services occupying thirteen
villages covering an area of some fifty square miles. This dispersed
system called for a cumbersome network of communications. It was
difficult to know where anyone was and command from the top
suffered from the very beginning. It was an amazing layout.

I have always held the opinion that Gort's appointment to command
the B.E.F. in September 1939 was a mistake; the job was above his
ceiling. One only has to read his instructions signed by Hore-Belisha,
and dated 3rd September 1939, to see what he was in for; that
directive is a pretty fair commentary on the command set-up and it
would have taxed a much better brain than Gort's to deal with such
a complicated problem. Furthermore, he was asked to attempt the
impossible: his Headquarters had to act as a G.H.Q., and at the same
time had to exercise direct command over the fighting and adminis
trative forces allotted to him. The instructions to the C.-in-C. are
given below.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
BRITISH FIELD FORCE

"Role

1. The role of the force under your command is to co-operate
with our Allies in the defeat of our common enemy.

2. You will be under the command of the French Commander-in-
Chief 'North-East Theatre of Operations/ In the pursuit of
the common object you will carry out loyally any instructions
issued by him. At the same time, if any order given by him
appears to you to imperil the British Field Force, it is agreed
between the British and French Governments that you should
be at liberty to appeal to the British Government before
executing that order. While it is hoped that the need for such
an appeal will seldom, if ever, arise you will not hesitate to
avail yourself of your right to make it, if you think fit.

3. Initially the force under your command will be limited to two
corps of two divisions with G.H.Q., Corps and L. of C.* Troops

* Line of Communication.

Britain Goes to War in 1939 51

together with a Royal Air Force Component of two bomber,
four fighter and six Army co-operation squadrons.

4. It is the desire of His Majesty's Government to keep the British
Forces under your command, as far as possible, together. If at
any time the French Commander-in-Chief 'North-East Theatre
of Operations* finds it essential for any reason to transfer any
portion of the British troops to an area other than that in
which your main force is operating, it should be distinctly
understood that this is only a temporary arrangement, and
that as soon as practicable the troops thus detached should
be reunited to the main body of the British forces.

5. Whilst die Royal Air Force Component of the Field Force is
included under your command, the Advanced Air Striking
Force, which will also operate from French territory, is an
independent Force under the direct control of the Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, in the United
Kingdom. The War Office has nevertheless undertaken the
maintenance of this Force from the common bases up to rail
head and for this you, as Commander-in-Chief of die Field
Force, will be responsible. You are not, however, responsible
for the protection of the aerodromes or railheads of the Ad
vanced Air Striking Force. This has been undertaken by the
French. But should a situation arise which would make it
necessary for you to assume responsibility for the protection
of this Force, you will receive instructions from the War
Office.

6. It is realised that you may require air co-operation beyond the
resources of the Royal Air Force Component of the Field
Force. Additional assistance may be necessary for the general
protection of your Force against hostile air attack, for offensive
air action in furtherance of military operations, or to establish
local air superiority at certain times. You should apply for
such assistance when you require it to the Air Officer Com
manding Advanced Air Striking Force.

(Signed) Leslie Hore-Belisha"
3/9/39

Having read these instructions we should look at the command
set-up in France, given on the opposite page.

General Gamelin was the Supreme Commander. Th£ B.E.F. is
shown as in Army Group No, i, under General Billotte. But the
instructions to Gort placed him under the direct command of General
Georges. Here were possibilities of trouble, and they descended on
the North-Eastern front in full measure.

Active operations began on the loth May 1940 and on the next

52 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

day the line-up on die front from Longwy to the sea was as follows

from south to north:

General Billotte's Army Group No. i
Second French Army
Ninth French Army
First French Army

These armies held the front from Longwy northwards through
Sedan to Wavre. The Ardcnnes-Meuse part of this front was
held by the Second and Ninth Armies consisting mostly of
second-grade divisions. The First Army was next to the B.E.F.,
and consisted mostly of first-grade divisions.

The B.E.F.

Not under General Billotte, but taking orders direct from
General Georges. My 3rd Division was the left division of the
B.E.F., with the Belgian Army on our left.

The Belgian Army
Independent, and commanded by the King of the Belgians.

Seventh French Army (Girmid)

Included in Army Group No. i and intended by General
Georges to be held in reserve under him behind the left flank;
this decision of Georges was correct. But Gamelin decided
otherwise; he directed that this Army of seven divisions should
operate forward across Belgium towards Antwerp in order to
support the Belgian and Dutch forces. It suffered heavy losses
and ran out of ammunition; it achieved nothing nor could it
have done so. Its forward move was one of Gamelin's greatest
mistakes since it unbalanced the whole North-East front. Things
might have been not so bad as they were had this Army been
kept in reserve behind the left flank.

Quite apart from this faulty command set-up, the state of the sig
nal communications did not tend to make things easier or to facilitate
command. From the day war was declared the French had insisted
on such a high degree of wireless silence that little or no practice of
operators was possible, certainly not with the higher-powered sets.
The result was that wireless communication within the B.E.F. was
never efficient; outside the B.E.F. it hardly existed. Because of this,
inter-communication within the Allied forces was almost entirely by
civil telephone and this was always "insecure."

Moreover, G,H,Q. of the B.E,R had never conducted any exer
cises, either with or without troops, from the time we landed in France
in 1939 up to the day active operations began in May 1940. The need

Britain Goes to War in 1939 53

for wireless silence was given as an excuse; but an indoor exercise
on the model could easily have been held. The result was a total lack
of any common policy or tactical doctrine throughout the B.E.F.;
when differences arose these differences remained, and there was no
firm grip from the top.

On the 12th May it was agreed that the operations of the B.E.F.
and of the Belgian Army would be "co-ordinated" by General Billotte
on behalf of General Georges. This co-ordination never amounted to
effective command of all the forces involved. In battle this is vital.
General Billotte disappeared on the 2ist May, seriously injured in a
motor accident, and died two days later. There was then nobody to
co-ordinate French, British and Belgian operations. After three days'
delay General Blanchard of the First French Army was finally ap
pointed to succeed Billotte; but it was then too late.

The civil telephone was still the main channel of communication,
supplemented by liaison officers and visits by Commanders and their
staffs. From the i6th May onwards the German advance began to cut
the land lines, and telephone communications ceased on that day
between Supreme H.Q. (Gamelin) and H.Q. North-East Front
(Georges). From the same date all direct communication ceased be
tween General Georges and Army Group No. i (Billotte). Also, from
the 17th May Gort had no land telephone lines to the Belgian H.Q.
on his left, the First French Army on his right, and H.Q. North-East
Front (Georges) behind.

In fact, it may be said that there was no co-ordination between the
operations of the Belgians, the B.E.F., and the First French Army; the
commanders of these armies had no means of direct communication
except by personal visits.

Gort's plan was to go forward with a small Advanced H.Q. when
active operations began, leaving his Main H.Q. at Arras. As time went
on, more and more officers said it was essential that they should be
at the Advanced H.Q.; this soon became so big that the project was
dropped. The final plan was to have a small Command Post well
forward. Since signal communications were so inadequate, the Com
mand Post could be set up only at places— few and far between—
where the international buried cable system came to the surface.
There was also, naturally, a lack of security. The traffic consequently
thrown on the wireless was too great for the few available sets to
handle. And the size of the Command Post grew and grew.

Finally, there was a breakdown in the Intelligence organisation.
On the isth May the French began to be in difficulties on the right of
the B.E.F. The break-through by the Germans had occurred on the
front of the Ninth French Army, and G.H.Q. had no liaison officer
at that H.Q. such as they had with the First French Army immediately
on the right of the B.E.F. Anyhow, G.H.Q. was not given details

54 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

about the break-through at once. It was clear that G.H.Q (Intel
ligence) was not getting proper information from the French about
the situation either of their own troops or of the enemy. An amazing
decision was now taken. On the i6th May Gort took the head of
his Intelligence Staff ( Major-General Mason-MacFarlane) and put him
in command of a small force to protect the right rear of the B.E.F.,
and the general took with him a senior staff officer of his department
as his GSO i for the force (Lieut-Colonel Gerald Templer). There
after Gort was often without adequate information of the enemy.
Overall, the distribution of staff duties between G.H.Q. and the
Command Post was badly organised from the very beginning; the
staff plan was amateur and lacked the professional touch.

Enough has been said to show that from the point of view of
command and control of the forces available in France in May 1940,
the battle was really almost lost before it began. The whole business
was a complete "dog's breakfast."

Who must bear the chief blame? Obviously General Gamelin. He
was Supreme Commander and, as such, was responsible. He did
nothing to put it right. But I would also blame the British Chiefs of
Staff. They should never have allowed the British Army to go into
battle with such a faulty command set-up. It is clear that Gort and his
Chief of Staff were also greatly to blame; knowing the hopeless
organisation of the high command, they should have organised G.H.Q.
in a more professional way. I never myself thought very much of the
staff at G.H.Q. Nobody in a subordinate command ever does!

My own divisional area was south of Lille. My operational task
was to work on defences which were being undertaken in order to
prolong the Maginot Line behind the Belgian frontier. Until the
loth May Belgium was a strictly neutral country. Apart from the
defensive tasks, I concentrated on training the division for the active
operations which I was certain must come. My soul revolted at what
was happening, France and Britain stood still while Germany swal
lowed Poland; we stood still while the German, armies moved over to
the West, obviously to attack t/s later on; we waited patiently to be
attacked; and during all this time we occasionally bombed Germany
with leaflets. If this was war, I did not understand it.

I well remember the visit of Neville Chamberlain to my division;
it was on the i6th December 1939. He took me aside after lunch and
said in a low tone so that no one could hear: "I don't think the
Germans have any intention of attacking us. Do you?"

I made it quite clear that in my view the attack would come at the
time of their own choosing; it was now winter and we must get ready
for trouble to begin when the cold weather was over.

The 3rd Division certainly put that first winter to good use and
ttained hard. If the Belgians were attacked, we were to move forward

Britain Goes to War in 1939 55

and occupy a sector astride Louvain behind the River Dyle. I trained
the division for this task over a similar distance moving westwards,
i.e. backwards into France. We became expert at a long night move,
and then occupying a defensive position in the dark, and by dawn
being fully deployed and in all respects ready to receive attack. This
is what I felt we might have to do; and it was.

My Corps Commander was General Brooke (now Lord Alan-
brooke). We had been instructors together at the Staff College and
I knew him well. I had, and retain, a great liking and an enormous
admiration and respect for him. I consider he is the best soldier that
any nation has produced for very many years. I never worried him
about things that didn't matter, and so far as I can remember I never
asked him a question after he had given his orders even in the middle
of the most frightful operational situations; there was never any need
to ask questions since all his orders and instructions were very clear.
He handled me very well in that he gave me a completely free hand
as regards carrying out his orders. He saved me from getting into
trouble on several occasions before the war ended, and always backed
me when others wanted to "down" me. At times he would get angry
and I received quite a few "backhanders" from him; but I would take
anything from him and I have no doubt I deserved all I got.

During the winter G.H.Q. arranged for divisions to send infantry
brigades in turn down to the active front in the Saar, holding positions
in front of the Maginot Line in contact with the German positions in
the Siegfried Line. I went down there in January 1940 to visit one of
my brigades and spent a few days having a look round. That was my
first experience in the war of the French Army in action; I was seri
ously alarmed and on my return I went to see my Corps Commander,
and told him of my fears about the French Army and what we might
have to expect from that quarter in the future. Brooke had been down
there himself and had formed the same opinion.

The popular cries in the Maginot Line were: Ils ne passer ont pas
and On les aura.

But the general attitude did not give me any confidence that either
of these two things would happen. Brooke and I agreed not to talk
about it to our subordinates; I believe he discussed the matter with
Gort

I got into serious trouble during that first winter of the war. It
happened in this way. After a few months in France the incidence of
venereal disease in the 3rd Division gave me cause for alarm. To stop
it I enlisted the aid of the doctors and even the padres; but all efforts
were unsuccessful and the figures increased. Finally I decided to write
a confidential letter to all subordinate commanders in which I analysed
the problem very frankly and gave my ideas about how to solve it.
Unfortunately a copy of the letter got into the hands of the senior

56 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

chaplains at G.H.Q., and the Commander-in-Chief (Gort) was told
of my action. My views on how to tackle the problem were not con
sidered right and proper and there was the father-and-mother of a
row. They were all after my blood at G.H.Q. But my Corps Com
mander (Brooke) saved me by insisting on being allowed to handle
the matter himself. This he did in no uncertain manner and I received
from him a proper backhander. He said, amongst other things, that
he didn't think much of my literary effort Anyhow it achieved what
I wanted, since the venereal disease ceased,

I do not propose to describe in any detail the operations of tihe
3rd Division in the campaign which began on the loth May 1940.
But certain episodes arc of interest. The first task we had to perform
was exactly what I had expected; it was to move forward and occupy
a sector on the River Dyle astride Louvain. The division executed the
movement perfectly. The sector on the Dyle was occupied by a Belgian
division, which was not at that moment in contact with the Germans.
When the Belgian soldiers woke up on the morning of the nth May
they found a British division doubled-up with them in the sector; we
had arrived quietly and efficiently during the night, the Belgians
being mostly asleep—presumably because there were no Germans
about. I went to see the Belgian general, asked him to withdraw
his division, and allow me to hold the front; he refused and said he
had received no orders to that effect; furthermore, only Belgian troops
could hold the ancient city of Louvain. The Germans were approach
ing and the Belgian Army on the line of the Albert Canal in front
was falling back fast; there were too many troops in the sector and
I therefore withdrew my division into reserve behind the Belgian
division. I decided that the best way to get the Belgians out and my
division in was to use a little flattery. So I told the Belgian General
that it was essential to have one responsible commander in the sector
and it must be the general whose division was holding the front;
I would therefore place myself under his orders. He was delighted!
The news got to G.H.Q. and there was terrific consternation; my
Corps Commander came to sec me. But I told him not to wony as
I was about to get the Belgians out> and I would then be in front and
be the responsible commander. When the Germans came within
artillery range and shelling began I had no difficulty in taking over
the front from the Belgian division; it moved into reserve and then
went northwards and joined up with the main body of the Belgian
Army.

It was during this campaign that I developed the habit of going to
bed early, soon after dinner, I was out and about on the front all day
long, saw all my subordinate commanders, and heard their problems
and gave decisions and verbal orders. I was always back at my
Divisional H.Q. about tea-time, and would see my staff and give

Britain Goes to War in 1939 57

orders for the night and next day. I would then have dinner and go
to bed, and was never to be disturbed except in a crisis. I well re
member how angry I was when I was woken up one night and told
the Germans had got into Louvain. The staff officer was amazed when
I said: "Go away and don't bother me. Tell the brigadier in Louvain to
turn them out" I then went to sleep again.

The story of the withdrawal of die B.E.F., the desperate fighting
that took place, and the final evacuation from Dunkirk and its beaches,
has been told many times. My division did everything that was de
manded of it; it was like a ship with all sails set in a rough sea,
which rides the storm easily and answers to the slightest touch on the
helm. Such was my 3rd Division. There were no weak links; all the
doubtful commanders had been eliminated during the previous six
months of training. The drasion was like a piece of fine steel. I was
intensely proud of it

I think the most difficult operation we had to do was on the 2/th
May when I was ordered to side-step the division to the left of the
British front and fill a gap which had opened between the soth Divi
sion and the Belgians. It involved a night move of the whole division
within a couple of thousand yards of the 5th Division front, where a
fierce battle had been raging all day and was still going on. If this
move had been suggested by a student at the Staff College in a scheme,
he would have been considered mad. But curious things have to be
done in a crisis in war. The movement was carried out without a hitch
and the gap was filled by daylight on the 28th May. Imagine my
astonishment to learn at dawn on the 2,8th May that the King of the
Belgians had surrendered the Belgian Army to the Germans at mid
night on the 27th May, i.e. while I was moving my division into the
gap! Here was a pretty pickle! Instead of having a Belgian Army on
my left I now had nothing, and had to do some rapid thinking.

During the operations the food situation became difficult and the
whole B.E.F. was put on half -rations. It made little difference. The
civil population were mostly moving out, leaving their farms; we
lived on the country, giving requisition forms to mayors of villages
when they could be found. We never were short of meat as my
R.A.S.C.* used to requisition beef cattle and take it along with the
division; "beef ration on the hoof."

The last headquarters of the 3rd Division before it moved into
the final Dunkirk bridgehead was in a portion of the Abbaye de S,
Sixte, at Westvleteren in Belgium. I still had all my kit with me,
and some interesting papers which were not secret but which I did
not want to lose; I also had a very good lunch basket. So I asked
the Abbot, Fr. M. Rafael Hoedt, if he could look after a few things
for me; possibly they could be buried in the garden. He agreed to
* Royal Army Service Corps.

58 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

take a small box, and my lunch basket, and he had them bricked up
into a wall of the abbey in a very clever manner. I told him we would
return to Belgium in due course, and then I would come for my
possessions. When we liberated Belgium in September 1944, the
Abbot wrote to me and said he had my belongings ready for me;
they had remained safely in their hiding-place and had never been dis
covered by the Germans. I will always be grateful to the Abbot and
his brave band of monks for their kindness in those days. They little
knew the risks they were running; nor did I at that time. It is clear
to me now that I should not have asked them to hide my belongings,
which, in point of fact, were only of sentimental value to myself.

THE FINAL SCENE AT LA PANNE

G.H.Q. went to La Panne on the 28th May and remained there
till the end. That place was chosen because the submarine cable to the
U.K. entered the sea there; in consequence good telephone conversa
tion was possible to Dover and London to the last. My 3rd Division
moved into its position on the left of the Dunkirk bridgehead on the
night 2Qth-30th May. We held the line of the canal between Fumes
and Nieuport. My H.Q. were in the sand-dunes on the outskirts of
La Panne. G.H.Q., or what was left of it, was in a house on the
sea-front; it now consisted only of Gort himself and a few staff
officers.

On the morning of the soth May, Brooke came to see me at my
H.Q. in the sand-dunes. He told me he had been ordered to get back
to England; he was terribly upset. We were great friends and I did
my best to comfort him, saying it was clearly essential to get our best
generals out of it as quickly as possible since there were many years of
war ahead; if we were all to be lost, at least lie must be saved. He then
told me that I was to take command of his corps, the 2nd Corps. This
surprised me as I was the junior major-general in the corps, Brooke
left for England that evening,

Lord Gort held a final conference at his H.Q. on the sea-front that
afternoon, the 3Oth May, to give his orders. Since I was now com
manding the 2nd Corps, I attended. This was the first time I had
seen him since the fighting began on the loth May. My H.Q. was
quite near and I went along and had a talk with him before the con
ference assembled; he was alone in the dining-room of the house
and looked a pathetic sight, though outwardly cheerful as always. His
first remark to me was typical of the man: "Be sure to have your
front well covered with fighting patrols tonight."

At the conference he read us the telegram containing the final
instructions of the Government. The instructions were as follows:

Britain Goes to War in 1939 59

"Continue to defend the present perimeter to the utmost in order
to cover maximum evacuation now proceeding well* Report every
three hours through La Panne. If we can still communicate we
shall send you an order to return to England with such officers
as you may choose at the moment when we deem your command
so reduced that it can be handed over to a Corps Commander.
You should now nominate this Commander. If communications
are broken you are to hand over and return as specified when your
effective fighting force does not exceed the equivalent of three
divisions. This is in accordance with correct military procedure
and no personal discretion is left you in the matter. On political
grounds it would be a needless triumph to the enemy to capture
you when only a small force remained under your orders. The
Corps Commander chosen by you should be ordered to carry on
the defence in conjunction with the French and evacuation
whether from Dunkirk or the beaches, but when in his judgment
no further proportionate damage can be inflicted on the enemy
he is authorised in consultation with the senior French Com
mander to capitulate formally to avoid useless slaughter."

It is commonly supposed that at this final conference Gort "nomi
nated" Major-General H. R. L. G. Alexander to command after he
himself had left. This is not so; moreover, Alexander himself was not
even present at the conference. I will describe what actually happened.

The two Corps Commanders at the conference were Lieut-General
M. G. H. Barker, ist Corps, and myself, who had just taken over
command of 2nd Corps. Barker had been given command of ist
Corps when Dill returned to England in April to become Vice-Chief
of the Imperial General Staff.

Gort's plan was based on the War Office telegram, and he ordered
that I was to withdraw 2nd Corps the next night, 3ist May/ ist June,
and that the ist Corps would then be left in final command. He in
formed Barker that as a last resort he would surrender himself, and
what remained of his corps, to the Germans. The conference then
broke up. I stayed behind when the others had left and asked Gort
if I could have a word with him in private. I then said it was my view
that Barker was in an unfit state to be left in final command; what was
needed was a calm and clear brain, and that given reasonable luck
such a man might well get ist Corps away, with no need for anyone to
surrender. He had such a man in Alexander, who was commanding
the ist Division in Barker's corps. He should send Barker back to
England at once and put Alexander in command of the ist Corps.
I knew Gort very well; so I spoke very plainly and insisted that this
was the right course to take.

Gort acted promptly. Barker was sent off to England and I never

60 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

saw him again. Alexander took over the ist Corps. The two corps
were now commanded by two major-generals and we met the next
day in La Panne to discuss the situation; we were both confident
that all would be well in the end. And it was; "Alex" got everyone
away in his own calm and confident manner.

On the evening of the soth May I held a conference of the divisional
commanders of the 2nd Corps and gave out my orders for the with
drawal and evacuation from the beaches on the next night, the 3ist
May. It was very unpleasant in La Panne that evening and shells were
bursting all round the house in which I held the conference. I ordered
that any men who could not be embarked from the beaches were to
move along the beach to Dunkirk and get on board ships in the
harbour.

The next night I withdrew the 2nd Corps. The situation on the
beaches was not good, for some of the improvised piers we had made
began to break up; many had to walk to Dunkirk. While standing
on the beach, my A.D.C. was wounded in the head by a splinter of
shell. I cursed him soundly for not wearing his steel helmet, quite
forgetting that I was not wearing one myself— as he pointed out! He
was Charles Sweeny, in the Ulster Rifles; he was with me for much
of the war and was killed right at the end, in Germany. He was a
delightful Irish boy and I loved him dearly. In the end we ourselves
walked along the beach to Dunkirk, some five or six miles away,
together with Brigadier Ritchie (now General Sir Neil Ritchie) and
my batman. We got there at dawn -and embarked on a destroyer,
landing in Dover on the morning of the ist June.

LOUD GORT

I have already said that the appointment of Gort to command the
B.E.F. was a mistake. I have never departed from that view, and
am still of the same opinion today.

The first point to understand is that the campaign in France and
Flanders in 1940 was lost in Whitehall in the years before it ever
began, and this cannot be stated too clearly or too often. One might
add after Whitehall the words "and in Paris/* Therefore the situation
called for two almost super-men from the British Army: one as
C.I.G.S., and one to command the B.E.F* The two actually selected
were Ironside and Gort, and in my opinion both appointments were
unsuitable. Furthermore, these two appointments were not made till
war was declared; this, of course, was monstrous.

Gort then was faced with an almost impossible task. He faced it
bravely and did his best; but, as we have seen, much that should have
been done was not done. I would say myself that he did not choose

Britain Goes to War in 1939 61

his staff wisely; they were not good enough. He was a man who did
not see very far, but as far as he did see he saw very clearly. When the
crisis burst on the French and British armies, and developed in ever-
increasing fury, he was quick to see that there was only one end to it:
the French would crack and he must get as much of the British Army
as he could back to England. Planning for the evacuation via Dunkirk
was begun at G.H.Q., so far as I am aware, about the 2ist May. There
after, Gort never wavered; he remained steady as a rock, and refused
to be diverted from what he knew was the only right and proper
course. When General Billotte disappeared on the 2ist May and co
ordination broke down, Gort acted not on any definite orders but on
what he considered to be his proper action in the spirit of the co
ordination agreement. His action, as time went on, was more and
more tempered by another consideration: his duty to H.M. Govern
ment at home as being responsible for the safety of the B.E.F. And
at the last moment he threw out Barker and put in Alexander to
command the ist Corps and take charge of the final evacuation.

It was because he saw very clearly, if only for a limited distance,
that we all got away at Dunkirk. A cleverer man might have done
something different and perhaps tried to swing back to the Somme,
keeping touch with the French. If he had done this, the men of the
B.E.F. might have found themselves eventually in French North
Africa— without weapons and equipment.

Gort saw clearly that he must, at the least, get the men of the B.E.F,
back to England with their personal weapons. For this I give him
full marks and I hope history will do the same. He saved the men of
the B.E.F. And being saved, they were able to fight again another
day: which they did to some purpose, as the Germans found out.

CHAPTER 5

The Army in England After Dunkirk

I ARRIVED in London on the evening of the ist June and went the
next morning to the War Office to report myself to the CXG.S.:
Jack Dill, an old friend.

He was despondent and said: "Do you realise that for the first
time for a thousand years this country is now in danger of invasion?"

I had had a good night's sleep in a hotel and was feeling very full
of beans. I laughed. This made Dill angry and he asked what there
was to laugh about. I said that the people of England would never
believe we were in danger of being invaded when they saw useless
generals in charge of some of the Home Commands, and I gave him
some examples. He could not but agree, but he ticked me off for
speaking in such a way at such a time in our misfortunes, and said that
remarks of that kind could only cause a loss of confidence. My answer
was that plain speaking between the two of us, alone in his office,
could do no harm. Again he agreed. But flic next day I received a
letter telling me to stop saying such things, which of course I obeyed;
but one by one the useless generals disappeared.

Although I had been a Corps Commander at Dunkirk, I asked to
be allowed, and was permitted, to go back to my 3rd Division, to
reform it and get it ready for what lay ahead.

The officers and men of the B.E.F. were now back in England, less
many brave men who sacrificed themselves that the majority should
get away. Except for personal weapons our armament and equipment
was mostly left behind in France.

There was in England sufficient transport and armament to re-equip
one division completely, and no more. It was decided to give it to the
3rd Division and to get that division ready to go back across the

62

The Army in England After Dunkirk 63

Channel and join up with the small British forces which were still
fighting with tie French Army. This was a great compliment, although
I don't think any of us had any delusion about what we might be in
for a second time. However, Brooke was to be the new C,-in-C. and
we of the 3rd Division were prepared to go anywhere under his
command.

We reformed in Somerset, received our new equipment, and were
all ready to start back across the Channel by the middle of June. Then
France capitulated on the i/th June.

My division was then ordered to move to the south coast; we
were to occupy a sector of the coast which included Brighton and the
country to the west of it, and to prepare that area for defence against
invasion which was considered imminent. So we moved to the south
coast and descended like an avalanche on the inhabitants of that area;
we dug in the gardens of the seaside villas, we sited machine-gun
posts in the best places, and we generally set about our job in the way
we were accustomed to do things in an emergency. The protests
were tremendous. Mayors, County Councillors, private owners, came
to see me and demanded that we should cease our work; I refused,
and explained the urgency of the need and that we were preparing
to defend the south coast against the Germans.

The real trouble in England in the early days after the fall of
France was that the people did not yet understand the full significance
of what had happened, and what could happen in the future. The fact
that the B.E.F. had escaped through Dunkirk was considered by
many to be a great victory for British arms. I remember the disgust
of many like myself when we saw British soldiers walking about in
London and elsewhere with a coloured embroidered flash on their
sleeve with the title "Dunkirk." They thought they were heroes, and
the civilian public thought so too. It was not understood that the
British Army had suffered a crushing defeat at Dunkirk and that our
island home was now in grave danger. There was no sense of urgency.
Churchill was to bring it home to the nation in words that rang and
thundered like the Psalms. The spirit was there all right but it needed
a Winston Churchill to call it forth.

It was in that summer of 1940 on the south coast, near Brighton,
that I first met Winston Churchill and his wife. We were to become
great friends as the war went on, and today I regard him as chief
among all my friends. Before proceeding with my story I would like
to describe that first meeting, as my thoughts often return to it and
he and I have often recalled it.

My Divisional Headquarters were near Steyning, in a house lying
to the north of the downs. I was told the Prime Minister wished to
spend the afternoon of die 2nd July with my division; he would
arrive by car and I was to finish the tour in Brighton, so that he could

64 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

return to London by train in the evening. I was not impressed by
politicians in those days; I considered that they were largely respon
sible for our troubles. But I was keen to see this politician who had
for many years before the war been telling a series of Governments
what would happen; they had not listened, and now it had happened.

He arrived with Mrs. Churchill, as she then was, and some others,
one of whom was Duncan Sandys. I have never discovered what
Churchill thought of me that day; I know I was immensely impressed
by him. I showed him all that was possible in the time. I took him
to Lancing College, inhabited by the Royal Ulster Rifles, and showed
him a counter-attack on the small airfield on the coast below which
was assumed to have been captured by the Germans; he was delighted,
especially by the action of the Bren-gtm carrier platoon of the bat
talion. We then worked our way along the coast, finishing up in
Brighton at about 7.30 p.m. He suggested I should have dinner with
him and his party at the Royal Albion Hotel, and we talked much
during the meal. He asked me what I would drink at dinner and I
replied—water. This astonished him. I added that I neither drank nor
smoked and was 100 per cent fit; he replied in a flash, that he both
drank and smoked and was 200 per cent fit. This story is often told
with embellishments, but the above is the true version. From the
window of the dining-room we could see a platoon of guardsmen
preparing a machine-gun post in a kiosk on Brighton pier, and ho
remarked that when at school near there ho used to go and sec the
performing fleas in the kiosk. Then we talked about my problems.
The main thing which seemed curious to me was that my division
was immobile. It was the only fully equipped division in England,
the only division fit to fight any onomy anywhere. And hero we were
in a static role, ordered to dig in on the south coast* Some other
troops should take on my task; my division should be given buses,
ami be held in mobile reserve with a counter-attack role. Why was I
left immobile? There were thousands of buses in England; lot them
give me some, and release me from this static role so that I could
practise a mobile counter-attack role. The Prime Minister thought this
was the cat's whiskers. I do not know what the War Office thought;
but I got my buses.

The planners were now getting busy in Whitehall and various
schemes were being considered. When it came to deciding which
troops would carry out these wild-cat schemes, the answer was always
the same: it must be the 3rd Division since there was no other forma
tion yet ready for active operations. And so the planners decided as
a first step that I must be ready to take my division overseas to seize
the Azores; this was duly worked out, models of the islands were
prepared, and detailed plans worked out for the operation.

The Army in England After Dunkirk 65

Then I was told it was not to be the Azores, but the Cape Verde
Islands. Then after much work, I was told to prepare plans for the
seizure of Cork and Queenstown in Southern Ireland, so that the
harbour could be used as a naval base for the anti-submarine war in
the Atlantic. I had already fought the Southern Irish once, in 1921 and
1922, and it looked as if this renewed contest might be quite a party—
with only one division.

None of these plans came to anything and I imagine that any work
we did on them is tucked away in a cupboard in the War Office
which is labelled "war babies." I have seen that cupboard. It seemed
curious to me that anyone in his senses could imagine that, at a time
when England was almost defenceless, the Prime Minister would
allow to leave England the only division he had which was fully
equipped and fit to fight in battle.

In July 1940 I was promoted to command the $th Corps and from
that time begins my real influence on the training of the Army then
in England. By this I mean that the 5th Corps gave a lead in these
matters which had repercussions far beyond the corps area of Hamp
shire and Dorset In April 1941 1 was transferred to command the 12th
Corps in Kent, which was the expected invasion corner of England;
and in December 1941 1 was promoted to command the South-Eastern
Army which included the counties of Kent, Surrey and Sussex. So the
ideas and the doctrine of war, and training for war, which began as far
west as Dorset, gradually spread along the south of England to the
mouth of the Thames.

Let us examine those ideas; this is important for understanding,
since it was the same doctrine which I carried with me to Africa in
1942, to Sicily and Italy in 1943 and to Normandy in 1944. In fact, '
what happened in the various commands I held in England during
the two years after Dunkirk was the basis of success in all that hap
pened in the long journey from Alamein to Berlin.

As time went on and my experience in command increased, so I
was able to practise and confirm my ideas and to be ready when the
call came to command the Eighth Army in August 1942. And I had
served during those two years under some splendid officers, who had
taught me much. In the 5th Corps I first served under Auchinleck,
who had the Southern Command; I cannot recall that we ever agreed
on anything. However, he soon went off as C.-in-C. in India and I
then served in turn under Alexander and Paget; and Brooke was
either C.-in-C. Home Forces or C.I.G.S. All these three were
great friends and I held them all in high regard: as men and as
soldiers.

The first point I tackled was the question of fitness: physical and
mental. The Army in England was not fit and it must be made so.

66 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I often used to recall the lines of Kipling in his preface to Land and
Sea Tales:

"Nations have passed away and left no traces,
And history gives the naked cause of it-
One single, simple reason in all cases;
They fell because their peoples were not fit."

Training in the 5th Corps was ordered to be hard and tough; it
must be carried out in all conditions of weather and climate; in rain,
snow, ice, mud, fair weather or foul, at any hour of the day or night—
we must be able to do our stuff better than the Germans. If they
could only fight well in fine weather and in daylight, and we could
fight with the maximum efficiency in any weather and at any time of
the day or night, then we would beat them. All training was to be
organised to lead up to exercises at the higher level, and all exercises
were to be staged in an imaginative way. The large-scale exercises
from the divisional level upwards must be designed to ensure that
commanders, staffs and troops wore capable of continuous and sus
tained operations over prolonged periods, and that all responsible
echelons understood how to organise the twenty-four hours so that
this would be possible.

Commanders and staff officers at any level who couldn't stand the
strain, or who got tired, wore to be weeded out and replaced— ruth
lessly*

Total war demanded total fitness from the highest to the lowest.
As always happens, once active operations finished the paper work
increus<xl and staff officers and clerks became tied to offices. I ordered
that at every headquarters the whole staff, officers and men, would
turn out on one* afternoon each week and do a seven-mile run. This
applied to everyone under forty, and there would be no exception;
those who didn't want to run the whole course could walk and trot,
but they must go round the course even if they walked the whole
way. There were many protests; but they all did it, even those over
forty, and they enjoyed it in the end— some of them. I remember die
case of a somewhat stout old colonel who went to the doctor and
said if he did the run it would kill him; the doctor brought him to
sec me with a recommendation that he should be excused. I asked
him if he truly thought he would die if he did the run; he said yes,
and I saw a hopeful look in his eye. I then said that if he was thinking
of dying it would be better to do it now, as he could be replaced easily
and smoothly; it is always a miisancc if officers die when the battle
starts and things arc inclined to be hectic. His state of health was
clearly not very good, and I preferred him to do the run and die.
He did the run and so far as I know he is still alive today*

There was an urgent need to get rid of the "dead wood* which

The Army in England After Dunkirk 67

was hampering the initiative of keen and efficient young officers.
There were old retired officers called up from the reserve; there were
many inefficient regular officers from majors upwards who had never
seen a shot fired in action and didn't want to. All these had to be
weeded out and I made it my business to do so. I visited every unit
and got to know all the senior officers and many of the junior ones;
one by one the inefficient and lazy departed.

A struggle took place over wives. It was the custom for wives and
families of officers to accompany units, and live in the towns and
villages on the coast where invasion was expected at any time. I
ordered that all wives and families were to leave at once; they were
not allowed to live in the area of divisions that had an operational
role in repelling invasion. I gave my reasons, which were as follows.

Invasion by the Germans was considered to be probable and we
were all preparing to meet and defeat it. If an officer's wife and family
were present with him in or near his unit area, and the attack came,
an officer would at once be tempted to see to their safety first and to
neglect his operational task; he would be fearful for their safety,
amid all the shelling and bombing of the battle, and his thoughts
would be with them rather than on the priority task of defeating the
Germans. I was told that a good officer would never give a single
thought to his wife and family in such conditions; his whole mind
would be on the battle. I said that I did not believe it Anyhow,
human nature was weak and I was not prepared to let an officer be
tempted to fail in his duty. The whole future of England, and indeed
civilisation, was at stake; I would remove temptation and then there
would be no doubt. Moreover, since the men could not have their
families with them, the officers shouldn't either. The wives must go.
And they did.

The command level was particularly important. A sense of urgency
had to be instilled into officers and men and that precluded second-
raters in command at any level. The unfit and incompetent had to be
eliminated.

On the staff it was essential to ensure a standard of absolute service
and technical efficiency. In fact, throughout the whole Army there
was the definite necessity for physical and mental fitness, and for
technical efficiency in the business of the conduct of battle.

The first prerequisite at all levels were commanders who knew
their stuff and who were determined in spite of all the difficulties to
get their own way in the conditions which obtained in those very
difficult days. So far as I was concerned, encouragement of the young
at any level played a big part.

There were certain dangers against which we had to guard. There
was some danger that the staff might once again find themselves in
the same position vis-&-vi$ the regimental officer as in the 1914-1918

68 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

war. There was a danger that the administrative echelons and units
might accept the position of being the weaker vessels and decide that
fighting was not their business. Fighting was the business of everyone
and all must be trained to fight; that was my philosophy and I
preached it unceasingly.

There was a danger that the few fighting units we had in the Army
in England might think that the country and the British Army had
"had it" (to use an expression dating I believe from this period) and
that the Germans were invincible.

Lastly, there was a real danger that after the comparative rigours
of the Dunkirk campaign, the survivors would sink back into the
bosoms of their families and pay too much attention to the question
of personal comfort and amenities. On this subject I laid down that
while officers and men were not allowed to have their wives and
families with them, they were to have leave in the normal way so that
they could visit their families as often as possible. Also that while
training was to be hard and tough, when it was over the troops were
to return to good billets and good food, with good facilities for hot
baths.

And so slowly but gradually a sense of urgency was instilled into
the Army in England, and officers and men began to understand what
it was all about and to see the need for all these things. We gradually
got everyone on their toes after Dunkirk.

Some of the training exercises I organised and staged were harder
and tougher than anything previously known in England. They were
held in conditions of intense cold in the middle of winter, or in the
heat of summer. When officers and men were exhausted, and com
manders and staffs tired out, operational problems would flare up
again with new situations developing in unexpected quarters. I re
member one particular exercise very well, carried out in South-East
England, in the spring of 1942. It was called "Exercise TIGER" and was
the kst exercise I directed before I went to Africa later that year. It
was during that exercise that I first met Eisenhower; he was a major-
general and had been sent over from the U.S.A. with some other
generals to see what was going on. He wrote his name in my auto
graph book; the date was the a/th May 1942.

I found myself in disagreement with the general approach to the
problem of the defence of Britain and refused to apply it in my corps
area, and later in the South-Eastern Army. The accepted doctrine was
that every inch of tihe coastline must be defended strongly, the defence
being based on concrete pill-boxes and entrenchments on a linear basis
all along the coastline.

There was no depth in the defensive layout and few troops available
for counter-attack. Inland, "stop lines'* were being dug all over Eng-

The Army in England After Dunkirk 69

land; when I asked what troops were available to man the stop lines
I could get no clear answer. There were no troops.

My approach was different. I pulled the troops back from the
beaches and held them ready in compact bodies in rear, poised for
counter-attack and for offensive action against the invaders. After a
sea crossing, troops would not feel too well and would be suffering
from reaction; that is the time to attack and throw the invader back
into the sea.

On the beaches themselves all I would allow was a screen of
lightly equipped troops, with good communications and sufficient
firepower to upset any landing and cause it to pause.

My whole soul revolted against allowing troops to get into trenches
and become "Maginot-minded"; any offensive action would then be
out of the question, and once the linear defensive system was pierced
it would all disintegrate. My idea of the defence was that it must be
like a spider's web; wherever the Germans went they must encounter
fresh troops who would first subject them to heavy fire and would
then attack them.

I rebelled against the "scorched earth'* policy which had advocates
in Whitehall; their reasoning was that as the Germans advanced inland
towards London, so we would burn and destroy the countryside as
we retreated. I said we would not retreat, nor would the Germans
advance inland. Thus confidence in our ability to defeat the Germans
was built up, at any rate in the area under my command.

In fact I set out to produce troops who were imbued with that
offensive eagerness and infectious optimism which comes from physical
well-being. And whenever I inspected any unit I used to make the
men remove their steel helmets: not, as many imagined, to see if they
had their hair properly cut, but to see if they had the light of battle
in their eyes.

In 1942 the organisation of raiding operations on enemy coasts was
one of the functions of Combined Operations Headquarters, die head
of which was Admiral Mountbatten. In April 1942 the staff of that
headquarters began work on a plan to raid Dieppe; I was made re
sponsible for the Army side of the planning since I was then com
manding the South-Eastern Army, from which the troops for the raid
were to come. It was decided that the 2nd Canadian Division would
carry out the raid, and intensive training was begun. The troops were
embarked on the 2nd and 3rd July, and the raid was to take place on
the 4th or one of the following days. Once embarked the troops were
fully briefed, and were then "sealed" in their ships. The weather was
unsuitable for launching the enterprise on the night of the 3rd July,
and remained unsuitable till the 8th July— the last day on which con
ditions would permit it The troops were then disembarked and dis-

70 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

persed to their camps and billets. All the troops had been fully
informed of the objective of the raid and of the details connected with
it; it was reasonable to expect that it was now a common subject of
conversation in billets and pubs in the south of England, since nearly
5000 Canadian soldiers were involved as well as considerable numbers
of sailors and airmen. Once all this force was "unsealed" and dis
persed, I considered the operation was cancelled and I turned my
attention to other matters.

But Combined Operations Headquarters thought otherwise; they
decided to revive it and got the scheme approved by the British Chiefs
of Staff towards the end of July. When I heard of this I was very upset;
I considered that it would no longer be possible to maintain secrecy.
Accordingly I wrote to General Pagct, C.-in-C. Home Forces, telling
him of my anxiety, and recommending that the raid on Dieppe should
be considered cancelled "for all time." If it was considered desirable
to raid the Continent, then the objective should, not be Dieppe. This
advice was disregarded. On the loth August I left England to take
command of the Eighth Army in the desert.

The raid was carried out on the igth August and we received the
news about it that night, when the Prime Minister was staying with
me at Eighth Army H.Q.

The Canadians* and the Commandos working with them, fought
magnificently, so did the Navy. But the Canadians lost heavily. The
official history of the Canadian Army has the following remarks:

"At Dieppe, from a force of fewer than 5000 men engaged for
only nine hours, the Canadian Army lost more prisoners than in
the whole cloven months of the later campaign in North-West
Europe*, or the twenty months during which Canadians fought in
Italy. Sadder still was the loss in killed; the total of fatal casualties
was 56 officers and 851 other ranks. Canadian casualties of all
categories aggregated 3369."

Nearly 2000 of the total casualties were prisoners of war. Certain
modifications had been introduced into the revived plan. The most
important were— first, the elimination of the paratroops and their
replacement by commando units; secondly, the elimination of any
preliminary bombing of the defences from the air. I should not myself
have agreed to either of these changes. Commando units, if thought
necessary, should have been an addition to, and not a replacement of,
the paratroops; the demoralisation of the enemy defence by prelimi
nary bombing was essential (as was done in Normandy in 1944) just
before the troops touched down on the beaches.

My own feeling about the Dieppe raid is that there were far too
many authorities with a hand m it; there was no one single operational
commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start

The Army in England After Dunkirk 71

to finish, a Task Force Commander in fact Without doubt the lessons
learnt there were an important contribution to the eventual landing
in Normandy on the 6th June 1944. But the price was heavy in killed
and prisoners. I believe that we could have got the information and
experience we needed without losing so many magnificent Canadian
soldiers.

Early in August 1942 a large-scale exercise was to be held in Scot
land and General Paget, then C.-in-C. Home Forces, suggested I
should go up with him to see it. I was delighted to have an opportunity
to see what other troops were doing and travelled north with Paget in
"Rapier/* the C.-in-C/s special train (which I was myself to use in
1944). Then things began to happen: one after another, and fast. On
the second day of the exercise the War Office telephoned me to return
to London at once; I was to take over Command of the First Army from
Alexander, and begin work under Eisenhower on the plans for the
landing in North Africa which was to take place in November 1942,
under the code name TORCH. It was explained to me that Alexander
had already gone to Egypt to become C.-in-C. Middle East; a brigadier
would meet me in London and explain the situation. I returned to
London at once, met the brigadier, who did not impress me, and then
went to the War Office. I was there given more details and was told
that the first thing I must do was to get Eisenhower to make a plan
for the operation; time was getting on and the Chiefs of Staff could
not get Eisenhower to produce his plan. The whole thing did not
sound very good to me; a big invasion operation in North Africa in
three months* time, and no plan yet made. Eisenhower I had barely
met; I knew very few American soldiers and did not know how my
methods would appeal to him. The crisis of the war was approaching
and great events were to unfold. I was confident of being able to
handle any job successfully if I was allowed to put into practice the
ideas and methods that had become my military creed, and which by
now I was convinced would bring us success in battle against the
Germans. I returned to my Headquarters at Reigate hoping for the
best; anyhow, I had now been two years in England— and it was time
to move on.

The next morning (the 8th August) as I was shaving at about 7 a.m.,
the War Office telephoned and said the orders given me the previous
day about the First Army and Operation TORCH were cancelled; I was
to hold myself ready to proceed to Egypt at once to take command
of the Eighth Army in the desert.

Alexander was already in Egypt and I would be serving under him.
I was told later in the morning that Gott had been selected to com
mand the Eighth Army but he had been killed, and I was to take his
place. "

Instead of carrying out an invasion of North Africa under a C.-in-C.

72 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

whom I barely knew, I was now to serve under a G-in-C. I knew well
and to take command of an Army which was at grips with a German
and Italian Army under the command of Rommel— of whom I had
heard great things. This was much more to my liking and I felt I could
handle that business, and Rommel.

It was true that I had never fought in the desert and I would have
under me some very experienced generals who had been out there a
long time. However, Rommel seemed to have defeated them all, and
I would like to have a crack at him myself.

I was particularly glad that Alexander was to be my C.-in-C., as
I knew that we would get on well together.

So it was with a light heart and great confidence that I made prepa
rations for going to Africa. I was disturbed about my son David.
When he was born I had entered him for Harrow, my father's school.
But when the time came to send him to a public school in 1942 I
decided against it; Harrow was too near London and the boys often
had to sleep in the shelters. Instead I had sent him to Winchester.
Some friends had suggested he should go to Canada with their boys;
I declined the invitation; I wanted him in England, At the moment
he was staying with friends for his summer holidays. I took a very
quick decision and wrote to Major Reynolds, the headmaster of his
former preparatory school, and asked if he and his wife would take
charge of David for me, receive him into their family, and look after
him till I returned from the war. I left for Africa before I received
their reply but I had no fears; they took David in and treated him as
their own son, I never saw him to say goodbye.

Since I had few belongings, my preparations for leaving England
had been very simple. Everything I possessed had been destroyed by
enemy bombing in Portsmouth in January 1941. I was now going to
be given the opportunity to get my own back on the Germans.

A story is told by Sir Winston Churchill in The Hinge of Fate (Book
Two, Chapter 3) about my departure:

"Montgomery started for the airfield with Ismay, who thus had
an hour or more to give him the background of these sudden
changes. A story— alas, not authenticated— has been told of this
conversation. Montgomery spoke of the trials and hazards of a
soldier's career. He gave his whole life to his profession, and lived
long years of study and self-restraint. Presently fortune smiled,
there came a gleam of success, he gained advancement, opportu
nity presented itself, he had a great command. He won a victory,
he became world-famous, his name was on every lip. Then the
luck changed. At one stroke all his life's work flashed away, per
haps through no fault of his own, and he was flung into the endless
catalogue of military failures. 'But,* expostulated Ismay, 'you

The Army in England After Dunkirk 73

ought not to take it so badly as all that. A very fine Army is
gathering in the Middle East. It may well be that you are not
going to disaster/ What!' cried Montgomery, sitting up in the
car. What do you mean? I was talking about Rommel!' "

Alas, not authenticated! I had not seen Ismay for many weeks when
I left for Africa, and he did not go with me to fhe airfield.

I left England by air on the night of the loth August and reached
Gibraltar at dawn the next morning. We stayed at Gibraltar all that
day and left in the evening of the nth August for Cairo. During the
journey I pondered over the problems which lay ahead and reached
some idea, at least in outline, of how I would set about the business.

CHAPTER 6

My Doctrine of Command

I WAS leaving England to exercise high command in the field. The
work and experience of many years were about to be put to the
test. But I have not yet explained the general principles of com
mand which had gradually evolved in my mind during the past years
and which I had preached as far back as 1934 when Chief Instructor
at the Quetta Staff College. It is my firm belief that these principles of
command and leadership were the biggest factor in achieving such
success as came.

Although there is much to explain about my doctrine of command
it can l>c summed up in one word: leadership.

In his Memoirs, Harry Truman says he learned from a study of
history that "a leader is a man who has the ability to get other people
to do what they don't want to do, and like it"

Leadership may be too complex for such a brief definition. On the
other hand the word is often used somewhat loosely without its full
meaning being understood. My own definition of leadership is this:
"The capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common
purpose, and the character which inspires confidence/'

Merely to have the capacity is not enough; the leader must be willing
to use it. His leadership is then based on truth and character; there
must be truth in the purpose and will-power in the character.

The need for truth is not always realised. A leader must speak the
truth to those under him; if he does not they will soon find it out and
then their confidence in him will decline* I did not always tell all the
truth to the soldiers in the war; it would have compromised secrecy,
and it was not necessary.

I tolcl them all they must know for the efficient carrying out of their

74

My Doctrine of Command 75

tasks. But what I did tell them was always true and they knew it; that
produced a mutual confidence between us. The good military leader
will dominate the events which surround him; once he lets events get
the better of him he will lose the confidence of his men, and when
that happens he ceases to be of value as a leader.

When all is said and done the leader must exercise an effective
influence, and the degree to which he can do this will depend on the
personality of the man—the "incandescence" of which he is capable,
the flame which burns within him, the magnetism which will draw
the hearts of men towards him. What I personally would want to
know about a leader is:

Where is he going?

Will he go all out?

Has he the talents and equipment, including knowledge, experi
ence and courage? Will he take decisions, accepting full re
sponsibility for them, and take risks where necessary?

Will he then delegate and decentralise, having first created an
organisation in which there are definite focal points of decision
so that the master plan can be implemented smoothly and
quickly?

The matter of "decision" is vital. The modern tendency is to avoid
taking decisions, and to procrastinate in the hope that things will
come out all right in the wash. The only policy for the military leader
is decision in action and calmness in die crisis: no bad doctrine for
the political leader either.

I hold the view that the leader must know what he himself wants.
He must see his objective clearly and then strive to attain it; he must
let everyone else know what he wants and what are the basic funda
mentals of his policy. He must, in fact, give firm guidance and a dear
lead. It is necessary for him to create what I would call "atmosphere,"
and in that atmosphere his subordinate commanders will live and work.

I have known commanders who considered that once their plan was
made and orders issued, they need take no further part in the pro
ceedings, except to influence the battle by means of their reserves.
Never was there a greater mistake. The modern battle can very quickly
go off the rails. To succeed, a C.-in-C. must ensure from the beginning
a very firm grip on his military machine; only in this way will his
force maintain balance and cohesion and thus develop its fall fighting
potential. This firm grip does not mean interference, or cramping the
initiative of subordinates; indeed, it is by the initiative of subordinates
that the battle is finally won. The firm grip is essential in order that
the master plan will not be undermined by the independent ideas of
individual subordinate commanders at particular moments in the
battle. Operations must develop within a predetermined pattern of

76 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

action. If this is not done the result will be a compromise between
the individual conceptions of subordinates about how operations
should develop; alternatively, operations will develop as a result of
situations created by subordinate action and in a way which does not
suit the master plan. A third alternative is that the initiative might
pass to the enemy. The master plan must never be so rigid that the
C.-in-C. cannot vary it to suit the changing tactical situation; but
nobody else may be allowed to change it at will— and, especially, not
die enemy.

It is essential to understand the place of the "conference" when
engaged on active operations in the field. By previous thought, by
discussion with his staff, and by keeping in close touch with his
subordinates by means of visits, a commander should know what he
wants to do and whether it is possible to do it. If a conference of his
subordinates is then necessary, it will be for the purpose of giving
orders. He should never bring them back to him for such a conference;
he must go forward to them. Then nobody looks over his shoulder.
A conference of subordinates to collect ideas is the resort of a weak
commander.

It is a mistake to think that once an order is given there is nothing
more to be done; you have got to see that it is carried out in the spirit
which you intended. Once he has decided on his outline plan and
how he will carry it out, the commander should himself draft the
initial operational order or directive, and not allow his staff to do so.
His staff and subordinates then begin their more detailed work, and
this is based on the written word of die commander himself. Mistakes
are thus reduced to a minimum, This was my method, beginning from
the clays when I commanded a battalion.

No leader, however great, can long continue unless he wins victories.
The battle decides all. How docs one achieve success in battle?

In Sir Winston Churchill's study of Marlborough we note that:

*Thc success of a commander does not arise from following
rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension
of the dominant facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces
at work. Every great operation of war is unique. What is wanted
is a profound appreciation of the actual event. There is no surer
road to disaster than to imitate die plans of bygone heroes and fit
them to novel situations."

In battle, die art of command lies in understanding that no two
situations are ever the same; each must be tackled as a wholly new
problem to which there will be a wholly new answer.

I have always held the view that an army is not merely a collection
of individuals, with so many tanks, guns, machine-guns, etc., and that
the strength of the army is not just the total of all these tilings added

My Doctrine of Command 77

together. The real strength of an army is, and must be, far greater
than the sum total of its parts; that extra strength is provided by
morale, fighting spirit, mutual confidence between the leaders and the
led and especially with the high command, the quality of comrade
ship, and many other intangible spiritual qualities.

The raw material with which the general has to deal is men. The
same is true in civil life. Managers of large industrial concerns have
not always seemed to me to have understood this point; they think
their raw material is iron ore, or cotton, or rubber— not men but com
modities. In conversation with them I have disagreed and insisted
that their basic raw material is men. Many generals have also not fully
grasped this vital matter, nor understood its full implications, and that
is one reason why some have failed.

An army must be as hard as steel in battle and can be made so;
but, like steel, it reaches its finest quality only after much preparation
and only provided the ingredients are properly constituted and handled.
Unlike steel, an army is a most sensitive instrument and can easily
become damaged; its basic ingredient is men and, to handle an army
well, it is essential to understand human nature. Bottled up in men
are great emotional forces which have got to be given an outlet in a
way which is positive and constructive, and which warms the heart
and excites the imagination. If the approach to the human factor is
cold and impersonal, then you achieve nothing. But if you can gain the
confidence and trust of your men, and they feel their best interests
are safe in your hands, then you have in your possession a priceless
asset and the greatest achievements become possible.

The morale of the soldier is the greatest single factor in war and the
best way to achieve a high morale in war-time is by success in battle.
The good general is the one who wins his battles with the fewest pos
sible casualties; but morale will remain high even after considerable
casualties, provided the battle has been won and the men know it was
not wastefully conducted, and that every care has been taken of the
wounded, and the killed have been collected and reverently buried

Some think that morale is best sustained when the British soldier
is surrounded by N.A.A.FJ.S,* clubs, canteens, and so on. I disagree.
My experience with soldiers is that they are at their best when they
are asked to face up to hard conditions. Men dumped in some out-of-
the-way spot in the desert will complain less of boredom, because they
have to shift for themselves, than those surrounded by a wide choice
of amenities. The creation of the Welfare State in Britain after the
Second World War led too many to think that social security and
individual prosperity were the only things worth while. But this is
not so. If man wants prosperity he must work for it or else go without
it. He won't get it merely by voting for it The British soldier when
* Navy, Army and Air Force Institute.

78 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

properly led responds to a challenge and not to welfare benefits. Man
does not live by bread alone. The soldier has to be kept active, alert,
and purposeful all the time. He will do anything you ask of him so
long as you arrange he gets his mail from home, the newspapers, and,
curiously enough, plenty of tea. He then likes to know what is going
on in the battle area and what you require him to do. He gets anxious
if his home town is bombed and he cannot get any news about his
girl, or his wife and children; that is one reason why letters and papers
are so important. He leads a most unpleasant life in war. He will put
up with this so long as he knows that you are living in relatively much
the same way; and he likes to see the C.-in-C. regularly in the forward
area, and be spoken to and noticed. He must know that you really
care for him and will look after his interests, and that you will give
him all the pleasures you can in the midst of his discomforts.

It is essential to understand that all men arc different. The miners
from Durham and Newcastle, the men from the Midlands, the Cock
neys, the farmers from the West Country, the Scot, the Welshman-
all are different. Some men are good at night; others prefer to fight in
daylight. Some arc best at the fluid and mobile battle; others are more
temperamentally adapted to the solid killing match in close country.
Therefore all divisions are different In the 1914-18 war if ten divisions
were needed for an offensive, the staff would take the ten most easily
assembled. But a division develops an individuality of its own, which
the higher commmander must study and thus learn the type of battle
each is best at. Once I had grasped this essential fact of difference,
I used to match the troops to the job; having studied the conditions
of any particular battle which was impending, I would employ in it
divisions whose men were best suited to those conditions, and preferred
them.

It is exactly the same with generals; all arc different. Some will
handle well a mobile battle; others are best at the set-piece. Generals
must also be matched to the job. In fact, I spent a great deal of time
in consideration of this human problem; I always tused for each job in
the master plan the general and the troops best fitted for that particular
task. As a result each battle was already half -won before it ever began,
because of the quality of my weapon vifrd-vis that of the enemy— who,
as far as I could discover, did not work on the same philosophy*

The next point, still a human one, is the selection of commanders.
Probably a third of my working hours were spent in the consideration
of personalities. In dealing with subordinates, justice and a keen sense
of fairness are essential— as also is a full measure of human coasidera-
tion, I kept command appointments in my own hand, right down to
and including the battalion or regimental level. Merit, leadership, and
ability to do the job, were the sole criteria; I made it my business to
know all commanders, and to insist on a high standard. Good senior

My Doctrine of Command 79

commanders once chosen must be trusted and "backed" to the limit.
Any commander is entitled to help and support from his immediate
superior; sometimes he does not get it, a factor to be taken into account
if the man fails. If, having received the help he might normally expect,
a man fails— then he must go. It is sometimes thought that when an
officer is promoted to the next higher command, he needs no teaching
in how to handle it. This is a great mistake. There is a tremendous
difference between a brigade and a division, between a division and a
corps; when an officer got promotion, he needed help and advice in
his new job and it was up to me to see that he got it.

Every officer has his "ceiling" in rank, beyond which he should not
be allowed to rise— particularly in war-time. An officer may do well
when serving under a first class superior. But how will he shape when
he finds himself the boss? It is one thing to be merely an adviser, with
no real responsibility; it is quite another tiling when you are the top
man, responsible for the final decision. A good battalion commander
does not necessarily make a good brigadier, nor a good divisional
general a good corps commander. The judging of a man's ceiling in the
higher ranks is one of the great problems which a commander must
solve, and it occupied much of my time. The same problem must arise
in civil life.

It is clear that my whole working creed was based on the fact that
in war it is "the man" that matters. Commanders in all grades must
have qualities of leadership; they must have initiative; they must have
the "drive" to get things done; and they must have the character and
ability which will inspire confidence in their subordinates. Above
all, they must have that moral courage, that resolution, and that deter
mination which will enable them to stand firm when the issue hangs
in the balance. Probably one of the greatest assets a commander can
have is the ability to radiate confidence in the plan and operations even
(perhaps especially) when inwardly he is not too sure about the out
come. A C.-in-C. or Army Commander must therefore be a good judge
of men, and be able to have the right men in the right places at the
right times.

To work on this philosophy as regards all those under your com
mand, you must watch your own morale carefully. A battle is, in
effect, a contest between two wills—your own and that of the enemy
general. If your heart begins to fail you when the issue hangs in the
balance, your opponent will probably win.

It is absolutely vital that a senior commander should keep himself
from becoming immersed in details, and I always did so. I would
spend many hours in quiet thought and reflection in thinking out the
major problems. In battle a commander has got to think how he will
defeat the enemy. If he gets involved in details he cannot do this since
he will lose sight of the essentials which really matter; he will then be

80 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

led off on side issues which will have little influence on die battle,
and he will fail to be that solid rock on which his staff can lean. Details
are their province. No commander whose daily life is spent in the con
sideration of details, and who has not time for quiet thought and
reflection, can make a sound plan of battle on a high level or conduct
large-scale operations efficiently.

This principle applies equally in civil life and especially in Govern
mental affairs. I often think that the principle is not understood and
applied by Cabinet Ministers, and by others who work in the Govern
mental machine. Many politicians holding high Governmental posts
might well have the following inscribed on their tombstones when
they die:

*Here lies a man who died of exhaustion brought about by pre
occupation with detail. He never had time to think because he
was always reading papers. He saw every tree, but never the whole
wood."

On the operational side a C.-in-C. must draw up a master plan for
the campaign he envisages and he must always think and plan two
battles ahead— the one he is preparing to fight and the next one— so that
success gained in one battle can be used as a spring-board for the next.
He has got to strive to read the mind of his opponent, to anticipate
enemy reactions to his own moves, and to take quick steps to prevent
enemy interference with his own plans. lie has got to be a very clear
thinker and able to sort out the essentials from the mass of factors
which bear on every problem. If ho is to do these things he must be
abstemious and not be a heavy smoker, or drink much, or sit up late
at night He must have an ice-clear brain at all times. For myself, I do
not smoke and I drink no alcohol of any sort; this is purely because
I dislike both tobacco and alcohol, and therein I am lucky because I
believe one is in far better health without them. In general, I consider
that excessive smoking and drinking tend to cloud the brain; when
men's lives are at stake tins must never be allowed to happen, and it
does happen too often. You cannot win battles unless you ore feeling
well and full of energy.

The plan of operations must always be made by the commander
and must not be forced on him by his staff, or by circumstances, or by
the enemy. He has got to relate what is strategically desirable with
that which is tactically possible with the forces at his disposal; if this
is not done he is unlikely to win. What is possible, given a bit of luck?
And what is definitely not possible? That is always the problem. The
plan having been made, there will be much detailed work to be done
before the operation is launched; this detailed work must be done by
the staff. The commander himself must stand back and have time to
think; his attention must be directed to ensuring that the basic founda-

My Doctrine of Command 81

tions and corner-stones of the master plan are not broken down by the
mass of detail which will necessarily occupy the attention of the staff.
If all these things are to be done successfully, a good Chief of Staff is
essential. Fifty years ago a general could co-ordinate himself the work
of his staff; today he cannot do so and must not try. The first piece of
advice I would give any senior commander is to have a good Chief of
Staff; I always did.

The commander must decide how he will fight the battle before it
begins. He must then decide how he will use the military effort at his
disposal to force the battle to swing the way he wishes it to go; he
must make the enemy dance to his tune from the beginning, and never
vice versa. To be able to do this, his own dispositions must be so
balanced that he can utilise but need not react to the enemy's move
but can continue relentlessly with his own plan. The question of
balance" was a definite feature of my military creed. Another feature
was "grouping," i.e. seeing that each corps, which has to fight the
tactical battle, is suitably composed for its task. Skill in grouping
before the battle begins, and in re-grouping to meet the changing
tactical situation, is one of the hall-marks of generalship.

A commander must be very thorough in making his tactical plan;
once made, he must be utterly ruthless in carrying it out and forcing
it through to success.

Before the battle begins an Army Commander should assemble all
commanders down to the lieutenant-colonel level and explain to them
the problem, his intention, his plan, and generally how he is going to
fight the battle and make it go the way he wants. This practice is very
necessary; if every unit commander in the army knows what is wanted,
then all will fight the more intelligently and cohesion will be gained.
Unit commanders must, at the right moment and having due regard
to secrecy, pass on all relevant information to the regimental officers
and men. Every single soldier must know, before he goes into battle,
how the little battle he is to fight fits into the larger picture, and
how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole.

The whole army then goes into battle knowing what is wanted and
how it is to be achieved. And when the troops see that the battle has
gone exactly as they were told it would go, the increase in morale and
die confidence in the higher command is immense— and this is a most
important factor for the battles still to come.

The troops must be brought to a state of wild enthusiasm before
the operation begins. They must have that offensive eagerness and
that infectious optimism which comes from physical well-being. They
must enter the fight with the light of battle in their eyes and definitely
wanting to kill the enemy. In achieving this end, it is the spoken word
which counts, from the commander to his troops; plain speech is far
more effective than any written word.

82 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Operational command in the battle must be direct and personal, by
means of visits to subordinate H.Q. where orders are given verbally.
A commander must train his subordinate commanders, and his own
staff to work and act on verbal orders. Those who cannot be trusted
to act on dear and concise verbal orders, but want everything in
writing, are useless. There is far too much paper in circulation in the
Army, and no one can read even half of it intelligently.

Of course a commander must know in what way to give verbal
orders to his subordinates. No two will be the same; each will require
different treatment. Some will react differently from others; some will
be happy with a general directive whilst others will like more detail.
Eventually a mutual confidence on the subject will grow up between
the commander and his subordinates; once this has been achieved
there will never be any more difficulties or misunderstandings.

Command must be direct and personal. To this end a system of
liaison officers is valuable during the battle; I have always used such
a system from the days when I was commanding an infantry brigade.
It is essential to understand that battles are won primarily in the
hearts of men. When Britain goes to war the ranks of her armed forces
are filled with men from civil life who are not soldiers, sailors, or air
men by profession: and who never wanted to be. It must be realised
that these men are very different from the soldiers and sailors of the
Boer War era, or even of the 1914 period. The young man today reads
the newspapers. He goes to the cinema and sees how people live and
behave in other countries; he has the radio and television; his visual
world is therefore extensive and he can now measure his everyday
environment in a way which was impossible in the Victorian era. He
is daily taking in information and relating it to himself.

He can think, he can appreciate, and ho is definitely prepared to
criticise. He wants to know what is going on, and what you want him
to do— and why, and when. He wants to know that in the doing of it his
best interests will be absolutely secure in your hands,

If all these things axe understood by the military loader, and he acts
accordingly, he will find it is not difficult to gain the trust and con
fidence of such men* The British soldier responds to leadership in a
most remarkable way; and once you have won his heart he will follow
you anywhere.

Finally, I do not believe that today a commander can inspire great
armies, or single units, or oven individual men, and lead them to
achieve great victories, unless he has a proper sense of religious truth;
he must be prepared to acknowledge it, and to lead his troops in the
light of that truth. He must always keep his finger on the spiritual
pulse of his armies; he must be sure that the spiritual purpose which
inspires thorn is right and true, and is clearly expounded to one and
all. Unless he does this, he can expect no lasting success. For all loader-

My Doctrine of Command 83

ship, I believe, is based on the spiritual quality, the power to inspire
others to follow; this spiritual quality may be for good, or evil. In
many cases in the past this quality has been devoted towards personal
ends, and was partly or wholly evil; whenever this was so, in the end
it failed. Leadership which is evil, while it may temporarily succeed,
always carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction.

This is only a short explanation of a very big subject And I realise,
of course, that it is very dogmatic. I have tried to state briefly, to boil
down, what I believe to be the essence of the matter. But it may be
enough to enable the reader to appreciate better what lay at the back
of my mind when I arrived in Cairo on the morning of the lath August
1942-

CHAPTER 7

Eighth Army

My Thoughts During the Flight to Egypt

I WAS taking with me the military creed which I have just outlined.
But how to apply it?
The topography of North Africa was different from that to which
I had been used. I had always been interested in the relationship
between geography and strategy; this of course has to be carried a
stage lower, and a relationship established between topography and
the actual conduct of operations. As I understood it the objective was
Tripoli, the next large port westwards from Alexandria. There were
several small ports in between such as Tobruk, Benghazi, and other
smaller ones. The country generally between Alamein and Tripoli
was flat desert but three points of interest concerning it were upper
most in my mind.

Ftrrt— The one metalled or tarmac road, which hugged the coast
the whole way to Tripoli. This road was clearly a main supply axis,
from port to port; but it was also an axis of main movement for forces.

Second-The Jebel Akhdur (The Green Mountains), a hilly area
lying roughly between Tobruk and Benghazi which was sometimes
referred to as the Cyrenaica "bulge" or more usually as simply "the
Jebel."

This was clearly an important area but in previous campaigns it
had usually been outflanked. If held strongly, with forces trained to
attack southwards from it, it would be a valuable feature to possess
and could not be by-passed.

Third— The Agheila position, usually referred to by the Germans as
Mersa Brega. This was an area of soft sand and salt pans at the south
ernmost point of the Gulf of Sirte, and stretching inland to the south
for many miles. There were only a few tracks through this sand sea,

84

Eighth Army 85

and so long as Rommel held the area he could hold up our advance,
or alternatively could debouch at will against us. Our advance had
taken us up to the Agheila position in February 1941 and again in
early 1942; but on neither occasion had we been able to capture and
to occupy the position in strength, and since March 1941 it had re
mained in Rommel's possession.

My thinking on topography left me with the conviction that the
four main features that I must work into my plans were: the coast
road to Tripoli, the ports along the coast, the Jebel between Tobruk
and Benghazi, and die Agheila position. In my flight from Gibraltar
to Cairo I was circling this very territory; the direct route was not
safe for an aircraft flying alone and we took a detour to the south by
night, to hit the Nile well south of Cairo in the early dawn.

The next point in my thinking concerned the forces which would be
available to me, and how best to relate them to this topography.

From what I read and heard, Rommel's forces consisted of holding
troops who manned static defence positions and held vital areas of
ground, and mobile troops for counter-attack and to form the spear
head of offensives. The holding forces consisted largely of Italians and
were mostly unarmoured; the mobile forces were German and for the
greater part armoured. The corps d&lite was the Panzer Army consist
ing of i$th Panzer Division, 2ist Panzer Division, and goth Light
Division.

I came to the conclusion that the Eighth Army must have its own
Panzer Army— a corps strong in armour, well equipped, and well
trained. It must never hold static fronts; it would be the spearhead of
our offensives. Because of the lack of such a corps we had never done
any lasting good. The formation of this corps of three or four divisions
must be a priority task.

Then there was the question of morale. From what I had learnt
the troops had their tails down and there was no confidence in the
higher command. This would have to be put right at once, but until
I had actually got the feel of things myself I could not decide how
to set about it.

These thoughts, and many others, passed through my mind on the
journey and when I landed in Egypt the problem was beginning to
clarify in my mind. I was confident that the answers to the problems
would come to me once I got to real grips with them.

I was not looking forward to my meeting with Auchinleck. I had
heard certain things about his methods of command and knew that I
could never serve happily under him. I also considered that he was a
poor picker of men. A good judge of men would never have selected
General Corbett to be his Chief of Staff in the Middle East. And to
suggest that Corbett should take command of the Eighth Army, as
Audhinleck did, passed all comprehension.

86 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Again, nobody in his senses would have sent Ritchie to succeed
Cunningham in command of the Eighth Army; Ritchie had not the
experience or qualifications for the job and in the end he had to be
removed too. Later, after he had gained experience in command of a
division and a corps, Ritchie did very well in the campaign in North-
West Europe; he was put into an impossible position when he was
sent to command the Eighth Army.

On the 5th August 1942 the Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) had
visited General Auchinleck at H.Q, Eighth Army in the desert.
Churchill was on his way to Moscow. Auchinleck had assumed direct
command of the Eighth Army after he had relieved Ritchie of this
command, and was also C.-in-C. Middle East. The Prime Minister was
accompanied by the C.I.G.S. (Brooke). The general situation was
investigated and it was pointed out to Auchinleck that he could not
go on commanding the Middle East and also Eighth Army; he himself
must return to G.H.Q. in Cairo and someone else must command the
Eighth Army. Auchinleck agreed with Brooke's proposal that I should
come to Egypt and command the Eighth Army.

Field-Marshal Smuts was in Cairo at the time and the matter was
discussed with him later that day. The Prime Minister and Smuts both
favoured Gott, who had made a great name for himself in the desert
and who was strongly backed by general opinion in the Middle East.

On the 6th August the Prime Minister sent a telegram to the War
Cabinet regarding the changes he proposed to make. These included
the splitting-otf of Persia and Irak from the Middle East Command, the
replacement of Auchinleck by Alexander, and the assignment of
the command of the Eighth Army to Gott. But Gott was shot down in
an aircraft and killed on the 7th August and next day I was ordered
to take command. On the same day Brigadier Jacob (now Sir Ian
Jacob of the B.B.C.) took a letter from the Prime Minister to General
Auchinleck at H.Q, Eighth Army in the desert telling him he was to
be relieved of his command. On the 9th August, Alexander arrived
in Cairo and met Axtehinleck, who had by then come in from the
desert, having handed over acting command of the Eighth Army to
General Ramsclen, the commander of 30 Corps.

It is now clear to me that the appointment of Gott to command
the Eighth Army at that moment woxild have been a mistake. I had
never met him; he was clearly a fine soldier and had done splendid
work in. the desert. But from all accounts he was completely worn
out and needed a rest. He himself knew this. He said to a mutual
friend: "I am very tared. Also we have tried every club in the bag
and have failed. A new brain is wanted out here on this job; it's an
old job but it needs a new brain* If they want me to do it I will try.
But they ought to get someone else, a new man from England."

I arrived at an airfield outside Cairo early on the i2th August. I was

Eighth Army 87

met and taken to the Mena House Hotel near the Great Pyramid,
where General Auchinleck had a room; there I had a bath and break
fast, and was then driven to Middle East H.Q. in Cairo. I arrived there
soon after 10 a.m. and was taken straight to see Auchinleck. It was
very hot and I was wearing service dress as in England; I had seut
my AJD.C. off to buy some desert kit.

Auchinleck took me into his map-room and shut the door; we were
alone. He asked me if I knew he was to go. I said that I did. He then
explained to me his plan of operations; this was based on the fact that
at all costs the Eighth Army was to be preserved "in being" and must
not be destroyed in battle. If Rommel attacked in strength, as was
expected soon, the Eighth Army would fall back on the Delta; if Cairo
and the Delta could not be held, the army would retreat southwards
up the Nile, and another possibility was a withdrawal to Palestine.
Plans were being made to move the Eighth Army H.Q. back up the
Nile.

I listened in amazement to this exposition of his plans. I asked one
or two questions, but I quickly saw that he resented any question
directed to immediate changes of policy about which he had already
made up his mind. So I remained silent.

He then said I was to go down to the desert the next day and spend
two days at Eighth Army H.Q., getting into the picture and learning
the game. He was himself still commanding the Eighth Army, and he
had ordered Ramsden to act for him, I was not to take over command
till the isth August, the day on which he would himself hand over
to Alexander; he wished these two events to be simultaneous. In the
event of an enemy attack, or of some crisis occurring, he himself would
at once come to Eighth Army H.Q. and take direct command again
from Ramsden. It all seemed most peculiar and I got out of the room
as soon as I decently could.

I then went in search of Alexander; I soon found him in the head
quarters, calm, confident and charming— as always.

I would like to make the point now, categorically, how lucky I
was to have "Alex" as my C.-in-C. I could not have served under a
better Chief; we were utterly different, but I liked him and respected
him as a man. I will enlarge on this as my tale develops.

I at once put to him my plan for creating a reserve corps for the
Eighth Army, strong in armour, similar to Rommel's. He agreed; but
he was not yet C.-in-C. It was obviously useless to discuss the matter
with Auchinleck or his Chief of Staff; they were both to go. So I went
off to find the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major-General (now
Field-Marshal Sir John) Harding. He had been a student under me at
the Camberley Staff College and I had the highest opinion of his
ability* He did not know what Alexander and myself were doing in
Cairo; so I told him. I then put the whole plan to him and asked if

88 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

he could form the corps which I wanted from the bits and pieces
scattered around Egypt; 300 new Sherman tanks were due at Suez
from America on the 3rd September and these would provide the
equipment for the armoured divisions. He said he would go into it
and I arranged to come back and see him again at 6 p.m. that eve
ning to get the answer, and said I would ask Alexander to come with
me. Alexander and I then went off to lunch at Shepheard's Hotel,
where we discussed the whole affair. I outlined to him my ideas and
got his general agreement to the course of action I would pursue in
the Eighth Army. I spent the afternoon buying clothes suitable for the
desert in August; these were badly needed, as having spent a busy
day in Cairo in August in English serge uniform I was more than hot!
I had been asked to stay that night at the British Embassy in Cairo,
and had arranged that the Brigadier General Staff, Eighth Army, was
to meet me the next morning at the cross-roads west of Alexandria at
9 a.m. and take me to Eighth Army H.Q.

At 6 p.m. Alexander and I went back to G.H.Q. to see Harding;
he said he could produce the corps we wanted* It would be 10 Corps
and would consist of:

ist Armoured Division]

8th Armoured Division L Each of H

loth Armoured Division J

One armoured brigade
One infantry brigade
Divisional troops

New Zealand Division— Two infantry brigades and one
armoured brigade

This was splendid and we told him to go ahead.

One more thing had to be done that day and that was to collect a
second A.D.C. I had brought ouc with me from England, Captain
Spooner in the Royal Norfolk Regiment; either he nor myself had
campaigned in Egypt and I needed a second one who knew well the
ways of life in the desert. I was told that Gott had recently taken on
a young officer in the nth Hussars; he had not been in the aircraft
when Gott was shot down, and was now in Cairo, and he might be
what I wanted. He came to see me. His name was John Postou; he
was a Harrow boy, and had hardly left school when the war began.
He could see I was a lieut.-general and he knew I wanted an A.D.G;
but he had never heard of me before and he did not know what I was
doing in Egypt. I said to him: "My name is Montgomery. I arrived this
morning from England and I am going down to the desert tomorrow
to take command of the Eighth Army, I have not been in the desert
before and I want an A.D.C. who will go about with me and geoerally
help me. Will you come to me as my A.D.C.?"

He was clearly somewhat startled; this was highly secret news,
known to very few.

He didn't answer at once; he just looked at me, straight in the face.

Eighth Army 89

He looked sad; he had just been with Gott, who was known all over
the Middle East and was obviously a hero to all young officers. And
now his master was dead. I said nothing, but just waited for his
answer: looking into a pair of steady grey eyes.

At last he said: "Yes, sir; I would like to come with you."

I could not have made a better choice. We trod the path together
from Alamein to the Elbe, fighting our way through ten countries. I
was completely devoted to him. He was killed in Germany in the last
week of the war. The Promised Land by then was not so very far
away and he, who had travelled so far and fought so hard, gave his
young life that others might enjoy it.

At 5 a.m. on the 13th August I left the British Embassy by car to go
down to the desert.

The B.G.S.* of the Eighth Army was Brigadier (now Major-General
Sir Francis) de Guingand. "Freddie" de Guingand and I were old
friends; we had first met in York when I was a major and he was a
newly-joined second-lieutenant; we had met again in Egypt in 1932
and *933> to Quetta in 1935, and in 1939 when he was a sort of mill*
tary assistant to Hore-Belisha, who was Secretary of State for War.
He had a quick and fertile brain and I had in the past regarded "him
as an outstanding young officer. There he was again, waiting for me
as had been arranged at the cross-roads outside Alexandria, where
the road from Cairo turned westwards along the coast. He looked thin
and worried; he was obviously carrying a heavy burden. I realised
at once it was essential to re-establish the former close friendship
before tackling the main problem; so I made him get into my car and
I talked about our past days together, and we had a good laugh over
several episodes I recalled. He quickly became less tense and after a
while I said: "Well, Freddie my lad, you chaps seem to have got
things into a bit of a mess here. Tell me all about it."

He then produced a document which he had written for me, giving
the situation and all the relevant facts. I said: "Now, Freddie, don't
be silly. You know I never read any papers when I can get the person
concerned to tell me himself. Put that bumf away and unburden your
soul,"

He laughed and I saw at once I would now get a first class review
of the present situation and the causes of it— with nothing held back
We sat dose together with a map on our knees and he told me the
story; the operational situation, the latest intelligence about the enemy,
the generals commanding in the various sectors, the existing orders
of Audbinleck about future action, his own views about things. I let
him talk on. Occasionally I asked a question but only to clarify some
point. When he had done, there was silence for a moment or two:
then I asked about the morale of the officers and men. He said it
*Brigacher General Staff.

90 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

wasn't good; the Eighth Army wanted a clear lead and a firm grip
from the top; there was too much uncertainty and he thought the
"feel of the thing" was wrong. I did not press him on this point; I
knew he was trying to be loyal to his past chief.

The time passed quickly and in due course we left the coast road
and turned south along a track into the open desert. We were quiet
now and I was thinking: chiefly about de Guingand, and I have no
doubt he was thinking about me and his own future.

The magnitude of the task in front of me was beginning to be appar
ent I knew I could not tackle it alone; I must have someone to help
me, a man with a quick and clear brain, who would accept responsi
bility, and who would work out the details and leave me free to
concentrate on the major issues— in fact, a Chief of Staff who would
handle all the detailed and intricate staff side of the business and leave
me free to command. I knew that if I once got immersed in the details
of the "dog's breakfast" that was being set in front of me, I would fail
as others had failed before me.

Was Freddie de Guingand this man?

We were complete opposites; ho lived on his nerves and was highly
strung; in ordinary life he liked wine, gambling, and good food.
Did these differences matter? I quickly decided they did not; indeed,
differences were assets.

I have always considered that two people who are exactly the same
do not make the best team. He was about 14 years younger than I
but we had been great friends in the past and as I looked at him, thin
and worried as he was, the old affection returned. And he had a first
class brain, which was capable of working at high speed. Furthermore
ho knew me and my ways, and that was important. If he was to be
the man he must bo given the necessary power; he must be Chief of
Staff, not just Chief of the General Stuff.

But the British Army did not work on the Chief of Staff principle;
u commander hud u number of principal staff officers under him and
he was supposed to co-ordinate their activities himself. This was
impossible in the situation now confronting me. How could I co-ordi
nate all the staff work of the desert campaign? That is what all the
others had done and it had led them to lose sight of the essentials;
they had become immersed in details and hud failed.

Before we arrived at Eighth Army ILQ. I had decided that de
Guingand was the man; I would make him my Chief of Staff with full
powers and together we would do the job. But I did not tell him then;
I thought I would wait and announce it in front of the whole staff, so
as to build him up in their eyes and make clear the difference the new
appointment represented.

I have never regretted that decision. Freddie de Guingand and I
went through the rest of the war together. Wherever I went, he came

Eighth Army 91

as my Chief of Staff; we journeyed side by side from Alamein to
Berlin. And as we went, he grew in stature and I realised how lucky I
was. He was a brilliant Chief of Staff and I doubt if such a one has
ever before existed in the British Army or will ever do so again:
although of course here I am prejudiced.

As we bumped over the desert track I came to the conclusion that
I now had two tremendous assets. Behind me was Alexander, a firm
friend and ally, who could be relied on to support me and do all that
I asked of him— so long as it was sound, and I was successful. And by
my side would be de Guingand, my trusted Chief of Staff. What was
necessary next was to get good and reliable subordinate commanders
below me.

With these thoughts in my mind I was quite cheerful when we
arrived at the desert headquarters of the Eighth Army at about 11 a.m.
The sight that met me was enough to lower anyone's morale. It was
a desolate scene; a few trucks, no mess tents, work done mostly in
trucks or in the open air in the hot sun, flies everywhere. I asked where
Auchinleck used to sleep; I was told that he slept on the ground out
side his caravan. Tents were forbidden in the Eighth Army; everyone
was to be as uncomfortable as possible, so that they wouldn't be more
comfortable than the men. All officers' messes were in the open air
where, of course, they attracted the flies of Egypt. In the case of the
mess of senior officers which I was inheriting, a mosquito net had been
erected round the table; but it didn't shade one from the sun and the
flies, once inside, could not get out. I asked where was the Air Force
H.Q. I was told they were many miles back on the sea-shore, near
Burg-el-Arab; the Army and the Air Forces appeared to be fighting
two separate battles, without that close personal relationship which is
so essential. The whole atmosphere of the Army Headquarters was
dismal and dreary.

The acting Army Commander, Lt.-Gen. Ramsden, met me. I knew
him of old since he had commanded the Hampshire Regiment in my
8th Division in Palestine in 1938-39; he was a very good battalion
commander in those days and I had not met him since. He explained
the situation to me. I cross-examined him about the Army plans for a
withdrawal if Rommel attacked; certain orders had been issued about
the withdrawal but they were indefinite. There was an air of uncer
tainty about everything in the operation line, nor was Army H.Q. in
close touch with the H.Q. of the Desert Air Force.

It was clear to me that the situation was quite unreal and, in fact,
dangerous. I decided at once to take action. I had been ordered not
to take over command of the Eighth Army till the 1561 August; it was
still only the i3th. I knew it was useless to consult G.H.Q. and that
I must take full responsibility myself. I told General Ramsden he was
to return at once to his corps; he seemed surprised as he had been

92 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

placed in acting command of the Army, but he went. I then had lunch,
with the flies and in the hot sun. During lunch I did some savage
drinking. After lunch I wrote a telegram to G.H.Q. saying that I had
assumed command of Eighth Army as from 2 p.m. that day, the isth
August; this was disobedience, but there was no comeback. I then
cancelled all previous orders about withdrawal.

I issued orders that in the event of enemy attack there would be
no withdrawal; we would fight on the ground we now held and if we
couldn't stay there alive we would stay there dead. I remembered an
inscription I had seen in Greece when touring that country with my
wife in 1933. It was carved by the Greeks at Thermopylae to com
memorate those who died defending the pass over 2000 years ago, and
its English version is well known:

"Go, tell die Spartans, thou diat passeth by,
That here, obedient to their laws, we lie/*

We would do the same, if need be.

I thought that was enough for the moment, until I had seen more
of the ground and had met some of the subordinate commanders. I
decided to leave the H.Q. quickly in case any repercussion came from
G.H.Q. about my sudden seizure of command of the Eighth Army.
But before going I told de Guingand to assemble the whole staff at
6 p.m, that evening, so that I could speak to them. I had already met
Ramsdon, Commander 30 Corps, on the northern flank. I now set
out to H.Q. 13 Corps, on the southern flank, where I arranged to
meet General Freyberg; his substantive command was the New
Zealand division, but since the death of Gott he had been acting in
command of 13 Corps.

On the way to the H.Q. of 13 Corps I sat in the back of the car
and studied the map. My guide, an officer of Army H.Q. whose job
it was to know the way always to 13 Corps, sat in front with the
driver. After a time the car stopped and I asked my guide if he knew
where we were; he said he did not know and was lost.

I then noticed we were inside a large wired-in enclosure and I
asked what it was; he said we were in the middle of a minefield. I
wasn't too pleased, I told the driver to back die car along our tracks
till we were out of the minefield, by which time my guide had located
himself and we started off again*

I had a good talk with Freyberg, and later widi Morshcad, who
commanded the gth Australian Division. Those two were fine soldiers,
and I say this not only because diey both approved whole-heartedly
of my ideas, which I outlined to them.

I got back to Army H.Q. rather late and found die staff waiting
for me. De Guingand had assembled them a few yards from the

Eighth Army 93

caravan which was my office; it was now 6.30 p.m., and in the cool
of the evening I addressed my new staff.

I introduced myself to them and said I wanted to see them and
explain things. Certain orders had already been issued which they
knew about, and more would follow. The order "no withdrawal" in
volved a complete change of policy and they must understand what
that policy was, because they would have to do the detailed staff work
involved. If we were to fight where we stood the defences must have
depth; all transport must be sent back to rear areas; ammunition,
water, rations, etc., must be stored in the forward areas. We needed
more troops in the Eighth Army in order to make the "no withdrawal"
order a possibility. There were plenty of troops back in the Delta,
preparing the defence of that area; but the defence of the cities of
Egypt must be fought out here at Alamein. Two new divisions had
arrived from England and were being used to dig positions to defend
the Delta; I would get them out here.

Then, from all the bits and pieces in Egypt I was going to form a
new corps, the loth Corps, strong in armour; this would never hold
the line but would be to us what the Africa Korps was to Rommel;
the formation of this new 10 Corps had already begun.

The policy of fighting the enemy in brigade groups, Jock columns,
and with divisions split up into bits and pieces all over title desert was
to cease. In future divisions would fight as divisions.

I did not like the atmosphere I found at Army H.Q. No one could
have a high morale at the headquarters if we stuck ourselves down in
a dismal place like this and lived in such discomfort.

We ought to have the headquarters by the sea; where we could
work hard, bathe, and be happy.

My orders from Alexander were quite simple; they were to destroy
Rommel and his Army. I understood Rommel was expected to attack
its shortly. If he came soon it would be tricky, if he came in a week,
all rigjht, but give us two weeks and Rommel could do what he liked;
he would be seen off and then it would be our turn. But I had no
intention of launching our attack until we were ready; when that
time came we would hit Rommel for six right out of Africa.

There was clearly much work to be done and it couldn't be done
where we were, in all this discomfort. The H.Q. would move as
soon as possible to a site on the sea-shore near the Air Force H.Q.;
together with the Air Force we would work out the plan for our
offensive. The order forbidding tents was cancelled; let tents and mess
furniture be got and let us all be as comfortable as possible.

Finally, I explained my methods of working, and my dislike of
paper and details. I appointed de Guingand to be Chief of Staff of
the Eighth Army; every order given by him would be regarded as

94 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

coming from me, and would be obeyed instantly; he had my com
plete confidence and I gave him authority over the whole headquarters.

My talk was listened to in complete silence. One could have heard
a pin drop if such a thing was possible in the sand of the desert! But
it certainly had a profound effect and a spirit of hope, anyway of
clarity, was born that evening; one thing was very clear to the staff,
there was to be no more uncertainty about anything. But the old
hands thought that my knees were very white!

My first day in the desert, the isth August, had been a good one,
though long and tiring. Much had been achieved; but much still
remained to be done. I knew I must be careful for one more day,
until Auchinleck had departed on the i$th August; the existing
regime at G.H.Q. regarded me as an unpleasant new broom* So far
there had been complete silence from G.H.Q. so far as I was con
cerned; but they had only been notified of certain orders I had issued
and I had made no demands on them for anything. Once Alexander
was C.-in-C. on the morning of the isth August all would be well. He
would do all that we sought and would see it was done at once; I
had no doubt on that score. On de Guingand's advice I decided to
make no demands on G.H.Q. as a result of the change in policy till
the evening of the 14th August He had great wisdom and his advice
on these matters was always sound; as time went on he often restrained
me from rushing my fences. We wanted a lot, but I also needed to do
some reconnaissances before I could make ready my plan.

I had a good talk that night with de Guingand. He now had con
siderable powers and he wanted to know my views on certain matters,
I was going to be out all day on 14th August and a great deal even
after that; he was anxious to get hold of me in the evenings. By the
time I went to bed that night I was tired. But I know that we were
on the way to success, I'm afraid that it was with an insubordinate
smile that I fell asleep: I was issuing orders to an Army which someone
else reckoned he commanded!

I was woken up soon after dawn the next morning by an officer
with the morning situation report. I was extremely angry and told
him no one was ever to come near me with situation reports; I did
not want to be bothered with details of patrol actions and things of
that sort. He apologised profusely and said that Auchinleck was
always woken early and given the dawn reports,

I said I was not Auchinleck and that if anything was wrong the
Chief of Staff would tell me; if nothing was wrong I didn't want to
be told. The offending officer was very upset; so we had an early
morning cup of tea together and a good talk, and he went away
comforted. The Chief of Staff issued new orders about situation re
ports and I was never bothered again.

It was soon pretty clear to me, after talking with de Guingand,

Eighth Army 95

that all indications pointed to an early attack by Rommel; he would
make a last attempt to get to Cairo and Alexandria, and secure the
Delta, It was evident that if so, he would probably make his main
effort on the south or inland flank, and would then carry out a right
hook in order to get in behind the Eighth Army.

He could not leave the Army intact and pass on towards the flesh-
pots of Egypt; he must first destroy the Eighth Army, after which the
flesh-pots were all his for the asking.

That being the case, the outline of my plan was at once clear.

The northern flank must be strengthened on the front of 30 Corps
and made very strong with minefields and wire, so that it could be
held with a minimum of troops; I need not visit that front for the
moment. The southern flank demanded careful consideration; it was
there I would go. I also wanted a new commander for 13 Corps on
the flank; no one had yet been appointed to succeed Gott

I spent the day examining the ground on the inter-corps boundary
and on the southern flank, and at once saw the importance of two
dominating areas of ground: the Ruweisat Ridge and the Alam Haifa
Ridge. Both were important but the key to the whole Alamein posi
tion was the Alam Haifa Ridge. This was several miles in rear of the
Alamein Line and south-east from the Ruweisat Ridge; it was un
defended, because there were no troops available.

I had pondered deeply over what I had heard about armoured
battles in the desert and it seemed to me that what Rommel liked
was to get our armour to attack him; he then disposed of his own
armour behind a screen of anti-tank guns, knocked out our tanks,
and finally had the field to himself. I was determined that would not
happen if Rommel decided to attack us before we were ready to
launch a full-scale offensive against him. I would not allow our tanks
to rush out at him; we would stand firm in the Alamein position,
hold the Ruweisat and Alam Haifa Ridges securely, and let him beat
up against them. We would fight a static battle and my forces would
not move; his tanks would come up against our tanks dug-in in hull-
down positions at the western edge of the Alam Haifa Ridge.

During the day I met on the southern flank the general command
ing the 7th Armoured Division, the famous Desert Rats. We 'discussed
the expected attack by Rommel and he said there was only one ques
tion to be decided: who would loose the armour against Rommel?
He thought he himself should give the word for that to happen. I
replied that no one would loose the armour; it would not be loosed
and we would let Rommel bump into it for a change. This was a
new idea to him and he argued about it a good deal.

When I got back to my headquarters that night the outline of my
immediate plans for strengthening the Alamein position were clear
in my mind. I was determined to make the position so strong that we

96 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

could begin our preparations for our own great offensive and not
become preoccupied by any attack that Rommel might decide to
make. All information seemed to suggest that he would attack towards
the end of the month in the full moon period; I wanted to begin my
preparations for the battle of Alamein before then, and to continue
those preparations whatever Rommel might do.

Therefore we must be strong, with our forces so "balanced" that I
need never react to his thrusts or moves: strong enough to see him
off without disrupting the major preparations. That was my object.

I discussed the problem with de Guingand and we decided to ask
G.H.Q. for the 44th Division to be sent to the Eighth Army at once,
and to position it to hold die Alam Haifa Ridge. Once that ridge
was securely held by a complete division, well dug in and properly
supported by armour (not to be loosed), I really had not much more
to bother about. I asked that another division, the sist, should be sent
to me later; this division was beginning to arrive at Suez. The details
of the tactical plan on the southern flank I must leave to 13 Corps.
But at the moment I had no Corps Commander. I decided to ask
Alexander to get General Horrocks flown out from England at once
to command the 13 Corps. Horrocks had been in my 3rd Division as
a battalion commander; I had got him a brigade and then a division
in my corps in England; I now wanted him to have a corps in my
Army. I knew I could not have a better man and so it turned out;
he was exactly what was wanted for the job which lay ahead.

We had a little trouble with the staff at G.H.Q. when do Guingand
telephoned these requests that night I then got direct on to Alexander
and he agreed to everything; I do not know if he consulted Audhinleck
who was due to go the next morning.

And so by the isth August, the day on which Auchinlcck had
ordered me to assume command of the Eighth Army, I had already
been in command for two clays and we had got things moving in the
right direction. Above all, by taking grip we had already achieved a
definite lift in morale. This was important as the spirit of the warrior
is the greatest single factor in war.

We now had to begin planning for what was to be known as die
Battle of Alamein. Time was pressing and I already knew tliat I would
be urged to attack in September. But before describing certain aspects
of the preparation and conduct of that battle, we must have a quick
look at the Battle of Alam Haifa— which was a model defensive battle
under the conditions in which it was fought, and which was from
my point of view an essential preliminary to the Battle of Alamein.
Without Alam Haifa, Alamein might not have been so successful.

The Prime Minister visited the Eighth Army on the igth August
on his way back from Moscow. I took him round the front and ex
plained to him my plans for defeating Rommers expected attack and

Eighth Army 97

also my ideas about our own offensive. He stayed that night with me
at our new headquarters on the shore near Burg-el-Arab, to which
we had moved. He bathed in the Mediterranean before dinner; he
had no bathing costume and I had some difficulty in keeping the Press
away as he walked towards the sea in his shirt. He was interested in a
group of soldiers in the distance and said how curious it was that they
all wore white bathing trunks. I had to explain that no one wore any
bathing kit in the Eighth Army. The soldiers wore shorts all day and
often not even a shirt; their bodies got very brown from the sun.
What in the distance looked like white bathing drawers was actually
white flesh, which did not get brown because of the khaki shorts!
We had great fun that night in our Mess and de Guingand had ar
ranged suitable wine and old brandy for the Prime Minister.

When he left the next day I asked him to sign my autograph book.
He wrote this personal note. I had assumed command of the Eighth
Army on the isth August, the anniversary of the Battle of Blenheim.

"May the anniversary of Blenheim which marks the opening of
the new Command bring to the Commander of the Eighth Army
and his troops the fame and fortune they will surely deserve.

Winston S. Churchill*
aoth August 1942

CHAPTER 8

The Battle of Alam Haifa

31st August to 6th September 1942

IN ADDITION to the general plot which I have just outlined, I had
also made it clear to the Eighth Army that "bellyaching" would
not be tolerated. By this I meant that type of indiscipline which
arises when commanders are active in putting forward unsound rea
sons for not doing what they are told to do. In the Eighth Army orders
had generally been queried by subordinates right down the line; each
thought he knew better than his superiors and often it needed firm
action to get things done. I was determined to stop this state of affairs
at once. Orders no longer formed "the base for discussion/' but for
action.

What I now needed was a battle which would be fought in accord
ance with my ideas and not those of former desert commanders;
ftirthermore, it must be a resounding victory and would have to come
before our own offensive, so that confidence of officers and men in
the high command would be restored and they would enter on the
stern struggle which lay further ahead with an enhanced morale.
They must come to believe.

I had taken command of truly magnificent material; it did not take
me long to see that. The Eighth Army was composed of veteran fight
ing divisions. But officers and men were bewildered at what had
happened and this had led to a loss of confidence. "Brave but baffled"
the Prime Minister had called them.

This loss of confidence, combined with the bellyaching which went
on and which was partly the cause of it, were becoming dangerous
and could only be eradicated by a successful battle: a battle in which
Rommel was defeated easily, and must be seen to have been beaten,
and with few casualties to the Eighth Army.

98

The Battle of Alam Haifa 99

I could not myself attack; Rommel must provide that opportunity
for me. But in order to reap the full benefit, I must correctly forecast
the design of his expected attack and determine in advance how we
would defeat it This was not difficult to do.

My intelligence staff were certain the "break-in" to our positions
would be on the southern flank; this would be followed by a left
wheel, his armoured forces being directed on the Alam Haifa and
Ruweisat ridges. I agreed, and my plans were based on this forecast.
We were pretty clear about the timing, the direction, and the strength
of his attack. The rest lay on my plate.

I decided to hold the Alam Haifa Ridge strongly with the 44th
Division and to locate my tanks just south of its western end. Once
I was sure that the enemy main thrust was being directed against the
Alam Haifa Ridge, I planned to move the armour to the area between
the west of the ridge and the New Zealand positions in the main
Alamein line. I was so sure that this movement of my own armour
would take place that I ordered it to be actually rehearsed; and when
it did take place on the morning of the ist September I had some 400
tanks in position, dug in, and deployed behind a screen of 6-pounder
anti-tank guns. The strictest orders were issued that the armour was
not to be loosed against Rommel's forces; it was not to move; the
enemy was to be allowed to beat up against it and to suffer heavy
casualties.

It was obvious to me that Rommel could not just by-pass my forces
and go off eastwards to Cairo; if he did so, I could have descended on
his rear with 400 tanks and that would have been the end of his Army.

I then decided that my extreme south flank should be mobile; the
7th Armoured Division would hold a wide front and, as the attack
came, would give way before it. When the attack swung left-handed
towards the Alam Haifa Ridge, the 7th Armoured Division would
harry it from the east and south, and generally "shoot it up."

General Horrocks had by now arrived from England to command
13 Corps on my left flank and the details of the plan were placed
in his very capable hands. I insisted that in fighting his battle he was
not to allow 13 Corps, and particularly 7th Armoured Division, to
get mauled. They would have a part to play in our own offensive
in October, and I outlined to him the ideas which were forming in
my mind about that offensive. He entered into it with his characteristic
enthusiasm.

The sketch map (see Map, No. 12) will serve to illustrate the battle.
The design of Rommel's attack was exactly as had been forecast to
officers and men of the Eighth Army; we fought the battle as I had
laid down. Once Rommel's forces had beaten up against our strong
positions from the New Zealand Division area eastwards, they became
unable to move. We then concentrated on shooting them up from all

100 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

directions and the Desert Air Force in attacking them from the air.
This was very successful and after a few days the enemy losses in
tanks and soft-skinned vehicles were so severe that he had to consider
a withdrawal.

A most important factor which forced his eventual withdrawal was
the action of the Desert Air Force under Air Marshal Coningham.
Army and Air Force worked on one plan, closely knitted together, and
the two headquarters were side by side. It had seemed to me when I
arrived in the desert that the two Services were tending to drift apart
and that the true function of ah* power was not appreciated by com
manders in the Eighth Army. This battle brought us close together
again and for the rest of my time in the Eighth Army we remained
so.

A major factor in the overall air plan was Tedder's decision to send
his Wellingtons to bomb Tobruk behind Rommel's attack, so that his
last quick hope of re-supply vanished. This was the operative point
in Rommel's decision to call off the attack; he was already beaten,
and lack of petrol meant that he couldn't resume the attack. Tedder
bit his tail.

Once the plan to deal with the expected attack had been made and
preparations begun, I had tm*ned my attention to a consideration of
our own offensive.

Rommel's attack came on the night of the 3ist August. I had
gone to bed at my usual time and was asleep when the attack began
soon after midnight. De Guingand tells his own story about that night.
He deckled he should wake me up and tell me the news; he said I
merely replied "Excellent, couldn't be better" and went to sleep
again at once, and had breakfast at the usual time in the morning.
I don't remember but am prepared to believe him. I was confident
that if everyone obeyed orders, we must win this battle; my main
preoccupation was to see, in this my first battle with the Eighth Army,
that it was fought in complete accord with my master plan.

When I saw that Rommel's forces were in a bad way, I ordered a
thrust southwards from the New Zealand Division area to close the
gap through which they had entered our positions. The enemy reac
tion was immediate and violent; they began to pull back quickly
to the area of our minefield through which they had originally come.
We left them there and I called off the battle* Moreover, it suited me
to have their forces in strength on the southern flank since I was
considering making my main blow, later on, on the northern part of
the front. I remember Horrocks protesting to me that the enemy
remained in possession not only of our original minefields but also of
some good view points from which to observe his corps area. I replied
that he should get busy and make new minefields for his corps. As
regards the observation points, such as Himeimat, it suited me that

The Battle of Alam Haifa 101

Rommel should be able to have a good look at all the preparations for
attack we were making on our southern flank: they were a feint

I have sometimes been criticised for not following up Rommel's
withdrawal by launching the Eighth Army to the attack. There were
two reasons why I did not do so. First, I was not too happy about
the standard of training of the Army and also the equipment situation
was unsatisfactory; time was needed to put these right. And secondly,
I was not anxious to force Rommel to pull out and withdraw "in
being'* back to the Agheila position. If we were to carry out the
mandate, it was essential to get Rommel to stand and fight and then
to defeat him decisively. This had never happened to him before;
he had often retreated, but it was always for administrative reasons.
It was obvious that we would prefer to bring him to battle, when we
were ready, at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communications
—with oui-s short. Such would be his situation if he stood to fight
at Alamein,

Thus the Battle of Alam Haifa ended in the way we wanted. The
action of 13 Corps on the southern flank was all that could be desired.
Horrocks fought his battle in full accord with the master plan and
he deserves great credit for his action that day. He tells a story of
how I congratulated him when it was all over, and then proceeded
to tell him what he had done wrong and to give him a talk on how
to command a corps in battle.

I was interested to read in 1955 a book called Panzer Battles by
Von Mellenthin, who was on the operations staff of Rommel at this
time. He describes Alam Haifa as: "the turning point of the desert
war, and the first of a long series of defeats on every front which
foreshadowed the defeat of Germany."

On reflection, certain important lessons emerged from this battle.
It was an "army" battle. The power of the Eighth Army was devel
oped on a definite army plan and a firm grip was kept on the battle
at all times by Army H.Q. This led to a recognition among officers
and men of the necessity for one guiding mind which would control
their destinies, and after this battle they accepted me as that one
mind.

The Eighth Army consisted in the main of civilians in uniform,
not of professional soldiers. And they were, of course, to a man,
civilians who read newspapers. It seemed to me that to command
such men demanded not only a guiding mind but also a point of focus:
or to put it another way, not only a master but a mascot. And I
deliberately set about fulfilling this second requirement. It helped,
I felt sure, for them to recognise as a person— as an individual—the
man who was putting them into battle. To obey an impersonal figure
was not enough. They must know who I was. This analysis may sound
rather cold-blooded, a decision made in the study. And so, in origin,

102 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

it was: and I submit., rightly so. One had to reason out the best way
to set about commanding these men, to bring out their best, and to
weld them into an effective and a contented team which could answer
the calls I was going to make on them; and these were going to be
increasingly arduous. But I readily admit that the occasion to become
the necessary focus of their attention was also personally enjoyable.
For if I were able thereby to give something to them—and it was a
sense of unity which I was trying to create— I gained myself from the
experience by the way it enabled me to get to know them too, to
sense their morale and, as time went on, to feel the affection which
they generously extended to me. I started in the Alam Haifa battle
by wearing an Australian hat— first of all because it was an exceedingly
good hat for the desert, but soon because I came to be recognised by
it: outside the Australian lines, anywayl Later as readers may know, I
took a black beret, again for utilitarian reasons in the first place.

And the twin badges in the beret were, in origin, accidental; but
I quickly saw their functional result, and what started as a private joke
with the tank regiment which gave it to me became in the end the
means by which I came to be recognised throughout the desert. I soon
learnt that the arrival of the double-badged beret on die battlefield
was a help— they knew that I was about, that I was taking an intense
and personal interest in their doings, and that I was not just sitting
about somewhere safe in the rear issuing orders. The beret was func
tional in the way a "brass hat" could never have been. It became, if
you like, my signature. It was also very comfortable.

Then again I think the battle is noteworthy as heralding a reversal
of the previously accepted doctrine of "loosing" our own tanks at
Rommel's armour directly he attacked. With an imperfectly trained
army and inferior equipment it is necessary to adjust the tactics
accordingly. I refused to exploit our success as such action did not
suit my long-term plans.

And finally there was the raising of morale which follows a success
ful battle, in which the high command has foretold what will happen.
It had happened, and we had won with few casualties. In this case
the effect on morale was of tremendous importance. In my first few
days in the desert we had removed uncertainty by taking a tight grip
from Army Headquarters, and announcing a reorganisation which
was to hold our prospects of victory in the desert war. All this had
caused a feeling of relief. But the general atmosphere was: it looks
good, it sounds good, but will it work? There was of course a great
willingness to try and make it work, and a growing belief as the days
passed. But it was Alam Haifa which produced the final belief in me
and my methods, if you like, my prophecies, which was to make
Alamein possible.

All in all, the battle had achieved what I wanted. Besides the re-

The Battle of Alam Haifa 103

covery in morale, the Eighth Army had been given a trial run under
its new commander. Commanders, staffs, and troops, from myself
downwards, had worked together with the Air Force and had won
success.

When the battle was over I wrote to a friend in England, as follows:
"My first encounter with Rommel was of great interest. Luckily I
had time to tidy up the mess and to get my plans laid, so there was no
difficulty in seeing him off. I feel that I have won the first game, when
it was his service. Next time it will be my service, the score being
one-love."

We resumed our preparations for the Battle of Alamein; but certain
matters demanded immediate decision before they got properly under
way.

I had decided that in building up the Eighth Army for what lay
ahead I would concentrate on three essentials: leadership, equipment,
and training. All three were deficient. The equipment situation was
well in hand and I knew that Alexander would see that we got all
we needed. Training was receiving urgent attention. I soon realised
that although the Eighth Army was composed of magnificent material,
it was untrained; it had done much fighting, but little training. We
had just won a decisive victory, but it had been a static battle; I was
not prepared to launch the troops into an all-out offensive without
intensive prior training. I remember the shock I received on visiting
a certain unit and asking the C.O. if he trained his officers, and how it
was done. The C.O. replied without hesitation that he had handed
that task over to his second-in-command. I came across the second-
in-command later in the day and said: "I understand you are re
sponsible for training the officers in the unit. Tell me how you do it."
He replied that he did not do so, and that it was done by the C.O.
I ordered that a new C.O. be found for that unit at once; it was clear
that nobody trained the officers.

On the higher level I had to have three first-class Corps Com
manders. I had one for 13 Corps in Horrocks, and he had proved
himself in the Battle of Alam Haifa. I decided it was necessary to
replace Ramsden in 30 Corps and I asked for Major-General Sir
Oliver Leese who was commanding the Guards Armoured Division
in England. He was flown out at once and I never regretted that choice;
he was quite first class at Alamein and all through the campaign to
Tunis and later in Sicily. After long consultation with Alexander I
agreed to give 10 Corps, my corps d'&lite which was to resemble
Rommel's Panzer Army, to Lumsden; he had commanded the ist
Armoured Division in the desert and was highly spoken of in Middle
East circles. I hardly knew him and so could not agree with complete
confidence; but I accepted him on the advice of others. I had already
imported two new Corps Commanders from England and did not

104 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

want to make the Eighth Army think that none of its senior officers
was fit for promotion. I found it necessary to have a new commander
for the 7th Armoured Division and asked for Harding from G.H.Q.
in Cairo.

If we were to successfully blow a gap in Rommers defences
through which we could debouch, the artillery plan would be all-
important I came to the conclusion that I must have a new head
gunner at my headquarters. When I told this to a senior officer at
G.H.Q., he remarked that the present man was a delightful person and
was also a golf champion. I agreed he was delightful, but added that
unfortunately the game we were about to play was not golf. I asked
for Brigadier Kirkman from England whom I regarded as the best
artilleryman in the British Army. (He is now General Sir Sidney
Kirkman, and in charge of Civil Defence at the Home Office. )

I also wanted a first class senior chaplain. After considerable in
vestigation we found the man I wanted in Hughes, who was the
senior chaplain to a division. I never regretted that choice. Hughes
remained with me for the rest of the war; he then became Chaplain
General of the Army, being the first Territorial Army chaplain to do
so. Today he is Dean of Ripon. He was the ideal of what an Army
padre should be and became one of my greatest friends; he tells some
amusing stories of his first interview with me.

The head of my administration was Brigadier Robertson, now Gen
eral Sir Brian Robertson, the Chairman of the British Transport
Commission. I know him well as he had been a student under me at
the Staff College, Cambcrlcy; he was a most able officer and I had
no fears on that side of the house. He hud under him a highly efficient
assistant in Lieut-Colonel Miles Graham, now Major-General Sir
Miles Graham; when Robertson left me on promotion, Graham took
over his job and stayed with me to the end of the war.

Another who must be mentioned is Belchem. He was in the Staff
Duties and Organisation branch when I arrived in die desert; he was
a brilliant officer and after a period away from me, first as a Brigade-
Major and then in command of an armoured regiment, he rejoined my
headquarters and remained with me for the rest of the war as head of
my operations staff*

Finally I cast my eye over the Intelligence organisation at my head
quarters. I discovered there a major in the King's Dragoon Guards,
by name Williams (now Brigadier E. T. Williams, and Warden of
Rhodes House, Oxford). He was an Oxford don and had a brilliant
brain; as we shall see later it was a conversation with him which gave
me the idea which played a large part in winning the Battle of Alamein.
He was not the head of my Intelligence Staff but I was determined
that he soon must be. He went right through the rest of the war with
me.

The Battle of Alam Haifa 105

Having checked over the leadership problem and made the necessary
changes, I was satisfied that I had a team which would collectively
handle the task that lay ahead without difficulty. Some of them re
mained on my staff for the rest of the war: notably de Guingand,
Graham, Hughes, Belchem and Williams.

In war-time, when a successful commander has built up a highly
efficient staff team, he must take the chief members of the team with
him if he is moved to another appointment. The above five went with
me to 21 Army Group when I left the Eighth Army; there would not
have been time for me to have built up a new team before the landings
in Normandy.

Knowing what lay ahead, I pinned up three quotations in my
caravan when the Battle of Alam Haifa was over. They remained there
during the long journey from Alamein to Berlin and are still there,
that caravan now being at my home in Hampshire. The quotations
were as follows:

Prayer of Sir Francis Drake on the

morning of the attack on Cadiz

1587

O Lord God, when thou givest to Thy
servants to endeavour any great matter,
grant us also to know that it is not the
beginning, but the continuing of the
same, until it be thoroughly finished,
which yieldeth the true glory.

James Graham, Marquis of Montrose
1612-1650

He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
Who dare not put it to the touch,
To win or lose it all,

Henry V, Act TV, Scene I
O God of battles! steel my soldiers' hearts-

CHAPTER 9

The Battle of Alamein

23rd October to 4th November 1942

ALM HALFA had interfered with the preparations for our own
offensive, and delayed us. But the dividend in other respects
had been tremendous. Before Alam Haifa there was already a
willingness from below to do all that was asked, because of the grip
from above. And for the same reason there was a rise in morale, which
was cumulative. I think officers and men knew in their hearts that if
we lost at Alam Haifa we would probably have lost Egypt. They had
often been told before that certain things would happen; this time
they wanted to be shown, not just to be told. At Alam Haifa the
Eighth Army had been told, and then shown; and from the showing
came the solid rocklikc confidence in the high command, which was
never to be lost again.

The basic problem that confronted us after the Battle of Alam Haifa
was a difficult one. Wo were face to face with Rommel's forces be
tween the sea and the Qattara Depression, a distance of about 45
miles* The enemy was strengthening his defences to a degree previously
unknown in the desert, and these included deep and extensive mine
fields. There was no open flank. The problem was:

First—To punch a hole in the enemy positions.

Second—To pass 10 Corps, strong in armour and mobile troops,

through this hole into enemy territory.
Third-Then to develop operations so as to destroy Rommel's

forces.

This would be an immense undertaking. How could we obtain
surprise?
It seemed almost impossible to conceal from the enemy the fact

106

The Battle of Alamein 107

that we intended to launch an attack. I decided to plan for tactical
surprise, and to conceal from the enemy the exact places where the
blows would fall and the exact times. This would involve a great
deception plan and I will describe later some of the measures we took.
Next, a full moon was necessary. The minefield problem was such
that the troops must be able to see what they were doing. A waning
moon was not acceptable since I envisaged a real "dog-fight" for at
least a week before we finally broke out; a waxing moon was essential.
This limited the choice to one definite period each month. Owing to
the delay caused to our preparations by Rommers attack, we could
not be ready for the September moon and be sure of success. There
must be no more failures. Officers and men of the Eighth Army had
a hard life and few pleasures; and they put up with it. All they asked
for was success, and I was determined to see they got it this time in
full measure. The British people also wanted real success; for too long
they had seen disaster or at best only partial success. But to gain
complete success we must have time; we had to receive a quantity of
new equipment, and we had to get the army trained to use it, and also
rehearsed in the tasks which lay ahead. I had promised the Eighth
Army on arrival that I would not launch our offensive till we were
ready. I could not be ready until October. Full moon was the 24th
October. I said I would attack on the night of 23rd October, and
notified Alexander accordingly. The come-back from Whitehall was
immediate. Alexander received a signal from the Prime Minister to the
effect that the attack must be in September, so as to synchronise with
certain Russian offensives and with Allied landings which were to
take place early in November at the western end of the north African
coast (Operation TORCH). Alexander came to see me to discuss the
reply to be sent. I said that our preparations could not be completed
in time for a September offensive, and an attack then would fail: if
we waited until October, I guaranteed complete success. In my view
it would be madness to attack in September. Was I to do so? Alexander
backed me up whole-heartedly as he always did, and the reply was
sent on the lines I wanted. I had told Alexander privately that, in view
of my promise to the soldiers, I refused to attack before October; if a
September attack was ordered by Whitehall, they would have to get
someone else to do it. My stock was rather high after Alam Haifa!
We heard no more about a September attack.

THE PLAN

The gossip is, so I am told, that the plans for Alamein, and for the
conduct of the war in Africa after that battle, were made by Alexander
at G.H.Q. Middle East and that I merely carried them out. This is not

108 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

true. All the plans for Alamein and afterwards were made at Eighth
Army H.Q. I always kept Alexander fully informed; he never com
mented in detail on my plans or suggested any of his own; he trusted
me and my staff absolutely. Once he knew what we wanted he sup
ported us magnificently from behind; he never refused any request;
without that generous and unfailing support, we could never have
done our part. He was die perfect Commander-in-Chief to have in the
Middle East, so far as I was concerned. He trusted me.

The initial plan was made in the first days of September; immedi
ately after the Battle of Alam Haifa was over. This plan was to attack
the enemy simultaneously on both flanks. The main attack would be
made by 30 Corps ( Leese ) in the north and here I planned to punch
two corridors through the enemy defences and minefields. 10 Corps
(Lumsden) would then pass through these corridors and would posi
tion itself 011 important ground astride the enemy supply routes;
Rommel's armour would have to attack it, and would, I hoped, be
destroyed in the process. The sketch map (see Map, No. 14) shows
the plan. It will be seen that the defended area, including minefields,
through which the northern corridor was to be punched was 5 miles
deep.

In the south, 13 Corps (Horrocks) was to break into the enemy
positions and operate with 7th Armoured Division with a view to
drawing enemy armour in that direction; this would make it easier for
10 Corps to get out into the open in the north. 13 Corps was not to
suffer heavy casualties, and in particular yth Armoured Division was
to remain "in being'* and available for the mobile operations after the
break-out had been achieved. It will bo noted that my plan departed
from the traditional desert tactics of staging the main offensive on
the south or inland flank, and then wheeling towards the sea. I con
sidered that if my main attack was in the south there was only one
direction it could take after the break-in—and that was northwards.
The fact that a certain tactic had always been employed by all com
manders in the desert seemed to me a good reason for doing something
else* I planned to attack neither on my left flank nor on my right flank,
but somewhere right of centre; having broken in, I could then direct
my forces to the right or to the left us seemed most profitable. This
decision was not popular with the staff at G.H.Q. and pressure was
brought on rny Chief of Staff to influence me to change my mind.
Alexander never joined in the argument; he understood all my pro
posals and backed them to the hilt,

I was watching the training carefully and it was becoming apparent
to me that the Eighth Army was very untrained. The need for training
had never been stressed. Most commanders had come to the fore by
skill in fighting and because no better were available; many were
above their ceiling, and few were good trainers. By the end of Sep-

The Battle of Alamein 109

tember there were serious doubts in my mind whether the troops would
be able to do what was being demanded; the plan was simple but it
was too ambitious. If I was not careful, divisions and units would be
given tasks which might end in failure because of the inadequate
standard of training. The Eighth Army had suffered some 80,000
casualties since it was formed, and little time had been spent in train
ing the replacements.

The moment I saw what might happen I took a quick decision.
On the 6th October, just over two weeks before the battle was to
begin, I changed the plan. My initial plan had been based on destroy
ing Rommel's armour; the remainder of his army, the un-armoured
portion, could then be dealt with at leisure. This was in accordance
with the accepted military thinking of the day. I decided to reverse
the process and thus alter the whole conception of how the battle was
to be fought. My modified plan now was to hold off, or contain, die
enemy armour while we carried out a methodical destruction of the
infantry divisions holding the defensive system. These un-armoured
divisions would be destroyed by means of a "crumbling" process, the
enemy being attacked from the flank and rear and cut off from their
supplies. These operations would be carefully organised from a series
of firm bases and would be within the capabilities of my troops. I did
not think it likely that the enemy armour would remain inactive and
watch the gradual destruction of all the un-armoured divisions; it
would be launched in heavy counter-attacks. This would suit us very
well, since the best way to destroy the enemy armour was to entice it
to attack our armour in position. I aimed to get my armour beyond
the area of the "crumbling" operations. I would then turn the enemy
minefields to our advantage by using them to prevent the enemy
armour from interfering with our operations; this would be done by
closing the approaches through the minefields with our tanks, and we
would then be able to proceed relentlessly with our plans. The success
of the whole operation would depend largely on whether 30 Corps
could succeed in the "break-in" battle and establish the corridors
through which the armoured divisions of 10 Corps must pass. I was
certain that if we could get the leading armoured brigades through
the corridors without too great delay, then we would win the battle.
Could we do this? In order to make sure, I planned to launch the
armoured divisions of 10 Corps into the corridors immediately behind
the leading infantry divisions of 30 Corps and before I knew the
corridors were clear. Furthermore, I ordered that if the corridors were
not completely clear on the morning of D+i, the 24th October, the
armoured divisions would fight their own way out into the open
beyond the western limit of the minefields. This order was not popular
with the armoured units but I was determined to see that it was carried
out to the letter.

110 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

It will be seen later how infirmity of purpose on the part o£ certain
senior commanders in carrying out this order nearly lost us the battle.

I mentioned in Chapter 8 that there was a Major Williams on my
Intelligence staff who appeared to me to be of outstanding ability. To
all who served with me in the war he was known always as Bill
Williams. In a conversation one day about this time, he pointed out
to me that the enemy German and Italian troops were what he called
"corsetted"; that is, Rommel had so deployed his German infantry
and parachute troops that they were positioned between, and in some
places behind, his Italian troops all along the front, the latter being
unreliable when it came to hard fighting. Bill Williams's idea was that
if we could separate the two we would be very well placed, as we could
smash through a purely Italian front without any great difficulty. This
very brilliant analysis and idea was to be a major feature of the master
plan for the "crumbling" operations, and it paved the way to final
victory at Alamein.

THE DECEPTION PLAN

The object of the deception plan was twofold:

(a) To conceal from the enemy as long as possible our intention to
take the offensive.

(b) When this could no longer bo concealed, to mislead him about
both the date and the sector in which our main thrust was to be
made.

This was done by the concealment of real intentions and real moves
in the north, and by advertising false signs of activity in the south.

The whole dec-option was organised on an "army* basis; tremendous
attention to detail was necessary throughout, since carelessness in
any one area might have compromised the whole scheme. To cany
out such a gigantic bluff in the time available required detailed plan
ning, considoniblc quantities of labour and transport, mass production
of deception devices at the base, a large camouflage store with trained
staff, and the co-ordinated movement of many hundreds of vehicles
into selected areas. Because all these essentials were provided the
scheme was entirely successful, and great credit is due to the camou
flage organisation in the Middle East at the time.

A feature of the "visual deception'* was the creation and continued
preservation of the layout and density of vehicles required for the
assault in 30 Corps sector in the north; this was achieved by the ist
October by the placing in position of the necessary dummy lorries,
guns, ammunition limbers, etc. During the concentration of attacking
divisions just before the day of the attack, the dummies were replaced

The Battle of Alamein 111

at night by the actual operational vehicles. The rear areas, whence
the attacking divisions and units came, were maintained at their full
visual vehicle density by the erection of dummies as the real vehicles
moved out. The reason for all this visual deception was that enemy
air photographs should continue to reveal the same story. The co
ordinating brain behind this part of the plan was Charles Richardson,
a very able officer in the planning staff of Eighth Army H.Q. (now
Major-General C. L. Richardson, recently Commandant of the Military
College of Science).

In preparation for the offensive, dumps had to be made in the
northern sector. For example, a large dump was created near the
station of Alamein. This was to contain 600 tons of supplies, 2000 tons
of P.O.L. (petrol, oil, lubricants), and 420 tons of engineer stores. It
was of the utmost importance that the existence of these dumps should
not become known to the enemy. The site was open and featureless
except for occasional pits and trenches. Disguise provided the most
satisfactory method of hiding the dumps, and the whole endeavour
was a triumph for the camouflage organisation.

Another example I will quote was the dummy pipeline in the south
to cause the enemy to believe the main blow would be delivered on
that flank. It was started late in September and progress in the work
was timed to indicate its completion early in November. The dummy
pipeline was laid for a length of about 20 miles, from a point just
south of the real water point at Bir Sadi to a point 4 miles east of
Samaket Gaballa. The pipe-trench was excavated in the normal way.
Five miles of dummy railway track, made from petrol cans, were
used for piping. The "piping" was strung out alongside the open
trench. When each 5-mile section of the trench was filled in, the
"piping" was collected and laid out alongside the next section. Dummy
pump houses were erected at three points; water points and overhead
storage reservoirs were made at two of these points. Work began on
the 26th September and ceased on the 22nd October; it was carried
out by one section of 578 Army Troops Company.

There were of course other measures such as the careful planting
of false information for the enemy's benefit, but I have confined this
outline account to visual deception in which camouflage played the
major part. The whole plan was given the code name BERTRAM and
those responsible for it deserve the highest praise: for it succeeded.

The R.A.F. was to play a tremendous part in this battle. The AOC *
aimed to gain gradual ascendancy over the enemy fighters, and to
have that ascendancy complete by the 23rd October. On that day the
RA.F. was to carry out blitz attacks against enemy airfields in order

* Air Officer Commanding.

112 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to finish off the opposing air forces, and particularly to prevent air
reconnaissance. At zero hour the whole bomber effort was to be directed
against the enemy artillery, and shortly before daylight on the 24th
October I hoped the whole of the air effort would be available to
co-operate intimately in the land battle, as our fighter ascendancy by
that time would be almost absolute.

I issued veiy strict orders about morale, fitness, and determined
leadership, as follows:

ORDERS ABOUT MORALE: ISSUED ON THE 14TH SEPTEMBER

"This battle for which we are preparing will be a real rough
house and will involve a very great deal of hard fighting. If we
are successful it will mean the end of the war in North Africa,
apart from general 'clearing-lip' operations; it will be the turning
point of the whole war. Therefore we can take no chances.

Morale is the big tiling in war. We must raise the morale of our
soldiery to the highest pitch; they must be made enthusiastic, and
must enter this battle with their tails high iu the air and with the
will to win. There must in fact bo no weak links in our mental
fitness.

But mental fitness will not stand up to the stress and strain of
battle unless troops are also physically fit. This battle may go on
for many days and the final issue may well depend on which side
can best last out and stand up to the buffeting, the ups and downs,
and the continuous strain of hard battle fighting.

I am not convinced that our soldiery are really tough and hard.
They are sunburnt and brown, and look very well; but they seldom
move anywhere on foot and they have led a static life for many
weeks. During the next months, therefore*, it is essential to make
our officers and men really fit; ordinary fitness is not enough, they
must be made tough and hard."

ORDERS ABOUT LEADERSHIP: XSSXJKD ON THE Gxil OCTOBER

"This battle will involve hard and prolonged fighting. Our troops
must not think that, because we have a good tank and very power
ful artillery support, the enemy will all surrender. The enemy will
not surrender, and there will be bitter fighting.

The infanhy must bo prepared to fight and kill, and to continue
doing so over a prolonged period.

It is essential to impress on all officers that determined leader
ship will be very vital in this battle, as in any battle. There have
been far too many unwounded prisoners taken in this war. We
must impress on our officers, n.c.o.s. and men that when they are
cut off or surrounded, and there appears to be no hope of survival,
they must organise themselves into a defensive locality and hold

The Battle of Alamein 113

out where they are. By doing so they will add enormously to the
enemy's difficulties; they will greatly assist the development of
our own operations; and they will save themselves from spending
the rest of the war in a prison camp.

Nothing is ever hopeless so long as troops have stout hearts.,
and have weapons and ammunition.

These points must be got across now at once to all officers and
men, as being applicable to all fighting.'*

ORDERS REGARDING SECRECY

It was clear to me that we could not inform the troops about our
offensive intentions until we stopped all leave and kept them out in
the desert. I did not want to create excitement in Alexandria and
Cairo by stopping leave with an official announcement. I therefore
ordered as outlined below. Officers and men were to be brought fully
into the operational picture as follows:

Brigadiers

C.O.s of R.E. units

Uz8 September
Unit commanders 10 October

Company, battery, U October
etc., commander level J

Remaining officers "1 ~ ^ ,

, . & ^21 October

and the men J

On the 2ist October a definite stop was to be put to all journeys by
officers or men to Alexandria, or other towns, for shopping or other
reasons.

On the 2ist October unit commanders were to stop all leave, quietly
and without publishing any written orders. They were to give as the
reason that there were signs the enemy might attack in the full-moon
period, and that we must have all officers and men present.

What it amounted to was that by the 2ist October everyone,
including the soldiers, would be fully in the operational picture; no
one could leave the desert after that.

There was one exception. I ordered that troops in the foremost
positions who might be raided by the enemy and captured, and all
troops who might be on patrol in no-man's-land, were not to be told
anything about the attack till the morning of the 23rd October: which
was D-Day.

114 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

GROUPING FOR THE BATTLE

This was the grouping of divisions for the beginning of the battle:

10 Corps 13 Corps 30 Corps

i Armd Division 7 Armd Division 9 Aust Division

8 Armd Division 44 Divison 51 (H) Division

10 Armd Division 50 Division 2 N.Z. Division

i S.A. Division

4 (Indian) Division

Extra Formations
i Greek Brigade

1 Fighting French Brigade

2 Fighting French Brigade
Fighting French Flying Column

9 Armoured Brigade
23 Armoured Brigade (Valentine tanks)

FINAL ADDRESS TO SENIOR OFFICERS

This was to be an "Army" battle, fought on an Army plan, and
controlled carefully from Army H.Q, Therefore every commander
down to the lieut.-colonel level must know the details of my plan,
how I proposed to conduct the fight, and how his part fitted in to the
master plan. Only in this way could perfect co-operation be assured.
I therefore assembled these commanders and addressed them on the
following dates:

13 Corps j Octobcr

30 Corps J y

10 Corps 20 October

I still have the notes I used for the three addresses: written in pencil
in my own handwriting. I reproduce them here (see illustration no.
15), I took a risk in saying "Whole affair about 12 days." It will be
seen that I originally wrote 10 days, and then erased the 10 and wrote
12. 12 was the better guess. It will also be seen in para. 2 that I
couldn't spell "Rommel" properly.

Rough notes used by me for mij address to all

senior officers before the Battle of Alamcin

(code name "Lightfoot")

ADDRESS TO OFFICERS— "LIGHTFOOT"

1. Back history since August. The Mandate; my plans to carry
it out; the creation of 10 Corps.
Leadership—equipment—training.

2. Interference by Rommell on 31 Aug.

The Battle of Alamein

The basic framework of the Army plan for Lightfoot as issued

on 14 Sep. To destroy enemy armour.

Situation in early October. Untrained Army.

Gradually realised that I must recast the plan so as to be

within the capabilities of the troops.

The new plan; the "crumbling" operations.

A reversal of accepted methods.

Key points in the Army plan. Three phases

30 Corps break-in.

10 Corps break-through.

13 Corps break-in.

The dog-fight, and "crum

Fighting for position and the
tactical advantage.

:>ling" operations.

The final "break" of the enemy.

6. The enemy

His sickness; low strengths; small stocks of petrol, ammunition,

food.

Morale is good, except possibly Italians.

7. Ourselves

Immense superiority in guns, tanks, men.
Can fight a prolonged battle, & will do so.
25 pdr 832

6 pdr 753 1200 tanks (470 heavy)

2, pdr 500
Morale on the top line.

8. General conduct of the battle

Methodical progress; destroy enemy part by part, slowly and
surely.

Shoot tanks and shoot Germans.
He cannot last a long battle; we can.

We must therefore keep at it hard; no unit commander must
relax the pressure; Organise ahead for a "dog-fight" of a
week. Whole affair about 10 days. (12).
—Don't expect spectacular results too soon.
Operate from firm bases.

Quick re-organisation on objectives.

Keep balanced.

Maintain offensive eagerness.

If we do all
> this victory is
certain

Keep up pressure.

10. Morale—measures to get it. Addresses.
Every soldier in the Army a fighting soldier.

No non-fighting man. All trained to kill Germans.
My message to the troops.

11. The issues at stake.

12. The troops to remember what to say if they are captured.
Rank, name, & number.

B.L.M.

116 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Finally, I issued the following personal message to the officers and
men of the army.

EIGHTH ARMY

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE ARMY COMMANDER

"i. When I assumed command of the Eighth Army I said that the
mandate was to destroy ROMMEL and his Army, and that it
would be done as soon as we were ready.

2. We are ready NOW.

The battle which is now about to begin will be one of the
decisive battles of history. It will be the turning point of the
war. The eyes of the whole world will be on us, watching
anxiously which way the battle will swing.

We can give them their answer at once, It will swing our
way.

3. We have first-class equipment; good tanks; good anti-tank
guns; plenty of artillery and plenty of ammunition; and we
are backed up by the finest air striking force in the world.

All that is necessaiy is that each one of us, every officer and
man, should enter this battle with the determination to see it
through— to fight and to kill— and finally, to win.

If we all do this there can be only one result— together we
will hit the enemy for six, right out of North Africa.

4. The sooner we win this battle, which will be the turning point
of this war, the sooner we shall all get back home to our
families'.

5. Therefore, let every officer and man enter the battle with a
stout heart, and with the determination to do his duty so long
as he has breath in his body.

AND LKT NO MAN SUKKKNDUR SO LONG AS HE IS X7NWOUNDJED
AND CAN FIGHT.

Let us all pray that the Lord mighty in battle will give us
the victory,

B. L, Montgomery,

Lieutenant-General, G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army"
Middle East Forces,
23-10-42

After briefing the Press on the morning of the 23rd October, I went
forward that afternoon to my Tactical H.Q. established near H.Q.
30 Corps. In the evening I read a book and went to bed early. At
9,40 p.m. the barrage of over one thousand guns opened, and the
Eighth Army which included some 1200 tanks went into the attack.
At that moment I was asleep in my caravan; there was nothing I could
clo and I knew I would be needed later. There is always a crisis in

The Battle of Alamein 117

every battle when the issue hangs in the balance, and I reckoned I
would get what rest I could, while I could. As it turned out, I was
wise to have done so: my intervention was needed sooner than I
expected.

The story of the battle has been told by me in Alamein to the River
Sangro, and by General de Guingand in his book Operation Victory.
My purpose now will be to explain the action I took at certain critical
moments. Throughout the war I have kept a very precise diary and
what follows is taken from notes made each day during the battle.

SATURDAY 24TH OCTOBER

The attack had gone in on the 23rd October in accordance with the
plan I have just described. The whole area was one enormous minefield
and the two corridors in the north had not been completely opened for
the armoured divisions of 10 Corps by 8 a.m. on the 24th October.
In accordance with my orders, I expected the armoured divisions to
fight their way out into the open. But there was some reluctance to do
so and I gained the impression during the morning that they were
pursuing a policy of inactivity. There was not that eagerness on the
part of senior commanders to push on and there was a fear of tank
casualties; every enemy gun was reported as an 88-mm. (the German
A. A. gun used as an anti-tank gun, and very effective). The loth
Corps Commander was not displaying the drive and determination so
necessary when things begin to go wrong and there was a general
lack of offensive eagerness in the armoured divisions of the corps.
Tliis was not the sort of battle they were used to. It was clear to me
that I must take instant action to galvanise the armoured divisions
into action; determined leadership was lacking. I therefore sent for
Lumsden and told him he must "drive" his Divisional Commanders,
and if there was any more hanging back I would remove them from
their commands and put in more energetic personalities. This action
produced immediate results in one of the armoured divisions; by
6 p.m. that evening the armoured brigade of ist Armoured Division
in the northern corridor was out in the open; it was then attacked by
i5th Panzer Division, which was exactly what I wanted.

Farther south the New Zealand Division began its movement to the
south-west as part of the "crumbling" operations. And farther south
still, 13 Corps was playing its part according to plan.

SUNDAY 25TH OCTOBER

I have always thought that this was when the real crisis in the battle
occurred. At 2.30 a.m. 10 Corps reported that the break-out of loth

118 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Armoured Division in the southern corridor in 30 Corps' sector was
not proceeding well and that minefields and other difficulties were
delaying progress. The Divisional Commander had said he did not
feel happy about the operation, and that even if he did get out he
would be in a very unpleasant position on the forward slopes of the
Miteriya Ridge. His division was untrained and not fit for such difficult
operations; he wanted to stay where he was. Lumsden was inclined
to agree. In the northern corridor, 1st Armoured Division was out in
the open and was being furiously attacked by the enemy armour; which
was exactly what the doctor ordered; so long as I was the doctor in
question. De Guingand rightly decided it was necessary for me to see
the two corps commanders concerned and grip the situation; he issued
orders for a conference at my Tactical H.Q. at 3.30 a.m. and then
came and woke me and told me what he had done. I agreed. Leese and
Lumsden arrived on time and I asked each to explain his situation.
The "atmosphere" at that conference is described most vividly by
de Guingand on page 200 of his book, Operation Victory.

I discovered that in the loth Armoured Division, one of the ar
moured regiments was already out in the open and that it was hoped
more would be out by dawn. The divisional commander wanted to
withdraw it all back behind the minefields and give up the advantages
he had gained; his reason was that his situation out in the open would
be very unpleasant and his division might suffer heavy casualties.
Lumsden agreed with him; he asked if I would personally speak to
the divisional commander on the telephone. I did so at once and
discovered to my horror that he himself was some 16,000 yards (nearly
10 miles) behind his leading armoured brigades. I spoke to him in no
uncertain voice, and ordered him to go forward at once and take
charge of his battle; he was to fight his way out, and lead his division
from in front and not from behind.

I then told both corps commanders that my orders were unchanged;
there would be no departure from my plan. I kept Lumsden behind
when the others had left and spoke very plainly to him. I said I was
determined that the armoured divisions would get out of the minefield
area and into the open where they could manoeuvre; any wavering or
lack of firmness now would be fatal. If he himself, or the Commander
loth Armoured Division, was not "for it," then I would appoint others
who were.

By 8 a.m. all my armour was out in the open and we were in the
position I had hoped to have achieved at 8 a.m. the day before.

At noon I had a conference of corps commanders at H.Q., 2nd
N.Z. Division. It became clear that the movement south-west of the
N.Z. Division would be a very costly operation and I decided to
abandon it at once. Instead, I ordered the "crumbling" operations to
be switched to the area of the gth Australian Division, working

The Battle of Alamein 119

northwards towards the coast; this new thrust line, or axis of opera
tions, involved a switch of 180 degrees which I hoped might catch the
enemy unawares.

WEDNESDAY 28TH OCTOBER

Hard fighting had been going on for the previous three days and
I began to realise from the casualty figures that I must be careful.
I knew that the final blow must be put in on 30 Corps' front, but at
the moment I was not clear exactly where. But I had to get ready
for it. So I decided to turn my southern flank (13 Corps) over to the
defensive except for patrol activities, to widen divisional fronts, and
to pull into reserve the divisions I needed for the final blow. The N.Z.
Division I had already got into reserve.

We now had the whole of Rommers Panzer Army opposite the
northern corridor and I knew we would never break out from there.
So I made that area a defensive front and pulled ist Armoured
Division into reserve.

I also decided that for the moment I would use only 30 Corps to
fight the battle in the north; so I pulled 10 Corps H.Q. into reserve,
to get it ready for the break-out

I ordered that operations by gth Australian Division towards the
coast be intensified, my intention then being to stage the final break
out operation on the axis of the coast road.

THURSDAY 2QTH OCTOBER

During the morning it became increasingly evident that the whole
of Rommers German forces were grouped in the northern part of the
front. The action of ist Armoured Division in the northern corridor,
and the operations of gth Australian Division northwards towards the
coast, had clearly made him think that we intended to break out in
the north along the coast, which was indeed my design at the time.

But we had now achieved what Bill Williams had recommended.
The Germans had been pulled against our right and were no longer
"corsetting" the Italians. The Germans were in the north, the Italians
together in the south; and the dividing line between them appeared
to be just to the north of our original northern corridor.

I at once changed my plan and decided to direct the final blow at
this point of junction, but overlapping well on to the Italian front.
I took this decision at 11 a.m., the &gth October,

When could we stage the blow?

I knew that Operation TORCH, mounted from England, was to land
in the Casablanca-Oran area on the 8th November. We must defeat

120 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the enemy, and break up his army, in time to be of real help to TOBCH.
Quite apart from wanting to get to Tripoli first! But more immediately,
the timing was affected by the need to get the Martuba airfields so
as to assist by giving air cover to the last possible convoy to Malta,
which was short of food and almost out of aviation fuel. The convoy
was to leave Alexandria about the middle of November.

I decided that on the night 3Oth-3ist October the gth Australian
Division would attack strongly northwards to reach the sea; this would
keep the enemy looking northwards. Then on the next night, 3ist Octo
ber/ ist November, I would blow a deep hole in the enemy front just
to the north of the original corridor; this hole would be made by the
2nd New Zealand Division which would be reinforced by the gth
Armoured Brigade and two infantry brigades; the operation would
be under command of 30 Corps. Through the gap, I would pass 10
Corps with its armoured divisions.

Tlie sketch map (see Map, No. 16) of the break-out shows the plan
very clearly.

We already had the necessary divisions in reserve and they had
been resting and refitting.

What, in fact, I proposed to do was to deliver a hard blow with
the right, and follow it the next night with a knock-out blow with
the left. The operation was christened SUPERCHARGE.

During the morning I was visited at my Tactical H.Q. by Alexander,
and by Casey who was Minister of State in the Middle East. It was
fairly clear to me that there had boon consternation in Whitehall when
I began to draw divisions into reserve on the 2/th and 28th October,
when I was getting ready for the final blow. Casey had been sent up
to find out what was going on; Whitehall thought I was giving up,
when in point of fact I was just about to win.

I told him all about my plans and that I was certain of sxiccess;
and de Guingand spoke to him very bluntly and told him to tell
Whitehall not to bellyache. I never heard what signal was sent to
London after the visit and was too busy with SUPERCHARGE to bother
about it. Anyhow, I was certain the C.I.G.S. (Brooke) would know
what I was up to.

FHIDAY 30TH OCTOBER

I spent the morning writing out my directive for SUPERCHARGE.
I always wrote such orders myself, and never let the staff do it. This
was the master plan and only the master could write it. The staff
of course has much detailed work to do after such a directive is issued.
This procedure was well understood in the Eighth Army (and later,
because of the experience in the Mediterranean, in 21 Army Group).

The Battle of Alamein 121

This is what I wrote:

OPERATION SUPERCHARGE

EIGHTH ARMY PLAN

MOST SECRET

2,0 Oct. 1942

"i. Operation SUPERCHARGE will take place on night 31 Oct/i Nov.
The operation is designed to:

(a) Destroy the enemy armoured forces,

(b) Force the enemy to fight in the open, and thus make
him use petrol by constant and continuous movement

(c) Get astride the enemy supply route, and prevent move
ment o£ supply services.

(d) Force the enemy from his forward landing grounds and
aerodromes.

(e) Bring about the disintegration of the whole enemy
army by a combination of (a), (b), (c) and (d).

30 CORPS TASK

2. To attack by night from the present forward positions between
the 297 and 301 Northing grids. Attack to penetrate Westwards
to a depth of 4000 yds.

3. On reaching the final objective, armoured and infantry patrols
to push out farther to the West so as to cover the debouch
ment of the armoured divisions and so enable them to get out
and deploy the more easily.

4. The flanks of die penetration to be held securely, and their
Eastern extremities to be linked up firmly with our existing
positions.

5. The whole area of penetration to be cleared, and organised
for free movement, and to be held securely as a firm base
from which to develop offensive operations.

1O CORPS OPERATIONS

6. 10 Corps will break out into the open through the penetration
made by 30 Corps.

7. Armoured cars, at least two regiments initially, will be
launched through the bridgehead area before daylight on
ist November and will push out to the N.W., the West, the
S.W., and the South.

The task of the armoured cars will be to operate offensively
on the enemy supply routes, destroy everything they meet,
and prevent any supplies or reinforcements from coming
forward, and prevent any movement from the forward areas
to the rear.

122 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Armoured cars must be prepared to operate on their own
for some days, keeping up the strangle-hold and making full
use of enemy petrol and supplies.

8. 10 Corps will secure as a first objective the general area Pt 46
in 858299— Tell el Aqqaqir in 860297. Operations will then be
developed so as to:

(a) Destroy the enemy armoured forces.

(b) Bring about the complete disintegration of the enemy's
rear areas.

9. The general axis of operations for 10 Corps, subject to the
fulfilment of the task given in para. 8 (a), will be N.W. towards
Ghazal Station, so as to get in behind the enemy forces in the
Sidi Rahman area and cut them off.

10. The forward movement of 10 Corps will be timed so that the
area of the first objective is secured before daylight on ist
November, and operations developed from that area as the
sun is rising.

11. It will be clearly understood that should 30 Corps not suc
ceed in reaching the final objective vide paras. 2 and 3, die
armoured divisions of 10 Corps will fight their way to the
first objective.

1O AND 30 CORPS

12. 30 Corps will hold N.Z. Div, in readiness to take over the area
of 10 Corps first objective vide para. 8, so as to free 10 Corps
for offensive operations against the enemy armoured forma
tions or for a N.W. movement towards Ghazal Station.

13. Very close touch, co-operation, and liaison will be required
between 10 Corps and 30 Corps throughout the whole op
eration.

14. This operation if successful will result in the complete dis
integration of the enemy and will lead to his final destruction.

It will therefore be successful*

Determined leadership will be vital; complete faith in the
plan, and its success, will be vital; there must be no doubters;
risk must be accepted freely; there must be no ^bellyaching."

I call on every commander to carry through this operation
with determination, to fight their formations bravely, and to
instil optimism and offensive eagerness into all ranks.

SUPERCHARGE will win for us the victory*

13 CORPS

15. 13 Corps will do what is possible on the Southern flank
before or after dark on 3ist October to make the enemy think
an attack is coming on that flank.

The Battle of Alamein 123

16. The corps will be ready to take immediate action the moment
it appears that the enemy is beginning to crack.

ARMY RESERVES

17. 7th Arm. Div. (less 4th Lt Arm. Brigade).

iSist Inf. Bde. (Queens).

These two formations will be held in Army reserve ready
for use as the situation develops.

R.A.F. OPERATIONS

18. The R.A.F. are playing a great part in inflicting moral and
material damage on the enemy. This is being intensified, from
tomorrow inclusive onwards, and will reach its culminating
point as SUPERCHARGE is launched.

FINALLY

19. We know from all sources of intelligence that the enemy is in
a bad way, and his situation is critical. The continued offen
sive operations of Eighth Army and the R.A.F. have reduced
him to such a state that a hard blow now will complete his
overthrow.

The first stage in the blow is the operation being staged by
gth Aus. Div. tonight on the North flank; success in this oper
ation will have excellent repercussions on SUPERCHARGE.

SUPERCHARGE itself, tomorrow night 3ist October/ist
November, will be the second blow and a staggering one, and
one from which I do not consider he will be able to recover."

SATURDAY 31ST OCTOBER

It was clear to me that the stage management problems in connec
tion with SUPERCHARGE were such that if launched on this night it
might fail. I therefore decided to postpone it for 24 hours to deliver
the blow on the night ist-2nd November. This delay would help the
enemy. To offset this, I extended the depth of penetration for a further
2000 yards, making 6000 yards in all— the whole under a very strong
barrage.

I should add that there were doubts in high places about SUPER
CHARGE, and whisperings about what would happen if it failed. These
doubts I did not share and I made that quite clear to everyone.

MONDAY 2ND NOVEMBER

At i a.m. SUPERCHARGE began and the attack went in on a front of
4000 yards to a depth of 6000 yards. It was a success and we were all

124 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

but out into the open desert. By dusk we had taken 1500 prison
ers.

TUESDAY 3RD NOVEMBER

There were indications the enemy was about to withdraw; he
was almost finished.

WEDNESDAY 4TH NOVEMBER

At 2 a.m. I directed two hard punches at the "hinges" of the final
break-out area where the enemy was trying to stop us widening the
gap which we had blown. That finished the battle.

The armoured car regiments went through as dawn was breaking
and soon the armoured divisions got clean away into the open desert;
they were now in country clear of minefields, where they could
manoeuvre and operate against the enemy rear areas and retreating
columns.

The armoured cars raced away to the west, being directed far
afield on the enemy line of retreat.

The Italian divisions in the south, in front of 13 Corps, had nothing
to do except surrender; they could not escape as the Germans had
taken all their transport. I directed Horrocks to collect them in, and
devoted my attention to the pursuit of Rommel's forces which were
streaming westwards.

THE VALUE OF THE STAFF INFORMATION*' SERVICE

This was an organisation for intercepting the signals sent out by
our own forward units and relaying them to Army and Corps H.Q.
Wo called the service "J7 for short It was used for the first time in
this battle. It was invented by a most able officer on my staff called
Hugh Mainwaring; he was unfortunately captured with a reconnais
sance party near Mersu Matruh early in November, and I then had to
find another officer to operate the "J" Service.

Receiving wireless sets "listened" on division, brigade, and armoured
corps forward controls and broadcast the information obtained. This
cut down the time-lag between the origination of information by the
forward troops and its receipt at Army and Corps H.Q. "J" gives to a
higher commander a good indication of the fighting spirit of his troops
and, incidentally, although this was not its prime purpose, it could
also help by spotting obvious breaches of security, It had the overall
effect of tightening the entity of the Army; bringing it all closer to-

The Battle of Alamein 125

gether. Wireless links became intimate links between men engaged
on the same enterprise. It ended the remoteness of the staff.

It will be remembered that as a GSO i in 1918 I had devised a
system of getting to Divisional H.Q. quickly the accurate information
of the progress of the battle which is so vital. Then I used officers with
wireless sets. The "J" Service invented by Hugh Mainwaring was a
great improvement on my earlier attempts.

SOME LESSONS

A mass of detailed lessons will always emerge from any battle. In
the British Army we are inclined to become immersed in details, and
we often lose sight of the fundamentals on which the details are based.

There were three distinct phases in this battle, and operations were
developed accordingly.
First: The break-in.

This was the battle for position, or the fight for the tactical advan
tage. At the end of this phase we had to be so positioned and ''bal
anced" that we could begin immediately the second phase. We must
in fact have gained the tactical advantage.
Second: The "dog-fight."

I use this term to describe what I knew must develop after the
break-in and that was a hard and bloody killing match. During this
we had so to cripple the enemy's strength that the final blow would
cause the disintegration of his army.
Third: The break-out.

This was brought about by a terrific blow directed at a selected
spot. During the dog-fight the enemy had been led to believe that
the break-out would come in the north, on the axis of the coast road.
He was sensitive to such a thrust and he concentrated his Germans in
the north to meet it, leaving the Italians to hold his southern flank.
We then drove in a hard blow between the Germans and Italians,
with a good overlap on the Italian front.

Determined leadership is vital throughout all echelons of command.
Nowhere is it more important than in the higher ranks.

Generals who become depressed when things are not going well,
who lack the "drive" to get tilings done, and who lack the resolution,
the robust mentality and the moral courage to see their plan through
to the end— are useless. They are, in fact, worse than useless— they are
a menace— since any sign of wavering or hesitation has immediate
repercussions down the scale when the issue hangs in the balance.
No battle is ever lost till the general in command thinks it so. If I had
not stood firm and insisted that my plan would be carried through,
we would not have won at Alamein.

126 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

If your enemy stands to fight and is decisively defeated in the
ensuing battle, everything is added unto you. Rommel's doom was
sounded at Alam Haifa; as Von Mellenthin said, it was the turning
point of the desert war. After that, he was smashed in battle at Ala-
mein. He had never been beaten before though he had often had to
"nip back to get more petrol." Now he had been decisively defeated.
The doom of the Axis forces in Africa was certain— provided we made
no more mistakes.

CHAPTER 10

Alamein to Tunis

5th November 1942 to 7th May 1943

THE PURSUIT TO AGHEILA

THE PURSUIT proper began on the $th November with 10 Corps
(Lumsden) in the van. I left 30 Corps (Leese) to reorganise to
the west of the break-out area. 13 Corps (Horrocks) had the
task of cleaning up the battle area of Alamein and of salving all the
war material of the enemy and of our own forces. It also had to collect
all the Italian prisoners; there were many of them and they sur
rendered in droves, headed by the generals carrying their suit-cases.

My ultimate objective was Tripoli; this had always been considered
the objective of the Eighth Army. But unfortunately the operations
to get tihere had become known as the "Benghazi Handicap." As one
officer expressed it to me: "we used to go up to Benghazi for Christ
mas and return to Egypt early in the New Year."

I was determined to have done with that sort of thing. Egypt must
be made secure for the duration of the war. I had long considered
the problem, and when the pursuit began I was clear that the way to
achieve this task was as follows:

(a) To capture the Agheila position, and hold securely the ap
proaches to it from the west.

(b) To locate a corps strong in armour in the Jebel about Mekili,
trained to operate southwards against any enemy force that
managed to break through the Agheila position and make
towards Egypt.

(c) To get the AOC to establish the Desert Air Force on the
Martuba group of airfields, and also to the south of Benghazi.

The establishment of aircraft on the Martuba group was not just
a long-term proposal; it was an immediate requirement since a convoy

127

128 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

for Malta was due to leave Alexandria on the i6th November. That
island was in dire straits with great shortage of food and fuel; it was
vital the convoy should get through and it might fail to do so unless
the Desert Air Force could provide fighter cover as it passed in day
light through the narrow area between Crete and Cyrenaica.

By the 15th November the air forces were established in the Mar-
tuba airfields, in time to see the convoy safely on its way.

For the development of these operations I agreed the following
detailed plan with the AOC Desert Air Force (Coningham). We
would use the air arm as the long-range hitting weapon, working in
close co-operation with armoured car regiments; fighter squadrons
would operate from advance landing grounds soon after the armoured
cars had reported them clear, and well ahead of the main bodies.
These tactics would lead to the enemy being shot up and harassed in
his withdrawal, while good fighter cover was given to our own forces.

I did not think we would have any serious fighting till we reached
Agheila. Rommel would undoubtedly withdraw to that position and
would endeavour to stop us there; his supply route would then be
shortened while ours would be long, thus reversing the supply situa
tion which had existed at Alamein.

I therefore planned to leave 10 Corps to lead the pursuit as far as
the Jebel, and to halt it there with orders to push light forces forward
towards Benghazi and Agedabia. I considered Lumsden would handle
these operations satisfactorily. I would then pass 30 Corps through
to tackle the Agheila position and the movement to Tripoli, I also
decided that as soon as 10 Corps was established in the Jebel I would
bring Horrocks up to command it and would send Lumsden back to
England. I had reached the conclusion that command of a corps in a
major battle was above Lumsden's ceiling. On the other hand, he was
a good trainer and as such he would be valuable back in England. I
decided to ask for Dempsey to be sent out from England to take over
13 Corps from Horrocks. I would then have three reliable Corps
Commanders in Leese, Horrocks and Dempsey; they had all served
under me before, and Leese and Dempsey had been students under me
at the Staff College. All these moves were agreed by Alexander.

The sketch map (see Map, No. 19) will serve to illustrate the devel
opment of my plans up to the Agheila position.

I gave precise instructions to Lumsden about the development of
operations for the pursuit to Agheila, and kept a firm hand on the
battle in order to ensure the master plan was not "mucked about" by
subordinate commanders having ideas inconsistent with it. I knew well
that, in the past, corps and divisional generals had had their own ideas
about operations in the desert, and had not liked a firm grip from
above; this was one reason why we had nearly lost Egypt. I made it
very clear to Lumsden that this time all would carry out my orders;

Alamein to Tunis 129

I had promised the soldiers complete success and I was determined
to see they got it.

Soon after the pursuit began I was in danger of capture. A recon
naissance party was sent forward to select a site for my headquarters
in the Mersa Matruh area; two members of this party were Hugh
Mainwaring and my stepson Dick Carver. On approaching Mersa
Matruh the party took a road leading down to a place on the shore
called Smugglers Cove, just to the east of the town. The enemy were
still there; they should all have been rounded up by that time but,
as will be seen later on, our forces moving across the desert were
halted by heavy rain. The reconnaissance party was captured, I my
self with a small escort was moving well forward in rear of the leading
elements of the army and was about to take the road leading to
Smugglers Cove. But at that moment I ran into a sharp engagement
which was going on a few hundred yards in front; we had bumped
into an enemy rearguard which was trying to hold us off while they
cleared Mersa Matruh. If I had gone down the road to Smugglers
Cove, it is possible I would have run into the enemy; if so, Tin pretty
clear that I wouldn't be writing this book today.

The other— and more important— operations developed successfully.
Twice Rommers forces were saved from complete disaster by heavy
rain. The first occasion was on the 6th and yth November when we
had three divisions "bogged" in the desert, unable to move, and it
was not possible even to get petrol to them; this setback saved Rom
mers forces from complete encirclement at Mersa Matruh. The second
occasion was when very heavy rain on the 15th, i6th and lyth Novem
ber held up our forces moving across the desert towards Agedabia to
cut off the enemy before he could reach the Agheila position.

However, I "drove" the Eighth Army hard and the following
figures will show how fast we moved:

5th November Pursuit began from Alamein.

nth November Reached Sollum (270 miles).

12th November Reached Tobruk (360 miles).

17th November Reached Msus (560 miles).

It was good going to do 560 miles in 13 days; but the administrative
situation quickly began to cause me anxiety. To get full value from
having established the air forces in the Cyrenaica bulge about Martuba,
they must be able to operate at full blast against Rommel's supply
routes by sea across the Mediterranean, the port of Tripoli, and the
enemy communications between Tripoli and Agheila.

The air force daily requirements for these tasks were given to me
as follows:

By 28th November 400 tons.
By 2nd December 800 tons.

130 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

By gth December 1050 tons.

By i6th December 1400 tons (1000 at Tobruk and 400 at

Benghazi).

These were big tonnages for the air forces alone. But if Rommel
intended to stand and fight at Agheila, we should also have to build
up army resources of supplies, petrol, and ammunition before we could
attack. However, from the larger angle, it was clear that the air forces
had to have all they wanted; they were the long-hitting weapon and
their operations if successful would indirectly make the army task
much easier.

On the 12th November, when we had driven the enemy forces out
of Egypt, I issued the following message to the Eighth Army:

"i. When we began the Battle of Egypt on 23rd October I said
that together we would hit the Germans and Italians for six
right out of North Africa.

We have made a very good start and today, lath November,
there are no German and Italian soldiers on Egyptian territory
except prisoners.

In three weeks we have completely smashed the German
and Italian Army, and pushed the fleeing remnants out of
Egypt, having advanced ourselves nearly 300 miles up to and
beyond the frontier.

2. The following enemy formations have ceased to exist as effec
tive fighting formations:

Panzer Army 20th Italian Corps

i5th Panzer Div. Ariete Arm. Div.

2ist Panzer Div. Littorio Arm. Div.

goth Light Div. Trieste Div.

i64th Light Div.
loth Italian Corps 2ist Italian Corps

Brescia Div. Trento Div.

Pavia Div. Bologna Div.

Folgore Div.

The prisoners captured number 30,000, including nine gen
erals.

The amount of tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, transport,
aircraft, etc., destroyed or captured is so great that the enemy
is completely crippled.

3. This is a very fine performance and I want, first, to thank you
all for the way you responded to my call and rallied to the
task. I feel that our great victory was brought about by the
good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire rather
than by anything I may have been able to do myself.

4. Secondly, I know you will all realise how greatly we were

Alamein to Tunis 131

helped in our task by the R.A.F. We could not have done it
without their splendid help and co-operation. I have thanked
the R.A.F. warmly on your behalf.

5. Our task is not finished yet; the Germans are out of Egypt but
there are still some left in North Africa. There is some good
hunting to be had farther to the West, in Libya; and our lead
ing troops are now in Libya ready to begin. And this time,
having reached Benghazi and beyond, we shall not come back.

6. On with the task, and good hunting to you all. As in all pur
suits some have to remain behind to start with; but we shall
all be in it before the finish.

B. L. Montgomery,

General,

G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army.9*

It will be noticed from the signature of this message that I was
now a general, having been a lieutenant-general when I arrived in
the desert on the isth August. I was promoted General for "dis
tinguished services in the field" after the Battle of Alamein, and
appointed a K.C.B.* at the same time.

A curious incident occurred as our light forces were moving forward
south of Benghazi. I was right up behind the leading armoured cars,
reconnoitring the area; I had a small escort with me. We had out
stripped the fighter cover and from time to time enemy aircraft strafed
the road; it was not a healthy place and I suppose that I ought not
to have been there.

Suddenly I saw a lorry coming up from behind, and on it a large
boat; a naval Petty Officer sat with the driver and some sailors were
inside.

I stopped the lorry and said to the Petty Officer: "What are you
doing here? Do you realise that you are right up with the most
forward elements of the Eighth Army, and you and your boat are
leading the advance? This is a very dangerous area just at present, and
you are unarmed. You must turn round and go back at once."

He was dreadfully upset. He had been ordered to open up a
"petrol point" at a small cove well to the north of Mersa Brega; small
naval craft were to land petrol at this point in order that the leading
armoured car regiments could refill their tanks; this was tie easiest
way of getting petrol and oil to them. He explained this to me, look
ing at me with pleading eyes rather like a spaniel asking to be taken
for a walk to hunt rabbits.

He then said: "Don't send me back, sir. If the armoured cars don't
get their petrol, they will have to halt and you will lose touch with
the Germans. Couldn't I go on with you? I would then be quite safe."
* Knight Commander of the Bath.

132 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

That Petty Officer was clearly a student of psychology! In point of
fact I did not know about these small petrol points for the armoured
cars; it was a staff plan and a very good one. I took the naval party
forward with me and saw them safely to their cove, where I was their
first customer for petrol. I have often thought of that Petty Officer; he
was from the Merchant Navy and in the R.N.V.R.; * his sense of duty
was of the highest order, and Britain will never lose her wars so long
as the Royal Navy can count on men like him.

THE BATTLE OF AGHEILA: 13TH TO lyTH DECEMBER 1942

As we approached the Agheila position I sensed a feeling of anxiety
in the ranks of the Eighth Army. Many had been there twice already;
and twice Rommel had debouched when he was ready and had driven
them back I therefore decided that I must get possession of the
Agheila position quickly; morale might decline if we hung about
looking at it for too long. It was a difficult position to attack.

I therefore decided to attempt bluff and manoeuvre, and to bustle
Rommel to such an extent that he might think he would lose his
whole force if he stood to fight He would be anxious too about the
morale of his own troops; they had been retreating continuously since
they were defeated at Alamein, more than 1000 miles away; they had
been hustled out of every position on which they had tried to make a
stand; they were continuously being "shot up" from the air. All this
would tend to make Rommel's forces dispirited and defensively
minded, looking over their shoulders for the next position to which
to withdraw— as had been the case in the Eighth Army once upon a
time.

In view of the awkward country to the south and the difficulty of
a frontal attack, it would obviously be preferable to manoeuvre Rom
mel out of the Agheila position and then attack him in the easier
country to the west; in view of the probable decline in morale in his
forces, I tihought this could be done if I did not delay too long.

30 Corps had now taken over the lead from 10 Corps; I recon
noitred the position with Leese in the last week in November and
gave him my orders, leaving all the details in his capable hands. The
main feature was to be a movement by Freyberg and his New
Zealanders round the enemy south flank to a position north of Marada,
and from thence to operate against the rear of Rommel's forces; this
would be synchronised with a frontal attack by sist (Highland)
Division and jth Armoured Division. I fixed the isth December as
the date on which the operation would begin. The sketch map illus
trates the plan. I then decided that I myself would fly back to Cairo
to discuss further plans with Alexander; I also wanted to get some
* Royal Navy Voluntary Reserve.

Alamein to Tunis J33

more clothes, and generally get cleaned up after nearly four months
in the desert. I spent a very pleasant week-end in Cairo, staying at
the British Embassy. I did not realise until I got to Cairo that I had
suddenly become a somewhat "notorious character**; my appearance
at SL George's Cathedral for the Sunday evening service, where I
read the lessons, created quite a stir. It is a strange experience to
find oneself famous and it would be ridiculous to deny that it was
rather fun.

When I got back to my headquarters just east of Benghazi, I found
preparations for facing up to the Agheila position were well advanced.
It seemed clear that the enemy was becoming nervous about our
preparations, and had begun to ferry back his immobile Italian troops
to the Buerat position— the next good defensive position to the rear.
I therefore decided to advance the proposed timing by two days.

Everything went well. The enemy began to withdraw the moment
our frontal attack developed; but the New Zealanders had got in
behind them by the 15th December, and at one time we had the
whole of Rommel's Panzer Army in between the New Zealand Division
and 7th Armoured Division, which was advancing strongly. The Ger
mans broke into small groups and burst their way through gaps in the
strung-out New Zealand positions; fighting was intense and confused
all day on the i6th December, and prisoners were captured and re
captured on both sides. The Panzer Army finally got through to the
west, but it was severely mauled by the New Zealanders and also
suffered heavily from air attack. I ordered the New Zealand Division
to halt and reorganise at Nofilia, and followed up Rommel's army with
light forces, making contact with them in the Buerat position which
they were holding strongly.

The Battle of Agheila was now over; that position was firmly in
our hands.

I had 10 Corps (Horrocks), strong in armour, in the Jebel about
Mekili. The Desert Air Force was vigorously supporting our operations
from Martuba airfields and from airfields south of Benghazi about
Agedabia.

We had in fact achieved our purpose.

I moved my advanced Tactical Headquarters forward to Marble
Arch, near the Merduma airfields, close to H.Q. 30 Corps. From this
area I was to be well placed to direct the reconnaissance of the
Buerat position and to draw up the plan for the advance to Tripoli.

CHRISTMAS 1942 IN THE DESERT

We were now well into Tripolitania, and over 1200 miles from
Alamein where we had started. Rommel and his Axis forces had been
decisively defeated. Egypt was safe for the duration of the war.

134 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I decided that the Eighth Army needed a halt during which it could
pull itself together and get ready for the final "jump" to Tripoli.
Indeed, officers and men deserved a rest and I was determined they
should have it. I ordered that we would halt where we stood, that no
offensive operations would take place until after Christmas, and we
would all spend that day in the happiest way that conditions in the
desert allowed. It was very cold. Turkeys, plum puddings, beer, were
all ordered up from Egypt and the staff concentrated on ensuring that
it all arrived in time: and it did.

I issued the following message to the Eighth Army:

"i. The Eighth Army has turned the enemy out of the famous
Agheila position and is now advancing into Tripolitania. It is
wonderful what has been achieved since the 23rd October,
when we started the Battle of Alamein.

Before the battle began I sent you a message in which I said:
Let us pray that "the Lord mighty in
battle* will give us the victory.

He has done so, and I know you will agree with me when
I say that we must not forget to thank Him for His great
mercies.

2. It is now Chistmas time and we are all thinking about our
families and friends in the home country.

I want to send you all my very best wishes, and my hope
that 1943 will be a very happy year for each one of you.

3. I have received a Christmas Greeting from Hull, in Yorkshire.
It is quite the nicest that I have ever received; my only regret
is that I cannot answer it, as the writer gave no address. But I
shall treasure it all my life. It is intended for you as well as for
me, and is as follows:

Dear Sir,

To wish you and our lads of die EIGHTH ARMY a very
happy Christmas. Good health. Good luck. And by the
Grace of God VICTORY IN 1943.

Keep ?em on the run, Monty. Best wishes from a York
shire lass with a lad in the Eighth Army.

4. What better Christmas greeting can I send on to you than the
one from the Yorkshire lass?

I would like to tell her, from us all, that we will do our best
to Tceep 'em on the run/

5. Good luck to you! And in the words of Tiny Tim, in Dickens's
Christmas Carol: 'God bless us all, each one of us.* "

I realised later that I had misquoted Tiny Tim. But the misquota
tion did the trick!

Alamein to Tunis 135

I enjoyed that Christmas in the desert; I think we all did. We had
a feeling that we had achieved something. The Agheila bogey had
been laid and we were leaguering as an Army beyond that once-
dreaded position, where hitherto only our advanced patrols had pene
trated. We had made the grade; and morale was high.

De Guingand was not with me. He had borne a tremendous burden
since we had met at the road junction outside Alexandria on the early
morning of the isth August, and he collapsed during the preparations
for the Battle of Agheila. I sent him back to Cairo for a rest; he had
become engaged to be married and I said he should get married before
he returned— which he did. I borrowed Bobbie Erskine (now General
Sir George Erskine) who was Chief of Staff to Leese in 30 Corps,
and he acted as my Chief of Staff till de Guingand returned.

Duncan Sandys, son-in-law to the Prime Minister, had been visiting
me and when he returned to Cairo he sent us a bottle of port for
Christmas. John Poston, my ADC told the mess corporal to take the
chill off it before putting the bottle on the table. The corporal wanted
to make certain there would be no mistake; so he boiled the port;
steam came from the bottle when it was placed before me at dinner
on Christmas night!

I recall particularly one incident about which I heard shortly after
wards. It took place in the Sergeants* Mess of a certain unit on Christ
mas night. Toasts were being drunk. Some of the younger sergeants
reckoned we would soon be in Tripoli and they were drinking to that
day and to the end of our labours. To many who had served in the
desert, Tripoli was the end of the road; once we got there, we should
have done our share and could sit back. An old and seasoned sergeant-
major, a veteran of many battles, watched the fun and the drinking
and then got up to make a speech. He was much respected and there
was instant silence when he rose. He spoke very quietly, outlining
what had been achieved and what still remained to be done. He
finished with these words:

"Some of you think that when we have got to Tripoli, it will
be the end of our labours. That is not the case. We went to war
in 1939 to defeat Hitler and everything for which he stands. A
long struggle lies ahead; when we have cleared die Axis Powers
from Africa we shall have to carry the war into Europe, and finally
into Germany. Only when we have defeated Germany in Europe,
will we be able to return to our families honourable men."

It will be remembered that the First Army (Anderson) had landed
in Algeria on the 8th November and was developing operations to
wards Bizerta and Tunis.

Having secured these places, it was to be directed on Tripoli. There
was considerable speculation in high places which Army would get

136 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to Tripoli first: the Eighth Army or the First Army. The idea that any
Army except ourselves should capture Tripoli infuriated officers and
men of the Eighth Army. For three years it had been the target; they
weren't going to miss it this time.

I wrote the following in my diary on Christmas Eve, the 24th
December, 1942.

"And so ends the first phase of this remarkable campaign. We
have driven the enemy from Egypt from Cyrenaica, and across
the border into Tripolitania. The next stage may be the most
difficult.

The war in Africa is not now so clear cut as it was in October
and November; we are away in Tripolitania and are 1200 miles
from where we started.

Our war, and the Tunisian war, are now getting close to each
other and require co-ordination.

Vested interests are beginning to creep in.

We want some very clear thinking; the object must be defined
clearly and pursued ruthlessly; we must not be led away on ven
tures that do not help in achieving the object. We really want
unified command; you cannot conduct operations in a theatre of
war with a committee.

My own view is that die surest way of getting to Tripoli quickly
is for the Eighth Army, with its accompanying Air Force, to
'drive* forward and that everything should be done to make this
possible."

The operations of the First Army made our task easier, without
any doubt

But it was the relentless forward move of the Eighth Army which
was eventually to save the First Army from serious disaster.

Shortly after Christmas I received the following letter from a soldier
in the Eighth Army. That letter, from an ordinary soldier, made me
feel very happy.

8/13056697, Pte. Glaister G.,

"A" Branch, Rear H.Q. 8th Army

23 Dec. 42

"To: General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, K.C.B., D.S.O.

General Officer Commanding Eighth Army.
Sir,

For a private soldier to write a personal letter to an Army

Commander is perhaps most unusual, even if the Regulations don't

wholly forbid it. But this isn't really a personal letter— it is written

on behalf of thousands of men in the Eighth Army.

,On October aist 1942, I had been in the Services for 2?2 years

Alamein to Tunis 137

without feeling very concerned about it. I felt the successful run
ning of the Army was more the business of its officers, not much
being expected from its privates.

But on October 2ist, the D.A.Q.M.G.* gathered us informally
together, and read your message to us.

There can never have been such a message read to troops
before, with the trust and confidence it placed in them. This mes
sage was a bond, and for the first time in my Army life I felt I
belonged to something— to some live force that had a job to do, a
job so hard that even my work as a clerk had a place in a gigantic
scheme. I know from talking to men in this and other units, that
your speech— a man to man speech, had a tremendous effect on
their spirits.

You achieved far more by your human, personal message than
any Order of the Day could have done. For myself, thank you,
Sir, for this new feeling. You have made us proud to belong to
the 8th Army.

And now you have sent us a Christmas message which, by its
friendliness and references to his home, must have gone to the
heart of each one of us.

Because circumstances more or less compel troops as a whole
to be inarticulate, I again on behalf of thousands of us here in
Libya— on behalf of this great brotherhood, thank you sincerely.

In closing, may I wish you a very happy Christmas and a
brilliant and successful 1943.

God Bless you, Sir, and guide you at all times.

Yours obediently and humbly,

Geoffrey Glaister.
Pte."

THE ADVANCE ON TRIPOLI: 3-5TH TO 23RD JANUARY 1Q43

When the enemy withdrew from the Agheila area he went back
to the Buerat position and began to prepare that line for defence.
The basis of my plan for dealing with that position was twofold:

(a) I did not want the enemy to withdraw: I wanted him to stand
there and fight If he did this, he could probably be destroyed,
since the position could be outflanked to the south, I would
therefore hold main bodies of attacking divisions at least 100
miles behind the front, while we built up our administrative
arrangements. The opening phases of the advance would
then take the form of an encounter battle.

* Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General.

138 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

(b) When I attacked the Buerat position my plan must be such
that we could go right through to Tripoli, without allowing
the enemy to delay us or stop our movement.

The essence of the whole operation must be speed, for the crux of
the problem of getting to Tripoli was administration. I calculated that
I must have enough petrol, ammunition, supplies, etc., for 10 days*
fighting. My forces were based on Benghazi and Tobruk, and it was
a long haul by road from them. A pause was now necessary to build
up the administrative resources we needed; my staff told me the
necessary dumping could be completed by the 14th January. I de
cided to attack on the isth January. I well knew that if we did not
reach Tripoli in 10 days I might have to withdraw— for lack of sup
plies. On arrival at Tripoli it would be vital to get the port open and
working at full capacity very quickly; the enemy must not be allowed
time to damage the port facilities unduly.

My plan then was to complete dumping by the 14th January, to
leap on the enemy in strength on the early morning of the 15th Jan
uary, and to "crash" right thorough to Tripoli within 10 days. Adminis
tratively, it was a considerable risk.

On the 4th January very heavy gales began to rage in the Mediter
ranean and these created havoc and destruction at Benghazi. Ships
broke loose and charged about the harbour; heavy seas broke up the
breakwater and smashed into the inner harbour; much damage was
done to tugs, lighters and landing places.

The capacity of the port, which had been brought up to 3000 tons
a day, dropped at once to 1000 tons a day. The storms looked like
continuing and all ships had to leave the harbour; Benghazi was
practically "out" as a base port and indeed by the 12th January its
capacity had fallen to 400 tons a day.

Here was a "pretty how-de-do"! We were at once thrown back
on Tobruk; which place was 1000 miles by road from Tripoli. And
having got to Tripoli we would have to build up good dumps there
for use in the operations beyond.

G.H.Q. in Cairo got anxious and asked if I would now have to
change my dates and thus put everything back.

I decided there was only one thing to do— to "crash" on to Tripoli
with no change in the timing. To do this I decided to "ground" the
three divisions of 10 Corps which were in the Jebel about Mekili, and
use all their transport to lift forward from Tobruk and Benghazi the
supplies. needed by the 14th January. 10 Corps must become Eighth
Army's "Carter Paterson."

I sent for Horrocks and put him in charge of the whole business;
he entered into it with the greatest enthusiasm and organised a first
class transportation service. We kept our dates.

Alamein to Tunis 139

I issued the following message to the Army on the 12th January.

**i. The leading units of Eighth Army are now only about 200
miles from Tripoli. The enemy is between us and that port,
hoping to hold us off.

2. THE EIGHTH ARMY IS GOING TO TRIPOLI.

3. Tripoli is the only town in the Italian Empire overseas still
remaining in their possession. Therefore we will take it from
them; they will then have no overseas Empire.

The enemy will try to stop us. But if each one of us, whether
front-line soldier, or officer or man whose duty is performed
in some other sphere, puts his whole heart and soul into this
next contest— then nothing can stop us.

Nothing has stopped us since the Battle of Alamein began
on 23rd October 1942. Nothing will stop us now.

Some must stay back to begin with, but we will all be in
the hunt eventually.

4. ON TO TRIPOLI!

Our families and friends in the home country will be thrilled
when they hear we have captured that place."

The advance began on the isth January. Things went well to begin
with and by the igth January we were up against the Homs-Tarhuna
position, which the enemy clearly meant to hold if he could. On the
axis of the coast road through Horns the 5ist (H) Division seemed to
be getting weary, and generally displayed a lack of initiative and
ginger. A note in my diary dated the aoth January reads as follows:

"Sent for the GOC. 51 (Highland) Division and gave him an
imperial 'rocket'; this had an immediate effect."

The leading troops entered Tripoli at 4 a.m. on the ajjrd January
1943, three months to a day since the beginning of the Alamein battle.

THE EIGHTH ARMY IN TRIPOLI

We had a good reception from the population; the city was quiet
and there was no panic. I myself arrived outside the city at 9 a.m. on
the 23rd January and sent for the leading Italian officials to come and
report to me. I gave them my orders about the city and requested
their co-operation in ensuring the well-being of the population. I
appointed Brigadier Lush, Deputy Chief Political Officer for Tripoli-
tarria, to take over civil control as soon as he could— working through
the Italian authorities. I imposed a strict military control for the first
24 hours, so as to establish a good degree of discipline; shops were
shut, curfew was imposed at night, and so on.

140 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I foresaw certain dangers in the proximity of my army to a large
city like Tripoli, Palaces, villas, flats, were available for officers. I
myself was asked if I intended to live in the Governor's palace. I said
"No/* and installed my headquarters in the fields some 4 miles outside
the city. Much fighting lay ahead and I was not going to have the
Eighth Army getting "soft/* or deteriorating in any way. I forbade
the use of houses, buildings, etc., for headquarters and troops; all
would live in the fields and in the desert, as we had done for many
months. The army had to retain its toughness and efficiency.

Having given orders about these things, I drove into the city with
Leese and we sat in the sun on the sea front and ate our sandwich
lunch. We were great friends, and we discussed together the past and
the future. Our ADC's and police escort sat not far away, also having
their lunch. I asked Leese what he thought they were talking about
after many months of monastic life in the desert; he reckoned they
were speculating on whether there were any suitable ladies in the city.
I had no doubt that he was right. I decided to get the Army away from
Tripoli as early as possible.

Two days after we arrived in the city it was reported to me that
the food situation was deteriorating among the civil population. I at
once issued the following order:

"i. The food situation in Tripoli is not good; the civil population
is likely to be short of food very shortly, and then would have
to be fed by the Army. This would be a commitment which
would cause us serious embarrassment; it would therefore be
exactly what the Germans would like to happen.

2. The British Army, the Allied Air Forces, and the personnel of
the Royal Navy in Tripoli, have their own rations and must not
eat the food of the civil population. The enemy would make
very good propaganda out of the fact that enough food was
left by them and a good deal of it was eaten by the British
forces.

3. It is therefore rny order that no member of the British forces
in Tripolitania, whether officer or other rank, shall have any
food— breakfast, lunch, dinner or supper— at hotels or restau
rants in Tripoli.

4. The only exception to this order will be that tea shops may,
if they are able and willing, sell tea and buns to the troops.

5. Officers and other ranks visiting Tripoli must take their rations
with them. Arrangements are being made to establish clubs for
officers and other ranks in Tripoli which will be run by the
N.A.A.F.I., and these will be opened as soon as possible; it will
not be possible to provide meals at these clubs, except possibly
tea and buns.

Alamein to Tunis 141

6. Commanders will ensure that the terms o£ my order in para. 3
above are brought to the notice of all officers and other ranks,
together with the reasons for it. The D.C.P.O.* will ensure that
hotel and restaurant managers receive orders not to serve meals
to personnel of the British forces."

The Prime Minister and the C.I.G.S. visited Tripoli on the 3rd
and 4th February and we organised for them parades of the Highland
Division and the New Zealand Division, with certain units of the
Royal Armoured Corps and the R.A.S.C.

Winston Churchill was immensely impressed, and was deeply
moved when the troops marched past him: looking so fit and well,
and with such a fine bearing. I felt a very proud man myself to be
in command of such men.

I asked him to address the officers and men of my headquarters,
and it was then that he said:

"Ever since your victory at Alamein, you have nightly pitched
your moving tents a day's march nearer home. In days to come
when people ask you what you did in the Second World War, it
will be enough to say: I marched with die Eighth Army/*

After getting to Tripoli on the 23rd January my main preoccupation
was to get the harbour uncorked and ships inside, so as to get a good
daily tonnage landed. This was the task of the Royal Navy, and no
easy one to do quickly. Speed was vital; my chief engineer went to
work with the Navy, and we helped with all our own resources. This
made a great difference; the first ship entered the harbour on the
3rd February and the first convoy on tie gth February. I was anxious
to do away with the road link from Tobruk and Benghazi as soon as
possible, abolish the "Carter Paterson" service, and maintain Eighth
Army from the Tripoli base.

The next tough battle would be on the Mareth Line; this was a
very strong position and the main feature of the attack upon it would
have to be an outflanking movement round its western flank I en
visaged using the New Zealanders on this task and I had launched
reconnaissances before Christmas, when we captured the Agheila
position, i.e. nearly 3 months before the Battle of Mareth took place.

Meanwhile our first task must be to push the enemy back on to the
main position so that we could reconnoitre it. We also needed to
secure the necessary road centres of communication at Ben Gardane,
Foum Tatahouine and Medenine, and the lateral roads, and the air
fields about Medenine. The sketch map (see Map, No. 23) makes the
picture dear.

Initially I used only 7th Armoured Division for this task But as our
administrative situation eased so I began to build up strength in the
* Deputy Chief Political Officer.

142 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

forward area, sending up the $ist ( H ) Division and a further brigade
of tanks.

Towards the end of February the port of Tripoli was working well
and we were discharging up to 3500 tons a day. My administrative
anxieties were over and I could bring 10 Corps forward to Tripoli
from the Tobruk-Benghazi area.

I must mention that General Leclerc had joined me, having come
up from Central Africa with his small French force. He put himself
under my command. All he asked in return was that I should givaiam
food, petrol and clothing: which I did, as I was glad to get the help
of this remarkable man.

In accordance with decisions taken at the Casablanca Conference,
which had assembled in January, the Eighth Army was to come under
General Eisenhower for the fighting in Tunisia; Alexander was made
Deputy C.-in-C. and was to command the land forces. Tedder became
C.-in-C. of all air forces in the Mediterranean theatre. This grouping
was good, and if we played our cards properly the successful outcome
of the operations in Tunisia was certain. The air power in Tunisia,
in Malta, and with the Eighth Army could now be concentrated and
the whole of it used to support any one operation.

Coningham went over to join Tedder as commander of the Tactical
Air Forces, and Harry Broadhurst took command of the Desert Air
Force working with the Eighth Army.

Alexander told me he had found things in a terrible mess when he
went over to join General Eisenhower. The First Army was being
heavily attacked on the southern part of its front and everything looked
like sliding there. Generally, he found stagnation: no policy, no plan,
the front all mixed up, no reserves, no training anywhere, no building
up for the future, so-called reinforcement camps in a disgraceful state,
and so on. He found the American troops disappointing; they were
mentally and physically soft, and very "green." It was the old story:
lack of proper training allied to no experience of war, and linked with
too high a standard of living. They were going through their early
days, just as we had had to go through ours. We had been at war a
long time and our mistakes lay mostly behind us.

Alexander worked day and night to get things right. But he had
some anxious moments and he sent me a very real cry for help on the
20th February, asking if I could do anything to relieve the pressure on
the Americans. I replied that I would do all I could— adding that if he
and I exerted pressure at the right moments we might get Rommel
running about like a "wet hen** between our respective fronts. My
staff always used to refer to this message as the "wet hen" signal!

I speeded up events and by the 26th February it was clear that our
pressure had caused Rommel to break off his attack against the
Americans. This gave Alexander the time he needed, and he wrote to

Alaraein to Tunis 143

me on the 5th March saying that he reckoned the patient had passed
the crisis and was on the way to recovery; but the military body is
always left with great weakness after such an illness. When the
Americans had learnt their lesson, and had gained in experience, they
proved themselves to be first-class troops. It took time; but they did
it more quickly than we did.

After Rommel had pulled out from the First Army front I thought
it likely it would be my turn to be attacked next: and it was. We
got indications of movement down to our front. I brought up the
New Zealand Division from Tripoli and got ready to receive the blow
which I was sure would come. I was not very strong on the ground
at the time because I had taken certain risks in answer to Alexander's
cry for help. Any setback we might receive would upset the prepara
tions for our own attack against the Mareth Line, which was timed
for about the igth March. Still, one cannot always get what one wants
in war; the great thing is to turn every mischance into an advantage.
Perhaps this might prove another Alam Haifa, a defensive battle which
would help the offensive one which followed.

On the evening of the 5th March all indications pointed to an attack
the next morning.

THE BATTLE OF MEDENINE: 6TH MARCH 3-943

As expected, Rommel attacked early in the morning with three
Panzer divisions: this attack was beaten off. He attacked again in the
afternoon; again he was driven back. Our tank losses were nil; our
total casualties in personnel were 130 all ranks. The enemy lost 52
tanks, all knocked out by the anti-tank guns of the infantry, except
seven which were destroyed by a squadron of Sherman tanks.

I fought the battle in the same way as I had at Alam Haifa. I made
up my mind that Rommers attack would be made in a certain way
and I planned to receive it on ground of my own choosing. I refused
to move to counter any of his thrusts.

I refused to follow up when Rommel withdrew. And I proceeded
with my plans for our own offensive when the battle was over. It
lasted only one day. As Alam Haifa had helped Alamein, so Medenine
was to help the Battle of Mareth. The 52 tanks which Rommel lost
at Medenine would have .been of great value to him at Mareth.

THE BATTLE OF MARETH: 2OTH TO 27TH MARCH 1Q43

The Mareth Line had been constructed by the French in Tunisia
as a defensive position in case of Italian aggression from Tripolitania.
It was very strong naturally, and had been improved artificially by the

144 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

French, and later by the Germans. Its eastern flank rested on the sea
and its western flank on the mountain massif of Matmata. A switch
line ran north-west from Matmata towards El Hamma.

The country to the west of the Matmata hills was reported to be
an impassable "sand sea," stretching away to the west for many miles.
The French told me that any outflanking movement through this sand
sea was impossible. I decided that a frontal attack against such a
strong position would be unlikely to succeed by itself, for there was
little room for manoeuvre between the Matmata hills and the sea.
The main feature of my plan must be an outflanking movement to the
west of the Matmata hills: to be synchronised with a limited frontal
attack*

The problem then was: could a route through the sand sea be
found?

It will be remembered that I had launched reconnaissances into this
area from the Agheila area before Christmas. A passable route was
found by the Long Range Desert Group and the plan then took shape.

My plan in outline was as follows:

(a) 30 Corps to attack the eastern flank with three divisions.
This would be a relentless pressure, with the right flank
on the sea. Its object would be to draw the enemy reserves
down to this part of the defensive line.

(b) To launch the New Zealanders, heavily reinforced with other
units, round the western flank and to '"break-in" behind the
Matmata massif.

(c) To hold 10 Corps in reserve with two armoured divisions ( ist
and yth), available to fling in on either flank as opportunity
offered. This corps was so positioned that it protected all
my "vitals/' and secured the important ground.

(d) The whole operation to be supported by the concentrated and
sustained effort of the air striking forces.

The flank move by the New Zealanders was a force of 27,000 men
and 200 tanks. It was assembled on our southern flank, without detec
tion by the enemy, by dawn on the i8th March. On the night of the
I7th-i8th March we carried out certain preliminary operations on
our right flank to mislead the enemy about where the real blow
would falL These operations were successful but during them 2Oist
Guards Brigade ran into very extensive minefields which were defended
by Germans: hand-to-hand fighting took place and the 6th Battalion
Grenadier Guards lost 24 officers and 300 men. The Guards Brigade
fought magnificently that night and made a notable contribution to
the final success which was to come our way.

The attack of 30 Corps on the right flank was timed to begin at
10,30 p.m. on the 20th March. It was clear to me on the morning of

Alamein to Tunis

the 20th March that the enemy had discovered the New Zealand
force lying concealed on my southern flank; I therefore ordered it to
abandon any further attempt at concealment and to go 'Tike heir
northwards and get on with the job: which it did.

I issued the following message to the Army on the 2Oth March:

**i. On 5th March Rommel addressed his troops in the mountains
overlooking our positions and said that if they did not take
Medenine, and force the Eighth Army to withdraw, then the
day of the Axis forces in North Africa were numbered.

The next day, 6th March, he attacked the Eighth Army. He
should have known that the Eighth Army NEVER WITHDRAWS;
therefore his attack could end only in failure— which it did.

2. We will now show Rommel that he was right in the statement
he made to his troops.

The days of the Axis forces in North Africa are indeed
numbered.

The Eighth Army and the Western Desert Air Force, to
gether constituting one fighting machine, are ready to advance.
We all know what that means; and so does the enemy.

3. In the battle that is now to start, the Eighth Army:

(a) Will destroy the enemy now facing us in the Mareth
position.

(b) Will burst through the Gabes Gap.

(c) Will then drive northwards on Sfax, Sousse, and finally
Tunis.

4. We will not stop, or let up, till Tunis has been captured, and
the enemy has either given up the struggle or has been pushed
into the sea.

5. The operations now about to begin will mark the dose of the
campaign in North Africa. Once the battle starts the eyes of the
whole world will be on the Eighth Army, and millions of people
will listen to the wireless every day— hoping anxiously for
good news, and plenty of it, every day.

If each one of us does his duty, and pulls his full weight,
then nothing can stop the Eighth Army. And nothing will
stop it.

6. With faith in God, and in the justice of our cause, let us go
forward to victory.

7. FORWARD TO TUNIS! DRIVE THE ENEMY INTO THE SEAl"

This battle has been described by several writers and it seems
unnecessary to tell the detailed story again. The major tactics may be
summarised as follows:

(a) The battle opened with a hard blow on our right.

Tlie Memoirs of Jbield-Marshal Montgomery

(b) When this blow went in, a strong outflanking movement was
set in motion on our left.

(c) The blow on the right made good progress at first

The threat here became so serious to the enemy that the
available German reserves were drawn in to meet it. These
reserves counter-attacked, drove us back, and we lost all our
gains. We were back where we had started two days before.
I well remember the Commander 30 Corps (Leese) coming
to tell me this at 2 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd March.
It is interesting to note that the crisis of the battle of Alamein
also took place at 2 a.m. (on the 25th October). Leese was
very upset. I said: "Never mind, this is where weVe got 'em;
but you must keep the German reserves tied to your corps
front."

(d) I immediately decided to hold hard on the right, but to main
tain such pressure there that the German reserves would be
kept in that area. I also opened a new thrust line in the centre
against the Matmata hills, using the 4th Indian Division.

(e) I then sent the ist Armoured Division from my reserve round
to join the New Zealand outflanking movement, which was
gathering momentum.

In short, I decided to reinforce success. I sent H.Q. 10 Corps
(Horrocks) to take charge of this left hook, and while this
reinforcement was moving to the left flank, we tee-ed up the
blitz attack which was to go in when it arrived.

(f) The enemy saw what was happening and tried to move his
reserves from opposite our right to stop our now very power
ful left thrust. They were too late. The blitz attack went in
twenty minutes after the last vehicle of ist Armoured Division
had arrived, and it swept everything before it.

By 9 a.m. on the 28th March we were in full possession of
the famous Mareth Line, after a battle lasting only one week.
Having received a setback on our right, we recovered quickly
and knocked the enemy out with a "left hook."

We never lost the initiative: without which in war you cannot win.
The enemy was made to commit his reserves in desperation and piece
meal, as at Alamein; we committed ours in one concentrated blow on
a narrow front.

The outstanding feature of the battle was the blitz attack on the
left flank, in daylight, on the afternoon of the 26th March. It was
delivered at 4 p.m. with the sun behind it and in the enemy's eyes.
A dust storm was blowing at the time, the wind also being behind
us and blowing the dust on to the enemy. The enemy was making

Alamein to Tunis 147

ready for our usual night attack; instead he was assaulted in the
afternoon with great ferocity.

The attack was simply conceived; it was dependent on surprise,
on complete integration of land and air forces, and on a willingness
to take risks and to face casualties.

The air forces played a notable part in the attack, using twenty-two
squadrons of Spitfires, Kitty bombers and Hurricane tank-busters,
operating in the area beyond the artillery barrage; in that area every
vehicle, and anything that appeared or moved, was shot to pieces.
Brilliant and brave work by the pilots completely stunned the enemy;
our attack burst through the resistance and the battle was won. In
this attack we took 2500 prisoners, all Germans; our own casualties
were only 600, and we lost only 8 pilots.

This blitz attack was the most complete example of the close inte
gration of land and air power up to that time. It should be noted that
there ware grave misgivings at the headquarters of the Tactical Air
Forces; Coningham considered the risks were too great and an officer
was sent over to try and stop the use of air power in this way. But the
A.O.C. Desert Air Force (Harry Broadhurst) decided to accept the
risks and refused to listen to the emissary. When it was all over and
had been proved a great success with very small losses, he received
many congratulations from Air Headquarters in Tunisia; and even
from the Air Ministry!

THE END OF THE WAR IN AFRICA

It was obvious that the end of the war in Africa would now come
quite soon.

The Eighth Army had only to burst through the Gabes gap and
join hands with die American forces; the remaining enemy would
then be hemmed in, and in an ever diminishing area. ( See Map, No.

24.)

We had a stiff one-day battle on the line of the Wadi Akarit north
of Gabes on the 6th April, where we took another 7000 prisoners. On
the 8th April, we joined up with the American forces moving east
wards from Gafsa. We were now taking prisoners at the rate of 1000
a day, and no army can lose men at that rate for very long and remain
efficient

Oil the loth April we captured Sfax.

General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, had visited me
in Tripoli in February and we had discussed the problem of how soon
the Eighth Army could join up with the First Army north of Gabes.
I had said that I would be in Sfax by the 15th April Bedell Smith

148 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

said that if I could do that, General Eisenhower would give me any
thing I liked to ask for. I said I would do it, and would like an aero
plane for my personal use. Bedell Smith agreed, willingly.

On the morning of the loth April I sent a message to Eisenhower
asking for the aircraft. It arrived on the i6th April, a 617 (a Flying
Fortress). It made me a thoroughly mobile general. Later, I got prop
erly ticked off by Brooke, the C.I.G.S., for my action in the matter.
He said that it was all a joke on the part of Bedell Smith and that
Eisenhower was furious when I demanded the aircraft I explained
that it was very far from a joke on that day at Tripoli when the state
ment was made. I don't think Bedell Smith had ever told Eisenhower
about it, and he was suddenly confronted with having to pay. Brooke
added that the R.A.F. could well have provided me with an aircraft;
they certainly could, but didn't— in spite of my repeated requests.
Eisenhower produced it at once. And, being the great and generous
man he is, he arranged that I was provided with an aircraft from
American sources for the rest of the war; furthermore, he did this for
my Chief of Staff also. He saw the need and acted promptly.

On the loth April I wrote to Alexander saying a decision was
required about which army should make the main effort for the final
phase in Tunisia. I recommended that the First Army should do so;
the plain west of Tunis was suitable ground for armour whereas my
army was likely to be faced with difficult and mountainous country at
Enfidaville and Takrouna. Alexander agreed and asked me to send the
First Army one armoured division and one armoured car regiment;
my task would be to exert pressure all the time, and make the enemy
think the main attack would be delivered by the Eighth Army. I made
my plans accordingly and attacked the Enfidaville position on the
night of die igth-aoth April. It was difficult going in the mountains
about Takrouna but we progressed about three miles. I regrouped and
made plans to put in another attack after a week. I was not happy
about these attacks and considered the main blow should be struck
on the First Army front, where the ground was not so mountainous
and armour could be used.

But the initial attempt of the First Army to break through to Tunis
was not successful. It took place on the 23rd April. 5 Corps attacked
on a front of three divisions, each on a front of six miles, and each
division with all three infantry brigades up; it was more of a partridge
drive than an attack and had no hope of success. 9 Corps with two
armoured divisions tried to break through somewhere else. I was in
bed at the time with an attack of tonsilitis and influenza, and so I
asked Alexander if he would come and see me at my headquarters
near Sousse. He arrived on the soth April. I said it was essential to
regroup the two armies, First and Eighth, so that the attack on Tunis
could be made with the maximum strength in the most suitable area.

Alamein to Tunis 149

I suggested that I should send First Army the yth Armoured Divi
sion, 4th Indian Division, soist Guards Brigade, and some extra
artillery, together with a very experienced corps commander to handle
the attack; I meant Horrocks.

I finally said we really must finish off the war in Africa quickly.
We were due to invade Sicily in July and there was much to do before
we could tackle that difficult combined operation. Alexander thor
oughly agreed.

Horrocks went over to the First Army and staged the corps attack
on Tunis on the 6th May; it was made in great strength at the selected
point and broke clean through the enemy defences to the west of Tunis.
Bizerta and Tunis were captured on the yth May and the enemy
was then hemmed in to the Cap Bon peninsula.

The first troops to enter Tunis were those of our own /th Armoured
Division. They had earned this satisfaction. Organised enemy resist
ance ended on the 12th May, some 248,000 being taken prisoner.

And so the war in Africa came to a close. It ended in a major
disaster for the Germans; all their troops, stores, dumps, heavy
weapons, and equipment were captured. From a purely military
point of view the holding out in North Africa once the Mareth Line
had been broken through, could never be justified. I suppose Hitler
ordered it for political reasons. It is dangerous to undertake tasks
which are militarily quite unsound, just for political reasons; it may
sometimes be necessary, but they will generally end in disaster.

The contribution of the Eighth Army to the final victory in North
Africa had been immense. It drove Rommel and his army out of
Egypt, out of Cyrenaica, out of Tripolitania, and then helped the
First Army to finish them off in Tunisia. Only first-class troops could
have done it and I realised what an honour and what an excitement it
was to command such a magnificent army at the time of its greatest
triumphs.

Early in June the Prime Minister wrote the following in my auto
graph book:

"The total destruction or capture of all enemy forces in Tunisia,
culminating in the surrender of 248,000 men, marks the triumphant
end of the great enterprises set on foot at Alamein and by the
invasion of N.W. Africa. May the future reap in the utmost full
ness the rewards of past achievements and new exertions.

Winston S. Churchill"
Algiers. June 3, 1943

Before closing this chapter I just want to mention certain matters
which, cumulatively, played the major part in this amazing campaign.
It is about 2000 miles from Alamein to Tunis, and we had got to
Tripoli in three months and to Tunis in six. How was it done?

150 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

First, I would say that the soldiery gave of their best I had told
them in August 1942 that I would lead them to victory. There would
be no setback, no failures; at all times when we were ready I would
tell them what we were going to do, and we would then do it. I gave
orders that the Press was to have the fullest facilities for finding out
what was going on, and for reporting it. We went from one success
to another; the Eighth Army developed a crusading spirit, and the
soldiers began to think it was invincible. By the end of the campaign
I believe they would have done anything I asked; they felt we were
all partners in the battle and that they themselves "belonged/* and
mattered. They gave me their complete confidence. What more can
any commander want? My only fear was that I myself might fail these
magnificent men.

Next, I had a superb Chief of Staff. I have already referred to de
Guingand. His fertile brain was full of ideas and he was never
defeated by the difficulties of any problem. He could take from me
an outline conception of a plan, work out the staff details, and let me
know quickly if it was possible from the staff point of view: and if
not, what changes in substance were desirable. He accepted responsi
bility readily. I gave him full powers. If he couldn't get hold of me
he would give a major decision himself, and I never once questioned
any such decision. I trusted him completely; he seemed to know in
stinctively what I would do in any given situation, and he was always
right

With such a Chief of Staff I could keep clear of detail; I left that
all to him. The first requirement in high command is to have a good
Chief of Staff. Without de Guingand, I doubt if I could have done
my part of the overall task. It was of course a fluke that I found him
in Egypt when I arrived; but I took full advantage of that fluke. It
was, of course, hardly a fluke that he was where he was when I
arrived.

Under de Guingand the Eighth Army staff developed into a splendid
team. I have always been a great believer in youth: with its enthu
siasm, its optimism, its original ideas and its willingness to follow a
leader. Our staff was on the young side; many of them were not
soldiers by profession. The only requirement needed for getting on my
staff was ability to do the job; it mattered not whether a man was a
regular, or a temporary soldier for the duration of the war.

I arrived in the desert for die first time on the isth August 1942.
They were veterans at the game, but they "accepted" me that every
day (or perhaps the day after!) and they laboured unceasingly to
carry out my plans and ideas. And de Guingand welded them into a
devoted unity.

As the campaign developed I learnt the value of Intelligence. Bill
Williams was the main source of inspiration^ intellectually he was far

Alamein to Tunis 151

superior to myself or to anyone on my staff, but he never gave one
that impression. He saw the enemy picture whole and true; he could
sift a mass of detailed information and deduce the right answer. As
time went on he got to know how I worked; he would tell me in ten
minutes exactly what I wanted to know, leaving out what he knew I
did not want to know. Once a commander and his intelligence chief
have achieved this state of intimate co-operation, it is obvious they
must not be parted; that is why he went right through to Berlin with
me. He was "accepted" and trusted right through the Eighth Army.
In this respect he was possibly helped by the fact that he wore a
K.D.G.* badge in his cap and not that of the Intelligence Corps. In
the Second World War the best officers in the Intelligence branch of
the staff were civilians; they seemed to have the best brain for that
type of work, trained in the "rules of evidence," fertile and with great
imagination, and Bill Williams stood out supreme among them all*

Then I must mention my system of personal command from a
Tactical Headquarters, located well forward in the battle area. I
divided my headquarters into three echelons:

Tac H.Q.
Main H.Q.
Rear H.Q.

Tac H.Q. was the headquarters from which I exercised personal
command and control of the battle. It was small, highly efficient, and
completely mobile on its own transport. It consisted chiefly of signals,
cipher, liaison staff, defence troops, and a very small operations staff
for keeping in touch with the battle situation.

Main H.Q. was the central core of the whole headquarters organisa
tion. I gave verbal orders to my subordinate commanders from Tac
H.Q. The staff work consequent on those orders was done at Main and
Rear. The Chief of Staff, and the senior administrative officer, both
lived at Main. But the chief administrator had to have a good deputy
at Rear and this is where Miles Graham began to reveal his capacity.
Ultimately as I have said he succeeded Brian Robertson, and then
"Rim" Lymer, in his turn, became Graham's deputy.

Rear H.Q. was the administrative echelon of the headquarters
organisation. There were located the "A" and "Q" branches, and the
services and departments.

We became very experienced in developing and using this type of
organisation, and I took it with me to 21 Army Group when I left
the Eighth Army. It is applicable from an Army Headquarters upwards;
it is not applicable to a Corps H.Q., as a Corps Commander must
have the full machinery of his Main H.Q. around him in order to fight
the tactical battle.
* Kings Dragoon Guards.

152 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

An Army Commander can only produce the best results by working
from a Tac H.Q. If he cannot acquire the Tac H.Q. mentality, he is
not and never will be any good in command of an army.

Finally, I must mention die constant advice I was given by all and
sundry about how I should fight the battle, what I ought to do next,
and so on. I suppose this used to go on with my predecessors in
command of the Eighth Army, and possibly they accepted it.

About the middle of November 1942 I wrote to the C.I.G.S. and
I quote the following from that letter:

"One of the most interesting points to my mind about this
business of making war is the way people try and shake your
confidence in what you are doing, and suggest that your plan is
not good, and that you ought to do this, or that. If I had done
all that was suggested I would still be back in the Alamein area!"

One of the big lessons I learnt from the campaign in Africa was the
need to decide what you want to do, and then to do it. One must never
be drawn off the job in hand by gratuitous advice from those who are
not fully in the operational picture, and who have no responsibility.

My great supporter throughout was Alexander. He never bothered
me, never fussed me, never suggested what I ought to do, and gave me
at once everything I asked for— having listened patiently to my explana
tion of why I wanted it. But he was too big to require explanations;
he gave me his trust.

My upbringing as a child had taught me to have resource within
myself. I needed it in the desert campaign. I was also taught to count
my blessings, and this I certainly did.

CHAPTER 11

The Campaign in Sicily

10th July to 17th August 1943

ORDERS were received in North Africa in January 1943 that when
the Axis Powers had been turned out of Africa, operations
would be developed to knock Italy out of the war. It was
decided that the first step was the capture of Sicily; the code name was
HUSKY.

On the i8th April, when the Eighth Army was still fighting in
Tunisia, I sent a message to Alexander to say that in my opinion the
situation regarding the planning for Operation HUSKY was becoming
acute. I understood that a plan for the operation had been drawn up
in London, which from what little I could learn about it did not sound
a good one. It was urgently necessary that we should meet with
Eisenhower, and reach decisions on certain vital matters. This was
agreed at once and I flew to Algiers in my recently acquired Flying
Fortress on the igth April

The following were the notes I used at our conference, and I left
a copy with Alexander:

"i. The key dates for the Eighth Army are as follows:

27th April Army admin, plan complete and handed to
subordinate formations.

15th May Tonnage allocations for stores in first three
convoys passed to G.H.Q.

17th May Subordinate formations submit plans of alloca
tion of troops to ships,

22nd May Consolidated plans, with allocations of troops
to ships, sent to G.H.Q.

ist June Start loading ships.

153

154 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

2. The fallowing points need to be understood:

(a) I myself, and my Army H.Q. staff, know very little about
the operation as a whole, and nothing whatever about
the detailed planning that is going on.

(b) The following who are to take part in HUSKY are now
involved in battle operations in TUNISIA.:

Army H.Q.

30 Corps H.Q.

Three complete Divisions.

Various Army and Corps Troops.

(c) The Army staff who are responsible for, and must con
trol, the operation are completely in the dark as to what
is going on.

(d) Detailed planning is being carried out by Staff Officers
who are not in touch with battle requirements.

(e) There is no responsible senior commander thoroughly
versed in what happens in battle who is devoting his
sole attention to the HUSKY operation.

3. If we go on in this way much longer we may have a disaster.
The preparations for the operation must be gripped firmly, and
be handled in a sensible way.

4. The crux of the matter is this:

(a) The real and proper answer to the problem is to with
draw from battle operations in Tunisia now Eighth Army
H.Q. and all troops who are required for HUSKY.

(b) If this is done, can we be certain of finishing the war in
Tunisia in time to allow of HUSKY being launched?

I do not know the answer to this.

5. Possibly some sort of compromise will be necessary in order
to get ourselves out of the mess we are now in.

To compromise is a well-known British habit, and we shall
have to adopt it.

6. I consider that the following are the minimum requirements
of the compromise, and that these requirements must be im
plemented at once:

(a) A Chief of Staff to be added to the establishment of H.Q.
Eighth Army and to be given the acting rank of Major-
General.

(b) By means of this Chief of Staff, who will represent me
in Cairo, and whose rank will enable him to carry the
necessary weight and to force things through, I will keep
my grip on what is going on.

(c) I will, at my discretion, send to Cairo such members of
my staff as I consider must be there, either permanently
or temporarily. I will decide to what extent this can be

The Campaign in Sicily 155

done without affecting adversely the battle of Tu
nisia.

(d) The following to be withdrawn from the operations in
Tunisia at once so that they can get down to HUSKY;

Comd and ELQ. 30 Corps.
5oth Div. complete.
5ist Div. complete.

(e) I myself to pay an early visit to Cairo to see that all is
well. Thereafter I will fluctuate between Cairo and
Tunisia at my discretion, as is indicated by the course
of events.

(f) The New Zealand Div. to be dropped from the initial
operations. It has man-power problems which will
take some time to settle.

(g) 56th Div. to go into the battle in Tunisia. I cannot take
on HUSKY a division that has never fired a shot in this
war.

The Inf. Bde. Group of 56th Div. now in Egypt, to join

50th Div., so as to complete soth Div. to a three-brigade

div.
(h) ySth Division to be allocated as my reserve division.

This division to be withdrawn from the battle in Tunisia

during May.

7. There will come a time when Eighth Army H.Q. must leave
the battle in Tunisia. This will come fairly soon, and in any
case very early in May.

When that time comes, I suggest that H.Q. 10 Corps should
be left in charge of the remaining Eighth Army troops, and
come under First Army."

Eisenhower and Alexander gave their full agreement to my pro
posals, and a telegram was sent to the War Office asking for de
Guingand to be given the official appointment of Chief of Staff Eighth
Army with the rank of Major-GeneraL

I left for Cairo on the 2;jrd April. As I flew there I pondered on the
future. Private Glaister had referred to the Eighth Army as a "brother
hood." He was right: we were a "brotherhood in arms." We did what
we liked. We dressed as we liked. What mattered was success, and
to win our battles with a minimum of casualties. I was the head of
the brotherhood. I was pretty tough about mistakes and especially
mistakes which cost lives; I would allow no departure from the
fundamentals of the master plan. But I let subordinate commanders
do as they liked about details and didn't fuss about the wrong things.
Until we had burst through the Gabes gap and emerged into the plain
of Tunisia, it was a private war run by the Eighth Army; we made

156 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

our own plans and adjusted the time factor to suit the problems.
Alexander let me run this private war in my own way and supported
me to the hilt; we gave him success all along the road and he was
content to leave well alone.

But we were now round the corner and had joined the main body
of the forces in North Africa. We had got to learn to adjust our way
of doing things, our very behaviour, to a larger canvas— to die war as
a whole— and this would often mean, would probably generally mean,
compromise. The Eighth Army was now to be taken to sea by the
Navy, and then had got to learn to fight in Europe, in close country.
The desert which we knew so well, and which we had conquered, was
to be left behind. We all knew that the Second Front in Europe, the
invasion across the Channel, was looming ahead. Possibly Sicily was
to be, in a sense, a rehearsal for the more serious operation which
would come in 1944.

Anyhow, the more I thought about it the more I realised that the
freedom we had enjoyed in the desert was now over. We had got to
learn to work with others, and many of our own ideas and concepts
would possibly be brushed aside for the good of the whole. Even so,
I was determined to ensure that the Eighth Army was never launched
into battle with a bad plan, and that the lives of officers and men were
not thrown away in unsound ventures. I had led the Army to victory
across two thousand miles of Africa. I had promised officers and men
there would be no more failures. And before we went to Sicily I
would have to visit all my divisions and tell the soldiers that I was
confident of success there.

I knew from what de Guingand had told me that there had been
already seven plans for the assault on Sicily. ( See Map, No. 28. )

Plan No. i was produced by the Joint Planning Staff in London in
January 1943. This plan split the assaulting force up into a large
number of landings between Catania on the east coast, southwards
round the Pachino peninsula, and thence to a point far away at the
western end of the island. To such a dispersion of effort we would
never have agreed, but at that time we were fighting our way to
Tripoli— and I doubt if I even knew that Sicily was to be the next
objective. This plan was apparently accepted in principle by Alex
ander's headquarters in Tunisia in April, and his own staff produced
Plan No. 2. This was a detailed plan which involved landings between
Catania and Palermo, from D-Day to D-f 5. This was the basis of the
plan which, with some modifications, was eventually submitted by
General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington
in April 1943, and which I shall call Plan No. 3— since it was the third
plan that I knew about.

So far I had not been consulted in any way, although the Eighth
Army was to play a major part in the operations.

Further detailed ways of invading Sicily were produced by various

The Campaign in Sicily 157

planning experts, some of whom came to see me, making a total of
seven by the middle of April. This didn't look to me a good way of
going about the operation; time was getting short and a firm plan
was essential, and quickly.

As I flew towards Cairo I began to see the future more clearly.

Obviously there were rocks ahead and we would have to walk
delicately and not force our desert ways down the throats of all and
sundry. Also we must try and preserve our sense of humour and—
very important— we must not get a name for non-cooperation. We
mustn't "bellyache." But I was determined on one thing: I would
never agree to compromise over vital issues.

De Guingand met me at Cairo and the next day I was given a
presentation of the plan for the invasion of Sicily as finally proposed
by Alexander's headquarters. This could be called Plan No. 8. The
naval commander responsible for landing the Eighth Army in Sicily
was Admiral Ramsay, known as Bertie Ramsay. He was a grand
person and I had known him when he was Flag Officer, Dover, and
I had been commanding the South-Eastern Army. Later we worked
together on the Normandy landings. It was a real tragedy for us all,
and to me a great personal loss, when he was killed in an air crash in
France early in 1945. *"

I listened to the presentation of Plan No. 8 and quickly decided
that it would not do. The Eighth Army was to land in the south-east
of the island in a wide arc stretching from a point just south of Syra
cuse, southwards round the Pachino peninsula, and then westwards to
Gela. The Seventh U.S. Army was to land in the extreme north-west of
the island, astride Trapani. Such dispersion was obviously based on
meeting only very slight resistance. I had a good talk about it with
Bertie Ramsay, and also with Leese and Dempsey who were to be
my Corps Commanders for the campaign in Sicily.

I decided to send a signal to Alexander saying I could not accept
the proposed plan for the Eighth Army, and to put forward instead a
new plan which put the Army ashore in a suitable area between a
point just south of Syracuse and the Pachino peninsula inclusive.

This was Plan No. 9 and was called by my staff the "Easter Plan,"
having been made during the Easter week-end. Plan No. 9 was the
one finally agreed for the Eighth Army. I sent the following signal
to Alexander on the 24th April:

<ci. Am now in Cairo with my Corps Commanders and for the
first time am able to investigate the problem confronting the
Eighth Army in the invasion of Sicily. I send you the following
points.

2. The fact that I have not been able to devote my sole atten
tion to this problem before today has affected all the work
here.

158 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

3. Planning to date has been on the assumption that resistance
will be slight and Sicily will be captured easily. Never was
there a greater error. Germans and Italians are fighting well
in Tunisia and will repeat the process in Sicily. If we work on
the assumption of little resistance, and dispense our effort as
is being done in all planning to date, we will merely have
a disaster. We must plan for fierce resistance, by the Germans
at any rate, and for a real dog fight battle to follow the initial
assault.

4. I am prepared to carry the war into Sicily with the Eighth
Army but must really ask to be allowed to make my own
Army plan. My Army must operate so concentrated that corps
and divisions can co-operate. The whole initial effort of the
Eighth Army should be made in the area between Syracuse
and the Pachino peninsula. Subsequent operations will be
developed so as to secure airfields and ports. The first thing
to do is to secure a lodgement in a suitable area and then
operate from that firm base.

5. Time is pressing. If we delay while the toss is being argued in
London and Washington, the operation will never be launched
in July. All planning is suffering because everyone is trying
to make something of a plan which they know can never
succeed.

6. I have given orders that as far as the Eighth Army is concerned
all planning and work will proceed on the lines outlined in
para. 4.

7. Admiral Ramsay is in complete agreement with ine and to
gether we are prepared to launch the operation and win.

8. It is essential we have close and intimate air support and I
must have the Desert Air Force working with me, with Broad-
hurst and his staff and experienced squadrons.

9. I must make it clear that the above solution is die only possible
way to handle the Eighth Army problem with the resources
available."

It will be noted that my plan for the Eighth Army separated us still
farther from the American landings in the north-west corner of the
island, and it involved no troops landing in the Gulf of Gela to secure
the airfields about that place. I had my own ideas about the American
landings but did not think the moment was yet opportune to put
them forward. I expected my signal to produce immediate repercus
sions in Algiers, and it did!

The next day, the 25th April, Ramsay received a proper "stinker"
from Admiral Cunningham, the Naval C.-in-C. working with Alex-

The Campaign in Sicily 159

ander. He was rather upset; but we had a good laugh over it and he
agreed that I should send the following signal to Alexander.

"I hear that Cunningham and Tedder have told you they
disagree completely with our proposed plan for the Eighth Army
assault on Sicily. I wish to state emphatically that if we carry
out the suggested existing plan it will fail. I state on whatever
reputation I may have that the plan put forward by me and
Ramsay will succeed. Would you like us both to come over and
explain our plan. Meanwhile work is continuing on our plan as
tune is short"

I then left Cairo on the 26th April and returned to my H.Q. in the
field in Tunisia. On arrival, I found I had a high temperature and went
to bed in my caravan with influenza and tonsilitis.

Meanwhile Alexander had called a conference at Algiers for the
2gth April, which Ramsay and I were to attend. I was in bed so I
wired to Cairo that de Guingand was to go in my place. His aircraft
had a forced landing at El Adem, and he was removed to hospital
with concussion. I then asked Oliver Leese to go and he got there
safely, and in time.

The conference produced no result Tedder said that if the initial
bridgehead did not include the airfields at Comiso and Gela, then his
air forces could not operate effectively. This led Cunningham to say
that unless the air forces could keep the enemy air away, then the
convoys could not operate. Alexander was unable to get inter-Service
agreement, and the conference broke up without coming to any
decision.

It will be remembered that I had previously wired to Alexander
saying I was anxious to see him about what could be done to finish
off the war in Tunisia quickly, so that we could get on with planning
the Sicily campaign. He came to see me on the soth April. I was still
in bed. When we had dealt with the war in Tunisia, he told me about
the conference at Algiers the day before: the 2Qth April. I said some
thing must be done, and suggested a full-scale conference at Algiers
on the 2nd May; I would be well enough by then to fly over to Algiers
and state my case. Alexander agreed.

"THE WRITING ON THE WALL"

I arrived at Algiers on the 2nd May to find that Alexander could
not get there; mist and low cloud prevented his flying from his head
quarters* I suggested we might hold the conference without him, but

160 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Cunningham and Tedder would not agree; they were quite right,
since to have done so would not have been fair to Alexander,

I began to wonder what could be done. I went to look for Bedell
Smith, Chief of Staff to Eisenhower. He was not in his office and I
eventually ran him to ground in the lavatory. So we discussed the
problem then and there. He was very upset; he said that for political
reasons it was essential to reach a final decision and get on with the job.
I said it was far more important to do so for military reasons, and that
I could give him the answer to the problem at once; he asked me to
do so. I said the American landings up near Palermo should be
cancelled and the whole American effort put in on the south coast,
astride Gela and west of the Pachino peninsula, with the object of
securing the airfields that were considered so essential by our air
forces. The Eighth Army and the Seventh U.S. Army would then
land side by side, giving cohesion to the whole invasion.

Bedell Smith said there would be no difficulty whatever in doing
what I suggested. We then left the lavatory and he went off to
consult Eisenhower, who liked the plan but quite rightly refused to
discuss it with me unless Alexander was present. The air forces liked
it. The navy planners were a bit suspicious, and were doubtful whether
the American forces could be supplied over the beaches for any
length of time. There was no good port on their front of assault, or
anywhere else.

I next persuaded Bedell Smith to assemble a conference. I said it
could be a staff conference, and I would sit in with the staff; then
when Alexander arrived the next day, the staff could present an agreed
plan to him and his brother Commanders-in-Chief.

So this was done.

I presented my case; everyone agreed with it. I had now got Eisen
hower and his Chief of Staff on my side. But Eisenhower quite
rightly refused to come to a decision until the plan was recommended
to him by Alexander and the other Commanders-in-Chief. This is
what I said at the conference that day, in the form in which my
remarks were taken down in shorthand:

*i. I know well that I am regarded by many people as being a
tiresome person. I think this is very probably true. I try hard
not to be tiresome; but I have seen so many mistakes made
in this war, and so many disasters happen, that I am desper
ately anxious to try and see that we have no more; and this
often means being very tiresome. If we have a disaster in
Sicily it would be dreadful.

2, We have now reached a very critical stage in the planning for
the attack on Sicily.

Unless some final decision is reached within the next few

The Campaign in Sicily 161

days it is very doubtful if we will be able to launch the
operation in July.

I would like to put before you the problem as it appears to
me, the Commander of an Army which has got to be landed
in Sicily and there fight a hard battle.

3. Three outstanding factors are as follows:

(a) The capture of Sicily will depend ultimately on the
effective operations of the land forces.

(b) These land forces have to be got there by the Navy,
and the Navy has to be able to maintain them once
ashore.

(c) The above two things cannot possibly happen unless
the air forces can operate effectively and they cannot
do so unless suitable airfields are acquired quickly so
that fighter squadrons can be stepped forward, and the
enemy air is pushed well back and is generally domi
nated.

4. We next want to be clear that enemy resistance will be very
great; it will be a hard and bitter fight; we must go prepared
for a real killing match. That is nothing new, and we have
had many parties of that sort; but there are certain rules in
that sort of game, or killing match, which have to be ob
served; if you do not observe them then you lose the match.

The outstanding and great rule is that dispersion of effort
by the land forces leads to disaster. They must keep collected,
with corps and divisions within supporting distance of each
other.

5. We next have to consider in what way the land forces must
be put on shore by the Navy so that they are then well placed
to develop their operations and to maintain themselves.

The area selected must be inside fighter cover; a good port
must be seized quickly; good airfields must be secured
quickly for the air forces.

The size of the initial bridgehead you can establish is lim
ited by your resources.

With limited resources you will be lucky if this bridgehead
includes a good port and all the airfields you want; some may
have to come later as operations are developed. Therefore it
is very important that with limited resources, and against
strong resistance you act as follows in the first instance:

(a) Keep concentrated.

(b) Secure a suitable area as a firm base from which to
develop your operations.

(c) Keep the initial operations within good fighter cover of
vour own airfields.

162 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

6. I have made it clear that the extent of the bridgehead is
limited by your resources.

What we must now be clear about is that the initial bridge
head must include the immediate essentials, without which the
whole combined operation would merely collapse.

7. Let us now apply the above principles to Sicily— the S.E.
portion. The best place for the Eighth Army to be put ashore
is between Syracuse and Pachino.

This would meet every requirement that I have brought out
in the preceding paragraphs, except one.

And that one is very important; it does not secure sufficient
airfields for the air forces or deny to the enemy the use of
airfields from which he could interfere with our seaborne
traffic and operations generally. The airfields in question are
those in the general area Comiso-Gela.

These airfields must, according to the air, be included in
the initial bridgehead.

In fact they are, as I have already said:
Immediate essentials, without which the whole combined
operations would merely collapse.*

8. I must state here very clearly, and beyond any possibility of
doubt, that I will never operate my Army 'dispersed' in this
operation. I consider that to do so would mean failure; and
Sicily, instead of being a success, would involve the Allied
Nations in a first class disaster; that is exactly what the Ger
mans would like, and would be a shattering blow to Allied
morale all over the world.

It is not merely a matter of capturing some beaches, or
some airfields, or some ports. It is a matter of the conduct
of offensive operations in an enemy country; the objectives
include airfields, ports, and so on, and finally we require the
whole island.

9. Are there any alternatives?

(a) You could shift the whole bridgehead layout north
wards to include the Catania area and the airfield
there.

This can be discarded at once, if only for the reason
that it is outside fighter cover of our own air bases.

(b) You could shift the whole layout westwards to the
area of the Gulf of Gela.

This gets the airfield we require. But you have no
port, and the total forces could not be maintained for
long only through the beaches.

10. The whole point turns on the size of the initial bridgehead
we can secure.

The Campaign in Sicily 163

The factors are as follows:

(a) The Army won't have dispersion, and we must have a
port.

(b) A bridgehead to satisfy the Army can NOT include,
with the resources available, certain airfields to the
west which are essential for the air.

(c) I understand the air point of view to be that these air
fields must be denied to the enemy at once, and then
quickly secured for our own use. Unless this is done
tie air forces cannot guarantee air protection beyond
the initial stage, i.e. for, say, the first 48 hours.

11* It is therefore quite obvious that these airfields must be taken.
But we have not any troops for the purpose. Two divisions,
assault loaded, would be necessary, and they would carry out
the landings in the Gulf of Gela.

12. We have now reached the stage when we can say quite
definitely that we require two more divisions, assault loaded
and to be landed on D-Day in the Gulf of Gela, if the invasion
of Sicily is to be a success.

Given these two divisions, then all requirements of die
Army, Air, and Navy are met and this very difficult and tricky
operation will be a complete success.

Without these two divisions, it would seem— in view of
what the air say—that we might well have a disaster.

13. I consider that the answer to the problem is to shift the U.S.
effort from the Palermo area, and to use it in the Gulf of Gela,
to land on either side of Gela.

The invasion of Sicily will then be a complete success."

When the conference was over, I returned in the evening to my
operational H.Q. in Tunisia to await events.

At midnight the next day, the 3rd May, I received a signal from
Alexander saying that Eisenhower had approved. At last we could
get on with our work, with a firm plan.

Having been woken up and given the signal, I went to sleep again
feeling that fighting the Germans was easy compared with fighting for
the vital issues on which everything depended. I wondered if the
Germans went on like this in planning their operations.

Two more things were necessary before I could feel happy about
the invasion of Sicily. As a result of the acceptance by all concerned
of the plan of attack, land operations by British and American forces
really became one operation. Each would be dependent on the other
for direct support in the battle; our administrative needs would also
be interdependent. Time was pressing and it was clear that the co
ordination, direction and control should be undertaken by one Army

164 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

commander and a joint staff. I put this viewpoint to Alexander and
he agreed; his view was that one Army H.Q. should handle the whole
operation. Alexander put this to General Eisenhower, who did not
agree. The organisation was to be two armies, one American and one
British, under Alexander.

Much more important was the second point. We were going to
open up a new campaign in a new theatre. The planners, and every
one else, had been concentrating on where to land; nobody had con
sidered how the campaign in Sicily should be developed. We wanted
to secure the island quickly and prevent the escape of its garrison
back to Italy. To do this we must work to a master plan, which I sug
gested should be the following.

The two armies, landing side by side on the south coast, should
push quickly northwards and cut the island in half. A defensive flank
should then be formed facing west, and the combined efforts of both
armies be concentrated on getting rapidly to Messina to prevent the
get-away across the straits. The navies and air forces must co-operate
to see that none of the enemy got away by sea.

Although Alexander then agreed with this conception of how the
campaign should be developed by his two armies, and with the role
of the naval and air forces, in fact the campaign was not conducted in
this way. By the time we had captured the whole island, the Germans
had mostly got back to Italy.

I GO TO ENGLAND

All resistance in North Africa ended on the 12th May.

Field-Marshal Messe, the Italian C.-in-C. who succeeded Rommel
in the overall command, surrendered to the Eighth Army on the 13th
May; he had dinner with me that night before going off to his prison
camp, and we discussed various aspects of the battles we had fought
against each other.

I decided then that I would go to England for a short holiday before
the Sicily campaign began. I also wanted to see the ist Canadian
Division which was to land direct on the Sicily beaches from the U.K.
We should not see them until we were fighting alongside them. This
obviously needed buttoning up beforehand.

I left Tripoli in my "Flying Fortress" on the i6th May, arriving
in England on the i/th. I enjoyed the visit, and especially my time
with David.

One thing made me feel lonely. A Thanksgiving Service for the
end of the war in Africa was held in St. Paul's Cathedral on the igth
May; I was in London but was not asked to attend. It was explained
to me after the service that it was desired to keep my presence in

The Campaign in Sicily 165

England a secret. Yet to my delighted surprise, wherever I went I was
followed by crowds. The incident made me realise that if I were
pretty popular with a lot of people, I was not too popular in some
circles. Perhaps the one explained the other.

I returned to the Eighth Army via Algiers, and met the Prime Min
ister and the C.LG.S. there on the 2nd June; I did the journey from
London to Algiers in one day in the "Flying Fortress," in daylight.

I gained the impression that the Prime Minister and the C.I.G.S.
had come on to Algiers from Washington in order to ensure that the
capture of Sicily should be pushed hard and exploited to the utmost;
to do this was somewhat at variance with the decisions taken in
Washington, and therefore they had persuaded General Marshall to
come with them. The P.M. was determined to knock Italy out of the
war. He cross-examined me a good deal about the plan for Sicily. I
expressed confidence in our plan and in our ability to carry it out.

This was only natural, since it was my plan! I also emphasised the
need for a master plan which would ensure that, once ashore, the
operations would be developed in the right way.

While in England I had been told that the King was going to visit
the forces in North Africa in June. He arrived in Africa on the 13th
June and came to Tripoli on the 17th to see the Eighth Army, or as
much of it as was there. He stayed with us in our camp on the sea
shore some miles outside Tripoli, and I think he enjoyed the visit. We
certainly enjoyed having him with us; he put us all at our ease and
was in splendid form.

I was anxious for his safety at one time as enemy parachutists were
still at large, and Tripoli was full of Italians. When the King was
actually in that town I confined all civilians to their houses; and on
one day fire was opened on suspicious elements trying to break out.

On the day he arrived, the igth June, he gave me the accolade of
Knighthood in the lunch marquee near the airfield.

WE INVADE SICILY

On the Sth July the Prime Minister sent me a telegram: "Every
good wish and all our confidence goes with you and your splendid
Army."

On the same day I issued my usual personal message to the Eighth
Army.

We landed in Sicily two hours before dawn on the loth July. The
story of the campaign in that island has been told frequently and I
have already described it myself in Alamein to the River Sangro.

I had a difficult decision to make soon after we landed. General
McNaughton, the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army (in England),

166 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

had arrived in Malta about the middle of July with a party of staff
officers and he asked to be sent over to Sicily to see the Canadian
troops.

The ist Canadian Division had not been in action before and
officers and men were just beginning to find their feet. Guy Simonds,
the Divisional Commander, was young and inexperienced; it was the
first time he had commanded a division in battle.

I was determined that the Canadians must be left alone and I wasn't
going to have Simonds bothered with visitors when he was heavily
engaged with his division in all-out operations against first-rate Ger
man troops. However, to make sure I went to see Simonds and asked
him if he would like McNaughton to come to Sicily. His reply was im
mediate— "For God's sake keep him away." On that, I sent a message
to Malta asking that the visit be postponed. When the campaign in
Sicily was over, I invited General McNaughton to come and see the
Canadian troops and he stayed with me at my Tac Headquarters at
Taormina. I have not seen him since those days, although I have paid
many visits to Canada since the war ended. It seemed to me that he
had never forgiven me for denying him entry to Sicily in July 1943.

The Canadians were magnificent in the Sicilian campaign. They
had done no fighting before, but they were very well trained and they
soon learnt the tricks of the battlefield which count for so much and
save so many lives. When I drew them into reserve to prepare for the
invasion of the Italian mainland, they had become one of the Eighth
Army's veteran divisions.

The men of the Eighth Army enjoyed Sicily after the desert. It
was high summer; oranges and lemons were on the trees; wine was
plentiful; the Sicilian girls were disposed to be friendly. It was very
hot and the mosquitoes were unpleasant; indeed, they were a menace
since they were the malarial type. Our medical discipline was not good
as regards the regular parades for taking preventive medicines that are
so necessary in such conditions; we suffered almost as many casualties
from malaria as we did from enemy action. We were all used to the
heat; but whereas the desert was dry, Sicily was humid.

The men in back areas discarded all possible clothing and some
even took to wearing the wide-brim Sicilian straw hat. I well re
member an incident that occurred one day as I was driving in my
open car up to the front. I saw a lorry coming towards me with a
soldier apparently completely naked in the driver's seat, wearing a silk
top hat. As the lorry passed me, the driver leant out from his cab and
took off his hat to me with a sweeping and gallant gesture. I just roared
with laughter. However, while I was not particular about dress so
long as the soldiers fought well and we won our battles, I at once
decided that there were limits. When I got back to my headquarters

The Campaign in Sicily 167

I issued the only order I ever issued about dress in the Eighth Army;
it read as follows: "Top hats will not be worn in the Eighth Army."

It was in Sicily that I gave up the "Flying Fortress" I had won at
Sfax. We had got away from the large airfields of Africa and there
were few in Sicily on which such a large aircraft could land safely. We
nearly crashed the day I landed at Palermo to visit General Patton. So
I asked Eisenhower if he would kindly change it, and he provided
instead a Dakota with a jeep inside it— which was far more useful.

I think everyone admitted that we learnt a great deal in Sicily. In
some cases possibly all that was learnt was how not to do certain
tilings. But all in all, the experience was invaluable to us all: to the
high command at Allied Force H.Q. in the Mediterranean theatre,
to my staff and myself, and to every officer and man in the Eighth
Army. But the campaign had an unsatisfactory ending in that most of
the German troops on the island got away across the Straits of Messina
to Italy, and this when we had complete air and naval supremacy. This
was to cause us great trouble later on when we ourselves went into
Italy. It seems to me worthwhile, therefore, to go back over the
ground and try to discover what was wrong.

The operation involved planning a major seaborne assault, incor
porating the establishment of a beach-working system of maintenance,
without any previous experience of an operation of this magnitude.
Simplicity, care, and close co-operation between the Services and
Allies, were absolutely vital.

Although orders for the invasion of Sicily were received in North
Africa in January 1943, the plan was not finalised till May, two months
before D-Day. The main reasons for this delay were the following:

(a) The responsible commanders-in-chief, and those who were
actually to command in the field, were all engaged in current
operations in North Africa.

Planning was undertaken by ad hoc planning staffs which
went to work without the guidance of commanders.

A series of plans was produced; none of them was good
since the planners were inexperienced.

(b) When the field commanders were able to begin work on the
plan, major alterations were necessary to make it a practical
proposition. Meanwhile much time and effort had been
wasted during the "absentee landlord" period.

(c) The headquarters of the responsible C.s-in-C., and of the field
commanders, were widely dispersed. For the major planning
meetings, Naval and Army Commanders of the Eastern Task
Force (the Eighth Army) had to fly from Cairo to Algiers, a
distance of over 2000 miles. This led to inevitable delays.

168 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

(d) Final decisions had to be made by the Supreme Commander.
But he was deeply involved in political matters in North
Africa and was not free to devote his entire energies to the
campaign ahead.

The responsibilities for the mounting of the operation, and em
barkation ports, were most complicated. Troops of the Eighth Army
had to be embarked from the following ports:

Haifa, Canal Ports, Alexandria, and some of the follow-up from

Tripoli. G.H.Q. Middle East in Cairo were responsible for

all this loading.
Sfax, Sousse, and Kairouan (for airborne troops). Supreme H.Q.

at Algiers, and Alexander's H.Q., were responsible.
Canadian Division and certain troops from the U.K. The War

Office in London was responsible.

Signals between Cairo, Algiers and London often overlapped or
were contradictory.

Above all, there was confusion in the army/air planning, and espe
cially with regard to air photographs. There was a representative of
the superior Air H.Q. (North Africa) at Eighth Army H.Q. in Cairo.
But he had no executive powers and no experience in army/air opera
tions. He did his best but there was great delay since he had to wait
for answers to letters sent from Cairo to Algiers, whence they had
to be referred to Malta. The executive air commander, who was sup
posed to plan the assault and initial stages of the operation with my
headquarters, was in Malta—very occupied with current operations.
This air commander and his staff were expert in island defence and
coastal operations; they had no experience of using air power to assist
the tactical battle on land. The expert in working with the Eighth
Army was the Commander of the Desert Air Force (Broadhurst) and
he sat virtually unemployed in Tripoli; he did not come into the
picture until we were firmly on shore and his squadrons could be
moved to Sicily.

It will always be a wonder to me how my staff competed with all
these dreadful problems, many of which should never have been
allowed to occur. It will be remembered that de Guingand was away
for much of the time, recovering from his air crash at El Adem; but
Belchem was a very able substitute and he handled the exasperating
work splendidly.

The intention of the three Commanders-in-Chief under Eisenhower
(Alexander, Cunningham, and Tedder) covered only the assault of
the island and the immediate seizure of airfields and ports.

The method by which the campaign would be developed once the

The Campaign in Sicily 169

armies were on shore, and how the island would finally be reduced,
was not decided. In fact, there was no master plan. As a result the
operations and actions of the two Allied armies were not properly
co-ordinated. The army commanders developed their own ideas of
how to proceed and then "informed" higher authority. The Seventh
U.S. Army, once on shore, was allowed to wheel west towards Palermo.
It thereby missed the opportunity to direct its main thrust-line north
wards in order to cut the island in two: as a preliminary to the
encirclement of the Etna position and the capture of Messina.

During the operations it was difficult to get things decided quickly.
The responsible C.s-in-C. had their headquarters widely dispersed;
they did not live together. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander,
was in Algiers; Alexander, in command of the land forces, was in
Sicily; Cunningham, the Naval C.-in-C., was in Malta; whereas
Tedder, the Air C.-in-C., had his headquarters in Tunis. When things
went wrong, all they could do was to send telegrams to each other;
it took time to gather them together for the purpose of making joint
decisions.

I once discussed this campaign with Admiral Morison, the United
States naval historian. He holds the same view as myself about the
iniquity of letting most of the Germans get away to Italy.

Time was vital if we were to exploit success in Italy before the
winter set in. We took some five weeks to complete the capture of
Sicily and the Eighth Army suffered 12,000 casualties. With close co
ordination of the land, air and sea effort we would, in my view, have
gained control of the island more quickly, and with fewer casualties.

Eisenhower came to stay with me in Sicily when the campaign was
over; we always enjoyed his visits and he charmed us all with his
friendly personality. He had only one A.D.C. with him, a naval
officer called Captain Butcher.

I had established my Tactical Headquarters at Taormina, in a lovely
house overlooking the Straits of Messina. At dinner one night, dis
cussion turned on how long the war would last and Eisenhower gave
it as his opinion it would all be over before Christmas 1944. It was
clear to me that it ought to be over by then. But after our experiences
in the planning and conduct of the Sicily campaign I felt we had much
to learn, and I believed in my heart that the Allies would make such
mistakes that the war would go into 1945.

So I asked Eisenhower if he would like to bet on it, as I would
bet against it. He said he would and the bet was written out by Cap
tain Butcher for a level £5, being signed on the nth October in Italy
during his next visit.

A few days before Christmas 1944 when we were fighting on the
threshold of Germany, I sent Ike a message saying it looked as if he

170 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

owed me £5. He replied saying he still had five days left and you
never know what can happen in war.

He sent me the £5 on the 26th December.

We had much fun that night at Taormina and I remember asking
Ike, to his great amusement, if he had ever been told that the final
plan for Sicily had been put forward in an Algerian lavatory!

CHAPTER 12

The Campaign in Italy

3rd September to 31st December 1943

IF THE planning and conduct of the campaign in Sicily were bad,
the preparations for the invasion of Italy, and the subsequent
conduct of the campaign in that country, were worse still.

It will be remembered that the next task after clearing the Axis
Powers from Africa was to knock Italy out of the war. As a first step
we were to capture Sicily but there was no plan for operations beyond.
There should have been a master plan which embraced the capture
of Sicily and the use of that island as a spring-board for getting quickly
across to Italy, and exploiting success.

We proposed to invade the mainland of Europe without any clear
idea how operations were to be developed once we got there. The
decision precisely where we were to land in Italy was not firm till the
ijth August, the day on which the campaign in Sicily ended. So far
as the Eighth Army was concerned I was to launch it across the Straits
of Messina on the 30th August, but was given no "object." On the
igth August I insisted that I must be told what I was to do in Italy,
My object was given me on the 2Oth August, ten days before we were
to land in Italy. (See Map, No. 31.)

Originally it was intended that the invasion of the mainland was
to be carried out by the Eighth Army only, on a two-corps front.
Landings were to be made as follows:

Operation BurnuESS, in the area of Gioia Tauro, on the north

coast of the toe.
Operation BAYTOWN, a direct assault across the Straits of Messina.

Towards the end of July a third operation began to be considered
in the Salerno area; this would be called Operation AVALANCHE.

171

172 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

In my view, AVALANCHE was a good operation to carry out; every
thing should have been put into it from the very beginning and all
endeavours concentrated on making it a great success. This was not
done.

On the lyth August it was decided that BUTTRESS would not take
place; my 10 Corps which was to have carried it out was put under
the Fifth U.S. Army which was to carry out AVALANCHE.

So by the ijth August it was decided that two armies would invade
the mainland of Italy:

Eighth Army, across the Straits of Messina— Operation BAYTOWN.
Fifth U.S. Army, at Salerno— Operation AVALANCHE.

Our troubles now began.

In order to bolster up AVALANCHE, landing-craft began to be taken
away from BAYTOWN. I could not proceed with the planning of BAY-
TOWN because I had no senior naval officer, or any adequate naval
planning staff. I protested, and got Alexander to add his protests to
mine; but it was without result, and finally the carrying out of BAY-
TOWN as envisaged became impossible.

On the afternoon of the igth August, I sent this following signal
to Alexander.

**i. I have been ordered to invade the mainland of the continent
of Europe on the 30th August. In the absence of information
to the contrary, I must assume that some resistance will be
offered by the enemy.

2. I have been given no 'object' for the operation. Is my object
to secure the Straits for the Navy and to act as a diversion for
AVALANCHE? If not, please define what it is.

3. The landing-craft and naval personnel given me make an
invasion of Europe with any object in the face of opposition
quite impossible.

4. The delays that have occurred make it impossible for BAYTOWN
to take place on the 30th August.

5. I agree that AVALANCHE must have priority but we do not
want to start in Europe with a setback in the toe of Italy.

6. I need definite orders as to the timing and object of any opera
tion you want me to carry out across the Straits of Messina,
and the object must be possible with the resources in craft
and naval personnel given to me, assuming opposition to the
landing.

7. Can you give me any information as to the degree of enemy
resistance that is likely?9*

This telegram produced immediate results. On the 2Oth August I
received a statement from Alexander laying down the object of

The Campaign in Italy 173

Operation BAYTOWN: written in his own handwriting on a half -sheet
of notepaper, which I still have.

"Your task is to secure a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to enable
our naval forces to operate through the Straits of Messina.

In the event of the enemy withdrawing from the toe, you will
follow him up with such force as you can make available, bearing
in mind that the greater the extent to which you can engage
enemy forces in the southern tip of Italy, the more assistance
will you be giving to AVALANCHE."

This "object" is worth examining. No attempt was made to co
ordinate my operations with those of the Fifth Army, landing at
Salerno on the night gth-ioth September. It was not visualised that
the Eighth Army would go further than the Catanzaro neck, a distance
of about 60 miles from Reggio. Our resources were cut accord
ingly.

What actually happened is well known; the Salerno landings were
very soon in difficulties; I was asked to push on and help the Fifth
Army, and administrative troubles then built up around my Army.

Eisenhower ordered a conference of his Commanders-in-Chief at
Algiers on the 23rd August, and I was summoned to attend. At the
conference I was asked to explain in outline my plan for Operation
BAYTOWN. This I did. I said that the naval delays had made it impos
sible for me to do the operation on the night soth-sist August. I had
now got the necessary resources in craft and naval personnel, and could
carry it out on the night 2nd~3rd September; the Navy, however, had
told me the earliest they could manage was the night 4th-5th
September.

Eisenhower suggested to Cunningham that he should go at once
to Sicily and sort it out, adding that we must aim to get the operation
launched on the night 2nd-srd September.

Cunningham left the conference at once, and flew to Sicily. As a
result of his visit, the Navy agreed to do the operation on the night
snd-grd September.

Having settled that matter, Eisenhower told us of the negotiations
going on with the Italian Government about an armistice. The Italians
had said they were fed up with the war. It seemed that at a given
moment they were prepared, if we would land on the mainland of
Italy, to come in with us and fight the Germans. I remarked that this
looked like the biggest double-cross in history. I argued that the
Italians would never fight the Germans properly; if they tried to they
would be hit for six; the most we could hope for from the Italian
Army was assistance in our rear areas, and non-cooperation with the
Germans in German-occupied areas.

But if this was to be the general atmosphere, it looked as if the

174 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

opposition I might expect to receive in BAYTOWN might not be so
great after alL

General Mark Clark, Fifth U.S. Army, explained his plan for the
landing at Salerno on the night gth-ioth September. The Germans
had some twenty divisions in Italy and at least four could be con
centrated fairly quickly against the Fifth Army; I mentioned this, but
everyone was so pleased about the Italians fighting on our side that it
was considered the situation would be good. I was unable to agree.

THE EIGHTH ARMY LANDS IN EUROPE

I issued the following personal message to the Army and it was read
to officers and men on the 2nd September:

"i. Having captured Sicily as our first slice of the Italian home
country, the time has now come to carry the battle on to the
mainland of Italy.

2. To the Eighth Army has been given the great honour of being
the first troops of the Allied Armies to land on the mainland of
the continent of Europe.

We will prove ourselves worthy of this honour.

3. I want to tell all of you, soldiers of the Eighth Army, that I
have complete confidence in the successful outcome of the
operations we are now going to carry out.

We have a good plan, and air support on a greater scale
than we have ever had before.
There can only be one end to this next battle, and that is:

ANOTHER SUCCESS.

4. Forward to Victory!

Let us knock Italy out of the war!

5. Good luck. And God bless you all/*

I looked forward to landing on the mainland of Europe on the 3rd
September, the fourtb anniversary of the outbreak of the war. We
were about to enter the fifth year of the war and there was still much
to avenge. In May 1940 together with many others I had been pushed
into the sea at Dunkirk by the Germans. In May 1943 I had the
greafr1*^ -ure of helping to push the Germans into the sea in Tunisia.
In '&$'& '1943 I had the further pleasure of helping to push the
German's *nto the sea in Sicily.

Anyhow, Dunkirk was avenged.

I wondered what the attitude of the Italians would be. A curious
sight in Sicily was Italian soldiers in uniform, and carrying rifles,
policing the embarkation beaches which we were using for the inva
sion of their mainland. And during the advance in Sicily, Italian

The Campaign in Italy 175

Chilians accompanied our leading platoons and pointed out the sites
of booby traps, mines, etc., thus saving many British lives.

The story of the operations in Italy has been told by many writers
and an Official History will doubtless appear in due course. But I
have learnt that official histories, and dispatches, almost inevitably
miss the "inside story." So let us have a look at it from the inside.

The initial landing went well; there was little opposition and we
were quickly on shore. But our troubles soon began once we had got
some little distance northwards; the country generally was ideal for
delay by the action of small units co-ordinated with skilfully sited
demolitions, and the Germans took full advantage of this.

On the 5th September Alexander flew to Reggio and I met him
on the airfield. He told me the Italians had signed our armistice terms
on the 3rd September, but no announcement was to be made at pres
ent The further plans and arrangements were to be as follows:

(a) At 1800 hours on the Sth September, Badoglio from Rome
and Eisenhower from Algiers would broadcast the fact that
the Italians had surrendered unconditionally.

(b) At 2100 hours on the Sth September, American airborne
troops would land near Rome. At the same time the city
would be seized by the Italian divisions in the vicinity.

(c) The Italian Army was to seize Taranto, Brindisi, Ban and
Naples.

(d) At 0430 hours on the 9th September the Allies would land as
follows:

Fifth U.S. Army— at Salerno, for Naples.
5th British Corps— at Taranto.

Alexander was most optimistic and was clearly prepared to base
his plans on the Italians doing all they said. I asked him to move away
from the other officers who were with us, and then gave him my
views. The following is the extract from my diary, written that night:

"I told him my opinion was that when the Germans found out
what was going on, they would stamp on the Italians. The Italian
Army morale was now very low; that Army would not face up
to the Germans. I said he should impress on all senior coror ^ders
that we must make our plans so that it would make no J*_ * ,,ice
if the Italians failed us, as they most certainly would. T^ ^y might
possibly do useful guerilla work, sabotage, and generally ensure
complete non-cooperation on the part of the local population.
But I did not see them fighting the Germans.

The Germans were in great strength in Italy and we were very
weak. We must watch our step carefully and do nothing foolish.
I begged him to be careful; not to open up too many fronts and

176 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

dissipate our resources; and to be certain before we landed any
where that we could build up good strength in that area. I said
the Germans could concentrate against AVAJLANCHE quicker than
we could build up; that operation would need careful watching.
Rommel is in charge in Italy and I have fought against him a good
deal; he has twenty divisions, of which five are armoured. If the
landings at Salerno go against us, we will be in for a hard and
long fight. We will have to fight the Germans by ourselves as the
Italians will not do so— not yet, at any rate.

Before we embark on major operations on the mainland of
Europe we must have a master plan and know how we propose
to develop those operations. I have not been told of any master
plan and I must therefore assume there was none/*

I also discussed with Alexander the time factor. It was essential to
do what we wanted in Italy before the winter set in. Also, we must
be certain that our administration in rear was commensurate with what
we were trying to achieve in front; but it wasn't. Alexander listened
to what I said, but I do not think he agrejed.

We all know what happened. The Germans dealt very effectively
with the Italian armed forces in their own areas; they were all dis
armed.

The Salerno landings soon got into trouble, and a critical stuation
arose on the night I3th-i4th September when the Germans attacked
the s6th American Division in strength. That Division was new to
battle and the enemy thrust got within three miles of the beach and
within two miles of Army H.Q. On the 14th September I received a
cry for help from Alexander to push on and threaten the German forces
opposite the Fifth Army. This I did, and I also sent a staff officer over
to see General Clark. On the i6th September the leading troops of the
Eighth Army joined hands with the right flank of the Fifth U.S. Army.
General Clark wrote me a very nice letter congratulating us: "on the
skilful and expeditious manner in which your Eighth Army moved up
to the north."

This was good to receive, but I have never thought we had much
real influence on the Salerno problem; I reckon General Clark had
got it well in hand before we arrived. But we did what we could. We
marched and fought 300 miles in 17 days, in good delaying country
against an enemy whose use of demolition caused us bridging prob
lems of the first magnitude. The hairpin bends on the roads were such
that any distance measured on the map as say I'o miles was 20 miles
on the ground and in some cases 25. But, in my view, Fifth Army did
their own trick without our help—willing as we were.

After the first phase was over and the two armies had joined hands,
I was ordered to transfer the operations of the Eighth Army to the

The Campaign in Italy 177

east or Adriatic side of the main mountain range of the Apennines.
This involved switching our administrative axis from Calabria to the
ports in south-east Italy, of which the most important were Taranto,
Brindisi and Bait This was a major undertaking and took some con
siderable time. When it was completed we began a movement north
wards which involved capturing Foggia and its airfields, Termoli,
and fighting severe battles on the lines of the rivers Trigno and Sangro.

The weather began to break up at the end of October and veiy
heavy rain descended on us. The rains continued and by the gth
November the whole country was completely waterlogged, the mud
was frightful, and no vehicles could move off the road, which was
covered in "chocolate sauce." The wet season was on us, and on the
Adriatic coast it became cold and damp. We now began to pay dearly
for the loss of time in Sicily.

I had a little trouble about the middle of September with the
GOC * 7th Italian Army— General Rizzio. He was the senior Italian
officer in my area of operations, and the Italian Army had surrendered
to the Allies unconditionally. I was then told that the Italians were
now co-belligerents; I asked what was meant by ^unconditional sur
render" and "co-belligerent" in one and the same case, but could
get no clear answer.

The Italian general did not seem to know either; he placed the
emphasis on "co-belligerent" and wanted to forget everything else.
He was inclined to think that since he was the senior Army general in
southern Italy, the Eighth Army should therefore come under his
command, as we were now Allies. I decided to go and see him and
get the matter cleared up quickly, before trouble arose. I had written
out some notes of what I would say to him, through an interpreter
since neither of us could speak the other's language. I give these notes
below but when I actually met him I decided to leave out para. 3; I
saw at once there was no need for it as he was a very decent chap and
only too willing to help in any way.

"i. Delighted to meet him and feel sure he will co-operate whole
heartedly in the defeat of our common enemy— Germany.

2. We do not yet know the exact details of Italian co-operation
that have been settled by governments. But in order that our
co-operation may be very good it is essential that we should
all be quite dear as to our immediate general position. Any
misunderstanding would merely tend to prejudice our early
defeat of the Germans.

3. The armed forces of Italy have been defeated in battle and
have surrendered unconditionally to the Allies.

* General Officer Commanding.

178 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

We do not wish to cause any dishonour to the Italian Army,
or to disarm the personnel. But the above basic factor must be
remembered.

4. Command in the zone of the armies, and on the lines of com
munication must be exercised through British channels—
absolutely and completely, and in respect of any situation that
may arise.

5. Formations and units of the Italian Army will remain under
their own commanders. Orders as to their action, or work, or
general routine in garrisons and ports, will be communicated
through the British command.

All such orders must be obeyed instantly, and without com
ment; only in this way will our operations against the Germans
be able to develop their maximum power rapidly.

Any representations regarding modifications, etc., will be
submitted to the British command; these will always receive
sympathetic consideration, and will always be complied with
if this can be done without prejudicing the general war effort.

6. In general, the active offensive against the Germans for the
present will be conducted by the Allied British and American
Forces, pending any other arrangements by governments con
cerned.

7. The contribution of the Italian Army will be confined to:

(a) Defence of ports, and of the lines of communication,

(b) Work on communications, roads, etc.

(c) Provision of labour as necessary.

It is particularly important that Italian A.A. artillery should
be able to play its full part in the defence of ports and of the
lines of communications. Detailed orders about this will be
issued through the British command."

THE ADMINISTRATIVE MUDDLE

I had built up a most efficient and experienced administrative staff
in the Eighth Army, first under Brian Robertson and now under Miles
Graham. This staff worked well with G.H.Q. Middle East in Cairo,
each having full confidence in the other. When we got to Tunisia we
came under Allied Force Headquarters, the administrative staff of
which neither had the knowledge themselves, nor the courage and
good sense to put their trust in the information they received from the
well-tried and veteran administrative staff of the Eighth Army. We
first began to be anxious soon after we reached Tripoli; we were
very short of many essential needs and when we unloaded the first

The Campaign in Italy 179

ship that reached us under the auspices of A.F.H.Q.* we found that it
contained 10,000 dustbins! We thought, in our arrogant way, that
they probably needed them more than we did.

A.F.H.Q. did not understand that an important principle of suc
cessful administration during active operations is to put full confidence
in the staff of the lower formation and to send up, where possible,
without argument what is demanded from the front If the confidence
is found to be misplaced, the only course is to sack the miscreants
and put better men in their place. It is useless during battle operations
to argue about what the lower formations should or should not have
in stock; the time for such discussion is after the battle, and not before
or during it. This is the system we worked on in the Eighth Army,
and later in 21 Army Group.

I must of course qualify this by saying that the Chief Administrative
Officer of the higher formation must know his stuff, and must know
the character and foibles of the administrative staffs below him; this
can only be done by continual visits and by establishing friendly
relations with individuals throughout the administrative chain.

Allied Force H.Q. in Algiers failed in these respects and as a result
we had to encounter very great difficulties. At a later stage in the
operations in Italy, Robertson became Chief Administrative Officer
to Alexander, and he quietly gathered the reins into his very able
hands; then we had no more problems which could not be solved.

The basic trouble was that we became involved in a major cam
paign lacking a predetermined master plan. We had not made in
advance the administrative plans and arrangements necessary to sus
tain the impetus of our operations. The result was the administrative
machine became unable to keep pace with the constantly widening
scope of our operational commitments. It will be remembered that
the "object" given me did not visualise my advancing beyond the
neck of the toe of Italy, i.e. about 60 miles. But I drove the Eighth
Army forward at great speed beyond this point in order to try to
assist the operations of the Fifth U.S. Army at Salerno. In doing so I
had been warned by my staff that I was taking big administrative
risks. The advice was sound; so was my decision to ignore it. I at
tempted to relieve the enemy pressure on the Fifth Army at Salerno,
but paid the penalty of finding my own reserves were exhausted and
that supplies to replenish them were not forthcoming.

I then had to switch my administrative axis to the heel ports of
south-east Italy. This should have been foreseen by A.F.H.Q., but it
wasn't Our troubles then became intensified.

On the 4th October we had only 21 tons of petrol in our depots,
and my army was in danger of becoming immobilised. We had over
* Allied Forces Headquarters.

180 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

five hundred vehicles off the road wanting new engines; instead of
having base workshops in Italy with a pool of spare engines, the
vehicles had to be sent back to Egypt for repair, and returned later.

A serious medical scandal was narrowly averted; we could not clear
our sick and wounded from our hospitals and Casualty Clearing
Stations.

Convoys began to arrive in the "heel" ports of Italy loaded in bulk
to stock up the depots in Sicily. We had to unload large quantities of
stores, useless for the moment, in order to extract vital stores which
were needed urgently.

Later, when the Foggia airfields were captured, we had heavy
demands for the Strategic Air Force. The question of priorities be
tween the Army and the R.A.F. then became urgent. If the land armies
were to maintain the impetus of their operations then they had to be
supplied with what they needed for the job. Or the job must be
changed. It was essential to get established in Italy a weapon which
would be strong enough to get us forward to the line we wanted, if
only to cover the strategic airfields. Presumably this was the "Rome
Line" but I could get no clear statement on the subject from anyone.
The two armies went "slogging" up Italy, with no master plan, and at
the risk of a major administrative break-down.

FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF ALAMEIN

The 23rd October was the first anniversary of the Battle of Alamein.
I issued an anniversary message to officers and men. Actually, the
New Zealand Division was the only division then serving in the
Eighth Army which had fought with me at Alamein, and even in that
division many officers and men had not been there. So besides issuing
the written order to be read out to the troops, I made a record which
was broadcast by the B.B.C.

I received two letters on the anniversary which gave me great
pleasure, one from my Chief of Staff and one from the Supreme
Commander in Yugoslavia— Marshal Tito.

I give them below,

H.Q. Eighth Army
23rd October, 1943
"My dear General,

On this first anniversary of the Battle of El Alamein, I would
like, on behalf of your staff at Army H.Q., to send you our warm
est good wishes on this great occasion; and to express our gratitude
for leading us through the past year with such wisdom, inspira
tion, and success.

The Campaign in Italy 181

We look forward to the future \vith solid confidence in your
leadership.

(Sgd.) F. W. de Guingand
Major-General
Chief of Staff"

"The Commander of the Eighth British Army:
General Montgomery.

On the first anniversary of the glorious battle and big victory
of Alamein, please accept, General, together with your officers and
soldiers of the gallant Eighth Army, my very cordial congratula
tions.

In the name of the National Army of Liberation of Yugoslavia,
I express my joy that, as a result of your African victories, we are
now within 200 kilometres of each other in our operations against
the common enemy.

Thus, with every day, the Allied armies engaged in the fight
against the greatest foe humanity has ever had— aggressive Ger
man Fascism— are becoming more closely knit into one continuous
front.

I am confident that the fraternity in arms, sealed with the blood
of the finest sons of Great Britain and Yugoslavia, will not only
contribute to a speedy triumph over detested German Fascism,
but also foster full comprehension on the part of you personally,
your soldiers and the whole British nation of the aspirations which
permeate the nations of Yugoslavia.

In the name of these aspirations, a sea of blood of our best sons
has been shed. These aspirations are for a new, free and truly
democratic federal Yugoslavia, built on the fraternity and equality
of all nations in our country.

Kindly accept my respectful regards.

The Supreme Commander N.L.A. and P.G.Y.

(Signed) Tito"

A GIFT FBOM HEAVEN

When the winter closed in on us, with the constant rain and appal
ling mud, I wrote to the War Office and asked the C.I.G.S. if he
could send me out a waterproof suit, jacket and trousers, of some
mackintosh material. The Bishop of Southwark was to visit the Eighth
Army to hold confirmations before Christmas, and he was given the
suit to bring out to me. The following signal was sent me from the
War Office when the suit had been handed over to the Bishop.

I was told that the poem eventually found its way into an English

182 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

newspaper, but I am not certain about this; nor do I know who
wrote it

From: War Office.

To: Eighth Army,

Personal for General Montgomery.

Following to be read as verse.

We've despatched, pour la guerre,

A mackintosh pair
Of trousers and jacket, express;

They are coming by air

And are sent to you care
Of the Bishop of Southwark, no less.

So wherever you go

From Pescara to Po,
Through mud and morasses and ditches,

You undoubtedly ought

To be braced by the thought
That the Church has laid hands on your breeches.

We think they'll suffice

(As they should at the price)
To cover your flanks in the melee,

And avert the malaise

(In the Premier's phrase)
Of a chill in the soft underbelly.

According to Moss

(The outfitting Bros.)
Twon't matter, so stout is their fibre,

If you happen to trip

And go arse over tip,
Like Horatius, into the Tiber.

And you'll find— so we hope-
When you call on the Pope,

That his blessing's more readily given
On learning the news
That your mackintosh trews

Were brought down by a Bishop from Heaven.

I LEAVE THE EIGHTH ARMY

Veiy early in the morning of the 24th December, I was woken up
to be given a signal from the War Office to say I was to return to

The Campaign in Italy 183

England to succeed General Paget in command of 21 Army Group,
the British Group of Armies preparing to open a "second front" across
the Channel. Though sad of course to leave the Eighth Army, I was
naturally delighted to have been selected for the great task ahead: the
full-scale invasion across the Channel which would truly avenge
Dunkirk. It was a relief and an excitement: a relief because I was not
too happy about the overall situation in Italy and considered we had
only ourselves to blame for the situation which now faced us. No
grand design for the opening of a new theatre of operations; no master
plan; no grip on the operations; a first class administrative muddle-
all these had cumulatively combined to impose such delay on the
operations that we failed to exploit the initial advantages which we
had gained before the winter closed in upon us.

It was, of course, true that in under six months we had:

(a) Captured Sicily.

( b) Knocked Italy out of the war.

(c) Got the Italian fleet locked up in Malta.

(d) Captured about one-third of Italy, including Naples and the
Foggia airfields.

These were spectacular results, but they were all at the expense of
the Italians. Our real enemy was Germany; we had failed to bring
real discomfort to that enemy before the weather broke, because we
had not handled the business properly. For these reasons I was not
sorry to leave the Italian theatre. I made a quiet resolve that when we
opened the second front in North-West Europe we would not make
the same mistakes again: so long as I had any influence in the respon
sible circles concerned.

General Eisenhower had been appointed Supreme Commander for
the Second Front some days earlier, and there had been tremendous
speculation throughout the Eighth Army about who would go with
him as his Commanders-in-Chief, and who would succeed him in the
Mediterranean theatre. The favourite for Supreme Commander, Medi
terranean theatre, was Jumbo Wilson who was C.-in-C. Middle East.

On the afternoon of the 24th December, Christmas Eve, the new
appointments were announced by the B.B.C. and we picked it up in
Italy:

Wilson to succeed Eisenhower.
Alexander to remain in his present job.
Myself C.-in-C. 21 Army Group.

So far I had not mentioned to anyone the signal I had received in
the small hours of that morning; I wanted to discuss things first with

184 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

da Guingand, but he was on leave and was to return to my main H.Q.
in the evening. I knew there would at once be great discussion about
whom I would take with me to my new staff in England, and I wanted
to get it settled.

I was quite clear myself about whom I wanted at once:

de Guingand as Chief of Staff.

Graham as Chief Administrative Officer.

Williams as head of the Intelligence,

Richards as tank adviser.

Hughes as head chaplain.

There were others I would like to come later. I at once signalled
the War Office for permission to bring these five home with me. I also
wanted Belchem to be head of the operations staff; moreover, he was
an excellent man to have handy in case de Guingand went sick, as he
sometimes did after too much hard work and strain. For I worked him
to the bone; and he would have done that himself even without my
pressure. Belchem was quite capable of acting as Chief of Staff at
any time. But I couldn't very well remove too many all at once, as
this would not have been fair on my successor; I therefore left Belchem
out of the first request and decided to rope him in later.

The War Office approved de Guingand, Williams, and Richards
without delay. They did not approve Graham and Hughes. I decided
to take Graham home with me, and chance the anger in London. I
would send for Hughes and Belchem later, when I had sorted tilings
out in London.

I spent Christmas Day quietly at my Tactical H.Q., with the officers
and men who had been with me since Alamein. I told de Guingand
I wanted to see him and he came up in the afternoon from Main H.Q.
After tea I took him to my caravan and told him he was to go back
with me to England and be my Chief of Staff in 21 Army Group; I
also told him of the others who would go with me. He said he was
delighted. I was glad to know that; I could not possibly have handled
the gigantic task that lay ahead without the trusted Chief of Staff who
had been at my side since Alamein.

He knew me and my ways, and that was all-important.

Oliver Leese had been appointed to succeed me and he was to
arrive on the 3oth December. I settled to leave myself on the sist
December. Leese knew the Eighth Army well and he would not want
a long hand-over.

I flew to Algiers on the 27th December to see Eisenhower and
Bedell Smith, who was to go with Eisenhower as his Chief of Staff.

Eisenhower told me that he wanted me to take complete charge

The Campaign in Italy 185

of the initial land battle, and that he would place the American armies
in England under my command for the landing and subsequent opera
tions. We discussed the type of command set-up I would want and
what Americap officers we would need at the new Army Group H.Q.
I got back to Tac H.Q, in Italy on the afternoon of the a8th Decem
ber.

The problem of a farewell message to my beloved Eighth Army
was causing me seriously to think; I had only just issued a Christmas
message. I wrote the farewell message in the air on the 28th December
during the flight back from Algiers, and arranged that it should be
read to officers and men on the ist January 1944, after I had gone.
This is what I said:

"i. I have to tell you, with great regret, that the time has come
for me to leave the Eighth Army. I have been ordered to take
command of the British Armies in England that are to operate
under General Eisenhower—the Supreme Commander.

2. It is difficult to express to you adequately what this parting
means to me. I am leaving officers and men who have been
my comrades during months of hard and victorious fighting,
and whose courage and devotion to duty always filled me
with admiration. I feel I have many friends among the
soldiery of this great Army. I do not know if you will miss
me; but I will miss you more than I can say, and especially
will I miss the personal contacts, and the cheerful greetings
we exchanged together when we passed each other on the
road.

3. In all the battles we have fought together we have not had
one single failure; we have been successful in everything we
have undertaken.

I know that this has been due to the devotion to duty and
whole-hearted co-operation of every officer and man, rather
than to anything I may have been able to do myself.

But the result has been a mutual confidence between you
and me, and mutual confidence between a commander and
his troops is a pearl of very great price.

4. I am also very sad at parting from the Desert Air Force. This
magnificent air striking force has fought with the Eighth
Army throughout the whole of its victorious progress; every
soldier in this Army is proud to acknowledge that the support
of this strong and powerful air force has been a battle-winning
factor of the first importance. We owe the Allied Air Forces
in general, and the Desert Air Force in particular, a very great
debt of gratitude.

186 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

5. What can I say to you as I go away?

When the heart is full it is not easy to speak. But I would
say this to you:

You have made this Army what it is. You have made its
name a household word all over the world. Therefore, You
must uphold its good name and its traditions.

And I would ask you to give to my successor the same
loyal and devoted service that you have never failed to give
to me.

6. And so I say GOOD-BYE to you all.

May we meet again soon; and may we serve together again
as comrades-in-arms in the final stages of this war/*

The really great hurdle which faced me was to say good-bye to
the officers and men of Eighth Army H.Q., so many of whom had been
with me since Alamein. I said I would do this on the soth December
at Vasto, in which town was my Main H.Q. De Guingand suggested
the Opera House; it had been knocked about somewhat, but he
thought it would do for the purpose. I knew it would be a very diffi
cult moment for me when I got on the platform to speak, and it was.
I told de Guingand he was to go with me to the hall and take me
in; I knew I would need some close and faithful friend to be near me,
ready to lend a hand if I faltered.

I had asked my Corps Commanders to attend, Dempsey and Allfrey,
and of course Freyberg of the New Zealand Division, and Broadhurst
of the Desert Air Force. There was a great gathering in the hall.

I should have difficulty myself in describing the occasion. This is
Freddie de Guingand's account of it, taken from Operation Victory:

"I drove with him to the hall, feeling as I always do on such
occasions, sad and sentimental. My Chief was very quiet and I
could see that this was going to be the most difficult operation he
had yet attempted. We arrived inside and he said, 'Freddie, show
me where to go/ I led him to the stairs leading up to the stage.
He mounted at once, and to a hushed audience commenced his
last address to the officers of the Army which he loved so well.

He started very quietly, apologising in case his voice might
let him down for, as he said, 'this is not going to be easy, but I
shall do my best. If I happen to find difficulty in speaking on
occasions, I hope you will understand/ I felt a lump coming in
my throat, and one could feel every one of his audience was
perfectly tuned into his mood. He then very simply and rather
slowly explained about his coming departure, and what responsi
bilities lay ahead. He touched on the past—upon the successes
we had gained together, and of the things which he considered
important, and which guided him during his command. He

The Campaign in Italy 187

summed up the situation, and expressed his thanks to everyone
for the support he had received, and for the way they had fought.

He then asked them to follow the new Army Commander,
Leese, as they had followed him. There were no great feats of
oratory and no false note. It was exactly right and I found it
intensely moving. He finished quietly by reading his last of
many personal messages to the Army— his message of farewell.

We cheered him and then he walked slowly out to his car.
I followed feeling very uncomfortable, for I had tears on my
cheeks and we were riding in an open car. We drove back to
Main Headquarters, which was only a few hundred yards away,
where some of the senior commanders had been asked to come
and have a chat. It was a wonderful gathering of old friends.
As my Chief talked to this trusted few I could not help thinking
of Napoleon and his Marshals, for here surely there was to be
found the same relationship, born and tempered by mutual
esteem and success in battle. Later Freyberg, Dempsey, Allfrey
and the others departed, and I had a feeling that something
rather terrible was happening— I was leaving this great family.
But then again I remembered that I was leaving in company with
the one who had given us that inspiration, and that guidance,
and so although sad I felt content with fate."

Oliver Leese arrived that night and I handed over to him.

The next morning, the sist December, I took off in my Dakota
aircraft from the air strip near my Tactical H.Q. We had a heavy
load, as besides myself and my A.D.C.S there were de Guingand,
Graham, Williams and Richards. We also had with us five soldiers,
quite a lot of luggage, and a full load of petrol. The air strip was
small and I asked the pilot if we would get off. He said he thought we
should just manage it; and we did, but only just.

We headed for Marrakesh. The Prime Minister was there, con
valescent from his recent illness, and I was to spend the night with
him, and also New Year's Day, and go on to England on the night
ist-2nd January 1944.

As we flew across the Mediterranean I pondered over the past and
thought of the future; and especially of my bet with Eisenhower, and
his insistence that the war would be over by Christmas 1944. I was
certain that it could be, but only if we conducted it in the right way;
and I was not so certain that we would.

At Marrakesh on New Year's Day the Prime Minister wrote this
in my autograph book:

The immortal march of the Eighth Army from the gates of
Cairo along the African shore through Tunisia, through Sicily has
now carried its ever-victorious soldiers and their world-honoured

188 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Commander far into Italy towards the gates of Rome. The scene
changes and vastly expands. A great task accomplished gives
place to a greater in which the same unfailing spirit will win for
all true men a full and glorious reward.

Winston S. Churchill"

CHAPTER 1 3

In England Before D-Day

2nd January to 6th June 1944

WHEN i ARRIVED at Marrakesh on the evening of the 3ist
December, I found the Prime Minister studying a copy of the
plan for OVERLORD— the code name given to the invasion of
Normandy. He gave it to me to read and said he wanted my opinion
on the proposed operation. I replied that I was not his military
adviser; OVERLORD was clearly a combined operation of the first magni
tude and I had not seen the plan, and had not even discussed the
subject with any responsible naval or air authority. He agreed but
said he would like me to study the plan nevertheless, and give him
my "first impressions." I said I would take it to bed with me and give
him some impressions in the morning; he knew that I liked to go to
bed early.

Eisenhower had arrived in Marrakesh that afternoon. He was on
his way to the United States for talks with the President before taking
up his new appointment as Supreme Commander for OVERLORD. I
had seen him in Algiers a few days earlier; he had then told me he
had only a sketchy idea of the plan and that it did not look too good.
He directed me to act as his representative in London until he himself
could get there; I was to analyse and revise the plan and have it ready
for him on his arrival in England about the middle of January. I
replied that I thought his Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, should be in
London with me since he was much more in the general picture than
I was. I also asked that he should give Bedell a statement in writing
that I was to act for him until he himself arrived. All this had been
agreed in Algiers. I had only time for a short talk with Eisenhower
in Marrakesh and he took off for the United States at daylight on the
ist January.

189

. 190 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

That night was New Year's Eve and we had an amusing dinner
with the Prime Minister and his staff, and Mrs. Churchill. Lord
Beaverbrook was there; I had never met him before and what I had
heard had not been very complimentary. After that first meeting I
disagreed, for I found him most agreeable. He had at heart the best
interests of the Allies in general and of the British peoples in particu
lar; he was all out to win the war as soon as possible.

I knew the dinner-party would go on late and that the Prime
Minister would certainly stay up to salute the New Year. So I asked
permission to go to bed soon after dinner on the plea that I had to
read the OVERLORD plan. I spent some time on this and wrote out mv
first impressions; these were typed before breakfast and I took them
in to the Prime Minister as soon as the paper was ready. He was in bed
and read my paper at once. The important paragraphs to my mind
were the first four, which ran as follows:

*i. The following must be clearly understood:

(a) Today, ist January, 1944, is the first time I have seen the
Appreciation and proposed plan or considered the prob
lem in any way.

(b) I am not as yet in touch with Admiral Ramsay and have
not been able to consult any naval expert.

(c) I have not been able to consult the Air C.-in-C., or any
experienced air officer.

(d) Therefore these initial comments can have little value.
They are merely my first impressions after a brief study
of the plan.

2. The initial landing is on too narrow a front and is confined
to too small an area.

By D+i2 a total of 16 divisions have been landed on the

same beaches as were used for the initial landings. This would

lead to the most appalling confusion on the beaches, and the

smooth development of the land battle would be made

extremely difficult— if not impossible.

Further divisions come pouring in, all over the same beaches.

By D+24 a total of 24 divisions have been landed, all over

the same beaches; control of the beaches and so on would be

very difficult; the confusion, instead of getting better, would

get worse.

My first impression is that the present plan is impracticable.

3. From a purely Army point of view the following points are
essential:

(a) The initial landings must be made on the widest pos
sible front

(b) Corps must be able to develop their operations from

In England Before D-Day 191

their own beaches, and other corps must NOT land
through those beaches.

(c) British and American areas of landing must be kept
separate. The provisions of (a) above must apply in
each case.

(d) After the initial landings, the operation must be devel
oped in such a way that a good port is secured quickly
for the British and for American forces. Each should
have its own port or group of ports.

4. The type of plan required is on the following lines:

(a) One British army to land on a front of two, or possibly
three, corps. One American army similarly,

(b) Follow-up divisions to come in to the corps already on
shore.

(c) The available assault craft to be used for the landing
troops. Successive flights to follow rapidly in any type
of un-armoured craft, and to be poured in.

(d) The air battle must be won before the operation is
launched. We must then aim at success in the land
battle by the speed and violence of our operations/*

The Prime Minister was intensely interested. He said he had always
known there was something wrong in the proposed plan, but that the
Chiefs of Staff had agreed with it and that left him powerless. Now a
battlefield commander had analysed it for him and had given him the
information he needed— and he was grateful. I asked for my paper
back, saying it was written entirely without inter-Service discussion
and I did not want to start my new job by troubles with the planners
in London. But he kept it, promising to use it himself only as back
ground information. I had the subsequent impression that the back
ground was liable to intrude into the foreground.

Later in the morning we started out for a picnic lunch in the
country at Mrs. Churchill's suggestion. I drove with the Prime Minister
in his car and he continued to discuss OVERLORD, and my comments.
I said one of the lessons I had learnt in the war was the need to get
experienced fighting commanders "in on" future operational plans
early; if left too late it might be impossible to change the layout of
the operation. In all the operations in which I had had a share so far,
changes in the plan had been necessary and there had been all too
little time, e.g. HUSKY in May 1943, and now OVERLORD which did not
look too good

We had a quiet and refreshing day in the sunshine and warmth of
the Moroccan countryside in winter, and much stimulating conversa
tion. I got to know the Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill well
during that short visit to Marrakesh, and it was the beginning of a

192 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

friendship which developed into my becoming a close friend of them
both.

That night after dinner I left Marrakesh for England. Eisenhower
had refused to allow me to do the journey in my Dakota two-engine
aircraft, although I had had extra fuel tanks fitted. So I transferred to
an American four-engine 0/54 aircraft. I filled my own plane with
oranges and told the pilot to make his way to England. He followed
the next night. I reached London on the 2nd January.

Freddie de Guingand, and the other members of my staff whom I
was bringing from the Eighth Army, had arrived in London some
24 hours before me. Headquarters 21 Army Group was in St. Paul's
School, West Kensington, where I had been as a boy. My office was
located in the room of the High Master. Although I had been a school
prefect, captain of the ist XV, in the cricket XI and in the swimming
team I had never entered that room before. I had to become a Com-
mander-in-Chief to do so. Many of the people living in that part of
London wrote letters asking me to go away. There was a certain
amount of enemy bombing going on and we actually suffered some
casualties in the Headquarters. The inhabitants considered that our
presence there was the cause of the bombing, but there was no
evidence to justify that deduction.

Our "A" Mess was established in Latymer Court, a block of fiats
across the road from the school; I lived in one of them. I asked
Admiral Ramsay, the Naval C.-in-C. for OVERLORD, to live in the Mess,
and to bring with him Admiral Creasy, his Chief of Staff. We were a
most cheerful party and at dinner each evening the conversation
roamed over a wide field. Discussion often ended in bets being laid.
I suggested we should keep a betting book in which all bets would be
entered and signed by both sides. I have the book beside me and it
is of considerable historical interest. Some of the bets deal with
political and other personalities and will not bear publication— not
yet, anyhow. Bets made during our time in the Eighth Army were
copied into the book. I never laid any bets myself but was prepared
to accept those that looked promising; by this means I made quite a
lot of money so that charities in which I was interested benefited. Most
of the bets I accepted concerned the ending of the war. I held the view
that having now knocked Italy out of the war and got well established
in that country, and once a second front was opened in North-West
Europe, we should be able to bring the German war to a successful
conclusion by the end of 1944. That had been my opinion for some
time. But by the autumn of 1943 I had seen a good deal of the
higher conduct of the war during the campaigns in Sicily and Italy
and the experience did not fill me with confidence. While I con
sidered the Allies could win the war by the end of 1944, I was fairly
certain we would "muck it up" and would not do so.

In England Before D-Day 193

My Chief of Staff, de Guingand, was the first to be optimistic—
unduly so. On the 4th March 1943, when we will still fighting in
Africa, he laid bets with me that: "the German Army will not be
fighting as a co-ordinated body by the dates stated:

ist January 1944 Even £5.

ist April 1944 Even £5.

ist April 1944 £5 to £15.

ist February 1945 ^15 to &5-

20th March 1945 £5 to £10."

General Eisenhower was the next. I have already referred to the
bet he laid on the nth October 1943 in Italy, that: "the war with
Germany will end before Christmas 1944— an even £5."

Encouraged by Eisenhower's confidence, General Freyberg laid me
an even £10 on the 3ist October 1943 in Italy that: "the war will be
over by 2400 hrs. October 31, 1944— Japan excluded/'

All tie above bets were made in my Mess in the Eighth Army. The
scene now changes to England, to my Mess in 21 Army Group. Ad
miral Ramsay, when shown some of the past bets, said he would
certainly enter the lists. On the 26th January 1944 he bet me an even
£5 that: "the war with Germany will be over by January ist, 1945."

Not to be outdone by his C.-in-C., Admiral Creasy bet me in April
1944, two months before D-Day, that: "organised German resistance
will have ceased by 1200 hrs. on the ist December 1944."

General Crerar, Canadian Army, was the next victim. I was not
able to place the First Canadian Army in command of the left flank
of the British front in Normandy till the 23rd July, over six weeks
after we had landed in Normandy and just before the break-out from
the bridgehead began. Crerar was fearful lest the war should end
before he could command the Canadian Army in battle, and he used
to press me to let him assume command. On the 24th June he laid me
a bet that: "the war with Germany will be over by 1-9-44, i.e. that
Germany will have asked for an armistice by that date."

I had some interesting bets with General George Patton, of the
Third American Army. On the ist June 1944, he laid me two bets
which I quote in full:

"General Patton bets General Montgomery a level £100 that
the armed forces of Great Britain will be involved in another war
in Europe within ten years of the cessation of the present hos
tilities."

"General Patton bets General Montgomery that the first Grand
National run after the present war will be won by an American-
owned horse— an even £10."

194 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

One bet involved the Speaker of the House of Commons. Sir Alan
Herbert was a personal friend and often visited me; he always arrived
dressed as a Naval petty officer. In February 1945 he was staying a
night at my Tac Headquarters and an argument about bees developed
between AJP.H. and Lieut.-Colonel Dawnay of my personal staff.
Dawnay said the drone was sexless and A.P.H. protested it was not.
A bet was laid and I said it must be referred for a ruling to the
Speaker.

His reply was as follows:

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Speaker's House,

S.W.i.

28-2-45.

"Naturally I am flattered by the faith that you display in Mr.
Speaker's impartiality. But at the same time I think that this is the
first time since the days of Cromwell that the Speaker has been
detailed off for a job by the C.-in-C.! However, I will do my best.

Dawnay versus A.P.H.

1. The drone is surely not without sex—he is a male. When
swarming, the mass of bees are males seeking to enjoy the
Queen and the lucky one that does so dies at once.

2. Sexless does not mean without sex. Sex may be there but
dormant and this condition is then sexless; in short, it is an
adjective which applies to a mental state and not to a
physical condition.

3. I have forgotten the exact words of the bet but my impres
sion is that under the above (i and 2) A.P.H. wins/'

I know nothing about bees. But I upheld the Speaker's ruling; and
Dawnay paid up.

Not all our time was taken up in making bets. It had soon become
clear to mevon arriving home that we were confronted with a task
of great difficulty. I had been appointed to act as Land C.-in-C. for
a combined operation of greater magnitude than had ever been
attempted in the whole history of warfare. The greater portion of the
troops and of the subordinate headquarters, though well trained,
lacked battle experience. The operation had to be undertaken just
over five months later.

Headquarters 21 Army Group had been formed out of G.H.Q.
Home Forces and as such had been in existence for nearly four years.
It was a well dug-in static headquarters which had never been overseas
and had never had any operational experience. Many of the senior
officers had served in the headquarters a long time and had become

In England Before D-Day 195

set in their outlook. Into this somewhat hidebound "staff atmosphere"
it was vital to inject new blood, and to bring in senior staff officers
with battle experience who knew my methods and would get on with
the job without bellyaching. This was done, and the senior officers I
had brought back with me from Italy at once took over the top
jobs and began work under de Guingand. All this was unpopular and
ribald remarks were made in the London clubs, to the effect that "the
Gentlemen are out and the Players are just going in to bat/'

General Paget had been in command of 21 Army Group until I
arrived from Italy. We had been at Sandhurst together and were
great friends. It could not have been pleasant for him to be superseded
in command of the forces he had trained so well just when they were
about to be employed in battle, and to have seen so many changes
made so quickly. Although I have never discussed it with him, I have
always been under the impression that Paget regarded his replacement
by somebody like myself, with recent battle experience, as inevitable
in the circumstances. What he did not like was the manner in which
it was done, since it was at first proposed to relegate him to the
relatively unimportant command of Gibraltar. In the end he was
given the command in the Middle East vice Wilson.

The army then in England lacked battle experience and had tended
to become theoretical rather than practical. Officers did not understand
those tricks of the battlefield which mean so much to junior leaders
and which save so many lives. In the last resort the battle is won by
the initiative and skill of regimental officers and men, and without
these assets you fail— however good the higher Command. Some very
experienced fighting formations had returned to England however
from the Mediterranean theatre at the end of the Sicily campaign. By
exchanging officers between these formations and those which had
never left the country, I tried to spread such battle experience as was
available over the widest possible area. Again, this was unpopular,
but was more readily accepted when I had explained the reason.

Another major problem which caused me many initial headaches
was the tightness of the control exercised by the War Office over the
activities of the army in the United Kingdom—far tighter than that
over an army on active service in the field. I held the view that the
armies in 21 Army Group were already, in effect, on active service
and had to be prepared to challenge the veteran German Army in the
very near future. These armies, lacking battle experience, needed firm
guidance and quick decisions in order to ensure that they would fight
successfully and triumph on the continent of Europe; there was no
time for indecision, hesitation, or waiting for approval for essential
minor modifications in organisation or doctrine. We had got beyond
the text book. I tackled this problem at once. I summoned all the
general officers of the armies in England which were under my com-

196 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

mand, to a conference at St. Paul's School on the 13th January. There
I addressed them, gave my views on battle fighting and explained
my methods of working; in short, I gave them the "atmosphere" in
which, from then onwards, we would all work, and later would fight
During the subsequent discussion it emerged that if divisions were to
fight in the way I had outlined, certain minor changes in organisation
would be necessary. The need for these changes was agreed by all
the generals present; some of them had already been put forward to
the War Office, with no result. I at once approved the necessary
changes in organisation and ordered them to be implemented imme
diately.

Some officers from the War Office were present at the conference;
they evidently regarded me as a new broom and an unpleasant one at
that My action was at once reported to their superiors. There was
quite a storm and I was informed by Brooke that the Secretary of
State for War, Sir James Grigg, strongly disapproved of my apparent
disregard for War Office authority. I was disturbed at this, since
without full War Office support I could not get the armies ready in
time. Brooke suggested that Grigg should ask me to lunch so that we
could have a good talk; I did not then know Grigg very well, and
welcomed the suggestion. At that lunch meeting I explained how
much had to be done and how little time there was in which to do it
I apologised for going too fast and asked Grigg to trust my judgment
on the operational necessity for what I had done; if I went too fast
again I was quite prepared to be sent for by him and "ticked off."

This talk did a great deal to clear the air. It was the beginning of
a friendship between Grigg and myself, and he and his wife are today
two of my greatest friends. I regard him as the best Secretary of State
we have ever had at the War Office within my personal knowledge.

As regards the replacement of unsuitable senior commanders, I
asked the War Office for only one change: to bring General Dempsey
home from Italy, where he was commanding a corps in the Eighth
Army, and give him command of the Second Army. I had the greatest
admiration for Dempsey, whom I had known for many years. He took
the Second Army right through to the end of the war and amply
justified this confidence in his ability and courage.

Concurrently with these worries and changes, I found myself in
volved in a series of conferences on OVERLOBD as soon as I arrived in
London. Luckily Bedell Smith was there with me and he proved a
tower of strength.

Much has been written about the plan for the invasion of Normandy,
and the story of how it was gradually built up has been told by
many writers. I do not want to go over all the ground again. I just
want to discuss those matters which were my main preoccupation at

In England Before D-Day 197

that time, and explain certain points which were uppermost in my
own mind.

For a considerable time prior to 1944 a planning headquarters in
London, organised on an Allied basis and answerable to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff in Washington, had been studying the problem of the
re-entry of the Allied forces into North-West Europe. The head of this
planning staff was General Freddie Morgan, whom I knew well; he
had often complained to me how difficult it was to plan properly with
out a commander. He did a good job nevertheless, and produced
an outline plan for OVERLOAD which served as a basis for future
planning. He had to work on information supplied by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff as to the forces which would be available; he had no
alternative. And he had no experienced operational commander to
guide and help him.

The more I examined the proposed tactical plan of 21 Army Group,
based on Morgan's outline plan, the more I disliked it. The front of
assault was too narrow; only one Corps H.Q. was being used to
control the whole front, and the area of landing would soon become
very congested.

No landing was being made on the east side of the Cherbourg pen
insula, although the early capture of the port of Cherbourg was vital
to our needs. My approach to the problem was based on lessons learnt
in the stern school of active battle fighting, of which the following
were always to the fore in my mind:

First— It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to

what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal.
Second—To this end it is necessary to decide the development of

operations before the initial blow is delivered. There must be a

direct relationship between the two.
Third— If your flanks and rear are secure, you are well placed for

battle.
Fourth— Simplicity is vital in the planning of operations. Once

complications are allowed to creep in, the outcome is in danger.

There did not seem to be any clear idea how operations would be
developed once the armies had been put on shore in Normandy. We
were proposing to open up a new theatre of war on the continent of
Europe. The campaign would involve the whole problem of the
conduct of offensive operations on land in Western Europe with the
final object of destroying the enemy's armed forces and occupying
Germany.

Therefore, the first need was to decide how the operations on land
were to be developed, and then to work backwards from that to ensure
that we landed on the beaches in the way best suited to the needs of

198 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the master plan. We seemed to be tackling it the other way round. So
far as we knew at that time (January 1944) there were over fifty
German divisions in France and some of these, probably six, were
Panzer type. Bill Williams calculated that we might be fighting hard
against six German divisions by the evening of D-Day. We could take
no chances; if we failed in Normandy the war might drag on for years.

We would have to blast our way on shore and get a good lodgement
before the enemy could bring up sufficient reserves to turn us out.
We must gain space rapidly and peg out claims well inland. And while
doing this, the air would have to hold the ring, and hinder and make
difficult the movement of enemy reserves by train or road towards
the lodgement area.

We needed an initial assault by at least five divisions, with additional
airborne divisions dropped on the flanks so as to secure us from flank
interference while we pushed quickly inland. We would need a
build-up which would give us, say eight divisions on shore by the
evening of D-Day and twelve by the evening of D+2 (these figures
to include the airborne divisions). We should aim to have eighteen
divisions on shore by about the end of the first week.

All this would be an immense undertaking and it would be necessary
to get additional landing-craft from the Mediterranean theatre; we
would also need an air lift for three airborne divisions.

Eisenhower had appointed me to act for him and I had many con
ferences with the Naval and Air C.s-in-C., and our respective staffs.
We were convinced in all our work that full weight must be given
to the fact that OVERLORD marked the crisis of the European war.
Every obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered, every
priority granted, and every risk taken to ensure our blow was decisive.
We could not afford to fail.

We formed a revised plan and it at once became clear that our
success was going to depend on whether operation ANVIL could be
reduced to a threat and the landing-craft thereby saved transferred
to OVERLORD. Operation ANVIL was a proposed landing in the South of
France, to the east of Toulon. The Allied forces, American and French,
were to come from the Italian theatre. It was an American idea and
so far as I was aware it was never liked by any British political or
military authority. The American view was that OVERLORD and ANVIL
must be viewed as one whole, and that ANVIL would contain enemy
forces in the south of France, and thus help OVERLORD. The French
liked it since de Gaulle wanted to have a French Army under a French
C.-in-C. liberating French soil. Stalin liked it, I imagine, since it would
obviously hinder progress on the Italian front by Alexander, and thus
enable the Russians to reach Vienna before the Western Allies.

I didn't like it: nor did Winston Churchill.

In England Before D-Day 199

The discussions about ANVIL went on well into August; indeed,
they were still going on when we were finishing off the Germans
trapped in the Falaise pocket.

For some reason unknown to me the operation had then been
renamed DRAGOON.

I personally had always been opposed to ANVIL from the beginning,
and had advocated its complete abandonment for two main reasons.
First, we wanted the landing-craft for OVERLORD; and second, it weak
ened the Italian front at the very time when progress there had a
good chance of reaching Vienna before the Russians. (Failure to do
this was to have far-reaching effects in the cold war that broke out
towards the end of 1945. )

In the end we got the landing-craft we needed for OVERLOJRD by
postponing the target date for Normandy from the ist May till early in
June, and by getting ANVIL postponed till August. But ANVIL (or
DRAGOON) went in on the isth August and in my view was one of the
great strategic mistakes of the war. Eisenhower had a tremendous
argument about it with the Prime Minister at the end of July and early
in August. He thought it would help him with the Prime Minister if
he could say that I agreed with him that ANVIL must be launched in
August as planned.

By then I was willing to concur since it was already early August,
all the forces were assembled ready to go, and it was obviously im
possible to stop it and to land usefully anywhere else. It was to have
its effect in broadening the front tremendously; it emphasised the drag
south, and thus eventually aided a further strategical mistake when
we came to advance towards the German frontier. I wish now— as I
have often wished—that I hadn't half-heartedly concurred that early
August day. But I wanted to show willing to Ike; I had been show
ing unwilling in other matters, and I sensed then that there were
more of these "other matters" to come.

Eisenhower approved our revised plan for OVERLORD at a conference
in London on the 2ist January. From then onwards, the plan developed
steadily as all the details were gradually worked out and fitted into
their right places in the grand design. The work involved was terrific
and the strain on the staffs was very great. I used to think, in those
days, that my experienced staff under de Guingand played a major
part in ensuring that the problems which arose were handled in a
practical and realistic manner. I doubt if a better and more experienced
planning team existed anywhere in those days than de Guingand,
Graham, Belchem and Williams: to whom the addition of Herbert
(now Lieut-General Sir Otway Herbert) in the Staff Duties branch
was a tower of strength (he had already won a D.S.O. and bar and
was a terrific worker). A colossal amount of paper was in circulation

200 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

and everything was Secret or Top Secret. Hughes, our head chaplain,
asked if he should mark his files SACRED and Top SACRED!!

In order that the reader may understand fully what happened later
in Normandy, I want particularly at this stage to draw attention to
the fundamental framework of the plan for the development of opera
tions once we were ashore and firmly established, since it was uncer
tainty on this issue which was to lead to trouble later on.

Our intention was to assault, simultaneously, beaches on the Nor
mandy coast immediately north of the Carentan estuary and between
that area and the River Orne, with the object of securing as a base
for further operations a lodgement area which was to include airfield
sites and the port of Cherbourg. The left or eastern flank of the lodge
ment area was to include the road centre of Caen. ( See Map, No. 34. )

General Eisenhower had placed me in command of all the land
forces for the assault. For this we had two armies— the Second British
Army under Dempsey and the First American Army under Bradley.
Later, two more armies would come into being— the First Canadian
under Crerar and the Third American under Patton. It is important
to understand that, once we had secured a good footing in Normandy,
my plan was to threaten to break out on the eastern flank, that is in
the Caen sector. By pursuing this threat relentlessly I intended to draw
the main enemy reserves, particularly his armoured divisions, into
that sector and to keep them there— using the British and Canadian
forces under Dempsey for this purpose. Having got the main enemy
strength committed on the eastern flank, my plan was to make the
break-out on the western flank— using for this task the American forces
under General Bradley. This break-out attack was to be launched
southwards, and then to proceed eastwards in a wide sweep up to the
Seine about Paris. I hoped that this gigantic wheel would pivot on
Falaise. It aimed to cut off all the enemy forces south of the Seine, the
bridges over that river below Paris having been destroyed by our
air forces.

All our work was linked to this basic plot, which I explained at
many conferences from February onwards. On the 7th April, I
assembled all the general officers of the four Field Armies at my
headquarters in London and gave out my plan in outline, and then
in detail. The Naval and Air C,s-in-C. also outlined their plans.

Having got an agreed plan (or so I thought at the time!) I left the
details to de Guingand and his staff and devoted my main efforts to
ensuring that the weapon we were to use would be fit for battle. I
had already outlined to all general officers my views on tactical doc
trine, and training was proceeding accordingly. Confidence in the
high command by one and all was the next essential, and was vital.
I wanted to see the soldiers and, probably more important, I wanted

In England Before D-Day 201

them to see me; I wanted to speak to them and try to gain their trust
and confidence.

I had the use of a special train called "Rapier" and in it I toured
England, Wales, and Scotland, visiting every formation which was to
take part in OVERLORD. My method of inspection was characterised
by informality and was, I suppose, unusual; it certainly astonished
some of the generals who did not know me well. I inspected two, and
often three, parades a day, each of 10,000 men or more. They were
drawn up in a hollow square and I first spoke individually to the unit
commanders. I then ordered the ranks to be turned inwards and
walked slowly between them, in order that every man could see me;
the men "stood easy" throughout so that they could lean and twist,
and look at me all the time if they wished to—and most did. This in
spection of the men by me, and of me by them, took some little time;
but it was good value for all of us. It was essential that I gained their
confidence. I had to begin with their curiosity. When the appraisal
was over I stood on the bonnet of a jeep and spoke to officers and men,
quietly and very simply— using a loudspeaker or not, according to the
conditions. I explained how necessary it was that we should know
each other, what lay ahead and how, together, we would handle the
job. I told them what the German soldier was like in battle and how
he could be defeated; that if we all had confidence in the plan and in
each other, the job could be done. I was their Commander-in-Chief
and we had now had a good look at each other. As a result of the
meeting between us, I had absolute confidence in them, and I hoped
they could feel the same about me.

By the middle of May I had visited every formation in the United
Kingdom. I had been seen by practically every officer and soldier who
was to take part in the invasion of Normandy, and they had heard me
talking to them. I must have inspected, and been inspected by, well
over one million men. In this way I strove to gain the confidence
of all who were to serve under my command— British, Canadian,
American, Belgian, Polish, Free French and Dutch. It was an immense
undertaking but I believe that it paid a good dividend. The reaction
on the British soldier I could gauge fairly well, as my military life had
been spent with him. Of the American soldier I was not so sure.
However, I need have had no fear. Shortly after we landed in
Normandy, General Bedell Smith wrote me the following letter:

22 June 1944
"Dear General,

I have just received from a most reliable and intelligent source
a report on attitude and state of mind of American troops in
action. The writer is completely unbiased, and his report contains

202 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the following paragraph, which I hope will give you as much
pleasure as it has given me:

Confidence in the high command is absolutely without paral
lel* Literally dozens of embarking troops talked about General
Montgomery with actual hero-worship in every inflection. And
unanimously what appealed to them— beyond his friendliness,
and genuineness, and lack of pomp— was the story (or, for all
I know, the myth) that the General Visited every one of us
outfits going over and told us he was more anxious than any
of us to get this thing over and get home/ This left a warm
and indelible impression.

The above is an exact quotation. Having spent my life with
American soldiers, and knowing only too well their innate distrust
of everything foreign, I can appreciate far better than you can
what a triumph of leadership you accomplished in inspiring such
feeling and confidence.

Faithfully

BedelT

After I had been a few weeks in England, the Ministry of Supply
asked me to visit factories in various parts of the country which were
engaged in the production of equipment for the armies. In many cases
such equipment was urgently required for OVERLORD and men and
women were working overtime to produce it for us.

These visits brought me into contact with a large public outside
the army, and I was asked to address the workers at each factory. I
used to tell them that we were all one great army, whether soldier on
the battle front or worker on the home front; their work was just as
important as ours. Our combined task was to weld the workers and
soldiers into one team, determined to destroy German domination of
Europe and of the world.

On the 22nd February, I addressed at Euston Station a representa
tive gathering of railwaymen from all over England. The Secretaries of
the Railway Trades Unions were present, all the men's leaders, and, in
fact, a selection from every type of railway official. I spoke for i&
hours, and told them of our problems in what lay ahead and how they
could help. I said we now had the war in a very good grip and the bad
days were over; we must all rally to the task and finish off the war.
When I had finished speaking the Secretaries of the Trades Unions
pledged their full support.

On the 3rd March I was asked to go to the London Docks, where
I addressed some 16,000 dockers, stevedores and lightermen. My
theme was the same as to the railwaymen— there is a job to be done
and together we will do it.

In England Before D-Day 203

As a result of these visits during which I talked to many people, I
gained the impression that the mass of the people were jaded and
war-weary. The miners, the factory workers, the dockers, the railway-
men, the housewives— all had been working at high pressure for over
four years. It was difficult to get away for holidays. The blackout
added a dismal tone. It seemed to me more than ever necessary to end
the war in Europe in 1944. The people needed it and I made a vow
to do all I could to finish the German war by Christmas; I was sure it
could be done if we made no mistakes.

In my journeying round the country I was seen by the civil popula
tion and received everywhere with great enthusiasm. The people
seemed to think I had some magic prescription for victory and that I
had been sent to lead them to better things. I sensed danger in this
and knew my activities would not be viewed favourably in political
circles. Nor were they.

I received an intimation that I should lay off" these visits— to which
I paid no attention, beyond replying that I had been asked to under
take them by certain Ministries in Whitehall.

In point of fact, the working population wanted to have their spirits
raised and to be made enthusiastic for the cause. They wanted a new
subject of conversation. It was generally considered that the invasion
would be a blood bath, with fearful casualties; I assured them it
would not be so. All this could only be done by personal contact, and
my visits helped in that respect

The National Savings Committee chose this period to launch a new
savings appeal throughout the country on the lines of their "Wings
for Victory" and "Navy Week" campaigns. This latest appeal was
given the title of "Salute the Soldier."

After years of peace-time neglect by the public, culminating in early
disasters in the war, a revival in the Army's prestige was long overdue.
Alamein, and the victories in Africa, Sicily and Italy, had restored pub
lic confidence in the ability of the Army to achieve results. The British
public now saw their Army preparing to go forth to battle from
English soil. It was a moment of great psychological importance. The
"Salute the Soldier" campaign brought into being in every town and
village throughout the country, committees not only to raise money,
but also to show the unity of purpose of the country with the Army
in the task which lay ahead. The culminating point in the campaign
was a luncheon on tie 24th March at the Mansion House in London,
at which the main speakers were to be the Secretary of State for War
(Sir James Grigg) and myself. I decided that rny speech would be a
call to the Nation to inspire the Army going forth to battle with the
greatness of its cause. It was the first public speech I had ever made,
except to soldiers. It has been published already but I make no

204 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

apology for including it here since it shows the way my mind was
working in March 1944— when preparing for the great adventure in
Normandy.

"I would like to speak to you today about the soldier— about the
fighting men who came from all parts of the Empire to answer the
call of duty. It has been my great honour and privilege to com
mand a large Imperial Army overseas in Africa, and in the Italian
campaign. The men of the British Empire make magnificent
soldiers. In the business of war, it is 'the man* that counts; and it
seems to me it must be the same in civil life. The employer must
gain the confidence of his men; together they constitute one team,
and it is 'team work* that wins battles and hence wins wars.

THE NEED FOR GOOD WEAPONS

When great forces assemble for battle it is obvious that the armies
must be properly equipped, and be supplied with the best pos
sible weapons and equipment. We need not look far back in
history to see what happens when this is NOT done. And in this
respect it must forever redound to our shame that we sent our
soldiers into this most modern war with weapons and equipment
that were quite inadequate; we have only ourselves to blame for
the disasters that early overtook us in the field. Surely we must
never let this happen again; nor will we. And we can show our
earnestness in this respect during this 'Salute the Soldier* Cam
paign.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

But the key to success in battle is not merely to provide tanks, and
guns, and other equipment. Of course we want good tanks, and
good guns; but what really matters is the man inside the tank,
and the man behind the gun. It is 'the man* that counts, and not
only the machine. The tank, and the men inside it, are a team;
the best tank in the world is useless unless the crew inside it are
well trained and have stout hearts. One of the chief factors for
success in battle is the human factor. A commander has at his
disposal certain human material; what he can make of it will
depend entirely on himself. If you have got men who are mentally
alert, who are tough and hard, who are trained to fight and kill,
who are enthusiastic, and who have that infectious optimism and
offensive eagerness that comes from physical well being, and you
then give these men the proper weapons and equipment— there is
nothing you cannot do.
There are two essential conditions.

In England Before D-Day 205

First -Such men must have faith in God and they must think

rightly on the moral issues involved.

Second— You must have mutual confidence between the com
manders and the troops; any steps you take to establish
this confidence will pay a very good dividend; and once
you have gained the confidence of your men, you have a
pearl of very great price.

A sure method of gaining the confidence of soldiers is success. And
I suppose the methods you adopt to obtain success are a life
study. I suggest that a study of the military disasters that have
overtaken us in our history will reveal that they have been due,
basically, to:

faulty command

or
bad staff work

or

neglect of the human factor,
and sometimes possibly to all three.

If you tell the soldier what you want, and you launch him prop
erly into battle, he will always do his part— he has never let the
side down. The British soldier is easy to lead; he is very willing
to be led; and he responds at once to leadership.
Once you gain his confidence he will never fail you.
Amongst races of fighting men he is superb. And when the fight
ing men of the Empire assemble for the fray, the final result can
never be in doubt.

THE ABMY IN ENGLAND

The Army in this country has had a difficult time since the Dun
kirk days. It has had none of the excitements, and the interests, of
active service overseas. And yet it has retained its keenness and
its efficiency. I would like to pay tribute to my predecessor in
command, General Paget, who gave of his best in order that the
Army in England should stand ready at all times to answer the
call of duty.

I find the Army in England in very good trim. I believe that when
it goes into battle it will prove to be the best Army we have
ever had.

INSPIRATION FOR THE INVASION FORCES

I would like to plead for the help of the whole nation in the task
of inspiring the soldiers of our land at this momentous time.
The task of influencing an Army which dwells among an alien

206 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

population is easy; the thinking and way of life of the people is
mainly irrevelaiit; our own chaplains are the main influence in
religious thought.

But an Army which dwells among its own folk is a wholly different
proposition. It both regards and understands the people amongst
whom it dwells, and they pour their ideas and thoughts into the
receptive minds of soldiers all day— from every home, club, church,
chapel, restaurant, and so on. Some of these ideas are inimical to
battle and to battle morale. The chaplains are not the main in
fluence on men's religious thinking; they are only one element—
and not the most powerful.

When overseas I called on my chaplains to help me in my task;
and right well did they answer the call. In the Eighth Army the
inspiration had its roots in my call to the soldiers before Alamein:
'The Lord mighty in battle* will give us the victory.
But today my devoted brotherhood of chaplains are faced with a
different problem; something more is needed— and something far
beyond what they can do alone. The inspiration of the Armies
requires the inspiration of the Nation— of the whole populace in
whose houses and homes it lives, and who are their fathers,
mothers, brothers, sisters, friends, and so on.
We must call the whole people to our help, as partners in the
battle; only from an inspired Nation can go forth, under these
conditions, an inspired Army.

It is absolutely vital that we realise that: 'The tide in the affairs
of man which talcen at the flood leads on. to fortune* will not be
for this Nation on Armistice Day or on Victory Day.
It will be when our men go forth to battle on this great endeavour.
The tide will flow then, or not at all. That is the time when there
must swell up in the Nation every noble thought, every high
ideal, every great purpose which has waited through the weary
years. And then, as the sap rises in the Nation, the men will feel
themselves to be the instrument of a new-born national vigour.
The special glory of the whole endeavour must be a surge of the
whole people's finest qualities, worthy to be the prayer: 'Let
God arise and let His enemies be scattered.'
AH this is a necessity. A special gallantry is required of our sol
diers. The Promised Land is not now so far off; if necessary we
have got to hazard all, and give our lives, that others may enjoy
it. From a consecrated Nation, such men will abundantly come.
And 'The Lord mighty in battle' will go forth with our Armies
and His special providence will assist our battle.
The substance of the tide which has to turn and flow is quite clear;
it is not a personal fad or a one-man doctrine; it is the tide which
has borne the Nation through its history.

In England Before D-Day 207

It is found in the Coronation Service of our King and Queen.

The Nation's Church handed to our King from the Altar of

Westminster Abbey the Sword of State: With this sword do

justice, stop the growth of iniquity/

The task now in hand is the use of His Majesty's consecrated

sword in the reawakened spirit of that day.

There is no fear that the spirit which is alive with that resolution

will fail, falter, or fade, on the day of victory. All must help, and

the Nation's Church must give the lead.

THE TASK OF THE ARMY

I have nearly finished.

The Army is preparing to do its duty, and to play its full part in
what may come this year. Every soldier knows that if the Army
is to pull its full weight it must have the wholehearted co-operation
of the Navy and tie R.A.F.; and he also knows that that co
operation will be given in full measure.

I would add to this that the fighting services cannot pull their full
weight on the battle front without the full co-operation of the
home front. We are all one great team and we are preparing to
take part in the biggest tug-of-war the world has ever seen. We
lost the first few pulls but we are now leading; if we win this pull,
we win the match.

If any of us should fail, or should let go of the rope, or should fall
off the rope, then we lose the match.
Can you imagine this conversation in after years?
"What did you do in the World War?*

1 pulled hard to start with; but after a time I began to lose
interest and I let go of the rope. I thought I wanted a rest; and
I wanted more pay/
'And did you win?*

*No, we lost I let go of the rope, and we lost the match. God
forgive me; we lost the match/

Is it possible that such a conversation could apply to us British?
No. It is impossible; thank God it is impossible.
Then let us all 'stand to* and get on the rope. How long will
the pull last? No one can say for certain; it may last a year; it
may take longer. But it will be a magnificent 'party*; and we
shall win. The real burden of this war is borne by the women;
the women want us to win this pull; they are all helping al
ready.

So we must get right down to it; it will be a proper job for
proper men.

The task now in hand is the use of His Majesty's consecrated
sword; With this sword do justice, stop the growth of iniquity/

208 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Together the whole Empire team will see this thing through to
the end. It is a proper job for proper men.*

In February I began sittings for a portrait which I wanted for my
son David, in case I did not survive the war. Augustus John was
approached and agreement was reached on the financial side. After a
time, I found it difficult to give any further sitting, and finally had to
say I could not attend his studio any more.

He then asked me to come once more so that he could do a pencil
sketch, from which he would complete the portrait— and this I did.

On the 26th February, Bernard Shaw looked in at the studio for a
chat with Augustus John and remained there during the remainder
of the sitting. I had never met him before and found him most amusing,
and with a penetrating brain. That night Shaw wrote the following
letter to Augustus John:

26th February 1944
"Dear Augustus John,

This afternoon I had to talk all over the shop to amuse your
sitter and keep his mind off the worries of the present actual
fighting. And as I could see him with one eye and you with the
other: two great men at a glance— I noted the extreme unlikeness
between you. You, large, tall, blonde, were almost massive in
contrast, with that intensely compact hank of steel wire, who
looked as if you might have taken him out of your pocket.

A great portrait painter always puts himself as well as his sitter
into his work; and since he cannot see himself as he paints (as I
saw you) there is some danger that he may substitute himself for
his subject in the finished work. Sure enough, your portrait of
B.L.M. immediately reminded me of your portrait of yourself in
the Leicester Gallery. It fills the canvas, suggesting a large tall
man. It does not look at you, and Monty always does with intense
effect. He concentrates all space into a small spot like a burning
glass; it has practically no space at all: you haven't left room for
any.

Now for it. Take that old petrol rag that wiped out so many
portraits of me (all masterpieces), and rub out this one till the
canvas is blank Then paint a small figure looking at you straight
from above, as he looked at me from the dais. Paint him at full
length (some foreground in front of him) leaning forward with
his knees bent back gripping the edge of his camp stool, and
his expression one of piercing scrutiny, the eyes unforgettable. The
background: the vast totality of desert Africa. Result: a picture
worth £100,000. The present sketch isn't honestly worth more
than the price of your keep while you were painting it. You really
weren't interested in the man.

In England Before D-Day 209

Don't bother to reply. Just take it or leave it as it strikes you.
What a nose! And what eyes!
Call the picture INFINITE HORIZONS AND ONE MAN.
Fancy a soldier being intelligent enough to want to be painted
by you and to talk to me!

Always yours,

G.B.S."

He obviously gave the matter further thought, and wrote the fol
lowing letter to Augustus John on the 27th February:

"My dear John,

Having slept on it I perceive that part of my letter of yesterday
must be dismissed as an ebullition of senile excitement; for as a
matter of business the portrait as it stands will serve as the regula
tion one which its buyers bargained for and are entitled to have
(plenty of paint and die sitter all over the canvas). And between
ourselves it has a subtle and lovely Johannine color plan which
must not be thrown away.

The moral would seem to be to finish the portrait for your
customers and then paint the picture for yourself. Only, as he
certainly won't have time to give you a second set of sittings you
must steal a drawing or two made from the chair in which I sat.

The worst of being 87-88 is that I never can be quite sure
whether I am talking sense or old man's drivel. I must leave the
judgment to you.

as ever, but doddering.
(Sgd) G. Bernard Shaw"

I did not like the portrait when completed since I reckoned it was
not like me. I was not sure of the drill on such occasions so I ap
proached Augustus John about whether I need take delivery. This
was his reply.

May 19, 1944
"My dear General,

Although I haven't succeeded in pleasing you, I am amply
rewarded in having had the privilege of painting you and making
your acquaintance. I don't think you are right in rejecting the
picture, which some good judges have greatly admired, but I
wouldn't dream of insisting on your taking a picture against your
will. I have no doubt I have missed some aspect of you which
many people might prefer. Another sitting or two would probably
have resulted in a more sympathetic likeness. The enclosed letter
indicates that you and Colonel Dawnay are not alone in con
demning the work. I am deeply grateful to you for giving me so

210 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

much, of your time while being occupied in far more important
matters.

Thanks for your letter.

Yours sincerely
Augustus John'*

Letter enclosed by Augustus John

May i6th, 1944
"Dear Sir,

It was with great indignation I saw your picture, in The Lis
tener of May 4th of General Montgomery.

I should think you took your copy of Old Gandi or a man of
100 years old.

I call it an insult to The General, he looks like a dead man
instead of a living one.

Of course they had to accept your painting or you would have
made the fuss like you did a time before when your picture was
not hung.

It is also time you took a back place, and gave room for those
younger ones.

From

Mrs. M. E. Tozer"

The portrait, and the pencil sketch, were both exhibited in the
Royal Academy Show in the early summer. Both were sold, and the
portrait now hangs in an art gallery in Glasgow. [Augustus John writes:
"G.B.S. didn't come for a chat with me. I got him to come to meet
Monty at the latter4 *s request. There was no sitting or painting during
the interview which lasted an hour. The portrait was acquired by the
University of Glasgow (at a good price.) ]

THE TWO MONTHS BEFORE OVERLORD: APRIL AND MAY 1Q44

By the end of March everything was "set" for OVERLORD and the
armies were on the move to concentration areas. These moves were
to take some time and had to begin early; they would seriously test
the transportation and railway services.

D-Day was fixed for the 5th June.

The whole of April was taken up with exercises, culminating in a
very large "grand rehearsal" by all assault forces between the 3rd and
5th May.

I held a two-day exercise at my headquarters in London on the
7th and 8th April, which was attended by all the general officers of
the Field Armies. My object was to put all senior commanders and
their staffs completely into the whole OVERLORD picture—as affecting

In England Before D-Day 211

the general plan, the naval problem and plan, and the air action. This
was done on the first day. On the 8th April we examined certain
situations which might arise during the operation— either during the
approach by sea or after we had got ashore. The Prime Minister
attended on the first day and spoke to all the assembled officers.

On the 28th April my headquarters moved to Southwick House
in the Portsmouth area, which was to be our operational headquarters
on D-Day. My "A" Mess was established nearby, in Broomfield House.

It was during April that I issued the last tactical instruction to the
two Armies which were to land in Normandy. This is what I wrote,
dated the 14th April.

"i. In operation OVERLORD an uncertain factor is the speed at
which the enemy will be able to concentrate his mobile and
armoured divisions against us for counter-attack.

On our part we must watch the situation carefully, and
must not get our main bodies so stretched that they would be
unable to hold against determined counter-attack; on the other
hand, having seized the initiative by our initial landing, we
must ensure that we keep it.

2. The best way to interfere with the enemy concentrations and
counter-measures will be to push forward fairly powerful
armoured-force thrusts on the afternoon of D-Day.

If two such forces, each consisting of an armed bde group,
were pushed forward on each Army front to carefully chosen
areas, it would be very difficult for the enemy to interfere
with our build-up; from the areas so occupied, patrols and
recces would be pushed further afield, and this would tend to
delay enemy movement towards the lodgement area.

The whole effect of such aggressive tactics would be to
retain the initiative ourselves and to cause alarm in the minds
of the enemy.

3. To be successful, such tactics must be adopted on D-Day; to
wait till D plus i would be to lose the opportunity, and also
to lose the initiative.

Armoured units and Bdes. must be concentrated quickly
as soon as ever the situation allows after the initial landing
on D-Day; this may not be too easy, but plans to effect such
concentrations must be made and every effort made to carry
them out; speed and boldness are then required, and the
armoured thrusts must force their way inland.

4. The result of such tactics will be the establishment of firm
bases well in advance of our main bodies; if their location
is carefully thought out, the enemy will be unable to by-pass
them. I am prepared to accept almost any risk in order to

212 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

carry out these tactics. I would risk even the total loss of the
armoured brigade groups— which in any event is not really
possible; the delay they would cause to the enemy before
they could be destroyed would be quite enough to give us
time to get our main bodies well ashore and re-organised for
strong offensive action.

And as the main bodies move forward their task will be
simplified by the fact that armoured forces are holding firm
on important areas in front.

5. Army Commanders will consider the problem in the light of
the above remarks, and will inform me of their plans to carry
out these tactics."

I sent the Prime Minister a copy. This was his reply:

"For what my opinion is worth, it seems to be exactly the spirit
in which the execution should proceed, and I only wish that a
similar course had been attempted when the forces landed at
Anzio."

During May I had frequent talks with Bill Williams, who was now
brigadier and head of my Intelligence staff. In February Rommel had
taken command of the coast sectors between Holland and the Loire.
After his appearance, obstacles of all types began to appear on the
beaches and it was clear he intended to deny any penetration, and to
aim at defeating us on the beaches. Williams was very good at sifting
the intelligence we got, at discarding what was of little value, and
finally, giving me a considered enemy picture. His view was that
Rommel would aim to defeat us on the beaches and that we must be
prepared for stiff resistance in the bocage country as we pushed in
land. If Rommel failed to "see us off" on the beaches, he would try to
"rope us off" in the bocage. I laid my plans accordingly.

On the 15th May Supreme Headquarters staged a final presentation
of our combined plans. It was held in St. Paul's School, and was
attended by the King, the Prime Minister, General Smuts, and the
British Chiefs of Staff.

Throughout the day Eisenhower was quite excellent; he spoke
very little but what he said was on a high level and extremely good.
The King spoke before he left; he made a first class impromptu speech,
quite short and exactly right. At the end of the day Smuts spoke, and
finally the Prime Minister. Altogether, this was a very good day.

Shortly after this final review of plans. Smuts asked me to lunch
with him in London. We had a most interesting talk, and this is what
I wrote about it in my diary that night.

"Smuts is worried we may lose the peace. Britain, with American
aid, won the 1914/18 war. But when it was over we were tired

In England Before D-Day 213

and we stood back, allowing France to take first place in Europe.
The result was the present war.

He then went on to say that we cannot allow Europe to dis
integrate. Europe requires a structure— a framework on which to
rebuild itself. A good structure must have a firm core.

France has failed dismally.

Britain must stand forward as the corner stone of the new
structure. Nations that want security must range themselves on the
side of Britain; there can be no more neutrals.

It is Britain that stood alone in 1940/41 and then, with Amer
ican aid, stemmed the tide. Britain is a continental nation. Britain
must remain strong and must keep up small, but highly efficient,
forces which are capable of rapid expansion. The keynote of the
armed force necessary in peace time must be air power; the army
can be relatively small.

Smuts said that statesmen cannot always say things like this. He
said I had made a great name, and would make a greater one still
I could say practically what I liked; my position with the public
in England was secure and they would 'swallow* whatever I said.
He was emphatic that when the war was over, I must speak out
and say these things, and give a lead in the matter.

By the end of lunch I was rather startled. I am not convinced
it is right for the soldier to lay down the law on such matters; it
is more in the sphere of his political masters. However, it cer
tainly gives one seriously to think."

It has been written that I had a row with the Prime Minister shortly
before D-Day, and even threatened to resign. This is untrue. I would
like to tell the true story. Here it is.

For some time before D-Day the P.M. had not been satisfied that
we had the right balance between fighting troops and vehicles for the
initial landing on the Normandy beaches. He reckoned there were not
enough men with rifles and bayonets, and too many lorries, radio
vehicles, and so on. He gave out that he would come to my Head
quarters near Portsmouth and investigate the matter with my staff.
On that, I invited Him to dinner to meet my senior staff officers.

He came on the igth May 1944. The photograph reproduced here
as illustration no. 36 was taken on his arrival. I asked him to come to
my study for a short talk before meeting the others. Having got him
comfortably seated I said:

"I understand, sir, that you want to discuss with my staff the pro
portion of soldiers to vehicles landing on the beaches in the first
flights. I cannot allow you to do so. My staff advise me and I give
the final decision; they then do what I tell them.

"That final decision has been given. In any case I could never

214 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

allow you to harass my staff at this time and possibly shake their
confidence in me. They have had a terrific job preparing the invasion;
that work is now almost completed, and all over England the troops
are beginning to move towards the assembly areas, prior to embarka
tion. You can argue with me but not with my staff. In any case it is
too late to change anything. I consider that what we have done is
right; that will be proved on D-Day. If you think it is wrong, that
can only mean that you have lost confidence in me.**

A somewhat awkward silence followed these remarks. The P.M.
did not reply at once, and I thought it best to make a move! So I
stood up and said that if he would now come into the next room I
would like to introduce him to my staff. He was magnificent.

With a twinkle in his eye he said: "I wasn't allowed to have any
discussion with you gentlemen/*

We had a most amusing dinner and when he left I went to bed
feeling what a wonderful man he was— too big to stand on his dignity,
or not to see when he was on a bad wicket.

At the end of this chapter will be found the page he wrote in my
autograph book after dinner.

King George came to lunch with me at Broomfield House on the
22nd May, to say good-bye. On the next day I was to start on my final
tour of the armies to address all senior officers and I gave the King a
copy of my notes (which are reproduced below) for those talks.

On the 23rd May I started on that final tour. As I have already
said, D-Day was to be on the 5th June and I had to be back in good
time. I was determined to address all officers down to the lieut.-
colonel level, and to get over to them the main issues involved in the
tremendous operation on which we were about to embark.

I visited every corps and divisional area, and spoke to audiences
of from 500 to 600 officers at a time. On each occasion it was essential
that I should go "all out"; if one does this properly, energy goes out
of you and leaves you tired at the end. It took eight days in all and
was an exhausting tour.

But I am sure it did good and instilled confidence, and that was
vital as the day grew near.

The notes I used for all the addresses ran as follows:

*!. Before I launch troops into battle I make a point of speaking
personally to all senior officers down to the It.-col. rank in
clusive. In this way I can get my ideas across, and ensure a
common line of approach to the problem that lies ahead of
us; and at a final talk, like this one, I can emphasise certain
essential features, and give you some points to pass on to your
men. In fact I use these occasions in order to influence the
Armies, to instil confidence, and thus to help win the battle.

In England Before D-Day 215

2,. I would like to talk to you today on the following subjects:

(a) The past— very briefly.

(b) The present state of the war.

(c) The future prospects.

(d) The task immediately confronting us.

(e) Basic essentials for success.

THE PAST

3. We have been through some very bad times in this war. In
our darkest days we stood alone against the combined might
of the axis powers; we suffered some great shocks and some
bad disasters. But we stood firm— on the defensive, but
striking blows where we could.

Then America joined us; but that great Nation was not
immediately ready to strike heavy blows, and required time
to develop her strength.

Then the two of us— America and the British Empire—
gradually began to fight back. Slowly, but surely and re
lentlessly, the lost ground was recovered and we began to
pass from the defensive to the offensive.

4. Since that time we have been working throughout on the
same strategy. This has been:

(a) To clear the enemy out of Africa.

(b) To knock Italy out of the war, and open the Mediter
ranean for our shipping.

(c) To bring Turkey into the war.

(d) To defeat Germany, while containing Japan.

5. That has been the broad strategy of the Allies, and we have
stuck to it and never wavered.

We are now about to reap the harvest.

PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR

6. How do we stand today?

Of the four basic points in our strategy (vide para. 4),
the first two are achieved.

(a) The Germans are out of Africa.

(b) Italy is out of the war, and the Mediterranean is open
for our shipping.

These are great achievements, of which we may well be
proud— and we are.

7. We failed in the third point.

Turkey has not reacted in the way we hoped. But the
Allies have done so well in other directions that it has not
mattered overmuch; and the day may well come when

216 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Turkey will regret her present attitude, and will wish she had
come in with the Allies—who are now going to win.

8. We are now about to embark on the final phase of the fourth
point.

To defeat Germany; that is the crux of the whole matter.

After 4& years of war the Allies have, by hard fighting
on sea, land and in the air, worked themselves into a position
where they cannot lose. That is a very good position to reach
in any contest; but the good player is never content *to
draw— he wants to win. And so we must now win, and
defeat Germany. And while doing that, we are doing more
than contain Japan. That country is now definitely on the
defensive and in the S.W. Pacific the American and Australian
forces are gradually working their way towards the Philip
pines and Formosa, and are killing great numbers of Japanese
in the process.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

9. Germany is now fighting on three fronts: in Russia, in Italy,
and in the Balkans. Soon she will have a fourth front— in
Western Europe.

She cannot do this, successfully.

She has a large number of divisions, but they are all weak
and below strength. Everything is in the shop window; there
is nothing *in the kitty/

Her cities and industries are being devastated by bombing;
this will continue on an ever increasing tempo all this year;
by next winter there will be little left of her more important
cities.

The Allies have the initiative and Germany is ringed
round; she is about to be attacked from Russia, from the
Mediterranean front, and from England; and all the time
the bombing will go on relentlessly.

10. A very great deal depends on the success of our operations.
If they succeed, I consider that Germany will then begin to
crack. They will succeed; and the bombing will go on, every
day and all around the clock. Germany will not be able to
stand it.

If we do our stuff properly and no mistakes are made, then
I believe that Germany will be out of the war this year. And
Japan will be finished within six months after we have put
Germany out.

11. But the essential condition is that the Second Front should be
a great success. And that brings me to my next point.

In England Before D-Day 217

OUB IMMEDIATE TASK

is. When the time comes for us to operate on the Continent, no
one will claim that our task will be easy.

The enemy is in prepared positions; he has protected his
beaches with obstacles; we cannot gain close contact and
recce his position carefully, so as to examine the problem and
ensure we have the right solution. There are, and there are
bound to be, many unknown hazards. He has reserves posi
tioned for counter-attack.

13. We have a long sea journey, and at the end of it we will have
to land on an enemy coast in the face of determined opposi
tion.

During all this there is bound to be a certain loss of cohe
sion in assaulting units; and even reserves coming ashore
will require a little time to collect themselves.

The enemy will know every inch of the ground; we shall
be operating in a strange country.

14. But we have certain very great assets, and they are the ones
that matter.

We have the initiative; the enemy does not know where,
or when, we shall land.

We have great fire-power to support our WHal landing,
from the sea and from the air.

We have a good and simple plan.

We have well-trained troops, who are spoiling for a fight.

15. We have available to see us on shore, the whole of the allied
air power in England, and this air power will continue to
support our operations and to bomb Germany.

Its strength is terrific.

There are some 4500 fighters and fighter-bombers; and
about 6000 bombers of all types.

Nothing has ever been seen like it before.

16. Unknown hazards must have no terrors for us. We have first
class engineers, and every kind of mechanical and special
equipment.

All we need is a very robust mentality; as difficulties ap
pear, so they must be tackled and stamped on.

17. What we have to do is to blast our way on shore, and gain
ground inland quickly so that we secure a good and firm
lodgement area before the enemy has time to bring his re
serves into action against us.

The violence, speed, and power of our initial assault must
carry everything before it

218 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

The enemy reserves will be closely watched from the air;
when they sacrifice concealment and begin to move, they will
be bombed and shot-up from the air without ceasing, and
enemy reserve units will be in poor shape when they reach
the battle area.

BASIC ESSENTIALS FOR SUCCESS

18. I would like now to give you a few points which I regard
as terribly important. Obviously such points must be few in
number, since everything cannot be important. I consider
that compliance with the following points is essential for
success.

19. Allied solidarity.

We are a great team of allies, British and American. There
must be throughout this team a friendly spirit; we must have
confidence in each other.

As a British general I regard it as an honour to serve under
American command; General Eisenhower is captain of the
team and I am proud to serve under him. And I regard it as
a great honour to have American troops serving under my
command.

When we visit each other there should be only one idea;
and that is— how can I help the other chap. Let us have no
suspicion, and no petty jealousy.

Let us have, throughout, complete mutual confidence and
goodwill, all pulling together as one great team.

20. Offensive eagerness.

This is vital.

Once on land and the battle starts we must be offensive,
and more offensive, and ever more offensive as the hours go
by. We must call on the soldiers for an all-out effort.

Every officer and man must have only one idea, and that
is to peg out claims inland, and to penetrate quickly and
deeply into enemy territory. After a long sea voyage and a
landing followed by fighting, a reaction sets in and officers
and men are often inclined to let up and relax. This is fatal;
senior officers must prevent it at all costs on D-Day and on
the following days. The first few days will be the vital ones;
it is in those days that the battle will be won, and it is in
those days that it could well be lost.

Great energy and 'drive* will be required from all senior
officers and commanders.

. ' I consider that once the beaches are in our possession,
success will depend largely on our ability to be able to con-

In England Before D-Day 219

centrate our armour and push fairly strong armoured columns
rapidly inland to secure important ground or communication
centres. Such columns will form firm bases in enemy territory
from which to develop offensive action in all directions. Such
action will tend to throw the enemy off his balance, and will
enable our build-up through the beaches to proceed un
disturbed; it will cut the ground from under the armoured
counter-attack.

Offensive eagerness is not only necessary in the soldier;
it is essential in the officer, and especially in the senior officer
and commander.

Inaction, and a defensive mentality, are criminal in any
officer— however senior.

21. Enthusiasm.

Every officer and man must be enthusiastic for the fight,
and have the light of battle in his eyes. We must send our
soldiers into this encounter completely on their toes; they
must be imbued with that infectious optimism that comes
from physical well-being and absolute conviction in a great
and righteous cause.

22. Confidence.

I want you, and every soldier, to know that I have com
plete and absolute confidence in the successful outcome of
the operations that will shortly begin.

With stout hearts, and with enthusiasm for the contest,
let us go forward, to victory.

23. An all-out effort.

Everyone must go all out

And, as we enter battle, let us recall the words of a famous
soldier, spoken many years ago:

'He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
Who dare not put it to the touch
To win or lose it all/

24. Good luck to each one of you.

And good hunting on the mainland of Europe."

It will be noted that in para. 10 I made a definite statement that
we could win the German war in 1944 and we would defeat Japan
six months later. We did not win the German war till May 1945, and
I will have something to say about that later. But we finished the
Japanese war three months after the end of the German war.

220 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

1ST JUNE

As I pondered over all that had taken place since I arrived in
England on the 2nd January, I realised how much I owed to the War
Office. So I wrote the following letter to Sir James Grigg.

i June, 1944
"My dear Secretary of State,

In January last I came home from Italy to take command of the
Field Armies in England and to prepare for operations in western
Europe. The past 5 months have been a strenuous and a difficult
time; but the planning and the preparation are now completed
and we are ready for the great adventure.

2. Before we start, I would like to tell you how very grateful I
am for all the help and guidance I7 and my staff, have received
from the War Office. It has not been an easy period for any
of us, and I know that at times I have myself been impatient
and critical and have frequently upset you all by my methods!
Now that we have finished the job, and can look back on it
calmly, I would like to say that where friction has occurred,
and tempers have run high, it has nearly always been my
fault; the War Office, from top to bottom, has been splendid,
and every section, both military and civil, has spared no effort
to help us to get ready for the battle.

3. The great lesson left in my mind is that the War Office, and
the Commanders-in-Chief in the field, are together one team;
between them there must be complete mutual confidence and
trust. In periods of stress it is all too easy to allow differences of
opinion to magnify themselves, and so to drive a wedge
between the two branches of the team. You and the War Office
have given us a good example of how to work in such a team;
on our part, we have done our best and I hope that you have
not found us too bad.

4. At this moment, therefore, when our preparations are com
pleted and before battle is joined, I would like, through you,
to express the gratitude of myself and my staff to every mem
ber of the War Office— military and civil— for the kindly con
sideration you have shown us, and for your never failing help
and guidance in our difficulties.

If we gain successes in the field, they will be successes
gained by the whole team— as much yours as ours.
5* I felt that I must say this to you— as the head of the War
Office. And I hope that you will convey my deep gratitude to
all who work under you.

Yours ever,

B. L. Montgomery**

In England Before D-Day 221

This was his reply.

3rd June, 1944
"My dear Montgomery,

Thank you for what you have said in your letter of 1st June
and for the way in which you have said it. It can seldom have
happened that the War Office has received such a generous
expression of appreciation from a Commander in the field.

From top to bottom, soldier and civilian alike, the War Office
has one main aim—to see that the needs of the Army are met so
that the Army may, with the help of the other Services and our
allies, bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

We are glad to know that you are satisfied that we have been
able to give you what you want; we are confident that, if your
Army has that, we can safely leave it to you and them to do the
rest, and we wish you— every one of you— the best of luck in the
doing.

Yours sincerely,

P. ]. Grigg"

About this time, the 1st June, we began to scan the weather fore
casts anxiously. There were only four days in early June when OVER
LORD was possible, for the following reasons:

(a) There were a lot of obstacles on the beaches and we had to be
able to tackle them dry, i.e. not under water.

(b) At least 30 minutes had to be available to allow for this.

(c) In order to get full value from the naval and air bombard
ment, we needed at least one hour of daylight In certain
conditions we could accept less, but we did not want more if it
could be avoided.

(d) We needed about three hours of rising tide after the leading
craft touched down on the beaches.

Allowing for all these factors it was dear that the first dates and
times for the operation in June were as follows, civil twilight being
0515 hours.

Period after

D-Day H-Hour civil twilight

4th 0530 15 minutes

5th 0610 55 minutes

6th 0635 80 minutes

7th 0715 120 minutes

It was my view that the 4th June was unacceptable. That date did
not allow us time to get full value from our great air superiority— only

222 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

about 5 minutes, since bombing by the R.A.F. could not begin till
civil twilight plus 10 minutes.

It will be seen that the 5th June was the best date, and that date
had been agreed for D-Day some months earlier.

The 6th June was quite acceptable.

The 7th June was not good because it gave two hours of daylight
before touch-down on the beaches; but it could be managed.

After that date, the next possible period would not occur for a
fortnight. The prospect of having to disembark all the troops after
they had been fully briefed, and to wait for two weeks, was full of
terrors; we had, however, worked out all details of how it would be
done, if the weather forced a long postponement upon us.

2ND JUNE

On the and June, I addressed all officers of my headquarters— Tac
and Main at Southwick House near Portsmouth in the morning, and
those of Rear H.Q. in London in the afternoon.

That night Eisenhower dined quietly with me at Broomfield House
and after dinner we went up to Southwick House for a conference
with the Meteorological experts on the weather. The weather looked
reasonable, but the experts were worried about a depression over
Iceland. It was decided to lay on the operation for the 5th June, with
out any change, with another Meteorological conference at 9.30 p.m.
on the 3rd June.

3RD JUNE

The weather forecast was not good. The depression over Iceland
began to spread southwards and the high-pressure system which was
coming up our way from the Azores was being pushed back. This
meant that the prospect of a good belt of high pressure over the
Channel area on the night 4th-5th June, and on the 5th June, was
receding.

This was awkward, and I noted in my diary that some big decisions
might be necessary. I added:

"My own view is that if the sea is calm enough for the Navy to
take us there, then we must go; the air forces have had very
good weather for all its preparatory operations and we must
accept the fact that it may not be able to do so well on D-Day/7

We had our conference at 9.30 p.m. and decided to make no changes.
But we knew that a final decision regarding postponement must be
taken early on the 4th June, and even then some of the convoys would
have sailed.

In England Before D-Day 223

4TH JUNE

We met at 4 a.m. at Southwick House. Some of the convoys had
already sailed, working to a D-Day of the 5th June. The weather
reports were discouraging. The Navy reckoned the landing was possible
but would be difficult; Admiral Ramsay would not commit himself
one way or the other. I was for going. Tedder, Deputy Supreme Com
mander, was for postponement.

Weighing all the factors, Eisenhower decided to postpone D-Day
for 24 hours; it would now be on the 6th June.

We met again at 9.30 p.m. in the evening; the weather reports were
still bad and we agreed to assemble again at 4 a.m. the next morning.

STH JUNE

We met at 4 a.m. A heavy storm was blowing in the Channel and
it was dear that if we had persisted with the original D-Day of the
5th June, we might have had a disaster.

But the Met. reports indicated a slackening of the storm, and a
period of reasonable weather on the 6th June. Indeed, the experts
predicted reasonable weather for some days after the 6th June before
the next period of unsettled weather arrived.

On that Eisenhower decided to go. We were all glad. This con
ference did not last more than 15 minutes. Eisenhower was in good
form and made his decision quickly.

I went up to Hindhead that evening to see Major and Mrs. Reynolds
and to make final arrangements with them about David. I had not
seen him recently and did not want to indicate the nearness of D-Day
to all the boys at Winchester by going there to say good-bye to him.
Mrs. Reynolds told me afterwards that she knew it was the eve of
D-Day— not from anything I said or from the way I behaved, but
because I had taken my plain clothes there and had put them away
in a wardrobe.

6TH JUNE

I spent the day in the garden at Broomfield House. After breakfast
I made a record for the B.B.C. of my personal message to the armies,
which had been read to the troops when they were embarked. As the
morning wore on, it was clear that we were ashore, and that all was
going well as far as we knew. I decided my place was in Normandy;
I could do no good just outside Portsmouth. So I sailed at 9.30 that
evening in the destroyer H.M.S. Faulknor ( Captain C. F. H. Churchill,
R.N.) which was standing by in the dockyard to take me across. It

224 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

was nearly six months before I saw England again. I was anxious to
make personal contact with the two Army Commanders, Dempsey
and Bradley, who were afloat in their command ships with their
Naval counterparts.

Discussion with them was the next need.

This is what the Prime Minister wrote in my autograph book when
he came to dinner with me at Broomfield House on the igth May:

"On the verge of the greatest Adventure with which these
pages have dealt, I record my confidence that

all will be well

and that the organisation and equipment of the Army will be
worthy of the valour of the soldiers and the genius of their chief.

Winston S. Churchill"

CHAPTER 14

The Battle of Normandy

6th June to 19th August 1944

WE NOW come to events which were to have a marked influ
ence on the future course of the war. Much has been written
about the campaign in North- West Europe and it will be a.
happy hunting ground for historians for many years to come. National
feelings on the subject have tended to run high and in particular
American writers have launched heavy attacks on the British conduct
of operations in general and on myself especially. The seeds of trouble
were sown in Normandy so that will be my starting point My friend
Ike has agreed that it is now my turn to put my own point of view.
I will try and tell the story truthfully.

On the morning of the /th June, which was D+i, H.M.S. Faulknor
arrived off the beaches and then proceeded westwards into the
American area. We located U.S.S. Augusta in which was General
Bradley, and I had a good talk with him about the situation of the
First American Army. Bradley was concerned about the operational
situation on OMAHA, his eastern beach. We discussed his problem
and agreed on how it could be solved. Faulknor then returned to the
British sector and we located H.M.S. Scylla and H.M.S. Bulolo, lying
dose together. From these ships, General Dempsey and Admiral Vian
came on board Faulknor and I discussed with them their situation and
problem; all was going according to plan on the British beaches and
there was no cause for anxiety. Just at that time General Eisenhower
and Admiral Ramsay arrived off the British sector in the latter's flag
ship, and I went on board and had a talk with them. I then asked
Captain Churchill to return to the American sector so that I could
have another talk with General Bradley in Augusta. This we did. The
news from OMAHA beach was now better and General Bradley had

225

226 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

gone ashore; but his Chief of Staff came on board Faulknor and gave
me the situation. We then returned to the British sector.

The wind and sea had now dropped, the sun was shining, and the
"round the Fleet'* trips in the destroyer were delightful; there was
plenty to look at, ships everywhere, and blockships and artificial
harbours starting to arrive. There was no enemy air action and few
signs of battle on sea or land. It was difficult to imagine that on
shore a battle was being fought which was deciding the fate of Europe.
We anchored off the British beaches at about 8.30 p.m. and I asked
Captain Churchill if he could put me on shore at 7 a.m. the next
morning, the 8th June.

We got under way at 6.30 a.m. and began to move in towards the
beach on which I had asked to be landed. It was low water and, as
I had asked we should get as close in as possible, the captain began
sounding with hand leads and started the echo sounder. All beach-
marks were obliterated by smoke-screens. The next thing that hap
pened was that a slight shudder went through the ship; we were
aground aft on some outlying sandbank or boulders. I was on the
quarter deck with an A.D.C., and I sent him up to the bridge to ask
if we were going to get any closer to the shore. This was not well
received by the captain. Meanwhile the facts were being explained
to me on deck by tihe first lieutenant. When he told me we were
aground I am reported to have said: "Splendid. Then the captain has
got as close in as he possibly can. Now, what about a boat to put me
on shore?"

I was eventually taken off in a landing craft by some of my staff
who were already on shore, and the destroyer was refloated shortly
afterwards with the aid of a tug which pulled her stern round. They
tell me that this grounding incident, well exaggerated on its journey,
no doubt, went round the ward-rooms of the Navy.

Our assault on D-Day had achieved tactical surprise. The weather
was bad and the sea rough, but the troops were landed in good heart
and at the right places. Slowly and relentlessly we made ground and
extended the lodgement area.

On D+i we were five to six miles inland. By D+4 (loth June)
the lodgement area was joined up into one continuous whole; it was
sixty miles long and varied in depth from eight to twelve miles; it was
firmly held and all anxiety had passed. There had been considerable
cause for alarm on OMAHA beach in the early stages; but that situation
was put right by the gallantry of the American soldiers, by good
supporting naval fire, and by brave work by fighter-bomber aircraft.

The Prime Minister and General Smuts visited me in Normandy
on the i2th June. The P.M. was in first class form. For once he was
prepared to admit that I was in charge in the battle area and he must

The Battle of Normandy 227

do what he was told! Before leaving he again wrote in my autograph
book:

"France: June 12, 1944
As it was in the beginning so may it continue to the end.

Winston S. Churchill"

Underneath it, Smuts wrote:

"And so it will!

J. C. Smuts
12/6/1944"

At this time my Tac Headquarters was located in the gardens of
the cMteau at Creuilly, a small village a few miles east of Bayeux.
The owner of the estate, Madame de Druval, was still living in the
chateau itself. I thought my caravan contained all that I wanted when
we left Portsmouth but found that one article was still needed— a
jerry, or what the French call a pot-de-chambre. So I told my A.D.C.
to ask Madame if she could supply the article— on loan. After some
discussion it was agreed the situation was delicate, and that he had
better ask Madame if she would lend the Commander-in-Chief a vase.
Madame said she would be delighted and collected all available flower
vases in the chateau and asked my A.D.C. to select the one he liked
best. He looked over them very carefully and said he thought none
was really suitable for the general's flowers. Were there any other
types? Madame, having great intuition and no small sense of humour,
immediately sensed what was wanted— which was of course a vase-
de-nuit. She told my A.D.C. she thought she could find one more
type of vase, rather unusual but which would possibly be suitable for
a soldier. She left the room and returned after a few minutes carrying
a small white pot-de-chambre, ornamented with pink flowers. This
she placed proudly in the middle of the now large collection of flower
vases and said: *I think that is exactly what the general would like
for his flowers." The A.D.C. agreed that it was exactly right and would
look very well in the general's caravan!

Madame still lives in the chateau and I visit her there from time
to time. Every visitor is told the story of the general's vase, and most
people in Normandy know it by now. I expect the story expands con
siderably in the telling. I should add that Madame insisted I should
keep "the vase," and it now occupies a suitable position in my home
in Hampshire.

But to return to the campaign.

My master plan for the land battle in Normandy I have described
already. Briefly, it was so to stage and conduct operations that we
drew the main enemy strength on to the front of the Second British

228 The Memoirs ol Field-Marshal Montgomery

Army on our eastern flank, in order that we might the more easily gain
territory in the west and make the ultimate break-out on that flank-
using die First American Army for the purpose. I£ events on the
western flank were to proceed rapidly it meant that we must make
quick territorial gains there.

On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground
was not so pressing; the need there was by hard fighting to make the
enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet
less opposition in their advances to gain the territory which was vital
on the west.

In this master plan we were greatly assisted by the immense
strategic importance of Caen. It was a vital road and rail centre
through which passed the main routes leading to our lodgement area
from the east and south-east As the bulk of the German mobile
reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach
our bridgehead from the east and would thus converge on Caen. To
the south-east, between Caen and Falaise, was good ground for air
fields. I was convinced that strong and persistent offensive action in
the Caen sector would achieve our object of drawing the enemy
reserves on to our eastern flank: this was my basic conception. From
the beginning it formed the basis of all our planning. Once on shore
and firmly established, I began to get this strategy working and after
the heavy battles in the Caen area, and the overrunning of the Cher
bourg peninsula, it began to take shape.

I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan. Of course
we did not keep to the times and phase lines we had envisaged for the
benefit of administrative planning, and of course, too, we didn't hesi
tate to adjust our plans and dispositions to the tactical situation as
it developed—as in all battles. Of course we didn't. I never imagined
we would. But the fundamental design remained unchanged; it was
to that that I pinned my hopes and clung to resolutely, despite increas
ing opposition from the fainter-hearted. We did not capture Caen,
for instance, till the loth July and we did not finally clear the eastern
suburbs till the aoth July. It had been my original intention to secure
the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as
being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; but this was
not vital, and when I found it could not be done in accordance with
the original plan without suffering unjustified casualties, I did not
proceed with that venture. This was not popular with the Air
Command.

It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern
flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen
in the area about Bourguebus; this was the key to ensuring that we
kept the bulk of the German armour on the eastern flank, and thus
helped the American expansion on the west. We did not get on to this

The Battle of Normandy 229

high ground until Second Army launched Operation GOODWOOD on
the iSth July, with armoured forces. As soon as the armoured advance
came to a standstill because of determined enemy resistance, and
also because heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud, I
decided to abandon that thrust. Many people thought that when
Operation GOODWOOD was staged, it was the beginning of the plan
to break out from the eastern flank towards Paris, and that, because
I did not do so, the battle had been a failure. But let me make the
point again at the risk of being wearisome. There was never at any
time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on
the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic con
ception were responsible for much trouble between British and Amer
ican personalities. Here, for example, is an extract from page 32 of
Eisenhower's report on the campaign, dated the isth July 1945, to
the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

"Nevertheless, in the east we had been unable to break out
towards the Seine, and the enemy's concentration of his main
power in the Caen sector had prevented us from securing the
ground in that area we so badly needed. Our plans were sufficiently
flexible that we could take advantage of this enemy reaction by
directing that the American forces smash out of the lodgement
area in the west while the British and Canadians kept the Germans
occupied in the east. Incessant pressure by the Second Army to
contain the enemy was therefore continued by Field-Marshal
Montgomery during July."

The impression is left that the British and Canadians had failed in
the east (in the Caen sector) and that, therefore, the Americans had
to take on the job of breaking out in the west. This reflection on
Dempsey and the Second Army is a clear indication that Eisenhower
failed to comprehend the basic plan to which he had himself cheer
fully agreed.

AH through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there
was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards
the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued
makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at
Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for
the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included,
had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much
controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very
fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign
developed.

One of the reasons for this in my belief was that the original COSSAC*
plan had been, in fact, to break out from the Caen-Falaise area, on^
* Code-name for Planning Headquarters for Operation Overlord.

230 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

our eastern flank. I had refused to accept this plan and had changed
it General Morgan who had made the COSSAC plan was now at
Supreme Headquarters as Deputy Chief of Staff. He considered
Eisenhower was a god; since I had discarded many of his plans, he
placed me at the other end of the celestial ladder. So here were the
seeds of discord. Morgan and those around him (the displaced
strategists) lost no opportunity of trying to persuade Eisenhower
that I was defensively minded and that we were unlikely to break out
anywhere!

In all the "cufuffle" which developed on this issue Morgan was
assisted by the airmen, because most understandably, they wanted the
airfields on the eastern flank beyond Caen. And some airmen were
only too glad to be able to suggest that something had gone wrong.
One of the difficulties lay in the command set-up itself. In the desert,
''Maori" Coningham and I had been equal partners— he commanding
the Desert Air Force and I the Eighth Army. After the capture of
Tripoli he went off to work with Alexander in North Africa, and we
didn't join forces again until both of us were back in England in 1944.
And even then we were not equal partners. Not only did I have two
badges in my beret: I was wearing two berets. I was at once C.-in-C.
21 Army Group and the Ground Force Commander for Normandy.
So I had two Air Force opposite numbers: Leigh-Mallory, who was
Air C.-in-C., and "Maori" Coningham in command of 2nd Tactical
Air Force working with 21 Army Group. "Maori" was particularly
interested in getting his airfields south-east of Caen. They were
mentioned in the plan and to him they were all-important. I don't
blame him. But they were not all-important to me. If we won the
battle of Normandy, everything else would follow, airfields and all
I wasn't fighting to capture airfields; I was fighting to defeat Rommel
in Normandy. This Coningham could scarcely appreciate: and for
two reasons. First, we were not seeing each other daily as in the
desert days, for at this stage I was working direct to Leigh-Mallory.
Secondly, Coningham wanted the airfields in order to defeat Rommel,
whereas I wanted to defeat Rommel in order, only incidentally, to
capture the airfields. "Maori" and Tedder were old friends. They had
spent those crucial years in the Middle East together. So "Maori"
bad Tedder's ear— they were both good airmen. All this, as I reckon, had
its effect on Tedder and thereby provided Morgan at SHAEF with an
ally who had an advantage which he himself lacked— experience of
war, though not of war on land.

By the middle of July there developed a growing impatience on
the part of the Press; it appeared to them that stagnation gripped our
lodgement area. Bradley*s first attempt at the break-out, made towards
Coutances early in July, had failed. Then came Operation GOODWOOD

The Battle of Normandy

231

in the Caen section and the Press regarded this as an attempt to break
out on the eastern flank; and, as such, that operation, too, appeared
to have failed. This was partly my own fault, for I was too exultant
at the Press conference I gave during the GOODWOOD battle. I realise
that now— in fact, I realised it pretty quickly afterwards. Basically
the trouble was this— both Bradley and I agreed that we could not
possibly tell the Press the true strategy which formed the basis of all
our plans. As Bradley said, "we must grin and bear it." It became
increasingly difficult to grin.

By the iSth July Operation COBRA, the final break-out on the
American front, was planned and I had approved the scheme.

I should mention at this stage that the weather was generally very
much against us. Between the igth and 22nd June we had a gale of
unprecedented violence. Just when we needed fresh divisions to pro
ceed with our plans and retain the initiative, those divisions were in
ships anchored off the beaches and unable to land. On the 2Oth June
we had four divisions in that situation, two American and two British.
The First American Army suffered particularly badly; the American
artificial harbour (the "Mulberry") off OMAHA beach had to be aban
doned, American ammunition expenditure had to be rationed, and
Bradley became a week behind schedule in his planned build-up.

While our operations were developing according to plan, I kept in
close touch with our casualty figures. These were as follows:

British
American

British
American

British
American

22nd June

Killed Wounded
2,006 8,776

3,012 15,362

loth July

Killed Wounded
3,894 18,314

6,898 32,443

igth July
Killed Wounded

6,010 28,690

10,641 51,387

29,156

Total
34,700
62,028

96,728

In addition, by the igth July we had evacuated 11,000 sick from the
British sector.

232 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Meanwhile the First American Army was working itself into a
position from which it could stage the break-out operation. We had
hoped originally to launch the operation from the line St. L6-Coutances.
This concept had to be given up and Bradley finally decided to launch
it from the general line of the road St. L6-Periers. Our hope was to
reach this line by D+5 (nth June); it was not finally reached till the
iSth July.

All this time the British forces were steadily playing their part on
the eastern flank. By hard and continuous fighting they had kept the
main enemy strength occupied in the Caen sector. The greater the
delay on the American front, the more I ordered the British forces to
intensify their operations; and there was never any complaint from
Dempsey. ( See Map, No. 40. ) The following table serves to show how
well the British Second Army performed its task.

Enemy strength opposite Enemy strength opposite
First U.S. Army Second British Army

Panzer Infantry Panzer Infantry

Divisions Tanks Battalions Divisions Tanks Battalions

i5th June — 70 63 4 520 43

20th June i 210 77 4 430 43

25th June i 190 87 5 530 49

30th June % 140 63 fA 725 64

5th July X 215 63 7% 690 64

loth July 2 190 72 6 610 65

15th July 2 190 78 6 630 68

20th July 3 190 82 5 560 71

25th July 2 190 85 6 645 92

The enemy had attempted to "rope us ofp in the "bocage" country
some 15 to 20 miles inland from the assault area. For a time this
policy was successful; but it was only successful by a continuous
expenditure of reserves to plug holes in his defences and at a heavy
cost in men and materials. These enemy reserves prevented any sub
stantial gain on our part east and south of Caen, but in doing this
they were not available to counter the thrusts on the western flank,
In short, they were being committed. As at Alamein, we had forced
the enemy to commit his reserves on a wide front; we were now
ready to commit ours on a narrow front, and so win the battle.

Operation COBRA, was due to be launched on the 20th July; this
was the day on which I had ordered Operation GOODWOOD on the
eastern flank about Caen to be closed down. But again the weather
delayed us and COBRA was not actually launched till the 25th July.

It was clear to me that as the American attack gathered momentum

The Battle of Normandy 233

there would be severe repercussions all along the enemy front The
enemy line would be bent back and he would try and re-establish a
front based on certain strong hinges. I decided those hinges would be
three in number:

1. At Caumont

2. On the River Ome.

3. The high ground between Caen and Falaise.

I therefore planned to knock out in succession the key rivets in the
north on which, I reckoned, the enemy would try to "hinge back" his
left flank. I gave orders accordingly, and the Second Army began
at once to re-group and to transfer its weight from its extreme left
south-east of Caen to its extreme right at Caumont This movement
was a major undertaking and Second Army organised it beautifully.

The attack at Caumont (Operation BLUECOAT) was to be delivered
by six divisions on the 2nd August. But because of the unexpected
speed of the American advance, with Dempsey's agreement I advanced
the date to the soth July.

Thus, on the 25th July, the day on which the American break-out
began, we were on the threshold of great events. We were now to
reap where we had sown; the strategy of the Battle of Normandy was
about to achieve decisive success. And then, without warning, a cloud
descended on our affairs.

On the 26th July, Eisenhower had lunch in London with the Prime
Minister. Exactly what was said at that lunch party I don't know. But
Eisenhower wrote to me that evening and one sentence in his letter
caused me misgivings., knowing the feeling that existed against me
among his staff at Supreme Headquarters. That sentence read:

"He [the P.M.] repeated over and over again that he knew
you understood the necessity for ^keeping the front aflame/ while
major attacks were in progress."

It seemed to me that Eisenhower had complained to the Prime
Minister that I did not understand what I was doing. Actually, as I
heard later, he had told the Prime Minister he was worried at the out
look taken by the American Press that the British were not taking
their share of the fighting and of the casualties. He gave the Prime
Minister to understand that in his view the British forces on the
eastern flank could and should be more offensive; they were not
fighting as they should, and he quoted the casualty figures to prove
his case. This sparked off quite a lot of trouble. The next night, the
27th July, the Prime Minister summoned a few responsible persons to
meet Eisenhower at dinner. I very soon heard what had taken place.

Eisenhower complained that Dernpsey was leaving all the fighting

234 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to the Americans. His attention was drawn to my basic strategy, i.e.
to fight hard on my left and draw Germans on to that flank whilst I
pushed with my right It was pointed out that he had approved this
strategy and that it was being carried out; the bulk of the German
armour had continuously been kept on the British front. Eisenhower
could not refute these arguments. He then asked why it was we could
not launch major offensives on each army front simultaneously— as
the Russians did. It was pointed out to him that the German density
in Normandy was about 2/2 times that of the Russian front, and our
superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25 per cent as
compared to the 300 per cent Russian superiority on the eastern front.
We clearly were not in a position to launch an all-out offensive along
the whole front; such a procedure would be exactly what the Germans
would like and would not be in accord with our agreed strategy. We
had already (on the 25th July) launched the break-out operation on
the right flank. It was an all-out offensive; it was gathering momentum
rapidly. The British Second Army was fighting to keep the Germans
occupied on the left flank. Our strategy was at last about to reap its
full reward. What was the trouble?

It was then pointed out to Eisenhower that if he had any feelings
that I was not running the battle as he wished, he should most cer
tainly tell me so in no uncertain voice; it was for him to order what
he wanted, and to put all his cards on the table and tell me exactly
what he thought. Eisenhower clearly was shy of doing this. He was
then asked if he would like the C.LG.S. to help. Would Eisenhower
like the C.I.G.S to tell me what he had said? Would Eisenhower like
the C.LG.S to accompany him on a visit to me? Eisenhower didn't
take to any of these suggestions.

In a few days' time we were to gain a victory which was to be
acclaimed as the greatest achievement in military history. The British
had had the unspectacular role in the battle, and in the end it would
be made to appear in the American Press as an American victory. All
that was accepted. But we all knew that if it had not been for the
part played by the British Second Army on the eastern flank, the
Americans could never have broken out on the western flank. The
strategy of the Normandy campaign was British, and it succeeded
because of first class team-work on the part of all the forces engaged
—British and American. But just when final victory was in sight,
whispers went round the British forces that the Supreme Commander
had complained that we were not doing our fair share of the fighting.
I do not think that great and good man, now one of my greatest
friends, had any idea of the trouble he was starting. From that time
onwards there were always "feelings" between the British and Amer
ican forces till the war ended. Patton's remarks from time to time did
not help. When stopped by Bradley at Argentan he said: "Let me go

The Battle of Normandy 235

on to Falaise and well drive the British back into the sea for another
Dunkirk.9*

It was always very clear to me that Dee and I were poles apart
when it came to the conduct of war. My military doctrine was based
on unbalancing the enemy while keeping well-balanced myself. I
planned always to make the enemy commit his reserves on a wide
front in order to plug holes in his defences; having forced him to do
this, I then committed my own reserves on a narrow front in a hard
blow. Once I had used my reserves, I always sought to create fresh
reserves quickly. I gained the impression that the senior officers at
Supreme Headquarters did not understand the doctrine of "balance" in
the conduct of operations. I had learnt it in battle fighting since 1940,
and I knew from that experience how it helped to save men's lives.

Eisenhower's creed appeared to me to be that there must be aggres
sive action on the part of everyone at all times. Everybody must attack
all the time. I remember Bedell Smith once likened Eisenhower to a
football coach; he was up and down the line all the time, encouraging
everyone to get on with the game. This philosophy was expensive in
life, as is brought out by the figures I have given earlier in this chapter.
On the nth August, when the Battle of Normandy was nearing its
end, the total casualties were:

British and Canadian 68,000

American 102,000

170,000

We then had thirty-seven divisions in France, as follows:

12 (U.S.) Army Group 21

21 Army Group 16

These differences in military outlook were of course used by my
critics at Supreme Headquarters to make trouble, and I always thought
it was they who persuaded Eisenhower to complain to the Prime
Minister on the 26th July that the Second Army wasn't fighting as it
should. Such action was the greatest disservice that could ever have
been done to the Allied cause. And the real pity was that there was
no need for it— victory was in our grasp, and was achieved in full
measure a few days later. The trouble which began in this way in
Normandy was to grow and develop into storms which at times
threatened to wreck the Allied ship.

The Battle of Normandy can be said to have ended on the igth
August as it was on this day that we finally cleaned up the remnants of
the enemy trapped in the "pocket" east of Mortain. (See Map, No. 41.)
The final victory was definite, complete, and decisive. The following
table shows the enemy losses in the battle.

236 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Enemy Losses: Battle of Normandy
6th June to igth August 1944

Army Commanders "1

Corps Commanders ^Killed or captured 20

Divisional Commanders J

Army Commanders wounded

(Rommel; Hausser) 2,

Supreme Commanders dismissed

(von Rundstedt; von Kluge) 2

Divisions eliminated or savagely mauled About 40

Total enemy losses: Difficult to estimate accurately. Prob
ably about 300,000 but some German
authorities would put the total at
under 200,000

Guns captured and destroyed Over 3,000

Tanks destroyed Over 1,000

I do not want to end this chapter on a bitter note. I have been
accused of many things in Normandy. Perhaps the most amazing was
when I was confronted officially by one of my own staff officers at my
Tac Headquarters and accused of not only condoning looting but
being concerned in it Here is the story of how it happened.

At the end of July the Foreign Office wrote to the C.I.G.S. saying
it had come to its attention from certain private sources that there had
been some rather bad cases of looting by British troops in Normandy.
The F.O. asked that the matter be investigated and put right, since the
French were complaining about it. I took the matter up at once with
M. Coulet, General de Gaulle's representative in the lodgement area,
and was informed by him that he had received no complaint and that
I could rest assured that the allegations were without f oundation. But
there is seldom any smoke without a fire and it was clear to me that
the rumours were being spread in London by a colonel that I had
removed from my Tac Headquarters. Early in July one of my A.D.C.s
had rounded up and shot with his revolver a pig belonging to a local
farmer which was careering round my camp and could not be caught.
The colonel dealt with the matter, tie farmer was paid for the pig,
and it was eaten by the soldiers.

Later, certain other officers in my team of liaison officers were
accused by the colonel of collecting livestock in their journeys round
the forward areas; the peasants had left their farms, and rabbits,
chickens, etc., were running wild all over the place.

The Battle of Normandy 237

The colonel came to see me about it. I knew nothing of the incidents
and asked for details. It was a very worrying moment in the battle and
I finally told the colonel he must see the Chief of Staff about it. He then
became somewhat argumentative and hinted that I myself obviously
condoned this action on the part of my personal staff, and was even
quite prepared to take part in it myself. That was too much. I tele
phoned my Chief of Staff, and said the colonel must be removed from
my Tactical Headquarters at once. This was done. On his arrival in
London later in July the stories began to circulate and the colonel
made a written report to the War Office.

I read the War Office file on the subject when I was C.I.G.S. after
the war. It must have been the first time in the history of war that a
Commander-in-Chief in the field was accused of looting by one of his
own staff officers. But no doubt it kept the War Office busy.

CHAPTER 15

Allied Strategy North of the Seine

THE GERMAN situation in France in the middle of August 1944
was desperate.
Paris fell on the 25th August and the next day the Intelligence
Summary issued by Supreme Headquarters contained the following
sentence:

"Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the
Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant
tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight,
almost within reach. The strength of the German Annies in the
West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the
Allied armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich."

An operational instruction issued by Supreme Headquarters shortly
afterwards began with these words:

"Enemy resistance on the entire front shows signs of collapse.
The bulk of the remaining enemy forces, estimated as the equiva
lent of two weak panzer and nine infantry divisions, are north
west of the Ardennes but they are disorganised, in full retreat,
and unlikely to offer any appreciable resistance if given no respite.
South of the Ardennes the enemy forces are estimated as the
equivalent of two panzer grenadier and four poor infantry divi
sions. A heterogeneous force withdrawing from south-west France
may number some one hundred thousand men but its fighting
value is estimated as the equivalent of about one division. The
equivalent of one-half panzer and two infantry divisions are being
driven northwards up the Rhone valley. The only way the enemy
can prevent our advance into Germany will be by reinforcing his

238

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 239

retreating forces by divisions from Germany and other fronts and
manning the more important sectors of the Siegfried Line with
these forces. It is doubtful whether he can do this in time and in
suffiicent strength."

That was the picture. It was my view that the end of the war in
Europe was most certainly "within reach." But what was now needed
were quick decisions, and above all a plan. And so far as I was aware
we had no plan. During the Battle of Normandy we had drawn in
nearly every division the Germans had in France; we had enticed our
enemy to battle south of the Seine, and there defeated him decisively.
The battle decides all; but it must be followed up.

I had a plan ready ( see Map, No. 42) and, before the final operations
of the Normandy fighting were completed, I decided to visit Bradley
and try to get his agreement. On the i/th August my Tac Headquarters
was at Le Beny Bocage and I flew on that day to see Bradley, who had
his headquarters north of Fougeres. I put to him the following outline
plan:

"i. After crossing the Seine, 12 and 21 Army Groups should keep
together as a solid mass of some forty divisions which would
be so strong that it need fear nothing. This force would move
north-eastwards.

2. 21 Army Group, on the western flank, to clear the channel
coast, the Pas de Calais, West Flanders, and secure Antwerp
and South Holland.

3. 12 Army Group to form the eastern flank of the movement
and to move with its right flank on the Ardennes— being
directed on Aachen and Cologne.

4. The whole movement would pivot on Paris. A strong American
force to be positioned in the general area Orleans-Troyes-
CMlons-Reims-Laon, with its right flank thrown back along
the R. Loire to Nantes.

5. The Dragoon force coming up from southern France to be
directed on Nancy and the Saar. We ourselves must not reach
out with our right to join it and thus unbalance our strategy.

6. The basic object of the movement would be to establish a
powerful air force in Belgium, to secure bridgeheads over the
Rhine before the winter began, and to seize the Ruhr quickly."

In its simplest terms this was the German "Schlieffen Plan" of 1914
in reverse, except that it would be executed against a shattered and
disorganised enemy. Its success depended on the concentration of
Allied strength, and therefore of maintenance resources, on the left
wing. At the same time, Bradley agreed entirely with this outline plan.

On the 20th August Eisenhower held a staff meeting at his Advanced

240 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

H.Q. in Normandy to collect ideas for the future conduct of the war.
My Chief of Staff attended. Certain decisions were reached. Briefly
these were:

(a) To change the system of command on the ist September,
Eisenhower taking personal command himself of the Army
Groups.

(b) 12, Army Group to be directed towards Metz and the Saar,
where it would link up with the Dragoon force.

The staff then began work on a directive to be sent to me. De
Guingand suggested it might be as well to consult me before any
action was taken; this was agreed, and he came to my Tac Headquarters
that night.

As I did not agree with the decisions which had been reached, I sent
de Guingand back to see Eisenhower and gave him some notes on the
problem to take with him. He spent two hours with Eisenhower on
the 22nd August trying to persuade him on certain points of principle.
Eisenhower was given the notes I had written and was told that on
the lyth August Bradley had expressed his complete agreement with
my suggested plan. These were my notes:

*"i. The quickest way to win this war is for the great mass of the
Allied armies to advance northwards, clear the coast as far as
Antwerp, establish a powerful air force in Belgium, and
advance into the Ruhr.

2. The force must operate as one whole, with great cohesion,
and be so strong that it can do the job quickly.

3. Single control and direction of the land operations is vital for
success. This is a WHOLE TIME job for one man.

4. The great victory in N.W. France has been won by personal
command. Only in this way will future victories be won. If
staff control of operations is allowed to creep in, then quick
success becomes endangered.

3. To change the system of command now, after having won
a great victory, would be to prolong the war."

De Guingand reported to me the result of his talk with Eisenhower,
which was negative, and I decided that I must see him myself. So I
asked him if he would come to lunch with me at my Tac Head
quarters the next day, the 23rd August, at Cond6-sur-Noireau. He
accepted gladly.

I was anxious to have a further talk with Bradley before seeing
Eisenhower. He had moved his headquarters to Laval and I flew there
on the morning of the 23rd August, early. I f ound to my amazement
that Bradley had changed his mind; on the iTth August he had agreed
with me, on the 23rd he was a whole-hearted advocate of the main

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 241

effort of his Army Group being directed eastwards on Metz and the
Saar, I returned to my headquarters in time to meet Eisenhower, who
had brought Bedell Smith with him; this was the first time I had seen
Bedell since I left England on the night of the 6th June.

I asked Eisenhower if I could see him alone as I wanted his decision
on certain vital matters of principle; these we must discuss alone, and
his Chief of Staff could come in later. He agreed, and we talked alone
for one hour. I gave him my views about the immediate need for a
firm and sound plan. I said that he must decide where the main effort
would be made and we must then be so strong in that area that we
could be certain of decisive results quickly. I outlined the administra
tive situation and said we would soon be very stretched; we must
concentrate our petrol and ammunition resources behind his selected
thrust line, and if we spread them evenly all along the front we should
fail to achieve a decision. I then described to him my own suggested
plan, which had originally been agreed by Bradley. I sketched in the
details on a map and showed that it offered good prospects of success.

I said that if he adopted a broad front strategy, with the whole line
advancing and everyone fighting all the time, the advance would
inevitably peter out, the Germans would be given time to recover, and
the war would go on all through the winter and well into 1945.

I also said that he, as Supreme Commander, should not descend
into the land batde and become a ground C.-in-C. The Supreme Com
mander must sit on a very lofty perch in order to be able to take a
detached view of the whole intricate problem— which involves land,
sea, air, civil control, political problems, etc. Someone must run the
land battle for him. We had won a great victory in Normandy because
of unified land control and not in spite of it. I said this point was so
important that, if public opinion in America was involved, he should
let Bradley control the battle and I would gladly serve under him; this
suggestion produced an immediate denial of his intention to do any
thing of the sort

After further talk, Eisenhower agreed that 21 Army Group was not
strong enough to carry out the tasks on the northern thrust, alone and
unaided. He agreed that whatever American assistance was necessary
must be provided. He agreed that the task of co-ordination and
general operational direction on the northern thrust must be exercised
by one commander: me.

I said I wanted an American army of at least twelve divisions to
advance on the right flank of 21 Army Group. He said that if this were
done then 12 Army Group would have only one Army in it, and public
opinion in the States would object

I asked him why public opinion should make us want to take
military decisions which were definitely unsound. Possibly I went a
bit far in urging on him my own plan, and did not give sufficient

242 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

weight to the heavy political burden he bore. To adopt my plan he
must stop the man with the ball: Patton, and his Third American
Army. Looking back on it all I often wonder if I paid sufficient heed
to Eisenhower's notions before refuting them. I think I did. Anyhow
he listened quietly. Ike is now one of my dearest friends and I never
cease to marvel at his patience and forbearance with me on that
occasion.

But my arguments were of no avail. The "broad front" strategy was
to be adopted and 12 Army Group, while thrusting forward on its left
to support 21 Army Group, was to direct its main effort eastwards
towards Metz and the Saar. I was to have authority to effect "opera
tional co-ordination'* between 21 Army Group and the left wing of
12 Army Group; the term "operational direction" was cut out of the
directive. But a later directive issued by Eisenhower when he had
assumed direct command of the land armies on the ist September,
laid down that 12 Army Group was to ensure that its troops operating
against the Ruhr on my right were ^adequately supported" logistically.

And so we all got ready to cross the Seine and go our different ways.

Optimism was in the air, the whips were got out, and the Supreme
Commander urged everyone on all along the front. Everyone was to
be fighting all the time. But the trouble was we had no fundamental
plan which treated the theatre as an entity. Our strategy was now to
become "unstitched." I was determined to play my full part in the
business; the British forces would show, and did show, that when it
came to the mobile battle they were just as good as the next man. But
I had great misgivings. All my military training told me we could not
get away with it, and then we would be faced with a long winter
campaign with all that that entailed for the British people.

In the middle of all these troubles and disappointments I received
the following message from the Prime Minister on the evening of the
3ist August:

"It gives me great pleasure to tell you that on my submission His
Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve your promotion to
the rank of Field-Marshal with the date of September ist, thus
recognising your outstanding service in the memorable and pos
sibly decisive battle which you have personally conducted in
France."

Later Sir Alan Lascelles, who was then Private Secretary to the
King, told me the following story of the circumstances in which
the submission appointing me a Field-Marshal was signed. Towards the
end of August the Prime Minister had returned from Italy and was
ordered to bed by his doctor, since he had a temperature of 103. On
the morning of the 3ist August the King, accompanied by Sir Alan
Lascelles, drove to the annexe in Storey's Gate where the P.M. was

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 243

lying up and found him in good spirits, robed in a sumptuous pale
blue dressing-gown of Oriental design. The P.M. had the submission
ready and he asked the King to sign it then and there— which he did,
using the pillow as a table. It would be interesting to know if a British
general has ever before been promoted to Field-Marshal in the middle
of a battle, that appointment being signed by his Sovereign on the
Prime Minister's pillow.

This was the second time during the war that I had been promoted
on the battlefield. It was announced publicly on the B.B.C. news
bulletin the next morning. At once, and characteristically, Eisenhower
sent me a telegram of generous and warm-hearted congratulation.

The more I considered what we were setting out to do, the more
certain I was that it was wrong. The British economy and man-power
situation demanded victory in 1944: no later. Also, the war was bearing
hardly on the mass of the people in Britain; it must be brought to a
close quickly. Our "must" was different from the American must: a
difference in urgency, as well as a difference in doctrine. This the
American generals did not understand; the war had never been
brought to their home country. Why should we throw everything
away for reasons of American public opinion and American electioneer
ing (1944 was the Presidential election year)? The strategy we were
now to adopt would mean more casualties in killed and wounded.
The armies were not being deployed on a broad front for any reasons
of safety; our southern flank was quite secure and could almost be
held by air power alone, with a small military backing. If Dragoon
had done nothing else, at least it had achieved that. There was no
real risk in doing what I suggested. Indeed my plan offered the only
possibility of bringing the war to a quick end.

I was beginning to get information from my liaison officer at Bradley's
headquarters that the American forces on my right were not getting
any priority in maintenance resources. Eisenhower's plan of two thrusts,
one to the Ruhr and one to the Saar, meant that everything had to be
.split— forces, air, maintenance, transport, rolling stock, etc. We were
throwing overboard the principle of concentration of effort.

Eisenhower had his headquarters at Granville, on the west side of
the Cherbourg peninsula. This was possibly a suitable place for a
Supreme Commander; but it was useless for a land force commander
who had to keep his finger on the pulse of his armies and give quick
decisions in rapidly changing situations. He was over four hundred
miles behind the battle front. Furthermore he was laid up with a
bad knee. There were no telephone lines, and not even a radio-tele
phone, between his H.Q. and Bradley and myself. In the early days
of September he was, in fact, completely out of touch with the land
battle, as far as I could see.

I decided to make one more approach to Eisenhower, in my efforts

244 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to get a sound plan adopted. I sent him the following message on the
4th September, the day we captured Antwerp and Louvain:

"I would like to put before you certain aspects of future operations
and give you my views.

1. I consider we have now reached a stage where one really
powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin is likely to
get there and thus end the German war.

2. We have not enough maintenance resources for two full-
blooded thrusts.

3. The selected thrust must have all the maintenance resources it
needs without any qualification and any other operation must
do the best it can with what is left over.

4. There are only two possible thrusts: one via the Ruhr and the
other via Metz and the Saar.

5. In my opinion the thrust likely to give the best and quickest
results is die northern one via the Ruhr.

6. Time is vital and the decision regarding the selected thrust
must be made at once and para. 3 above will then apply.

7. If we attempt a compromise solution and split our maintenance
resources so that neither thrust is full-blooded we will prolong
the war.

8. I consider the problem viewed as above is very simple and
clear cut

9. The matter is of such vital importance that I feel sure you will
agree that a decision on the above lines is required at once. If
you are coming this way perhaps you would look in and dis
cuss it. If so delighted to see you lunch tomorrow. Do not feel
I can leave this battle just at present"

In point of fact, it was now almost too late. The Saar thrust had
begun and Patton had been given the necessary resources for his drive
on Metz. On my right, the First American Army found itself having
to cover Pattern's advance and was unable also properly to support
my operations as had been ordered. But there was still time to save
something from the wreck, if only we could get a decision at once.

Eisenhower received my message on the 5th September. At 7.45 p.m.
that day he sent me his reply. The signal communications at his
Forward H.Q. at Granville were so inadequate that his reply reached
me in two parts. Paras. 3 and 4 came first and arrived at 9 a.m. on
the 7th September; paras, i and 2, reached me at 10.15 a.m. on the
morning of the gth September. Here is his message in full, as it was
eventually pieced together.

"Part i (Received 1015 hr$ 9 September 1944)
i. While agreeing with your conception of a powerful and full-
blooded thrust towards Berlin I do not agree that it should be

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 245

initiated at this moment to the exclusion of all other manoeu
vres.

2. The bulk of the German Army that was in the West has now
been destroyed. Must immediately exploit our success by
promptly breaching the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine on
a wide front, and seizing the Saar and the Ruhr. This I intend
to do with all possible speed. This will give us a stranglehold
on two of Germany's main industrial areas and largely destroy
her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take. It
will assist in cutting off forces now retiring from south-west
France. Moreover it will give us freedom of action to strike
in any direction and will force the enemy to disperse over a
wide area such forces as he may be able to assemble for the
defence of the West.

Part 2 (Received 0900 hrs 7 September 1944)

3. While we are advancing we will be opening the ports of Havre
and Antwerp, which are essential to sustain a powerful thrust
deep into Germany. No reallocation of our present resources
would be adequate to sustain a thrust to Berlin,

4. Accordingly my intention is initially to occupy the Saar and
the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this, Havre and
Antwerp should be available to maintain one or both of the
thrusts you mention. In this connection I have always given
and still give priority to the Ruhr RPT Ruhr, and the northern
route of advance, as indicated in my directive of yesterday
which crossed your telegram. Locomotives and rolling stock
are today being allocated on the basis of this priority to main
tain the momentum of the advance of your forces, and those
of Bradley north-west of the Ardennes. Please let me know at
once your further maintenance requirements for the advance."

On the 7th September I had only received Part 2 of the reply, but it
was enough to make me realise that we were unlikely to get the
decision needed. I therefore sent him the following.

"Have Just received paras. 3 and 4 of your message of 5 Septem
ber. First part of message has not arrived yet so do not know
what it contains. My maintenance is stretched to the limit. First
instalment of 18 locomotives only just released to me and balance
still seems uncertain. I require an air lift of 1000 tons a day at
Douai or Brussels and hi last two days have had only 750 tons
total. My transport is based on operating 150 miles from my
ports and at present I am over 300 miles from Bayeux. In order
to save transport I have cut down my intake into France to 6000
tons a day which is half what I consume and I cannot go on for

246 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

long like this. It is clear therefore that based as I am at present
on Bayeux I cannot capture the Ruhr. As soon as I have a Pas de
Calais port working I would then require about 2500 additional
3-ton lorries plus an assured air lift averaging minimum 1000
tons a day to enable me to get to the Ruhr and finally Berlin.
I submit with all respect to your para. 3 that a reallocation of our
present resources of every description would be adequate to get
one thrust to Berlin. It is very difficult to explain things in a
message like this. Would it be possible for you to come and
see me?"

Meanwhile I had been consulting with Bradley about the parlous
state of our logistics and we had agreed that we must cancel all our
plans for airborne drops to help the advance, and put all available air
craft on to transport work. This was no great sacrifice because the
speed of our advance since crossing the Seine had been so great that
we did not need parachute troops to help. Ever since the Battle of
Normandy had been won my eyes had been fixed on the Rhine and
the Ruhr; I knew that we should require all our airborne resources
to ensure we got over the Meuse and the Rhine. I had been allotted
the First Allied Airborne Corps and on the 3rd September, the day
we liberated Brussels, I had asked its commander (General Browning)
to come and see me, so that we might discuss the general axis of the
thrust towards the Rhine and the best areas in which to drop the
airborne divisions.

On the gth September I received information from London that
on the previous day the first Vz rockets had landed in England; it
was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amster
dam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far
as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my
operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine; it must be
towards Arnhem. Dempsey and Browning came to see me again on
the morning of the loth September to discuss the Arnhem operation;
but I knew that the maintenance situation would be the limiting factor
in deciding when it could be launched.

In response to the request in my signal three days before, Eisen
hower flew to Brussels on the afternoon of the loth September.
Tedder was with him and we had a good talk in Eisenhower's aircraft;
he could not get out since he was still very lame.

I explained my situation fully. I told him about the Va rockets
which had started to land in England, and from whence they came. He
said he had always intended to give priority to the Ruhr thrust and the
northern route of advance, and that this was being done. I said that
it was not being done. He then said that by priority he did not mean

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 247

"absolute priority," and he could not in any way scale down the
Saar thrust I told him that enemy resistance was stiffening on the line
of the Albert Canal; that there was a steady consumption of petrol
and ammunition; and that we were outstripping our maintenance.
It was becoming clear that I would not be able to launch the large-
scale operation towards Arnhem as soon as I had hoped and that this
would give the enemy more time to recover. Since crossing the Seine
my headquarters had moved northwards, and Bradley's eastwards.
The land battle was becoming jerky and disjointed. I said that so long
as he continued with two thrusts, with the maintenance split between
the two, neither could succeed. I pointed out that Antwerp, and the
approaches to the port which we had not yet got, lay behind the thrust
on die left flank which I had advocated on the 23rd August— nearly
three weeks ago. There were two possible plans— Bradley *s and mine.
It was essential "to back" one of them. If he tried to back both, we
couldn't possibly gain any decisive results quickly. The quickest way
to open up Antwerp was to back my plan of concentration on the left
—which plan would not only help our logistic and maintenance situa
tion but would also keep up the pressure on the stricken Germans in
the area of greatest importance, thus helping to end the war quickly.
It was essential for him to know my views; the decision about the
action to be taken was then his. It was obvious that he disagreed with
iny analysis. He repeated that we must first close to the Rhine and
cross it on a wide front; then, and only then, could we concentrate
on one thrust. We parted without any clear decision, except that, as
I understood it, the "broad front" strategy was to remain in operation.
But Eisenhower agreed that 21 Army Group should strike northwards
towards Arnhem as early as possible, and he admitted that successful
operations in that direction would open up wide possibilities for
future action.

The next day, the nth September, I sent Eisenhower the following
signal:

**I have investigated my maintenance situation very carefully
since our meeting yesterday. Your decision that the northern thrust
towards the Ruhr is NOT repeat NOT to have priority over other
operations will have certain repercussions which you should know.
The large-scale operations by Second Army and the Airborne
Corps northwards towards the Meuse and Rhine cannot now take
place before 23 Sep. at the earliest and possibly 26 Sep. This delay
will give the enemy time to organise better defensive arrange
ments and we must expect heavier resistance and slower progress.
As the winter draws on the weather may be expected to deteri
orate and we then get less results from our great weight of air

248 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

power. It is basically a matter of rail and road and air transport
and unless this is concentrated to give impetus to the selected
thrust then no one is going to get very far since we are all such
a long way from our supply hases. We will do all that is possible
to get on with the business but the above facts will show you
that if enemy resistance continues to stiffen as at present then no
great results can be expected until we have built up stocks of
ammunition and other requirements."

This message produced results which were almost electric. Bedell
Smith came to see me next day to say that Eisenhower had decided
to act as I recommended. The Saar thrust was to be stopped. Three
American divisions were to be grounded and their transport used to
supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the logistic
support of 12 Army Group was to be given to the First American
Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal direct with General
Hodges (the GOC First American Army).

As a result of these promises I reviewed my plans with Dempsey
and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem operation (MARKET GARDEN)
for Sunday i/th September.

I did not know until later (and perhaps it was as well that I didn't)
that when General Patton heard of these decisions he decided, with
Bradley's agreement, to get the Third American Army so involved
beyond the Moselle that Supreme Headquarters would be able neither
to reduce its maintenance nor to halt it.

On the 15th September, Eisenhower wrote me as follows:

"Dear Montgomery,

We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth
in my last directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession
of the Ruhr, the Saar and the Frankfurt area. I have been consider
ing our next move.

As I see it, the Germans will have stood in defence of the Ruhr
and Frankfurt and will have had a sharp defeat inflicted on them.
Their dwindling forces, reinforced perhaps by material hastily
scratched together or dragged from other theatres, will probably
try to check our advance on the remaining important objectives
in Germany. By attacking such objectives we shall create oppor
tunities of dealing effectively with the last remnants of the Ger
man forces in the West. Moreover, we shall be occupying further
key centres and increasing our stranglehold on the German
peoples.

Clearly, Berlin is the main prize, and the prize in defence of
which the enemy is likely to concentrate the bulk of his forces.
There is no doubt whatsoever, in my mind, that we should con
centrate all our energies and resources on a rapid thrust to Berlin.

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 249

Our strategy, however, will have to be co-ordinated with that
of the Russians, so we must also consider alternative objectives.

There is the area of the Northern ports, Kiel-Lubeck-Hamburg-
Bremen. Its occupation would not only give us control of the
German Navy and North Sea bases, of the Kiel Canal, and of a
large industrial area, but would enable us to form a barrier against
the withdrawal of German forces from Norway and Denmark.
Further, this area, or a part of it, might have to be occupied as
flank protection to our thrust on Berlin.

There are the areas Hanover-Brunswick and Leipzig-Dresden.
They are important industrial and administrative areas and centres
of communications on the direct routes from the Ruhr and Frank
furt to Berlin, so the Germans will probably hold them as inter
mediate positions covering Berlin.

There are the Nurnberg-Regensburg and the Augsburg-Munich
areas. Apart from their economical and administrative importance,
there is the transcending political importance of Munich. More
over, there may be an impelling demand to occupy these areas
and cut off enemy forces withdrawing from Italy and the Balkans.

Clearly, therefore, our objectives cannot be precisely deter
mined until nearer die time, so we must be prepared for one or
more of the following:

(a) To direct forces of both Army Groups on Berlin astride
the axes Ruhr-Hanover-Berlin or Frankfurt-Leipzig-Berlin,
or both.

(b) Should the Russians beat us to Berlin, the Northern Group
of Armies would seize the Hanover area and the Hamburg
group of ports. The Central Group of Armies would seize
part, or the whole, of Leipzig-Dresden, depending upon
the progress of the Russian advance.

(c) In any event, the Southern Group of Armies would seize
Augsburg-Munich. The area Nurnberg-Regensburg would
be seized by Central or Southern Group of Armies, depend
ing on the situation at the time.

Simply stated, it is my desire to move on Berlin by the most
direct and expeditious route, with combined U.S.-British forces
supported by other available forces moving through key centres
and occupying strategic areas on the flanks, all in one co-ordi
nated, concerted operation.

It is not possible at this stage to indicate the timing of these
thrusts or their strengths, but I shall be glad to have your views
on the general questions raised in this letter.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) Dwight D. Eisenhower"

250 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I considered this letter very carefully and sent him the following
reply on the i8th September:

**My dear Ike,

I have received your letter dated 15-9-44, and I give below my
general views on the questions you raise— as asked for by you.

1. I suggest that the whole matter as to what is possible, and
what is NOT possible, is very closely linked up with the ad
ministrative situation. The vital factor is time; what we have
to do, we must do quickly.

2. In view of para, i, it is my opinion that a concerted operation
in which all the available land armies move forward into
Germany is not possible; the maintenance resources, and the
general administrative situation, will not allow of this being
done QUICKLY.

3. But forces adequate in strength for the job in hand could be
supplied and maintained, provided the general axis of ad
vance was suitable, and provided these forces had complete
priority in all respects as regards maintenance.

4* It is my own personal opinion that we shall not achieve what
we want by going for objectives such as Nurnberg, Augsburg,
Munich, etc., and by establishing our forces in central Ger
many.

5. I consider that the best objective is the Ruhr, and thence on
to Berlin by the northern route. On that route are the ports,
and on that route we can use our sea power to the best
advantage. On other routes we would merely contain as
many German forces as we could.

6. If you agree with para. 5, then I consider that 21 Army Group,
plus First U.S. Army of nine divisions, would be adequate.
Such a force must have everything it needed in the mainte
nance line; other Armies would do the best they could with
what was left over.

7. If you consider that para. 5 is not right, and that the proper
axis of advance is by Frankfurt and central Germany, then I
suggest that 12 Army Group of three Armies would be used
and would have all the maintenance. 21 Army Group would
do the best it could with what was left over; or possibly the
Second British Army would be wanted in a secondary role
on the left flank of the movement.

8* In brief, I consider that as time is so very important, we
have got to decide what is necessary to go to Berlin and
finish the war; the remainder must play a secondary role. It
is my opinion that three Armies are enough, if you select the
northern route, and I consider that, from a maintenance point

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 251

of view, it could be done. I have not studied the southern
route.

9. I consider that our plan, and objectives, should be decided
NOW, and everything arranged accordingly. I would not my
self agree that we can wait until nearer the time, as suggested
in your letter.

10. Finally to sum up.

I recommend the northern route of advance via the Ruhr,

vide para. 5.

Para. 6 would then apply.

11. I hope the above is clear.

It represents my views on the general questions raised in your
letter.

12. The above is actually in accordance with the general views I
expressed to you in my telegram M 160 dated 4 Sep.

Yours ever

(Sgd) B. L. Montgomery**

Eisenhower replied to this letter on the aoth September, as follows:

"Dear Monty,

Generally speaking I find myself so completely in agreement
with your letter of 18 September (M-5^6) that I cannot believe
there is any great difference in our concepts.

Never at any time have I implied that I was considering an
advance into Germany with all armies moving abreast.

Specifically I agree with you in the following: My choice of
routes for making the all-out offensive into Germany is from the
Ruhr to Berlin. A prerequisite from the maintenance viewpoint
is the early capture of the approaches to Antwerp so that that
flank may be adequately supplied.

Incidentally I do not yet have your calculations in the tonnage
that will be necessary to support the 21 Army Group on this move.
There is one point, however, on which we do not agree, if I inter
pret your ideas correctly. As I read your letter you imply that all
the divisions that we have, except those of the 2ist Army Group
and approximately nine of the isth Army Group, can stop in
place where they are and that we can strip all these additional
divisions from their transport and everything else to support one
single knife-like drive towards Berlin. This may not be exactly
what you mean but it is certainly not possible.

What I do believe is that we must marshal our strength up
along the Western borders of Germany, to the Rhine if possible,
insure adequate maintenance by getting Antwerp working at full
blast at the earliest possible moment and then carry out the drive
you suggest All of Bradley's Army Group, except his left Army,

252 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

which makes his main effort, will move forward sufficiently so as
always to be in supporting position for the main drive and to pre
vent concentration of German forces against its front and flanks.

I have already directed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the
earliest possible meeting with all Army Group commanders and
with supply people. I am quite confident that we see this thing
almost identically. I merely want to make sure that when you
start leading your Army Group in its thrust on to Berlin and
Bradley starts driving with his left to support you, our other
forces are in position to assure the success of that drive. Otherwise
the main thrust itself would have to drop off so much of its
strength to protect its rear and its flanks that very soon the drive
would peter out.

As you know I have been giving preference to my left all the
way through this campaign including attaching the First Airborne
Force to you and adopting every possible expedient to assure your
maintenance. All other forces have been fighting with a halter
around their necks in the way of supplies. You may not know
that for four days straight Patton has been receiving serious
counterattacks and during the last seven days, without attempting
any real advance himself, has captured about 9000 prisoners and
knocked out 270 tanks.

I saw Bradley today and in furtherance of the general plan for
building up the left we are moving the Brest divisions up to take
over the defensive region east of Luxembourg so that Hodges can
concentrate his full strength on his left in his drive forward to
wards the Rhine. When we get to the Rhine the next concern of
Bradle/s will be to put a strong fully equipped Army on his left
to accompany you to Berlin.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) Dwight D. Eisenhower"

I replied at once (2ist September) to this letter by sending Eisen
hower the following signal:

"Dear Ike, thank you very much for your letter of 20 Sep sent
via Gale. I cannot agree that our concepts are the same and I am
sure you would wish me to be quite frank and open in the matter.
I have always said stop the right and go on with left, but the right
has been allowed to go on so far that it has outstripped its mainte
nance and we have lost flexibility. In your letter you still want to
go on further with your right and you state in your para. 6 that
all of Bradley's Army Group will move forward sufficiently etc.
I would say that the right flank of 12 Army Group should be given
a very direct order to halt and if this order is not obeyed we shall

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 253

get into greater difficulties. The net result of the matter in my
opinion is that if you want to get the Ruhr you will have to put
every single thing into the left hook and stop everything else. It
is my opinion that if this is not done then you will not get the
Ruhr. Your very great friend Monty."

Eisenhower then summoned a conference at his headquarters at
Versailles for the afternoon of the 22nd September, to decide on a
plan for the further conduct of the war. The situation at Arnhem was
not good on that day, and further south the Germans had cut the
corridor and established themselves on the main road between Veghel
and Grave, south of Nijmegen. I decided that I could not leave the
battle front and told de Guingand to represent me at the conference.
Moreover, I knew I was not popular at either Supreme Headquarters,
or with the American generals, because of my arguments about the
conduct of the war; I thought it best to keep away while the matter
was being further argued.

That night de Guingand sent me a message from Versailles to the
effect that Eisenhower had supported my plan one hundred per cent,
and that the northern thrust was to be the main effort and get full
support. I received this message early on the 23rd September. By that
date the Arnhem situation was really bad; the corridor leading to
Nijmegen was again cut and it looked as if we would have to with
draw the remnants of the ist British Airborne Division back over the
Neder Rijn. The division was in fact so withdrawn on the 2$th
September.

I could not help going back in my mind to my meeting with Eisen
hower at my Tac Headquarters at Conde on the 23rd August, when
I had asked him to take the decision to support my plan. He had
refused. Now at last, on the 23rd September, I was told he had agreed
and would support my plan. He had taken the decision exactly one
month too late. Nothing could now prevent events taking the course
which I had predicted a month before.

The maintenance situation all along the front got progressively
worse. The First American Army on my right was, by the 6th October,
unable to develop its operations according to plan, because it had not
got the necessary ammunition. On the jth October I reported from
Eindhoven the situation on the northern flank very fully to Eisenhower
and said I could not continue the planned operations to gain the line
of the Rhine unless the maintenance resources allotted to these opera
tions could be stepped up. I said I had asked Bradley to come and see
me the next day, the 8th October, to discuss the situation.

Knowing that Bradley would be with me at Eindhoven on the
8th October, Eisenhower sent us both a message giving his views on

254 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the problem that confronted us all. His message began with tie
following sentence (the italics are mine):

"Basic difficulty on northern flank appears to be lack of strength
in view of enemy reinforcement. Consequently, the plan for co
ordinated attack to Rhine must be postponed until strength can
be gotten up which must come from U.S. divisions on the beach,

Nevertheless, plans of both Army Groups must retain as -first
mission the gaining of the line of the Rhine north of Bonn as
quickly as humanly possible."

Bradley and I were unable to agree with the statement. It was our
definite opinion that we must reduce the tempo of our operations
towards the Rhine until we could improve the maintenance situation.
I reported to Eisenhower accordingly and said I had stopped the
operations of the Second Army towards the Ruhr and was now going
to concentrate on opening up the approaches to Antwerp— so as to
get that port working fully.

The next day, the gth October, I received a message from Eisen
hower in which he stated (again the italics are mine) :

"Unless we have Antwerp producing by the middle of Novem
ber, entire operations will come to a standstill.

I must emphasise that, of all our operations on our entire front
from Switzerland to the channel, I consider Antwerp of first im
portance!9

This was a fundamental change from the message of the day before,
in which the first mission of both Army Groups was given as "the
gaining of the line of the Rhine north of Bonn as quickly as humanly
possible/* However, we did now all seem agreed on what was to be
done.

General Marshall had come with Bradley to my headquarters on
the 8th October and I had a long talk with him, alone in my office
caravan. I told him that since Eisenhower had himself taken personal
command of the land battle, being also Supreme Commander of all
the forces (land, sea, and air), the armies had become separated na
tionally and not geographically. There was a lack of grip, and opera
tional direction and control was lacking. Our operations had, in fact,
become ragged and disjointed, and we had now got ourselves into a
real mess. Marshall listened, but said little. It was clear that he entirely
disagreed.

Later in the month, when I had settled future plans with Dempsey,
I moved into Brussels and joined up with my Main H.Q, At Brussels
I was better placed to exercise personal direction of the operations to
open up the approaches to Antwerp, which was the task of First

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 255

Canadian Army under Simonds. Crerar had been evacuated sick to
England.
On the 3rd November I informed Eisenhower:

"I have to report to you that the approaches to Antwerp and the
Scheldt estuary are now completely free from enemy interference.
Our troops on Walcheren are now in possession of the coast from
Domburg to West Kapelle and round to the east of Flushing the
whole of which town is in our hands and we have captured all
enemy coastal positions and guns. Our minesweepers are now at
work in the estuary and some have reached Terneuzen. We own
the whole of North Beveland and South Beveland. There are still
some enemy remaining on the northern and north-eastern parts
of Walcheren Island but these cannot interfere with shipping in
the estuary and they are being mopped up. All enemy resistance
on the mainland south of Walcheren and in the Knocke area has
now ceased and we have captured 14,000 prisoners in this area
since crossing the Leopold Canal. The full and free use of the port
of Antwerp is now entirely a naval matter.**

The reply came:

"Dear Monty: The capture of the Antwerp approaches will have
the utmost significance for us and I am profoundly grateful to you
personally for the energy you put into this matter. Will you please
convey to the Commanding General of the Canadians my thanks
and congratulations. (Signed) Dee.**

The proper development of allied strategy north of the Seine will
become one of the great controversies of military history. In the end
it was the Germans who benefited from the argument. At the time,
I was, and I remain, of the opinion that in September 1944 we failed
to exploit fully the German disorganisation consequent on their crush
ing defeat in the Battle of Normandy in August The quickest way to
end the German war was not merely to have the free use of Antwerp,
as some have alleged. It was to act quickly in the middle of August,
using the success gained in Normandy as a spring-board for a hard
blow which would finish off the Germans and at the same time give
us the ports we needed on the northern flank. To do these things we
had to have a plan and concentration of effort; we had neither. I am
still firmly convinced that had we adopted a proper operational plan
in the middle of August, and given it a sound administrative and
logistic backing, we should have secured bridgeheads over the Rhine
and seized the Ruhr before the winter set in. The whole affair if
properly handled would not only have shortened the war; it would
also have held out possibilities of bringing it to an end in Europe with

256 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

a political balance very much more favourable to an early and stable
peace than that which has actually emerged.

Some have argued that I ignored Eisenhower's orders to give
priority to opening up the port of Antwerp, and that I should not have
attempted the Arnhem operation until this had been done. This is
not true. There were no such orders about Antwerp and Eisenhower
had agreed about Arnhem. Indeed, up to the 8th October 1944 in
clusive my orders were to gain the line of the Rhine "as quickly as
humanly possible/* On the gth October Antwerp was given priority
for the first time— as will be seen from the orders quoted above.

The trouble was that Eisenhower wanted the Saar, the Frankfurt
area, the Ruhr, Antwerp, and the line of the Rhine. I knew how
desperately the Germans had fought in Normandy. To get all these
in one forward movement was impossible. If Eisenhower had adopted
my plan he could at least have got Antwerp and the Ruhr, with
bridgeheads over die Rhine in the north, and would then have been
very well placed. Or if he had adopted Bradley's plan he could have
got the Saar and the Frankfurt area, with bridgeheads over the Rhine
in the centre and south. But he was too optimistic. He compromised.
He failed to get any of his objectives, and was then faced with a
frustrating situation.

I was, of course, greatly disappointed. I had hoped that we might
end the German war quickly, save tens of thousands of lives, and bring
relief to the people of Britain. But it was not to be.

When I think back I am more and more convinced that the argu
ments, and difficulties of understanding, about die strategy after cross
ing the Seine have their origin in terminology. The matter has been
argued under the labels "narrow versus broad front." My plan was
described by Eisenhower as a "pencil-like thrust/' and on another
occasion as a "knife-like drive." But a strong thrust by forty divisions
can hardly be described as "a narrow front"; it would represent a
major blow. I was expounding die doctrine of die single punch against
an enemy who was now weak on his pins. It was on the lines of the
"left hook" of the desert batdes, leading to the knock-out blow; after
all I knew something about diat sort of diing. Once we can disabuse
ourselves of the word "narrow," all sorts of arguments go by the board,
e.g. pencil-like, knife-like and so on.

The dismal and tragic story of events after die successful batBe in
Normandy may be boiled down to one fundamental criticism. It is
this—whatever die decision, it wasn't implemented. In Normandy our
strategy for the land batde, and the plan to achieve it, was simple
and clear-cut The pieces were closely "stitched" together. It was
never allowed to become unstitched; and it succeeded. After Nor
mandy our strategy became unstitched. There was no plan; and we
moved by disconnected jerks.

Allied Strategy North of the Seine 257

The lightness or wrongness of the decision taken is, of course, open
to argument But what cannot be disputed is that when a certain
strategy, right or wrong, was decided upon, it wasn't directed. We
did not advance to the Rhine on a broad front; we advanced to the
Rhine on several fronts, which were un-coordinated. And what was
the German answer? A single and concentrated punch in the Ar
dennes, when we had become unbalanced and unduly extended. So we
were caught on the hop.

On the 6th November I left Brussels for a few days' leave in Eng
land.

It had been a difficult time for us all since we landed in Normandy
on the 6th June, exactly five months earlier. I reckoned that I had
earned a short rest.

On arrival in England I went at once to see the Prime Minister,
to tell him about OUT affairs and also that he must now expect the war
to go on all through the winter and well into 1945.

This is what my autograph book says:

"The Supreme Battle of Normandy carried with it the Liberation
of France. The conquest of Germany remains. Between these two
decisive struggles, the Liberation of Belgium and the opening of
the Scheldt as the main supply channel of the Allies constitutes
a victory of high consequence gained by the 21 Army Group and
its Commander.

Winston S. Churchill
6-11-44"

I returned to my headquarters at Brussels on the loth November.

CHAPTER 16

The Battle of Arnhem

17th to 25th September 1944

IN OUR move forward on the northern flank to secure the Ruhr in
accordance with Eisenhower's orders, we were confronted with
two major river obstacles— the Meuse and the Rhine. Whatever
route we took, there would be additional obstacles in the form of
large canals.

My plan was to drive hard for the Rhine across all these obstacles,
and to seize a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the enemy could
reorganise sufficiently to stop us.

I had been allotted the First Allied Airborne Corps under Lieut-
General Browning. This Corps consisted of: ist British Airborne
Division, 82nd U.S. Airborne Division, loist U.S. Airborne Division,
and the Polish Parachute Brigade. I placed it under the command of
Second Army (Dempsey).

I have already explained that the direction of the thrust would be
towards Arnhem, and why. The essential feature of the plan was the
laying of a "carpet" of airborne forces across the five major water
obstacles which existed on the general axis of the main road through
Eindhoven to Uden, Grave, Nijmegen, and thence to Arnhem.

30 Corps (Horrocks) was to operate along the axis of the "carpet,"
link up with the ist British Airborne Division in the Arnhem area,
and establish a bridgehead over the Neder Rijn north of that place.

Second Army was then to establish itself in the general area between
Arnhem and the Zuider Zee, facing east, so as to be able to develop
operations against the northern flank of the Ruhr. (See Map, No. 43.)

As 30 Corps moved northwards along the axis of the airborne
"carpet," two other corps were to widen the axis of advance— 8 Corps
(O'Connor) on the east and 12 Corps (Ritchie) on the west

258

The Battle of Arnhem 259

The whole operation as I have said already was given the code
name of MARKET GARDEN. It was certainly a bold plan. Indeed, Gen
eral Bradley has described it as "one of the most imaginative of the
war." But the moment he heard about it he tried to get it cancelled,
lest it should open up possibilities on the northern flank and I might
then ask for American troops to be placed under my command to
exploit them. He was an advocate of the double thrust— the Saar and
the Ruhr. So was Patton. Whenever Eisenhower appeared to favour
the Ruhr thrust, Patton used to say he was the best general the British
had.

But Eisenhower believed in Operation MARKET GARDEN. It will be
recalled that he had met me in Brussels for a conference on the loth
September, and had agreed my plans for the operation. On page 307
of his book Crusade in Europe he has described that conference, and
wrote as follows:

*After completion of the bridgehead operation he [Mont
gomery] was to turn instantly and with his whole force to the
capture of Walcheren Island and the other areas from which the
Germans were defending the approaches to Antwerp."

Now this point was not, in fact, ever mentioned at our conference
on the loth September. In my memory his intention was always to
occupy the Saar and the Ruhr and, while advancing to do this, to be
opening the ports of Havre and Antwerp. So far as his orders to me
were concerned he never deviated from this intention. Indeed, his
orders issued on the 8th October were that the plans of both Army
Groups "must retain as first mission the gaming of the line of the
Rhine north of Bonn as quickly as humanly possible," and the word
Antwerp does not appear in those orders. It was not until the gth
October that for the first time he named the free use of Antwerp as
having priority over all other missions.

The orders issued by me on the 14th September are interesting as
showing how I was trying to carry out his intentions. I give them in
full below. Paras. 2, and 10 seem to be especially important.

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE M 525

**i. Now that Havre has been captured, we are in a better posi
tion to be able to proceed with operations designed to lead
to the capture of the Ruhr.

2. We have captured the port of Antwerp, but cannot make use
of it as the enemy controls the mouth of the Scheldt; opera
tions to put this matter right will be a first priority for Cana
dian Army.

3. On our right flank, First U.S. Army has entered Germany and
is in contact with the defences of the Siegfried Line.

260 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

And away to the south, Third U.S. Army has bridgeheads
over the Moselle.

4. Together with 12 Army Group, we will now begin operations
designed to isolate and surround the Ruhr; we will occupy
that area as we may desire.

Our real objective, therefore, is the Ruhr. But on the way to
it we want the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, since the
capture of the Ruhr is merely the first stop on the northern
route of advance into Germany.

INTENTION

5. To destroy all enemy west of the general line Zwolle-Deven-
ter-Cleve-Venlo-Maastricht, with a view to advancing east
wards and occupying the Ruhr*

FOKWAKD BOUNDARY

6. Between 21 Army Group and 12 Army Group.
All inclusive 12 Army Group:

Hasselt-Sittard-Garzweiler-Leverkusen (on the Rhine).
All inclusive 21 Army Group:

Opladen (on the Rhine) -Warburg-Brunswick.

7. This boundary is given only as a general basis on which to
work. The general direction of movement of Second British
Army is northwards, and then eastwards round the northern
face of the Ruhr; the general direction of movement of First
U.S. Army is eastwards round the southern flank of the
Ruhr. The two armies will therefore tend to separate, and
they will have to take special measures to watch their inner
flanks.

FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

8- Complete the capture first of Boulogne, and then of Calais.
9. Dunkirk will be left to be dealt with later; for the present it

will be merely masked.
10. The whole energies of tie Army will be directed towards

operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port

of Antwerp.

Airborne troops are available to co-operate.

Air operations against the island of Walcheren have already

commenced and these include:

(a) the isolation of the island by taking out road and rail
bridges.

(b) attacks on coast defence guns.

(c) attacks on the artillery, including flak.

The Battle of Arahem 261

11. H.Q. i Corps, and 49* DIv., wiU be brought up from the
Havre area as early as possible, to the Antwerp area.

5ist Div. will be grounded completely in the Havre peninsula,
and its transport used to enable the above move to take place;
the division will remain grounded as long as its transport is
required by Canadian Army for maintenance or movement
purposes.

12. Canadian Army will take over the Antwerp area from Second
Army beginning on ijth September.

The boundary between the two armies on completion of this
relief will be as decided by Canadian Army; Second Army to
conform.

13. Having completed the operation for the opening of Antwerp,
vide para. io? Canadian Army will operate northwards on the
general axis Breda-Utrecht-Amsterdam.

Inter-Army boundary, all inclusive Canadian Army:

Herenthals-Turnhout-Tilburg-s'Hertogenbosch-Zaltbommel-
Utrecht-Hilversum.

Task: To destroy all enemy to the west of the Army boundary,

and open up the port of Rotterdam.

14. Subsequently, Canadian Army will be brought up on the left
(or northern flank) of Second Army, and will be directed on
Bremen and Hamburg.

SECOND BRITISH ARMY

15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure
the crossings over the Rhine and Meuse in the general area
Arnhem-Xijmegen-Grave. An airborne corps of three divisions
is placed under command Second Army for these operations.

16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general
line ZwoUe-Deventer-Arnhem, facing east, with deep bridge
heads to the east side of the Ijssel river.

From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to
the general area Rheine-Osnabruck-Hamm-Miinster.
In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed
towards Hamm, from which place a strong thrust will be
made southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr.

17. The thrust northwards to secure the river crossings, vide para.
15, will be rapid and violent, and without regard to what is
happening on the flanks.

Subsequently the Army will take measures to widen the area
of the initial thrust, and to create a secure line of supply.

18. D-Day for these operations is Sunday ijth September. Bad
weather for airborne operations may possibly cause a post
ponement.

262 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

12 ARMY GROUP

19. First U.S. Army is to move eastwards as follows:

(a) 5 Corps directed on Bonn.

(b) 7 Corps directed on Cologne.

(c) 19 Corps carrying out flank protection on the northern
flank of the Army, along the inter-Army Group bound
ary. See para. 7.

20. The Army is to capture Bonn and Cologne, and to establish a
deep bridgehead, some 10 miles in depth, on the east side of
the Rhine.

21. The Army is then to advance eastwards round the south face
of the Ruhr. This operation will be timed so as to be co
ordinated carefully with the move of Second British Army
round the north face of the Ruhr.

There will be very close touch between General Bradley and
myself during these operations.

GENERAL

22. Attention is drawn to para. 15 of M.$23 dated 3-9-44. When
we enter Germany, headquarter leaguers, and unit and sub-
unit areas, will require to be tighter, and special arrangements
will have to be made to prevent spies and gestapo agents get
ting in. Sniping may be a problem, and senior officers must
exercise due care when travelling about their areas.

Once we are in Germany the true form will probably very
quickly be apparent, and we must then adopt measures suit
able to the problem."

Eisenhower's reaction to these orders was immediate. He wrote me
by return a letter to say how completely he agreed. There was no
need for him to have done this. But it shows the wonderful humanity
of the man. He obviously thought I would value such a letter, know
ing what a lot of argument we had had over the past few weeks—
and I did value it. This is what he said:

16 September, 1944
**Dear Monty,

Your M. 525 has just arrived here and I must say that it not
only is designed to carry out most effectively my basic conception
with respect to this campaign but is in exact accordance with all
the understandings that we now have.

I sent a senior staff officer to General Bradley yesterday to see
that all of his intentions both with respect to application of his
forces and distribution of his supplies will co-ordinate completely
with this idea. While he had issued a temporary directive on Sep-

The Battle of Arnhem 263

tember 10 that on the surface did not conform clearly to this con
ception of making our principal drive with our left, the actual
fact is that everything he is doing will work out exactly as you
visualize it.

I believe the enemy is capable of only one more, all-out de
fensive battle in the West His major forces will, I feel, try to
cover the Ruhr. When our present pushing and thrusting has
forced him to his stand we shall close on him rapidly. It is my
concern so to shape our operations that we are concentrating for
that purpose, and by concentrating I include all troops and sup
plies that can be efficiently employed in the battle. So Bradley's
left is striking hard to support you; Third Army is pushing north
to support Hodges; and Sixth Army Group is being pushed up
to give right flank support to the whole.

I hear that our frantic efforts to scratch together ad hoc truck
companies to deliver you 500 tons a day did not get the supplies
flowing on September 15. However, I am assured that the first
batch will arrive there tomorrow morning, September 17.

My new headquarters will open at Versailles on Wednesday
morning. Personally I will be there only a few days and am going
forward wherever I can locate a really good landing ground some
where in the Compiegne-Reims area. I will give you the exact
location later.

Best of luck.

Sincerely

(Signed) D wight D. Eisenhower
A copy of this will go to Bradley,"

It will be noted that I instructed my subordinate commanders to
be careful about their security arrangements and personal safety when
we entered Germany. A copy of my orders was taken back to the War
Office by an officer who had come over to see me. They produced the
following telegram, by return:

"Personal jar P.M. Montgomery from V.C.I.G.S.*

Have just read your M-525. Reference para. 22 hope you realise
that you yourself have conspicuous appearance and dress and are
therefore obvious target for the enemy.

Little doubt that definite and concerted efforts will be made by
desperate men to kill you.

It is therefore your duty to put aside your feelings and take most
stringent and thorough steps for your personal safety. You can no
longer afford to be casual in these matters.

Please regard this message not as a suggestion but as a definite
order from C.I.G.S."
* Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

264 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Operation MABKET GAKDEN was duly launched on the i/th Sep
tember 1944. It has been described by many writers. Probably the best
and most complete account is that by Chester Wilmot in The Struggle
for Europe. I will not go over it aU again. We did not, as everyone
knows, capture that find bridgehead north of Arnhem. As a result we
could not position the Second Army north of the Neder Rijn at Arahem,
and thus place it in a suitable position to be able to develop operations
against the north face of the Ruhr. But the possession of die crossings
over the Meuse at Grave, and over the Lower Rhine (or Waal as it is
called in Holland) at Nijmegen, were to prove of immense value later
on; we had liberated a large part of Holland; we had the stepping
stone we needed for the successful battles of the Rhineland that were
to follow. Without these successes we would not have been able to
cross the Rhine in strength in March 1945— but we did not get our
final bridgehead, and that must be admitted.

The following signal was received from the ist Airborne Division
at Arnhem on the night of the 24th September:

"Must warn you unless physical contact is made with us early
25 Sep. consider it unlikely we can hold out long enough. All
ranks now exhausted. Lack of rations, water, ammunition, and
weapons with high officer casualty rate. . . . Even slight enemy
offensive action may cause complete disintegration. If this hap
pens all will be ordered to break towards bridgehead if anything
rather than surrender. Any movement at present in face of enemy
is not possible. Have attempted our best and will do so as long
as possible."

We could not make contact with them in sufficient strength to be
of any real help, and I gave orders that the remnants of the division
were to be withdrawn back over the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, and into
our lines, on the night of the 25th September. Some 2000 wounded
who were unable to be moved were left behind with doctors and
nursing orderlies, and these were taken prisoner by the Germans.

Of the senior officers in the division we got back only the Divisional
Commander (Urquhart), one Brigadier (Hicks) and the C.R.A.
(Loder-Symonds). All the battalion commanders were lost, except
one,

Of the other officers, and men, we recovered: 125 officers, 400
glider pilots, 1700 N.C.O.S and men. I sent them all back to England
at once.

General Urquhart came to stay with me at my Tac Headquarters
before returning to England. He asked me to give him a letter which he
could read out to the division when it re-assembled in England. I
gave him the following, dated the 28th September 1944:

The Battle of Arnhem

**i. I want to express to you personally, and to every officer and
man in your division, my appreciation o£ what you all did at
Arnhem for the Allied cause.

I also want to express to you my own admiration, and the
admiration of us all in 21 Army Group, for the magnificent
fighting spirit that your division displayed in battle against
great odds on the north bank of the Lower EJbine in Holland.

2. There is no shadow of doubt that, had you failed, operations
elsewhere would have been gravely compromised. You did
not fail, and all is well elsewhere.

I would like all Britain to know that in your final message
from the Arnhem area you said: 'All will be ordered to break
out rather than surrender. We have attempted our best, and
we will continue to do our best as long as possible.* And all
Britain will say to you: Ifou did your best; you all did your
duty; and we are proud of you/

3. In the annals of the British Army there are many glorious
deeds. In our Army we have always drawn great strength and
inspiration from past traditions, and endeavoured to live up
to the high standards of those who have gone before.

But there can be few episodes more glorious than the epic of
Arnhem, and those that follow after will find it hard to live
up to the standards that you have set.

4. So long as we have in the armies of the British Empire officers
and men who will do as you have done, then we can indeed
look forward with complete confidence to the future.

In years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able
to say: 1 fought at Arnhem/

5. Please give my best wishes, and my grateful thanks, to every
officer and man in your division."

There were many reasons why we did not gain complete success
at Arnhem. The following in my view were the main ones.

First. The operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters as
the spearhead of a major Allied movement on the northern flank
designed to isolate, and finally to occupy, the Ruhr— the one objective
in the West which the Germans could not afford to lose. There is no
doubt in my mind that Eisenhower always wanted to give priority
to the northern thrust and to scale down the southern one. He ordered
this to be done, and he thought that it was being done. It was not
being done. We now know from Bradley's book (A Soldiers Story),
page 412, that in the middle of September, there was parity of logistic
resources between the First and Third American Armies in 12 Army
Group.

266 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Eisenhower is a thoroughly genuine person; he is the very incar
nation of sincerity and he trusts others to do as he asks. But in this
instance his intentions were not carried out. The following quotation
from page 531 of The Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot is of
interest:

"If he [Eisenhower] had kept Patton halted on the Meuse, and
had given full logistic support to Hodges and Dempsey after the
capture of Brussels, the operations in Holland could have been an
overwhelming triumph, for First U.S. Army could have mounted
a formidable diversion, if not a successful offensive, at Aachen,
and Second British Army could have attacked sooner, on a wider
front and in much greater strength.**

Second. The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away
from the vital objective— the bridge. It was some hours before they
reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered
Second Army and i Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one
complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge,
so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and
its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so.

Third. The weather. This turned against us after the first day and
we could not carry out much of the later airborne programme. But
weather is always an uncertain factor, in war and in peace. This
uncertainty we all accepted. It could only have been offset, and the
operation made a certainty, by allotting additional resources to the
project, so that it became an Allied and not merely a British project.

Fourth. The 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem
area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew
it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight
effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was
quickly brought into action against the ist Airborne Division.

As after Normandy, so again after Arnhem, I was bitterly disap
pointed. It was my second attempt to try to capture the Ruhr quickly.
Bill Williams used to tell me that the Germans could not carry on the
war for more than about three months after they lost the Ruhr. But
we still hadn't got it

And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part— I underestimated
the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we
could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army
could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.

I will close this chapter with a final quotation on the battle from
Chester Wilmot (The Struggle for Europe, page 528). This what he
wrote about it:

"It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the
Allied High Command-the British caution about casualties and

The Battle of Arnhem 267

the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted
their baneful influence on this operation, which should, and could,
have been the decisive blow of the campaign in the West. This
was no time to count the cost, or to consider the prestige of rival
commanders. The prize at issue was no less than the chance of
capturing the Ruhr and ending the war quickly with all that
meant for the future of Europe.**

In my— prejudiced— view, if the operation had been properly backed
from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and admin
istrative resources necessary for the job— it would have succeeded
in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of
the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MAJRKET
GARDEN'S unrepentant advocate.

CHAPTER 17

Prelude to the Ardennes

THE BATTLE of the Ardennes, which began on the i6th December
1944 and continued to the i6th January 1945, has aroused such
bitter feelings between Britons and Americans that I cannot dis
regard it But I think we must first describe the events which led up
to it, since this examination will show that the battle could so easily
have been avoided.

On the 28th November Eisenhower came to stay a night with me
at my Tac Headquarters at Zonhoven. We had long talks that night
and die nest morning, in the course o£ which we discussed the situation
in which we found ourselves at that time— which, to say the least of it,
was far from good.

The war of attrition in the winter months, forced on us by our
faulty strategy after the great victory in Normandy,, was becoming
very expensive in human life. In the American armies there was a
grave shortage of ammunition. The rifle platoons in all divisions were
under strength and the reinforcement situation was bad. American
divisions in the line began to suffer severely from trench-foot as the
winter descended on us. In my own Army Group I was concerned
about the growing casualties. I give below the cumulative casualties,
by divisions, from the 6th June or date of arrival in the theatre, up to
the ist October:

Formation Casualties

11 Armd Div 3,825

Guards Armd Div 3?38s

7 Armd Div 2,801

3 Brit Inf Div 7,342

15 Inf Div 7,601

268

Prelude to the Ardennes 269

Formation Casualties

43 Inf Div 7,605

49 Inf Div 5,894

50 Inf Div 6,701

51 Inf Div 4,799
53 Inf Div 4,984
59 Inf Div 4,911

2 Cdn Inf Div* 8,211

3 Cdn Inf Div 9,263

4 Cdn Armd Div** 3,135
Polish 1,861

During my talk with Eisenhower I gave it as my opinion that
Bradley's 12 Army Group did not look to me to be very well "balanced,"
tactically. I suggested that to restore tactical balance some of Patton's
divisions should be moved up to the north, and that his offensive in
the south should be cancelled. These views were passed on to Bradley
and on the 3rd December he wrote me a letter to the effect that he
could not do this, giving his reasons. This letter is important in view
of what was to happen later, and I give below the relevant extracts
from it.

EXTRACT OF LETTER FROM GENERAL BRADLEY

"Ike told me of his recent conference with you and I am glad
that we are going to have a chance to get together later this week
to discuss future operations.

I thought you might like to have a few facts about our present
situation and our prospects for the future.

The question of whether I should transfer some of Patton's
divisions to the north was given careful consideration prior to our
recent jump-off. He had only six infantry divisions and he held a
front line of over seventy miles, and this front included the con
taining of the fortress of Metz. I felt that even though he remained
on the defensive I could not take away more than one infantry
division, or at the outside two, without too much weakening his
front. This would have left him in a position where he would be
unable to launch any offensive and thus co-operate with the Sixth
Army Group on the south. I therefore decided not to take any
divisions away from him so that he could launch an attack in
conjunction with Devers, with the hope of cleaning up Lorraine
and, if possible, the Saar. As of midnight November 30 he had
taken over 25,500 prisoners, and the total losses of the enemy for
this period of time must have been much greater.

Because of our inability to receive, equip, and supply troops

* Canadian Infantry Division,
*tt Canadian Armoured Division.

270 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

through our Channel ports, it has been necessary to divert seven
divisions to Devers* Army Group. Naturally we wanted to get
as much use out of these divisions as possible, and the attack of
the Sixth Army Group, in conjunction with Patton's attack, has so
far achieved very satisfactory results. I believe that between the
Seventh Army and the Third Army this very important attack can
be kept up."

I reminded Eisenhower that, overall, we had so far failed to carry
out the plan laid down in his directive of the 28th October, i.e. to
secure the Ruhr and the Saar. We now needed a new plan.

Before he left me on the 2Qth November, I suggested to him that
what was now indicated was a meeting between himself, Tedder,
Bradley, and myself; we could then all give our views and he could
give us his plan for the next phase. He agreed; he fixed the confer
ence for the 7th December, at Maastricht. We all four met there at
10.30 a.m. on the 7th December.

The following is the record of the conference I made in my diaiy
that night

THE MAASTRICHT CONFERENCE
EISENHOWER'S OPENING REMARKS

"He reviewed the past from about early Sept. onwards.

He then made the point that the recent operations had been
well worth while, and were going well.

One gained the impression that this part of his statement was
not very genuine, and that he was trying hard to put up a good
case to off-set what he knew I was going to say.

He finished by saying that the purpose of the meeting was to
air our views, and to give him ideas which he could think over.
He said he did not propose to issue any definite orders before we
dispersed; if any further orders were needed, they were to be
issued later.

He then asked me to give my views on the problem confronting
us.

THE CASE PUT FORWARD BY ME

I said that in order to win the war quickly there were two main
factors which must influence the solution to the problem:
First: The only real worth-while objective on the western front
is the Ruhr. If we cut it off from the rest of Germany the
enemy capacity to continue the struggle must gradually
peter out.

Second: It is essential that we force mobile war on the Germans
by the spring or early summer. They have little transport,
little petrol, and tanks that cannot compete with ours in

Prelude to the Ardennes 271

the mobile battle. Once the war becomes mobile, that is

the end of the Germans.

These two factors are basic and fundamental It is impossible to
argue against them.
It follows:

(a) that the Ruhr must be our strategic objective.

(b) that our main effort must be made in the north as it is
there, and only there, that suitable country exists for a
mobile campaign, i.e. to the north of the Ruhr.

Any other routes into Germany will produce no results as the
country is difficult and very suited for defensive war; to pursue
other routes will merely prolong the war; it is the static defensive
battle that suits the enemy.

We must be so strong in the north that we can produce decisive
results without any possibility of failure.

We were at present working on the plan contained in his direc
tive of the 28th Oct. That plan had failed to mature.

We require now a new plan, and the successive stages in this
plan must be objectives towards attainment of the master plan.

The new 'master plan* must cater for continuing the battle all
through the winter months so as to wear down the enemy's
strength. There will be difficulties caused by mud and by lack of
air support, but we must continue throughout the winter to con
duct any operations which:

(a) gain intermediate objectives towards the Ruhr;

(b) wear down the enemy's strength at a greater rate than our
own;

(c) place us in a good jumping-off position for a mobile cam
paign in the spring.

A highly important factor in the winter operations will be to
draw into the battle, and to defeat decisively, the enemy 6 Pz.
Army. This is his only strategic reserve on the western front, and
it contains the only divisions which could make any show at all in
a mobile campaign. These divisions must therefore be so mauled
during the winter months that they are out-of-action when spring
arrives.

The Germans will fight hard to keep us from the Ruhr, and to
keep the war static. At all costs they must stop the war from
becoming mobile.

So there will be no difficulty in bringing them to battle west of
the Rhine.

THE PLAN PUT FORWARD BY ME

12 and 21 Army Groups both to operate north of the Ardennes.
The right flank of 12 Army Group to be about Prum. A strong

272 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

thrust on the axis Prum-Bonn would have good country for opera
tions and would avoid existing defence lines and obstacles.

12 Army Group to operate towards the Rhine on two main
axes: Prum-Bonn, Duren-Cologne.

The left Army of at least ten divisions to operate northwards to
wards the thrust of 21 Army Group coming southwards between
the rivers Meuse and Rhine.

12 Army Group to be made up to a strength of some thirty-five
divisions.

21 Army Group to re-group and launch a strong offensive from
the Nijmegen area, southwards between the rivers, with the
object of securing all ground between the Rhine and Meuse as
far south as the line Orsoy-Venlo.

This would be the only offensive action on the front of 21 Army
Group; everything would be put into it; it would continue slowly
during the winter months. Target date: ist January.

21 Army Group, reinforced by American divisions as necessary
and by airborne divisions, to cross the Rhine at selected places
between Wesel and NijmegeiL Then to develop mobile operations
north of the Lippe canal and river, designed to outflank the Ruhr
from the north and to penetrate into Germany. This might happen
in March 1945.

12 Army Group to cross the Rhine in the Bonn area and
develop outflanking operations against the Ruhr from the south.

6 Army Group, based on Marseilles, to continue operations in
the Saar as far as its strength and resources will allow.

I said that it was difficult at this stage to say exactly how the
operations outlined above would develop.

The two Army Groups north of the Ardennes, 12 and 21, must
first advance to battle west of the Rhine, draw in on them all the
German strategic reserves and maul them, and then close up
to the Rhine. The rest could not be decided in detail at this
stage.

But I considered that one commander should be in operational
control and direction of all forces north of the Ardennes. That
commander must either be myself or Bradley. I would willingly
serve under Bradley.

EISENHOWER ODMMENTS ON* MT BEMABKS

He said that we must not put too much stress on the Ruhr; it
was merely a geographical objective; our real objective was to
kill Germans and it did not matter where we did it.

I disagreed with this and said we would find more Germans to
kill if we went for the Ruhr than anywhere else; we should also
at the same time be gaining objectives towards the capture or

Prelude to the Ardennes 273

isolation of the Ruhr and towards the attainment o£ the master
plan.

He said he agreed that the left wing of 12 Army Group must
certainly be made strong enough to get to the Rhine.

But he did not agree that we should shift the whole of 112 Army
Group to the north of Prum.

He said that he considered the right wing of 12 Army Group
should be strong, and should advance to the Rhine at about
Worms, and should then develop a strong thrust on the axis
Frankfurt-KasseL

This was a new one on me.

He said his general conception of the campaign was as follows:

(a) In the north should be 21 Army Group with Ninth U.S.
Army of ten divisions under command.

The southern boundary of 21 Army Group should be on
the Rhine about Orsoy, at the N.W. corner of the Ruhr.
The task of this force would be to cross the Rhine and
outflank the Ruhr from the North.

(b) The left wing of 12 Army Group would be a containing
force, not to cross the Rhine in strength, but to make feints
and threats in the Cologne-Bonn area and south of it. In
other words, no strong thrust here.

(c) On the southern flank, the right wing of 12 Army Group
should develop a strong thrust on the axis Franldrurt-Kassel.

(d) The general pattern of thfg plan is two offensives: one
round the north of the Ruhr vide (a), and one away in the
south vide (c). In between these two thrusts will be threats
and feints.

12 Army Group would stretch from Orsoy— astride the
Ardennes to Worms.

MY COMMENTS ON EISENHOWER'S PLAN

Eisenhower asked me what I thought of his plan, and said he
thought it differed from my ideas only very slightly.

I said that we must be clear that we differed, not slightly, but
widely and on fundamental issues.

I said I was quite unable to agree with his plan. If we split our
resources, neither thrust would be strong enough to obtain decisive
results; this is what we had done in the past, and we were now
paying for our mistakes; I hoped we would not do it again.

I said that we suffered at present from a faulty command set-up;
his plan made it no better. In fact it would make it worse.

Bradley would obviously stay at Luxembourg in the south, for
the Frankfurt thrust. I had moved my Tac H.Q. to Zorihoven so
as to be near Bradley; but he had never come north.

274 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I should now have to move up north of Eindhoven so as to be
near my own offensive.

I pleaded again for myself to take charge north of the Ardennes,
and Bradley south of the Ardennes. On his plan I would have
the northern offensive, and Bradley the southern or Frankfurt
offensive.

As things were now going to be, Bradley would be concerned
in both offensives and there would be much waste of time when
a quick decision was wanted.

I finished up with a strong plea for the concentration of all
available strength in the north, and for making the northern
offensive so strong that success was certain.

I also put in a strong plea for a sound set-up for command.

I gave it as my opinion that, unless we did these two things,
we would not succeed, and we would arrive at the spring not
ready to get on with the business.

Eisenhower did not agree with my views. He considered the
way to win the war was to have two strong thrusts:

(a) one round the north of the Ruhr,

(b) one on the axis Frankfurt-KasseL

In between these two thrusts the plan would be to threaten,
and make feints.

It is clear that, although the present plan has failed, we are still
to continue to consider it has not failed and are to work on it.9*

And so we really achieved nothing at the Maastricht conference on
the 7th December. I had hoped to get agreement that we would shift
our main weight towards the north. I then wanted the activities of
12 and 21 Army Groups to be directed against the Ruhr, and to the
task of imposing mobile war on the enemy in the north German plain
in the early spring. But no decision was given.

Meanwhile Bradley's 12 Army Group was disposed in two main
concentrations, each deployed for attack. In between was a gap of
some 100 miles, held by 8 American Corps of four divisions— under
Middletom

CHAPTER 18

The Battle of the Ardennes

16th December 1944 to 16th January 1945

ON THE morning of the i6tli December I felt in need of relaxation.
So I decided to fly up to Eindhoven in my Miles light aircraft,
land on one of the fairways of the golf course, and play a few
holes of golf. The H.Q. of the Air Force Group supporting Second
Army was in the Club House, and Dai Rees the well-known golf
professional was there as driver of the AOC.S car. I knew Rees very
well and we were great friends; we had been through the desert
together. His civil job was professional at Hindhead Golf Club and he
used to give lessons to my son David when the war was over, and
before he moved to South Herts. He is a most likeable character. I
did not realise then that he was to become the best match player in
theUJL

I asked if Rees could meet me when I landed with a club or two.
AH was arranged satisfactorily and we began to play. But our game
was soon interrupted by a message to say that the Germans had
launched a heavy attack that morning on the front of the First Amer
ican Army, and the situation was obscure. I said good-bye to Rees and
flew straight back to my Tac Headquarters at Zonhoven.

The blow had fallen mainly on the part of the First Army front
that was thinly held by 8 Corps under Middleton in the Ardennes.,
and a great "bulge9* or salient was being made in the American line.

I think the less one says about this battle the better, for I fancy that
whatever I do say will almost certainly be resented. All those with
whom I was associated during the battle have now retired— Bradley,
Hodges, Simpson, Ridgway, Collins, and Gerow. And Patton is dead.
So I will just mention the highlights as they appeared to me at the
time.

275

276 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

The situation deteriorated rapidly and finally Bradley's 12 Army
Group was split in two. His headquarters were at Luxembourg, whence
he could not control the northern half of his Army Group. I kept in
close touch with the situation by means of my team of Liaison Officers.
And I took steps to ensure that the right flank and right rear of 21
Army Group would be secure, whatever might happen.

At 10.30 a.m. on the 2oth December Eisenhower telephoned me
from his headquarters and ordered me to take command at once of
all American forces on the northern flank of the bulge. That order put
two American armies under my command: Ninth Army (Simpson)
on my immediate right, First Army (Hodges) to the right of Ninth
Army.

The First Army was fighting desperately.

Having given orders to Dempsey and Crerar, who arrived for a
conference at 11 a.m., I left at noon for the H.Q. of the First Army,
where I had instructed Simpson to meet me. I found the northern
flank of the bulge was very disorganised. Ninth Army had two corps
and three divisions; First Army had three corps and fifteen divisions.
Neither Army Commander had seen Bradley or any senior member
of his staff since the battle began, and they had no directive on which
to work.

The first thing to do was to see the battle on the northern flank as
one whole, to ensure the vital areas were held securely, and to create
reserves for counter-attack. ( See Map, No. 45. )

I embarked on these measures.

I put British troops under command of the Ninth Army to fight
alongside American soldiers, and made that Army take over some of
the First Army front. I positioned British troops as reserves behind the
First and Ninth Armies until such time as American reserves could be
created. Slowly but surely the situation was held, and then finally
restored. Similar action was taken on the southern flank of the bulge
by Bradley, with the Third Army.

I must mention a joke on my part which was not considered funny
in Whitehall. The War Office were very naturally worried and I sent
a telegram to the C.I.G.S. giving the whole story of what happened
and telling him what I was doing about it. The last sentence read:
"We cannot come out through Dunkirk this time as the Germans still
hold that placed

My telegram was sent on to the Prime Minister but with the last
sentence cut out!

The battle may be said to have ended in the middle of January.
On the 14th January I sent the following letter to General Bradley.

"My dear Brad,
It does seem as if the battle of the 'salient* will shortly be

The Battle of the Ardennes 277

drawing to a close, and when it is all clean and tidy I imagine that
your armies will be returning to your operational command.
I would like to say two things:
First : What a great honour it has been for me to command

such fine troops.
Second; How well they have all done.

2. It has been a great pleasure to work with Hodges and Simp
son; both have done very well.

And the Corps Commanders in the First Army (Gerow,
Collins, Ridgway) have been quite magnificent; it must be
most exceptional to find such a good lot of Corps Commanders
gathered together in one Army.

3. All of us in the northern side of the salient would like to say
how much we have admired the operations that have been
conducted on the southern side; if you had not held on firmly
to Bastogne the whole situation might have become very awk
ward.

4. My kind regards to you and to George Patton.

Yrs very sincerely,

(Signed) B. L. Montgomery"

On the i6th January I regarded the battle as over. Eisenhower had
ordered me to return the First Army to Bradley on the ijth January,
the Ninth Army to remain under my command. I sent the following
message to Eisenhower on the i6th January:

"I have great pleasure in reporting to you that the task you
gave me in the Ardennes is now concluded. First and Third Armies
have joined hands at HouflFaHze and are advancing eastwards. It
can therefore be said that we have now achieved tactical victory
within the salient. I am returning First Army to Bradley tomorrow
as ordered by you. I would like to say what a great pleasure it
has been to have such a splendid army under my command and
how very well it has done."

Eisenhower answered this telegram with a letter dated the 17th
January in which he said:

"Thank you again for the way you pitched in to help out during
the German thrust. Some day I hope I can show my appreciation
in a more lasting manner."

There is one characteristic story about General Horrocks and his
30 Corps at this period which I often recall I had ordered Second
Army to position 30 Corps behind the Meuse in the general area
between Louvain and Namur. Its role was to prevent any German
units crossing the Meuse. I went to see Horrocks in order to make

278 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

certain he was clear about his orders. He was full of enthusiasm, as
always, and had great ideas that he would let the Germans over the
river and then win the final battle of the war on the field of Waterloo
which was not far away! I told Dempsey that on no account was
Horrocks to allow any Germans over the river.

I should also mention that on the ist January the Germans carried
out large-scale attacks on our airfields in Holland and Belgium. My
aircraft, the Dakota given me by Eisenhower in Sicily in August 1943
in exchange for the Flying Fortress, was shot to pieces. He replaced
it at once and I was so touched that I sent him the following message
on the 6th January:

"M 424 Personal for Eisenhower from Montgomery.

My dear Ike, Have received the new 0/47 you have so kindly
lent me and I understand you have sent me one that was intended
for yourself. Such spontaneous kindness touches me deeply and
from my heart I send you my grateful thanks. If there is anything
I can ever do for you to ease the tremendous burden that you
bear you know you have only to command me. And I want you
to know that I shall always stand firmly behind you in everything
you do."

I will conclude this chapter with an account of the Press conference
I held on the yth January about the battle. I was perturbed at this
time about the sniping at Eisenhower which was going on in the
British press. So I sent a message to the Prime Minister and said that
in my talk to British and American correspondents about the battle I
proposed to deal with the story of the battle. I would show how the
whole Allied team rallied to the call and how team-work saved a
somewhat awkward situation. I suggested I should then put in a strong
plea for Allied solidarity. Nothing must be done by anyone that tends
to break down the team spirit. It is team-work that pulls you through
dangerous times. It is team-work that wins battles. It is victories in
battle that win wars.

The Prime Minister agreed and said he thought what I proposed
would be invaluable.

I held the conference. Many stories have been told about it, and
many quotations have been taken out of their context and published.
Nobody has ever published the full text of the notes from which I
spoke and which were given to the Press afterwards. Here they
are:

*i. Object of this talk

I have asked you to come here today so that I can give you
some information which may be of use to you, and also to
ask you to help me in a certain matter.

The Battle of the Ardennes 279

2. Tfie story of the present battle

Rundstedt attacked on 16 Dec; he obtained tactical surprise.
He drove a deep wedge into the centre of the First US Army
and split the American forces in two. The situation looked
as if it might become awkward; the Germans had broken
right through a weak spot, and were heading for the Meuse.

3. As soon as I saw what was happening I took certain steps
myself to ensure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they
would certainly not get over that river. And I carried out
certain movements so as to provide balanced dispositions to
meet the threatened danger; these were, at the time, merely
precautions, i.e., I was thinking ahead.

4. Then the situation began to deteriorate. But the whole allied
team rallied to meet the danger; national considerations
were thrown overboard; General Eisenhower placed me in
command of the whole Northern front.

I employed the whole available power of the British Group
of Armies; this power was brought into play very gradually
and in such a way that it would not interfere with the
American lines of communication. Finally it was put into
battle with a bang, and today British divisions are fighting
hard on the right flank of First US Army.
You have thus the picture of British troops fighting on both
sides of American forces who have suffered a hard blow.
This is a fine allied picture.

5. The battle has been most interesting; I think possibly one of
the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled,
with great issues at stake. The first thing to be done was to
laead off the enemy from the tender spots and vital places.
Having done that successfully, the next thing was to 'see him
off,* i.e. rope him in and make quite certain that he could
not get to the places he wanted, and also that he was slowly
but surely removed away from those places.

He was therefore ^headed off,* and then *seen off/

He is now being 'written off/ and heavy toll is being taken

of his divisions by ground and air action. You must not

imagine that the battle is over yet; it is by no means over

and a great deal still remains to be done.

The battle has some similarity to the battle that began on

31 Aug 1942 when Rommel made his last bid to capture Egypt

and was *seen off7 by the Eighth Army. But actually all battles

are different because the problem is different,

6. What was Rundstedt trying to achieve? No one can tell for
certain.

The only guide we have is the message he issued to his

280 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

soldiers before the battle began; he told them it was the last

great effort to try and win the war, that everything depended

on it; that they must go 'all out.'

On the map you see his gains; that will not win the war; he

is likely slowly but surely to lose it all; he must have scraped

together every reserve he could lay his hands on for this job,

and he has not achieved a great deal.

One must admit that he had dealt us a sharp blow and he sent

us reeling back; but we recovered; he has been unable to

gain any great advantage from his initial success.

He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose, unless the

prize was smaller than his men were told.

He has now turned to the defensive on the ground; and he

is faced by forces properly balanced to utilise the initiative

which he has lost.

Another reason for his failure is that his air force, although

still capable of pulling a fast one, cannot protect his army;

for that army our Tactical Air Forces are the greatest terror,

7. But when all is said and done I shall always feel that Rund-
stedt was really beaten by the good fighting qualities of the
American soldier and by the team-work of the Allies.

I would like to say a word about these two points.

8. I first saw the American soldier in battle in Sicily, and I
formed then a very high opinion of him. I saw him again in
Italy.

And I have seen a very great deal of him in this campaign.
I want to take this opportunity to pay a public tribute to
him.

He is a brave fighting man, steady under fire, and with that
tenacity in battle which stamps the first class soldier; all these
qualities have been shown in a marked degree during the
present battle.

I have spent my military career with the British soldier and
I have come to love him with a great love; and I have now
formed a very great affection and admiration for the American
soldier. I salute the brave fighting men of America; I never
want to fight alongside better soldiers. Just now I am seeing
a great deal of the American soldiers; I have tried to feel that
I am almost an American soldier myself so that I might take
no unsuitable action or offend them in any way.
I have been given an American identity card; I am thus
identified in the Army of the United States, my finger prints
have been registered in the War Department at Washington
—which is far preferable to having them registered at Scotland
Yard!

The Battle of the Ardennes 281

g. And now I come to the last point.

It is team-work that pulls you through dangerous times; it
is team-work that wins battles; it is victories in battle that
win wars. I want to put in a strong plea for Allied solidarity
at this vital stage of the war; and you can all help in this
greatly.

Nothing must be done by anyone that tends to break down
the team spirit of our Allied team; if you try and 'get at* the
captain of the team you are liable to induce a loss of con
fidence, and this may spread and have disastrous results. I
would say that anyone who tries to break up the team spirit
of the Allies is definitely helping the enemy.
10. Let me tell you that the captain of our team is Eisenhower.
I am absolutely devoted to Ike; we are the greatest of friends.
It grieves me when I see uncomplimentary articles about him
in the British Press; he bears a great burden, he needs our
fullest support, he has a right to expect it, and it is up to all
of us to see that he gets it.

And so I would ask all of you to lend a hand to stop that sort
of thing; let us all rally round the captain of the team and
so help to win the match.

Nobody objects to healthy and constructive criticism; it is
good for us.

But let us have done with destructive criticism that aims a
blow at Allied solidarity, that tends to break up our team
spirit, and that therefore helps the enemy.**

Not only was it probably a mistake to have held this conference at
all in the sensitive state of feeling at the time, but what I said was
skilfully distorted by the enemy. Chester Wilmot (The Struggle for
Europe, page 611) has explained that his dispatch to the B.B.C. about
it was intercepted by the German wireless, "re-written to give it an
anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was
then in Goebbels* hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast
was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text
that started the uproar.**

Distorted or not, I think now that I should never have held that
Press conference. So great was the feeling against me on the part of
the American generals, that whatever I said was bound to be wrong,
I should therefore have said nothing. Secondly, whatever I said (and
I was misreported) the general impression I gave was one of tremen
dous confidence. In contradistinction to the rather crestfallen American
command, I appeared, to the sensitive, to be triumphant— not over the
Germans but over the Americans. This was a completely false picture.
But I had also described the battle as "interesting." Those who did not

282 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

know me well could hardly be expected to share my professional
interest in the art of war and were, not unnaturally, aggrieved by
this phraseology; they were too sore to find the battle "interesting" as
an objective enterprise. In fact, not only should I not have held the
conference, but I should have been even more careful than I was
trying to be. All of which shows that I should have held my tongue.
The "best laid" Press conferences of "mice and men gang aft agley."
What I did not say was that, in the Battle of the Ardennes, the Allies
got a real "bloody nose/* the Americans had nearly 80,000 casualties,
and that it would never have happened if we had fought the campaign
properly after the great victory in Normandy, or had even ensured
tactical balance in the dispositions of the land forces as the winter
campaign developed. Furthermore, because of this unnecessary battle
we lost some six weeks in time— with all that that entailed in political
consequences as the end of the war drew nearer.

CHAPTER 19

The End of the War in Europe

THE COMMAND PROBLEM

IT WILL be manifest to the reader that from the 1st September 1944
onwards I was not satisfied that we had a satisfactory organisation
for command or operational control I wrote a paper on tie subject
entitled "Notes on Command in Western Europe'* and sent it to Bedell
Smith on the loth October; he showed it to Eisenhower. It will be
remembered that I had given my views on the subject to General
Marshall in no uncertain voice when he visited me at Eindhoven on
the 8th October. My main criticism stemmed from the fact that direct
operational command of land armies in war involved close touch with
subordinate commanders and therefore was a whole-time job; the
commander must be well forward and have a good grip on the battle.
In Normandy I had done this job; now nobody was doing it, and we
were getting into trouble. Having been shown my paper Eisenhower
replied to me direct in a letter dated the isth October. In this letter
he stated that he did not agree that one man could direct the land
battle intelligently on the long front from Switzerland to the North
Sea. It required an overall commander **to adjust the larger boundaries
to tasks commensurate to the several groups operating in the several
areas/* That overall commander must be tie Supreme Commander.
The letter also referred to the question of nationalism, as opposed to
purely military considerations.

It was a difficult time and Eisenhower was faced with the precise
situation which I had outlined to him at our meeting at my Tac Head
quarters on the 23rd August; his strategy, and the lack of any plan,
had led to our present frustrating situation in October. He was clearly
unhappy about the whole affair.

283

284 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I therefore decided to drop the subject of a single command on land
and on the i6th October I sent him the following message:

"Dear Ike, I have received your letter of 13 October. You will
hear no more on the subject of command from me. I have given
you my views and you have given your answer. That ends the
matter and I and all of us up here will weigh in one hundred per
cent to do what you want and we will pull it through without a
doubt. I have given Antwerp top priority in all operations in 21
Army Group and all energies and efforts will be now devoted
towards opening up that place. Your very devoted and loyal
subordinate Monty.**

Eisenhower's reply was immediate and ran as follows:

"Dear Monty, Thank you for your very fine message. Looking
forward very much to seeing you tomorrow. As ever, Ike."

That issue was now closed. What remained was to try and get a
sound plan for the winter campaign that lay ahead— the campaign in
the Rhineland— and to get proper co-ordination of effort throughout
the Allied forces.

During the Battle of the Ardennes the remorseless march of events
had forced Eisenhower to do what I had always suggested; I was
placed in operational command of the left flank of the Allies, with two
American armies under my command. This could not have been
pleasant for my critics at Supreme Headquarters, or for the American
generals who opposed my ideas. It had taken a major crisis to do what
I had been asking for ever since August

On the 28th December Eisenhower visited the northern flank and
I had a long talk with him in his special train at Hasselt The Ardennes
battle was then well in hand and our conversation turned mainly on
what was to be done when it was over. I again gave it as my opinion
that the Ruhr was the immediate objective; all available power must
be concentrated to secure it; operational control of the forces involved
must be exercised by one commander.

The next day, sgth December, I sent Eisenhower the following
letter:

"My dear Ike,

It was very pleasant to see you again yesterday and to have a
talk on the battle situation.

2. I would like to refer to the matter of operational control of all
forces engaged in the northern thrust towards the Ruhr, i.e.
12 and 21 Army Groups.
I think we want to be careful, because we have had one very

The End of the War in Europe 285

definite failure when we tried to produce a formula that would
meet this case; that was the formula produced in SHAEF
FWD 15510 dated 23-9-44, which formula very definitely did
not work.

3. When you and Bradley and myself met at Maastricht on 7
December, it was very clear to me that Bradley opposed any
idea that I should have operational control over his Army
Group; so I did not then pursue the subject.

I therefore consider that it will be necessary for you to be
very firm on the subject, and any loosely worded statement
will be quite useless.

4. I consider that if you merely use the word 'co-ordination/ it
will not work. The person designated by you must have powers
of operational direction and control of the operations that will
follow on your directive*

5. I would say that your directive will assign tasks and objectives
to the two Army Groups, allot boundaries, and so on.

Thereafter preparations are made and battle is joined.

It is then that one commander must have powers to direct
and control the operations; you cannot possibly do it yourself,
and so you would have to nominate someone else.

6. I suggest that your directive should finish with this sentence:

'12 and 21 Army Groups will develop operations in accord
ance with the above instructions.

From now onwards full operational direction, control, and
co-ordination of these operations is vested in the C.-in-C.
21 Army Group, subject to such instructions as may be
issued by the Supreme Commander from time to time/

7. I put this matter up to you again only because I am so anxious
not to have another failure.

I am absolutely convinced that the key to success lies in:

(a) all available offensive power being assigned to the north
ern line of advance to the Ruhr;

(b) a sound set-up for command, and this implies one man
directing and controlling the whole tactical battle on the
northern thrust.

I am certain that if we do not comply with these two basic
conditions, then we will fail again.

8. I would be grateful if you would not mention to Bradley the
point I have referred to in para. 3. I would not like him to
think that I remembered that point and had brought it up.

Yours always, and your very
devoted friend

Monty"

286 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

When Eisenhower got back to his headquarters and had received
my letter, he found waiting for him a telegram from General Marshall
saying that he had seen certain statements and articles in the British
press which were critical of American command. The telegram went
on to say that both the President of the United States and Marshall
himself had complete confidence in him (Eisenhower) and that the
appointment of a British officer to hold operational command or con
trol over Bradley would be entirely unacceptable in America.

I have always been under the impression that Eisenhower did not
know I had been told about Marshall's telegram. That telegram finished
the issue of "operational control'7 as far as I was concerned and I knew
it would be useless to open it again.

My Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand, was at Supreme Head
quarters when Eisenhower returned from his tour and studied my
letter which I have quoted above. They discussed the question at
length.

De Guingand was impressed by how greatly "het up" Eisenhower
was about the whole thing, and he came at once to my Tac Head
quarters to tell me about it. It was from him that I learnt about
Marshall's telegram. I decided at once to "pipe down." I sent Eisen
hower the following message on the 3ist December.

"Dear Ike, I have seen Freddie and understand you are greatly
worried by many considerations in these very difficult days. I
have given you my frank views because I have felt you like this.
I am sure there are many factors which have a bearing quite
beyond anything I realise. Whatever your decision may be you
can rely on me one hundred per cent to make it work and I know
Brad will do the same. Very distressed that my letter may have
upset you and I would ask you to tear it up. Your very devoted
subordinate Monty."

Eisenhower's reply dated the ist January was as follows:

"Dear Monty, I received your very fine telegram this morning.
I truly appreciate the understanding attitude it indicates. With
the earnest hope that the year 1945 will be the most successful for
you of your entire career, as ever Ike."

Meanwhile, Eisenhower had been working on an outline plan of
his own composition. On the 3ist December, the day I had sent him
my message, he wrote me a personal letter in his own handwriting,
which ran as follows:

"Dear Monty,

Enclosed is my outline plan covering operations as far as they
can be foreseen. The immediate thing is to give the enemy in the

The End of the War in Europe 287

salient a good beating, destroying everything we can. Following
upon that, the plan concentrates everything for the destruction of
the enemy north of Pram-Bonn, and gives to you and Bradley
each a specific task. The plan also provides for great strength
north of the Ruhr when the Rhine is crossed. In these principal
features it exactly repeats my intentions as I gave them to you
verbally on the train, on the 28th.

In the matter of command I do not agree that one Army Group
Commander should fight his own battle and give orders to another
Army Group Commander. My plan places a complete U.S. Army
under command of 21 Army Group, something that I consider
militarily necessary, and most assuredly reflects my confidence in
you personally. If these things were not true this decision would,
in itself, be a most difficult one.

You know how greatly IVe appreciated and depended upon
your frank and friendly counsel, but in your latest letter you dis
turb me by predictions of 'failure' unless your exact opinions in
the matter of giving you command over Bradley are met in detail.
I assure you that in this matter I can go no further.

Please read this document carefully and note how definitely I
have planned, after eliminating the salient, to build up the 21
Army Group, give it a major task, and put that task under your
command. Moreover, Bradley will be close by your H.Q.

I know your loyalty as a soldier and your readiness to devote
yourself to assigned tasks. For my part I would deplore the devel
opment of such an unbridgeable group of convictions between us
that we would have to present our differences to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. The confusion and debate that would follow would
certainly damage the goodwill and devotion to a common cause
that have made this Allied Force unique in history.

As ever, your friend,

Ike"

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

31 December, 1944

OUTLINE PLAN

"My outline plan of operations, based on the current situation
and prospects, is as follows:

Basic plan— to destroy enemy forces west of Rhine, north of the

Moselle, and to prepare for crossing the Rhine in force with the

main effort north of the Ruhr. The several tasks are:

a. To reduce the Ardennes salient by immediate attacks from

north and south, with present command arrangements undis-

288 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

turbed until tactical victory within the salient has been assured
and the Third Army and Collins* Corps have joined up for a
drive to the north-east. Bradley then to resume command of
the First U.S. Army. ( Enemy action within the salient indicates
his determination to make this battle an all-out effort with his
mobile forces. Therefore we must be prepared to use everything
consistent with minimum security requirements to accomplish
their destruction.}

b. Thereafter First and Third Armies to drive to north-east on
general line Prum-Bonn, eventually to Rhine.

c. When a is accomplished, 2ist Army Group, with Ninth U.S.
Army under operational command, to resume preparations for
VERITABLE/

d. All priorities in building up strength of U.S. Annies in per
sonnel, material and units, to go to 12th Army Group.

e. The front south of Moselle to be strictly defensive for the
present.

/. I will build up a reserve (including re-fitting divisions) which

will be available to reinforce success,
g. As soon as reduction of Ardennes salient permits, H.Q. i2th

Army Group will move north, in close proximity to 2ist Army

Group H.Q.
h. From now on, any detailed or emergency co-ordination required

along Army Group boundaries in the north will be effected by

the two Army Group commanders with power of decision

vested in C.G,, 21 Army Group.

The one thing that must now be prevented is the stabilization
of the enemy salient with infantry, permitting him opportunity
to use his Panzers at will on any part of the front. We must regain
the initiative, and speed and energy are essential.

At conclusion of the battle for the salient, assignment of Divi
sions to Army Groups and changes in boundaries will be an
nounced.

Dwight D. Eisenhower"

I studied this outline plan. It did all I wanted except in the realm
of operational control, and because of Marshall's telegram that subject
was closed. It put the weight in the north and gave the Ninth American
Army to 21 Army Group. It gave me power of decision in the event
of disagreement with Bradley on the boundary between 12 and 21
Army Groups. In fact, I had been given very nearly all that I had been
asking for since August Better late than never. I obviously could
not ask for more and I sent Eisenhower the following reply on the
and January 1945.

The End of the War in Europe 289

Thank you for your outline plan dated 31 Dec and letter. I sug
gest that tactical victory within the salient is going to take some
little time to achieve and that there will be heavy fighting. Also it
is all bound to get somewhat untidy in that area and I think we
want to be very careful to ensure that the moment for changes in
command is wisely chosen. I also feel that after we have achieved
tactical victory in the salient there may be a considerable interval
before other offensive movements begin to develop though I
think it is important to try and stage Operation VERITABLE earliest
possible. Apart from these few ideas which occur to me I have no
comments on the outline plan and details can be worked out later
on. You can rely on me and all under my command to go all out
one hundred per cent to implement your plan/*

I should explain that Operation VERITABLE was the attack south
wards of the Canadian Army from the Reichswald Forest, with a
view to securing possession of all ground west of the Rhine. The next
operation was to be the actual crossing of the Rhine by Second Army,
and this was to be planned while Operation VERITABLE was in progress.

All was now agreed in outline.

There were many details to be filled in and a detailed plan to be
drawn up; work on those details went on during January. Major-
General Whiteley, a British member of the Staff at Supreme Head
quarters, was a great help in ensuring that the fundamentals of the
plan were not lost sight of in all the detailed staff work that was
necessary; he succeeded.

We launched Operation VERITABLE into the Reichswald Forest
east of Nijmegen on the 8th February, driving southwards with our
left flank on the Rhine.

The Ninth American Army attacked northwards, with its right
directed on Dusseldorf, on the 2;jrd February, in conjunction with the
Canadian Army attack.

By the loth March, the troops of the Ninth American Army and
21 Army Group were lined up along the west bank of the Rhine
from Neuss (opposite Dusseldorf) to Nijmegen, all bridges over the
river being destroyed. Meanwhile, on the 7th March First American
Army had secured intact the railway bridge at Remagen and at once
formed a bridgehead on the east bank. The importance of this bridge
head to our subsequent operations was very great. Not only did it
lock up a considerable number of surviving enemy divisions in that
area, but more important, it loosened up the whole campaign by pro
viding a brideghead which could be exploited at will. By the third
week in March the Allied armies had closed to the Rhine throughout
its length from Switzerland to the sea.

290 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

In October I had dropped the question of who was to command
the ground forces; but I did not simultaneously give up the question
of how to command. The argument about a sound strategy continued.
The essential change was to abandon the doctrine of a single ground
force commander and to try to get Eisenhower to take a firm grip
himself, rather than let his ground armies swarm all over the place
without co-ordination. In other words— the purpose remained un
changed but the method of achieving it had, for personal and political
reasons, to be argued differently.

Tedder's role as Deputy Supreme Commander was never very
clear to me and, finally, being an airman, he found himself employed
to co-ordinate the air operations,

I never thought that this was what he was originally meant to do.
But it was what he became because of the never-ceasing rows between
the lords of the air, each with his own strategic conceptions and with
great jealousies between them.

The generals were little better. So while Tedder dealt with the air
barons, Eisenhower dealt with the warring tribes of generals. The
result was really no strategy at all, and each land army went as far as
it could until it ran out of gas or ammunition, or both.

Insofar, then, as I was concerned the "ground force command"
problem was closed by the end of 1944, as I have already explained.
But to my amazement it was re-opened in February 1945, by the
Prime Minister, who had discussed it I suppose with the British Chiefs
of Staff.

It was considered in London that Field-Marshal Alexander would
be a better Deputy Supreme Commander than Tedder, since he would
be able to relieve Eisenhower of his preoccupations with the land
battle, which Tedder could not do. I was consulted privately on this
proposal by the Prime Minister and by the C.LG.S. My answer was
immediate— if Alexander were brought to Supreme Headquarters there
would be storms, both in the Press and with the American generals.
However, the proposal was put to Eisenhower. He asked me to meet
him on the 14th February at some suitable place half-way between
his headquarters and mine, and we met at my old Tac Headquarters
at Zonhoven. The British and American delegations to the Yalta Con
ference early in February 1945 had been having preliminary talks in
Malta on their way to the Crimea; certain remarks made in Malta had
been reported to Eisenhower, who had not gone himself to the
talks but had sent Bedell Smith. I wrote the following in my di
ary after Eisenhower had left Zonhoven to return to his headquar
ters:

Eisenhower turned the subject to the question of command.
He said that the P.M. at Malta had told the President (or

'&vi&fc<*'

*';.->;..*/••

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Site

L My father at Cape Barren Island, on a missionary tour in 1895.

2. My mother, in the 19305.

ft

.

3, What I looked like when aged 9.

4 Three Old Paulines in
Arras in 1916. Left, my
brother Donald, in the 2gth
Bn Canadian Expeditionary
Force. Centre, Major B. M.
Arnold in the Artillery. Right,
the author who was Brigade-
Major 104 Inf. Bde. in the
35th (Bantam) Division.

5. The author and his Briga
dier, back from a tour of the
trenches on the Arras front,
1916.

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7. My wife and her three sons, April 1930.
Left to right-Dick Carver, David, John Carver,

8. My wife and David in Switzerland
—January 1936.

9. The author and David in Switzerland
—January 1937.

10. Lord Gort and Mr. Hore-Belisha visit the 3rd Division area in France. General

Brooke can be seen behind and to the left of Hore-Belisha. The author is on the

right in battle dress-the first General Officer ever to wear that dress.

Date-ig November 1939.

11. In the desert, wearing my Australian hat, greeting the Commander of the

Greek Brigade in the Eighth Army (Brigadier Katsotas) -August 1942.

The officer by the car door is John Poston.

THE BATTLE OF ALAM HALFA

BEGINNING 3! AUGUST 1942

0 5 SO

^iA^^v

CACCUTOft

n^.^^
'^irnrinin^

LEGEND
EIGHTH ARMY

ENEMY FORCES
n n MINEFIELDS

12. Map of the Battle of Alam Haifa.

cq

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THE BATTLE OF ALAMEIN

PLAN ON 30 CORPS FRONT

N

THOMPSON'S
POST

APPROX ZONE OF

ENEMY DEFENDED
LOCALITIES
INCLUDING MINEFIELDS

14. Map of the Battle of Alamein-Plan on 30 Corps Front.

is, •

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nrxCM>

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tow:1

15. Address to OflBcers before the Battle of Alamein.

.---I

THE BATTLE OF ALAMEIN

THE BREAK OUT

L .'/, 0 I 2 3 4

MILES

N

SIDI
EL RAHMAN/

"OPERATION
SUPERCHARGE"

aiO ARMD DIVS

AQQAQIR

\

LEGEND

LINE REACHED I NOV

OPERATIONS 2 NOV
OPERATIONS 3 NOV
OPERATIONS 4 NOV
APPROXIMATE ZONE
OF ORIGINAL ENEMY
DEFENDED LOCALITIES
INCLUDING MINEFIELDS

Map of die Battle of Alamein-The Break Out.

',*///' "

17. Battle of Alamein; observing operations from my tank. In rear, John Poston.

18. Battle of Alamein; having tea with my tank crew. On right, John Poston.

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21. The Prime Minister and

General Brooke outside my

caravans near Tripoli.

20, A picnic lunch on the sea
front in Tripoli with General
Leese, after the capture of
the town— 23 January 1943.

22. The Prime Minister ad
dresses officers and men of
Eighth Army H,Q. in Tripoli.

CO
01

THE END OF THE WAR IN AFRICA

20 10 0

CERTA

7WV

TO FIRST ARMY
FROM EIGHTH ARMY

18 APR IARMDD1V

30 APR 7ARMDDIV

4 INDIAN DIY

201 GDS BDE

SFAX/O

10 APR *^

24. Map of the end of the war in Africa.

25. Addressing officers of the New Zealand Division on 2 April 1943,
after the Battle of Mareth.

26. The Prime Minister inspecting troops of the Eighth Army in Tripoli. Lieut.-Gen.
Sir Oliver Leese, 30 Corps, in the back seat with the P.M. John Boston driving.

27. Eisenhower comes to visit me in Tunisia, 31 March 1943,
On right, John Poston.

c/

c

X
C\|

29. Speaking to the nth Canadian Tank Regiment near Lentini, Sicily-

25 July 1943.

30. A lunch party at my Tac H.Q. at Taormma, after the

campaign in Sicily was over— 29 August 1943. Seated, left

to right-Patton, Eisenhower, the author. Behind Patton is

Bradley. On extreme right, Dempsey.

THE INVASION OF ITALY
AND THE ADVANCE TO THE RIVER SANGRO

*£###&#£• ALL GROUND
#$&$*" OVER 600 N

31. Map of the invasion of Italy.

32. With General Brooke in Raly-15 December 1943.

33. At Tac H.Q. after my farewell address to the Eighth Army at Vasto-

30 December 1943. Left to right-de Guingand, Broadhurst,

the author, Freyberg, Allfrey, Dempsey.

•

"

35. Calling the troops round my jeep for a talk near Dover-2 February 1944.

36. The Prime Minister comes to din
ner at my Tae H.Q. near Portsmouth
-19 May 1944.

37. The King comes to my Tac H.Q.

to say good-bye before we go to

Normandy-22 May 1944.

38. The King lands in Nor
mandy to visit the British
and Canadian forces—
16 June 1944.

39. The Prime Minister at my

Tac H.Q. at Blay, to the west

of Bayeux, on a wet day—

21 July 1944.

GERMAN TANK DEPLOYMENT

ON EVE OF BREAKOUT

24 JULY 1944

EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS
50 GERMAN TANKS

40. Map of German Tank Deployment on eve of breakout in Normandy.

o
..... ./v 2

.V.V.ViV.-.V.'.V. <

EISENHOWER'S
BROAD FROHT STRATEGY

MY CONCEPTION
OF THE STRATEGY

42. Map of Eisenhower's Broad Front Strategy.
Map of my conception of the Strategy.

PLAN FOR
MARKET GARDEN

/ BR AB

92 US AB

A. AIRBORNE FORCES TO fiK\
CAPTURE WATER OBSTACLES^/

B. 30 CORPS TO FORCE I 1

CENTRAL CORRIDOR. | |

C. 8 CORPS AND 12 CORPS RTTTm
TO EXPAND CORRIDOR. UUsu|

D. BRIDGEHEAD OVER RHINE X&&S

'/<?/ US AB

^ACTUAL ADVANCE

BY 30 SEP

LINE
17 SEP

43. Map of Plan for Operation MARKET GARDEN (the Battle of Arnhem) .

44. Leaving the Maastricht Conference with General Bradley-/ December 1944.

BATTLE OF THE (!)

GERMAN OFFENSIVE -LAUNCHED 16 DEC. 1944

$ BRUSSELS

GERMAN START LINE VO
16 DEC. IV

DOMINATED BY GERMANS I II 111 I
20 DEC. Illlill

FURTHEST GERMAN »/X

PENETRATION 23 DEC. •/•'•

BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES (2)

ALLIED COUNTER-OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 3 JAN 1945

BRUSSELS

ALLIED START LINE

3 JAN
ALLIED CAINS

45. Map of Batde of the Ardennes,

46, In the Siegfried Line with General Simpson, Commander of the
Ninth American Army— 3 March 1945,

47. Lunch on the east bank of the Rhine, with the Prime Minister
and Field-Marshal Brooke-26 March 1945.

48. The Germans come to my Tac H,Q, on Liineburg Heath to surrender-

3 May 1945.

49. Reading the terms of surrender to the German delegation-Limeburg Heath,
4 May 1945. Chester Wilmot is just to the right of the left-hand tent pole.

" All Canaan aimed forces in HdlATID,
nortfeg«&t Gegmaaiy Ifldudiag all

•£$

.'.-!H

•:i&

The Gerwan Goesaand agrees to the wrreisder of all Serwn azraed
in HOUAKDj IB nortlBfeirf; CSBttKr inclwdin^ the*
i HBXSm&HD and all other islands, in 3C " "
IK, apd in BB1&BK, to the C.-in-C^21 Any Group* ,

fbese forces to lay dowi their aras mi to swrr«4er «acooditiooa23y»

All hostilities on land, oatsaa, or ^ the air by Gerjaon force*

5n tto 'above areas to cease at «§DD hrs, British Dwble Sti«i»r 7i«e
on Saturday 5 ita

?he Geiwan ooowund to oaray out at oaae» zu-sd without ar^^ent or
ooa3«nt, all further c«r^rs thit will b© ^^uua !>;• the Alliad

s, on ar

Disobedience of ordere, or f^Siuir* to ooopl? with th«m, will M
re^ai-ded as a bfe&ch of the*® «nr*ifi«r ter» and will be dealt
•with by the /Olied row«rs IT, a^oorOa^cse viith the noo82?t«d
and usajges of nar* . *

This instrraent of «rr«i4er i& 5iyid;er»a«nt

- to, and will be suA»er»edftd b^ ^ j»«r.l i
i^-osed by or en behalf of ',h» *Oli«a Bwwrs jad
and the >2eriiuti amaJ foraft- a* a "i

of surrender
to

fhis instrutaent of surrender i* writ*. en in 2£*c

The Br«£lish version i& the awiSiejitio text.

in

7i^ decision of the .Jliod Powara -ill I « ^isi;.l i" ui^," c«A3M or

dilute arises aa to t*«. .ae^iinj or iilter^ rotation of the c^rrender
• , terms* ••

50. Photo of the original surrender document that was signed by the Germans
at 1830 hrs on 4 May 1945.

51. Scene in the Champs
Elysees when I visited Paris
on 25 May 1945.

52. Field-Marshal Busch

comes to my Tac H.Q.

to be ticked off-

11 May 1945.

53. In the Kremlin with
Stalin, after dinner on
10 January 1947.

54. David receives the Belt of Honour from

his father, having passed out top

from the OCTU.

55. Isington Mill when purchased
in February 1947.

56. Isington Mill in 1955,

having been converted

to a residence.

57. The garden and mill stream at Isington Mill.

58. A joke with Ernie Bevin at the Bertram Mills Circus lunch-
17 December 1948,

59. David when at Trinity College
Cambridge, in 1950. Laying
"the smell" for the
Varsity Drag.

60. A walk in Hyde Park with Mary Connell, who married David on
27 February 1953.

61. The author enjoying the evening of life at Isington Mill.

The End of the War in Europe 291

Marshall) that he (Ike) did not visit me enough, and implied that
the British side o£ the party was being neglected.

This hurt him a good deal and he went on to say he was always
being bullied by Marshall and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff for being
too British, or by the P.M. and the British Chiefs of Staff for being
too American and for neglecting to visit me.

I am sorry this was said at Malta; it got back to Ike very
quickly, and was no doubt attributed to me; he is such an awfully
decent chap that I hate to see him upset

Ike then asked me for my views on the present command set-up;
I do not know the reason behind this.

I gave him my views as follows:

(a) I understood that he himself wished to handle the land
operations and to command the three Army Groups; he
did not want a land force commander between him and
the Army Groups.

(b) He had now divided his theatre into 'fronts* which had
a definite relation to strategical and geographical objec
tives; and he had allotted resources to each 'front' in
accordance with the task.

(c) My 'front* was to make the main effort. In order that one
commander should command all the forces engaged in the
main effort, he had placed an American Army under my
command. I also had an American Airborne Corps of two
U.S. airborne divisions and one British airborne division.

(d) Having in view (a) above, I therefore considered that the
command set-up was now satisfactory.

(e) I then said that having arrived at the present command
situation I hoped it would remain unchanged till the war
was over— which should be in the spring.

Re-grouping might be necessary from time to time, and
resources would then be allotted to 'fronts* in accordance
with their tasks. The great point was for one commander
always to be responsible for all the forces engaged in the
main effort; we should not depart from this principle.
Ike was delighted that I was happy about the present command
situation. There is no doubt that he was worried about something
when he arrived at Zonhoven, and appeared so during our talk.

I have even now no idea what is at the bottom of his worry.
But it was very obvious that as soon as I had said I was very well
satisfied with the present situation about command, he became a
different man; he drove away beaming all over his f ace.*

Having got me to state that I was satisfied with the existing com
mand set-up, Eisenhower wrote to the C.I.G.S. telling him of this and

292 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

asking him to consider the following points before advocating the
proposed change of the Deputy Supreme Commander:

(a) He (Eisenhower) ran the campaign. The Deputy Supreme
Commander handled air problems, since he was an airman.
He was responsible also for the administration in rear areas
and for planning certain matters such as the Control Com
mission for Germany; this is all he would ever allow Alex
ander to do if he came to our theatre.

(b) On no conditions would he agree to have anyone between
him and his Army Group Commanders.

(c) If this change was made, there would be great speculations as
to the reasons for it. The American generals would quite
possibly think that the British were resorting to further pres
sure in order to get their policy adopted.

On the ist March Eisenhower visited me again and told me all
he knew about the proposal to get Tedder "out" and Alexander "in."
He asked me for my views. I gave them as follows:

1. The Allies had been through very difficult and stormy times.

2. We had weathered these storms successfully, and the end of
the war was in sight.

3. If Alexander were now appointed Deputy Supreme Com
mander, it would be resented in certain American quarters; a
further great storm would arise and all the old disagreements
would be revived.

4. For goodness sake let us stop any further causes of friction at
all cost. We are just about to win the German war. Let Alex
remain in Italy. And let Tedder see the thing through to the
end as Deputy Supreme Commander.

Eisenhower agreed whole-heartedly with my views.

The Prime Minister visited me on the 2nd March and I told him
of my conversation with Eisenhower. He was not very pleased! He
went on to see Eisenhower. On the nth March the Prime Minister
wrote to me to say "the matter is now closed/*

During March, and before crossing the Rhine, I checked up on
our administrative situation. This was good. We had ample supplies
of petrol, ammunition and food. The health of the armies was excel
lent and the sick rate was no more than 6.75 per thousand per week.
During the whole winter we had a total of only 201 cases of trench-
foot

Our total battle casualties since D-Day the 6th June 1944 were on
the 22nd March 1945 as follows:

The End of the War in Europe 293

Nationality Casualties

British 125,045

Canadian 37,528

Polish 4,951

Dutch 125

Belgian 291

Czech 438

TOTAL 168,378
The division of this total was:

Killed Wounded Missing

35>825 114.563 17,990

The total prisoners captured by 21 Army Group were approxi
mately 250,000.

About 4000 officers and men per day were going to the U.K. on
leave. We planned to step this number up to 6000 per day on the
ist April. The following letter of appreciation about leave facilities
was received by me from a mother of two of my soldiers:

92 Long Street,
Dordon,

Nr Tamworth,
Staffs.

23/2/45
Sir,

As a Mother who is lying ill with Cancer and whose two boys
are serving overseas, I feel I must write to express my deep appre
ciation of the splendid arrangements that were made for leave for
boys from the B.L.A.*

My younger son has just spent seven days at home and now he
has returned to the Western Front. I think you would like to
know that he and his friends were loud in their praise of the
arrangements on his journey. Everything possible was done for
their comfort, even to the issue of new clean battledress to come
home in and refreshments on the journey.

No wonder the armies under your command have proved in
vincible in this war. Your men are treated like human beings.

I wish you every possible luck in your campaign and, if it is
not a presumption, may I congratulate you on your brilliant
personal achievements.

With heartfelt gratitude,
I am, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,

(Mrs.) A. D. Lear"

* British Liberation Aimy.

294 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I issued the following message to the armies on the 23rd March.

That night we began Operation PLUNDER, the crossing of the Rhine
in strength on a wide front between Rheinberg and Rees— with the
Ninth American Army on the right and the Second Army on the left.
The Canadian Army had an important role on the left flank, north
of Rees.

"i. On the yth February I told you we were going into the ring
for the final and last round; there would be no time limit;
we would continue fighting until our opponent was knocked
out. The last round is going very well on both sides of the ring
—and overhead.

2. In the West, the enemy has lost the Rhineland, and with it the
flower of at least four armies— the Parachute Army, Fifth
Panzer Army, Fifteenth Army, and Seventh Army; the First
Army, farther to the south, is now being added to the list.

In the Rhineland battles, the enemy has lost about 150,000
prisoners, and there are many more to come; his total casual
ties amount to about 250,000 since 8th February.

3. In the East, the enemy has lost all Pomerania east of the Oder,
an area as large as the Rhineland; and three more German
armies have been routed. The Russian armies are within about
35 miles of Berlin.

4. Overhead, the Allied Air Forces are pounding Germany day
and night. It will be interesting to see how much longer the
Germans can stand it.

5. The enemy has in fact been driven into a corner, and he can
not escape.

Events are moving rapidly.

The complete and decisive defeat of the Germans is certain;
there is no possibility of doubt on this matter.

6. 21 ARMY GROUP WILL NOW CROSS THE RHINE

The enemy possibly thinks he is safe behind this great river
obstacle. We all agree that it is a great obstacle; but we will
show the enemy that he is far from safe behind it. This great
Allied fighting machine, composed of integrated land and air
forces, will deal with the problem in no uncertain manner.

7. And having crossed the Rhine, we will crack about in the
plains of Northern Germany, chasing the enemy from pillar
to post. The swifter and the more energetic our action, the
sooner the war will be over, and that is what we all desire;
to get on with the job and finish off the German war as soon
as possible.

8. Over the Rhine, then, let us go. And good hunting to you all
on the other side.

The End of the War in Europe 295

g. May 'The Lord mighty In battle* give us the victory in this
our latest undertaking, as He has done in all our battles since
we landed in Normandy on D-Day."

The Prime Minister stayed with me at my Tac Headquarters and
watched the airborne divisions land beyond the river on the morning
of the 24th March- We were now fighting deep in Germany and I
asked the Prime Minister when British troops had last fought on
German soil. He told me it was when the Rocket Brigade, now *OW
(Rocket) Battery R.H.A.,* fought in the Battle of Leipzig on the
i8th October 1813. The Rocket Brigade was the only British unit in
that battle. It was commanded by 2nd Capt Richard Bogue, who
was killed in the battle at a place called Pounsdorff. The Brigade was
attached to the Swedish Army and was fighting with Prussians,
etc., against French, Saxons, Westphalians, etc. There were thus "Ger
mans'* both with us and against us. I consulted the senior artillery
officer at my headquarters and told the Prime Minister that "<T Bat
tery (Rocket Troop) R.HA. was now in the ist R.H.A. in Italy,
under Field-Marshal Alexander. They have always been extremely
proud of their title of "The Rocket Troop,** and in 1930 were invited
by the German Army to send representatives to Leipzig for the un
veiling of the Memorial which I believe was supposed to have been a
centenary celebration, but was delayed until that year. They took
with them Horse Artillery trumpeters who sounded the Last Post and
who were dressed in full dress. They were the guests of the German
Army at Leipzig.

It is interesting to note that gunners once again used rockets on
the Continent after a lapse of over 130 years. They were used by the
Canadians on the Meuse and were manned by personnel of a Light
A.A. Regiment. Second Army also used them at die Rhine crossing.

I asked the Prime Minister if he would send a message to the
soldiers of 21 Army Group, who had just crossed the Rhine. He
wrote the following:

"I rejoice to be with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
at Field-Marshal Montgomery's Headquarters of 21 Army Group
during this memorable battle of forcing the Rhine. British Soldiers
—it will long be told how, with our Canadian brothers and valiant
United States Allies, this superb task was accomplished. Once the
river line is pierced and the crust of German resistance is broken
decisive victory in Europe will be near. May God prosper our
arms in this noble adventure after our long struggle for King and
country, for dear life, and for the freedom of mankind.

(Sgd) Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister & Minister of Defence"
* Royal Horse Artillery.

296 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

When the Prime Minister left me on the 26th March to return to
London, he wrote the following in my autograph book:

"The Rhine and all its fortress lines lie behind the 2ist Group of
Armies. Once again they have been the hinge on which massive
gates revolved. Once again they have proved that physical bar
riers are vain without the means and spirit to hold them.

A beaten army not long ago master of Europe retreats before
its pursuers. The goal is not long to be denied to those who have
come so far and fought so well under proud and faithful leader
ship. Forward on wings of flame to final Victory.

Winston S. Churchill"

Once over the Rhine I began to discuss future operational plans
with Eisenhower. We had several meetings. I had always put Berlin
as a priority objective; it was a political centre and if we could beat
the Russians to it things would be much easier for us in the post-war
years. It will be remembered that in his letter to me dated the 15th
September 1944 (Chapter 15) Eisenhower had agreed with me about
the great importance of the German capital, and had said:

"Clearly, Berlin is the main prize.

There is no doubt whatsoever, in my mind, that we should con
centrate all our energies and resources on a rapid thrust to Berlin."

But now he did not agree. His latest view was expressed in a
message he sent me on the sist March 1945 which ended with the
following sentence:

"You will note that in none of this do I mention Berlin. That
place has become, so far as I am concerned, nothing but a geo
graphical location, and I have never been interested in these. My
purpose is to destroy the enemy's forces and his powers to resist."

It was useless for me to pursue the matter further. We had had so
much argument already on great issues; anyhow, it was now almost
too late. But after the victory in Normandy my point was that the
final defeat of the German armed forces was imminent— in a few more
months.

The important point was therefore to ensure that when that day
arrived we would have a political balance in Europe which would
help us, the Western nations, to win the peace. That meant getting
possession of certain political centres in Europe before the Russians—
notably Vienna, Prague and Berlin. If the higher direction of the war
had been handled properly by the political leaders of the West, and
suitable instructions given to Supreme Commanders, we could have
grabbed all three before the Russians. But what happened? The pos-

The End of the War in Europe 297

sibility of seizing Vienna disappeared when it was decided to land
the Dragoon force in southern France; the troops for the landing
were taken from Field-Marshal Alexander's force in Italy and that put
a brake on his operations. It should be noted that Stalin whole-heart
edly approved the Dragoon landing. Of course he did. It made certain
that his forces would get to Vienna before ours!

As regards Prague, the Third American Army was halted on the
western frontier of Czechoslovakia towards the end of April—for
reasons which I have never understood. When finally allowed to cross
the frontier early in May, Bradley states in A Soldiers Story, page
549, that it was ordered not to advance beyond Pilsen "because
Czechoslovakia had already been earmarked for liberation by the Red
army.9* He goes on to say that had SHAEF remanded its order, Patton
"could probably have been in Prague within 24 hours."

Berlin was lost to us when we failed to make a sound operational
plan in August 1944, after the victory in Normandy.

The Americans could not understand that it was of little avail to
win the war strategically if we lost it politically; because of this curious
viewpoint we suffered accordingly from VE-Day onwards, and are
still so suffering. War is a political instrument; once it is clear that
you are going to win, political considerations must influence its further
course. It became obvious to me in the autumn of 1944 that the way
things were being handled was going to have repercussions far beyond
the end of the war; it looked to me then as if we were going to
"muck it up.*7 I reckon we did.

There is not much more to tell which has not already been narrated
by others. With the Rhine behind us we drove hard for the Baltic.
My object was to get there in time to be able to offer a firm front to
the Russian endeavours to get up into Denmark, and thus control the
entrance to the Baltic. In order to speed up the rate of advance,
divisions operated in great depth on narrow thrust lines; enemy areas
of resistance were by-passed by armoured spearheads and were later
attacked from the flank or rear by other troops coming on behind -

As we moved eastwards, the Prime Minister and Eisenhower both
became anxious lest I might not be able to "head off* the Russians
from getting into Schleswig-Holstein, and then occupying Denmark.
Both sent me messages about it. I fear I got somewhat irritated and
my replies possibly showed it! To Eisenhower I replied on the 27th
April that I was very well aware what had to be done, but he must
understand that when he had removed the Ninth American Army
from my command (which he had done on the 3rd April) the tempo
of operations slowed down automatically on the northern flank. In
the end we beat the Russians to it. We reached the Baltic at Wismar
and Lubeck on the 2nd May and thus sealed off the Danish peninsula
with about six hours to spare, before the Russians arrived. We estab-

298 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

lished an eastern front from Wismar on the Baltic to the Elbe at
Domitz; German troops and civilians were surging against this flank,
trying to escape from the Russians. We had a western front from
Liibeck, westwards to Bad Oldesloe and thence south to the Elbe. In
between these two fronts was great congestion and confusion; the
roads were crowded with German soldiers and civilians who had come
in from the east. On the 2nd and 3rd May the prisoners taken by
Second Army totalled nearly half a million.

It was interesting to consider the difference in the two major
catastrophes the Germans had suffered at the hands of the Western
Allies since June 1944. In August 1944 they had suffered a major defeat
in Normandy; but they were allowed to recover and their man-power
situation was such that they could form and equip new divisions.
Their present defeat in March/April 1945 was not comparable to that
suffered in Normandy; they had lost so heavily in personnel and
territory that they could not again form and equip new divisions. They
would never again have uninterrupted communications and assured
mobility. Therefore their cause was lost and the German war had
reached its last moments. Hitler's Germany now faced utter disaster.

CHAPTER 20

The German Surrender

ON THE ayth April I received a report from the War Office that
on the 24th Himmler had made an offer of capitulation through
the Swedish Red Cross.

Himmler stated that Hitler was desperately ill and that he (Himm
ler) was in a position of full authority to act. I did not pay much
attention to this report. So far as I was concerned the oncoming
Russians were more dangerous than the stricken Germans. I knew the
German war was practically over. The essential and immediate task
was to push on with all speed and get to the Baltic, and then to form
a flank facing east; this was the only way to stop the Russians getting
into Schleswig-Holstein and thence into Denmark.

Events now began to move rapidly. Late on the ist May we picked
up an announcement on the German wireless that Hitler had died
at his command post in Berlin and that he had appointed Admiral
Doenitz to succeed hi™ as Fuhrer. No mention was made of Himmler;
one of my liaison officers later saw him at Doenitz's headquarters at
Flenshurg and gathered that he was no longer playing a leading part
in the direction of affairs.

On the afternoon of the 2nd May General Blumentritt, who was
commanding all the German land forces between the Baltic and the
River Weser> sent a message to Second Army headquarters that he
proposed to come in the next morning to offer the surrender of his
forces. He did not appear but instead sent a message to the effect that
negotiations were to be conducted on a higher level.

On the 3rd May Field-Marshal Keitel sent a delegation to my head
quarters on Liineburg Heath, with the consent of Admiral Doenitz,

299

300 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to open negotiations for surrender. This party arrived at 11.30 hrs.
and consisted of:

General-Admiral von Friedeburg, C.-in-C. of the German Navy.
General Kinzel, Chief of Staff to Field-Marshal Busch, who was

commanding the German land forces on my northern and

western flanks.
Rear-Admiral Wagner.
Major Freidel, a staff officer.

This party of four was later joined by Colonel Pollek, another staff
officer.

They were brought to my caravan site and were drawn up under
the Union Jack, which was flying proudly in the breeze. I kept them
waiting for a few minutes and then came out of my caravan and
walked towards them. They all saluted, under the Union Jack. It was a
great moment; I knew the Germans had come to surrender and that
die war was over. Few of those in the signals and operations caravans
at my Tac Headquarters will forget the thrill experienced when they
heard the faint "tapping" of the Germans trying to pick us up on the
wireless command link— to receive the surrender instructions from
their delegation.

I said to my interpreter, "Who are these men?" He told me.

I then said, "What do they want?"

Admiral Friedeburg then read me a letter from Field-Marshal Keitel
offering to surrender to me the three German armies withdrawing in
front of the Russians between Berlin and Rostock. I refused to con
sider this, saying that these armies should surrender to the Russians.
I added that, of course, if any German soldiers came towards my
front with their hands up they would automatically be taken prisoner.
Von Friedeburg said it was unthinkable to surrender to the Russians
as they were savages, and the German soldiers would be sent straight
off to work in Russia.

I said the Germans should have thought of all these things before
they began the war, and particularly before they attacked the Russians
in June 1941.

Von Friedeburg next said that they were anxious about the civilian
population in Mecklenburg who were being overrun by the Russians,
and they would like to discuss how these could be saved. I replied
that Mecklenburg was not in my area and that any problems connected
with it must be discussed with the Russians. I said they must under
stand that I refused to discuss any matter connected with the situation
on my eastern flank between Wismar and Domitz; they must approach
the Russians on such matters. I then asked if they wanted to discuss
the surrender of their forces on my western flank. They said they did

The German Surrender 301

not But they were anxious about the Chilian population in those
areas, and would like to arrange with me some scheme by which
their troops could withdraw slowly as my forces advanced. I refused.
I then decided to spring something on them quickly. I said to
von Friedeburg:

'Will you surrender to me all German forces on my western and
northern flanks, including all forces in Holland, Friesland with
the Frisian Islands and Heligoland, Schleswig-Holstein, and Den
mark? If you will do this, I will accept it as a tactical battlefield
surrender of the enemy forces immediately opposing me, and
those in support in Denmark3*

He said he could not agree to this. But he was anxious to come to
some agreement about the civilian population in those areas; I refused
to discuss this. I then said that if the Germans refused to surrender
unconditionally the forces in the areas I had named, I would order the
fighting to continue; many more German soldiers would then be
killed, and possibly some civilians also from artillery fire and air
attack. I next showed them on a map the actual battle situation on the
whole western front; they had no idea what this situation was and
were very upset. By this time I reckoned that I would not have much
more difficulty in getting them to accept my demands. But I thought
that an interval for lunch might be desirable so that they could reflect
on what I had said. I sent them away to have lunch in a tent by them
selves, with nobody else present except one of my officers. Von
Friedeburg wept during lunch and the others did not say much.

After lunch I sent for them again and this time the meeting was
in my conference tent with the map of the battle situation on the table.
I began this meeting by delivering an ultimatum. They must sur
render unconditionally all their forces in the areas I had named; once
they had done this I would discuss with them the best way of occupy
ing the areas and looking after the civilians; if they refused, I would
go on with the battle. "They saw at once that I meant what I said.
They were convinced of the hopelessness of their cause but they said
they had no power to agree to my demands. They were, however,
now prepared to recommend to Field-Marshal Keitel the uncondi
tional surrender of all the forces on the western and northern flanks
of 21 Army Group. Two of them would go back to O.K.W., see Keitel,
and bring back his agreement.

I then drew up a document which summarised the decisions reached
at our meeting, which I said must be signed by myself and von
Friedeburg, and could then be taken to Flensburg, and given to
Keitel and Doenitz.

302 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

It read as follows:

tti. All members of the German armed forces who come into the
21 Army Group front from the east desiring to surrender will
be made Prisoners of War.

An acceptance by 21 Army Group of the surrender of a com
plete German Army fighting the Russians is not possible.

2. No discussion about civilians possible.

3. Field-Marshal Montgomery desires that all German forces in
Holland, Friesland (including the islands and Heligoland),
Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark lay down their arms and
surrender unconditionally to him.

He is prepared when the surrender has been agreed to dis
cuss the method of occupying the areas, dealing with civilians,
etc.

4. General-Admiral Von Friedeburg is not at present empowered
to give the agreement of surrender as in para. 3. He will there
fore send two officers ( Rear-Admiral Wagner and Major
Freidel) to the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht to obtain
and bring back the agreement.

He requests Field-Marshal Montgomery to make available
an aircraft for the two officers as transport by road is too slow,
and requests that Admiral Von Friedeburg and General Kinzel
remain at Field-Marshal Montgomery's H.Q. in the meantime."

Actually it was von Friedeburg and Freidel who went back to
Flensburg, and they went by car. They were escorted through Ham
burg and into the German lines by Lieut-Colonel Trumbull Warren,
my Canadian ADC. I said they must be back at my Tac Head
quarters by 6 p.m. the next day, 4th May. Kinzel and Wagner re
mained at my headquarters.

I was certain von Friedeburg would return with full powers to
sign. I therefore decided to see the Press at 5 p.m. on the 4th May
and to describe to the correspondents all that had happened in the
last few days, and to tell them about what I hoped was going to happen
at 6 p.m. that evening.

It has been said that I was not usually very good at Press confer
ences. At the end of this one I received the following letter from
Alan Moorehead, who was the unofficial spokesman for the Press at
my headquarters.

"Dear Field-Marshal,

May I, on behalf of the correspondents, offer our thanks for
the admirable conference you gave us today?

We are most grateful for your interest especially at this historic
moment, and it only remains to us to offer our heartiest con-

The German Surrender 303

gratulations on the brilliant end of your long journey from the
desert.

We have all tonight tried to do justice to the story we have
waited so long to write, the best story probably of our lives.

I wonder, as one more kindness, would you sign the enclosed
copies of your armistice.

With all good wishes,

(Signed) Alan Moorehead"

Von Friedeburg and Freidel got back to my headquarters while
the Press conference was in progress. I saw Colonel Ewart, my staff
officer, enter the tent and knew he had the answer. But I finished my
talk and then asked Ewart if von Friedeburg was back. He said he
was. I told the correspondents they could all go with me to my con
ference tent and witness the final scene.

The German delegation was paraded again under the Union Jack,
outside my caravan. I took von Friedeburg into my caravan, to see
him alone. I asked him if he would sign the full surrender terms as I
had demanded; he said he would do so. He was very dejected and
I told him to rejoin the others outside. It was now nearly 6 p.m. I
gave orders for the ceremony to take place at once in a tent pitched
for the purpose, which had been wired for the recording instruments.
The German delegation went across to the tent, watched by groups of
soldiers, war correspondents, photographers, and others— all very ex
cited. They knew it was the end of the war.

I had the surrender document all ready. The arrangements in the
tent were very simple— a trestle table covered with an army blanket,
an inkpot, an ordinary army pen that you could buy in a shop for
twopence. There were two B.B.C. microphones on the table. The
Germans stood up as I entered; then we all sat down round the table.
The Germans were clearly nervous and one of them took out a
cigarette; he wanted to smoke to calm his nerves. I looked at him,
and he put the cigarette away.

In that tent on Luneburg Heath, publicly in the presence of the
Press and other spectators, I read out in English the Instrument of
Surrender. I said that unless the German delegation signed this docu
ment immediately, and without argument on what would follow their
capitulation, I would order the fighting to continue. I then called on
each member of the German delegation by name to sign the document,
which they did without any discussion. I then signed, on behalf of
General Eisenhower.

The document was in English, and the delegation could not under
stand it; but I gave them copies in German. A photograph of the
original appears here as illustration no. 50. It will be noticed that when
adding the date I wrote 5 May, then tried to change the 5 to a 4, then

304 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

crossed it out and initialled it, and wrote 4 alongside. The original is
typed on an ordinary sheet of army foolscap. I was asked to forward
it to Supreme Headquarters. Instead I sent photostat copies. The
original is in my possession and I will never part with it; it is a historic
document. I do not know what happened to the pen we all used; I
suppose someone pinched it.

INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER

OF

ALL GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN HOLLAND, IN

NORTHWEST GERMANY INCLUDING ALL ISLANDS,

AND IN DENMARK

1. The German Command agrees to the surrender of all German
armed forces in Holland, in northwest Germany including the
Frisian Islands, and Heligoland and all other islands, in Schles-
wig-Holstein, and in Denmark, to the C.-in-C. 21 Army Group.
This to include all naval ships in these areas.

These forces to lay down their arms and to surrender uncon
ditionally.

2. All hostilities on land, on sea, or in the air by German forces in
the above areas to cease at 0800 hrs. British Double Summer
Time on Saturday 5 May 1945.

3. The German Command to carry out at once, and without
argument or comment, all further orders that will be issued by
the Allied Powers on any subject.

4. Disobedience of orders, or failure to comply with them, will be
regarded as a breach of these surrender terms and will be dealt
with by the Allied Powers in accordance with the accepted
laws and usages of war.

5. This instrument of surrender is independent of, without
prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument
of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the Allied Powers and
applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as a
whole.

6. This instrument of surrender is written in English and in
German.

The English version is the authentic text.

7. The decision of the Allied Powers will be final if any doubt or
dispute arises as to the meaning or interpretation of the sur
render terms.

Friedeburg
B. L. Montgomery Kinzel

Field-Marshal Wagner

4 May 1945 Pollek

1830 hrs Freidel

The German Surrender 305

Of the four Germans who arrived at my Tac Headquarters on
Liineburg Heath on the 3rd May, only one is alive today. He is
Rear-Admiral Wagner, who is now Deputy Head of the Naval De
partment of the West German Ministry of Defence. The other three
died violent deaths. Von Friedeburg poisoned himself, Kinzel shot
himself, and Freidel was killed in a motor accident shortly after
wards.

Following the signing of the Instrument of Surrender there was
much to be done. I had ordered all offensive action to cease on the
3rd May when the Germans first came to see me; I knew it was the
end and I did not want any more casualties among the troops entrusted
to my care. I now sent out a cease fire order to take effect at 8 a.m.
on Saturday 5th May 1945.

I felt that I must at once speak to the Commanders and troops
under my command who had come so far and fought so well. Victory
was far more due to their efforts than to anything I had been able to
do myself. The first message was to my senior commanders, and ran
as follows:

"The German armed forces facing 21 Army Group have sur
rendered unconditionally to us. At this historic moment I want to
express to Army Commanders and to the Commander L. of C. my
grateful thanks for the way they and their men have carried out
the immense task that was given them. I hope to express myself
more adequately later on but I felt that I must at once tell you all
how well you have done and how proud I am to command 21
Army Group. Please tell your commanders and troops that I
thank them from the bottom of my heart."

I then spent some time in drafting a personal message to the officers
and men of 21 Army Group. Many had been with me in the Eighth
Army. It was not an easy message to write and I pondered long over
para. 5. In para. 7 I wrote: "We have won the German war. Let us
now win the peace."

I often wonder if we have won the peace. In fact, I do not think
we have.

MY LAST MESSAGE TO THE ABMIES

*i. On this day of victory in Europe I feel I would like to speak
to all who have served and fought with me during the last few
years. What I have to say is very simple, and quite short.
2. I would ask you all to remember those of our comrades who
fell in the struggle. They gave their lives that others might
have freedom, and no man can do more than that. I believe
that He would say to each one of them:
Well done, thou good and faithful servant/

306 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

3. And we who remain have seen the thing through to the end;
we all have a feeling of great joy and thankfulness that we
have been preserved to see this day.

We must rememher to give the praise and thankfulness
where it is due:

This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes/

4. In the early days of this war the British Empire stood alone
against the combined might of the Axis powers. And during
those days we suffered some great disasters; but we stood firm;
on the defensive, but striking blows where we could. Later
we were joined by Russia and America; and from then onwards
the end was in no doubt. Let us never forget what we owe to
our Russian and American allies; this great allied team has
achieved much in war; may it achieve even more in peace.

5. Without doubt, great problems lie ahead; the world will not
recover quickly from the upheaval that has taken place; there
is much work for each of us.

I would say that we must face up to that work with the same
fortitude that we faced up to the worst days of this war. It may
be that some difficult times lie ahead for our country, and for
each one of us personally. If it happens thus, then our dis
cipline will pull us through; but we must remember that the
best discipline implies the subordination of self for the benefit
of the community.

6. It has been a privilege and an honour to command this great
British Empire team in Western Europe. Few commanders can
have had such loyal service as you have given me. I thank
each one of you from the bottom of my heart.

7. And so let us embark on what lies ahead full of joy and
optimism. We have won the German war. Let us now win the
peace.

8. Good luck to you all, wherever you may be."

Then there were the other Services.

No one knew better than I how much we soldiers owed to the
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force since the war began in 1939.
My relations with the R.A.F. had been very close throughout; I had
not seen so much of the Navy.

I sent each Service a message from us all, which I reproduce below.

MESSAGE TO THE ROYAL NAVY

"Personal for Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham
from Field-Marshal Montgomery

i. As C.-in-C. of the armies of the British Empire in Western
Europe I would like today to salute you and the Royal Navy.

The German Surrender 307

2. Throughout our long journey from Egypt to the Baltic any
success achieved by the British Armies has been made possible
only by the magnificent support given us by the Royal Navy.
With unfailing precision we have been put ashore, supported,
and supplied. Our confidence has been such that the Army has
never questioned the certainty of a safe landfall nor of the
safe arrival of our reinforcements and supplies across the
seas.

3. I want to thank you and all those gallant sailors who have
supported us with such valour. We soldiers owe the Royal
Navy a great debt of gratitude and we will never forget it.

4. Would it be possible for you to convey the gratitude of myself
and all those serving under me to all your Flag Officers and
Captains and to all ranks and ratings of the Royal Navy. We
wish the Royal Navy the best of luck."

TOE REPLY OF THE NAVY

*i. On behalf of all officers and men of the Royal Navy I thank
you for your generous message.

2. Ever since the summer of 1940 the Royal Navy has been
eagerly looking forward to the day when we could land the
Armies of the British Empire once again on the continent of
Europe.

3. We sailors never doubted that, when the day came, the soldiers
would, however hard the struggle, achieve ultimate victory in
battle.

4. We have watched with profound admiration the progress of
your operations which have now inflicted on the enemy an
overwhelming and decisive defeat.

5. Our warmest congratulations and best wishes to you and all
ranks serving under your command."

MESSAGE TO THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

"Following for Sir Charles Portal from
Field-Marshal Montgomery

1. In 21 Army Group we have no Germans left to fight in Western
Europe.

2. At this historic moment I feel I would like to express to you,
the head of the Royal Air Force, the deep sense of gratitude
that we soldiers owe to you and your splendid Force. The
mighty weapon of air power has enabled us firstly to win a
great victory quickly and secondly to win that victory with
fewer casualties than would otherwise have been the case. We
are all deeply conscious of these facts. The brave and brilliant

308 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

work of your gallant pilots and crews and the devotion to duty
of the ground staffs have aroused our profound admiration.
3. I would be grateful if you would convey the gratitude of my
self and of all those serving under me to all your commanders
both senior and junior and to all ranks throughout the Royal
Air Force. And perhaps you would include a special word of
greeting and good wishes from myself personally to every
officer and man in the Royal Air Force."

REPLY OF THE AIR FORCE

*1 am profoundly moved by your most generous message which
will be passed to all ranks in the Royal Air Force. From the
landing in Normandy until this hour of Victory all of us in the
Royal Air Force have felt the highest admiration for the endur
ance, courage and skill of the officers and men of 21 Army Group
and for the wonderful success of the battles they have fought
under your brilliant leadership. We count it a high honour to
have had the opportunity to speed your advance and the thought
that we may have been able to reduce the casualties suffered by
your gallant men has given us all the greatest possible satisfaction.
Your splendid tribute will be received with deep pride and grati
tude by all ranks of the Royal Air Force and of the Dominion
and Allied Air Forces who have served with us. May I on their
behalf send you and all your men our heartfelt congratulations on
the greatest achievements of 21 Army Group/*

I would like to quote one of the many messages of congratulation
I received— that from the Army Council. I do so because at an earlier
stage in my career I had been informed of the displeasure of the Army
Council.

This message seemed to cancel the previous one!

"The Army Council congratulate you and all ranks of 21 Army
Group on the magnificent success achieved today. The Liineburg
capitulation marks the culmination not only of the brilliant cam
paign of the last eleven months, but also of the long years of
preparation that passed between the withdrawal of our armies
from north-west Europe when the British peoples were left to
uphold alone the cause of freedom, and the day of your trium
phant return. Now, in company with the Forces of great Allies,
you have liberated the territory of our friends, confounded the
armed might of the enemy and freed the people of this country
from a terrible ordeal and the threat of one still worse.

To your own unerring leadership, and to the skill and courage
of your soldiers, the gratitude of the nation is due. Never has

The German Surrender 309

Britain had such great need of her Army: never has it served her
better."

The immediate problem that now faced us was terrific. We had in
our area nearly one and a half million German prisoners of war. There
were a further one million German wounded, without medical supplies
and in particular with a shortage of bandages and no anaesthetics. In
addition, there were about one million civilian refugees who had fled
into our area from the advancing Russians; these and "Displaced
Persons*9 were roaming about the country, often looting as they went.
Transportation and communication services had ceased to function.
Agriculture and industry were largely at a standstill. Food was scarce
and there was a serious risk of famine and disease during the coming
months. And to crown it all there was no central government in being,
and the machinery whereby a central government could function no
longer existed.

Here was a pretty pickle!

I was a soldier and I had not been trained to handle anything of this
nature.

However, something had to be done, and done quickly.

Meanwhile I will close this chapter by quoting the last entry made
in my autograph book by the Prime Minister. It will be noticed that
this entry is headed "Chapter X," and the Prime Minister refers to a
"tenth chapter." This is because he wrote, in his own handwriting,
ten pages in my autograph book between August 1942 and May 1945.
Each one was at a definite milestone in the long journey from Alamein,
and was given the title of a chapter. These pages were later photo
graphed and were published by me in a litde booklet entitled Ten
Chapters (Hutchinson and Co.) in June 1946. The autograph book
itself is in my possession and very precious it is.

CHAPTER X

At last the goal is reached.

The terrible enemy has unconditionally surrendered. In loyal
accord with our splendid American Ally, full and friendly contact
has been made with the Russians advancing from the East.

The 2ist Group of Armies, wheeling and striking to the north
had the honour of liberating Holland and Denmark and of receiv
ing and gathering as captive in the space of three or four days
upwards of two millions of the once-renowned German Army.
This record of military glories, predicted or celebrated, now in its
tenth chapter, reaches its conclusion. The fame of the Army Group
like that of the Eighth Army will long shine in history, and other
generations besides our own will honour their deeds and above
all the character, profound strategy and untiring zeal of their

310 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Commander who marched from Egypt through Tripoli, Tunis,
Sicily and southern Italy, and through France, Belgium, Holland
and Germany to the Baltic and the Elbe without losing a battle
or even a serious action.

Winston S. Churchill
MayS, 1945"

CHAPTER 21

Some Thoughts on High Command

in War

IT HAS been iny unique privilege to have commanded during my
career every echelon from a platoon up to and including a Group
of Armies. I say "unique" because I doubt if there is any other
soldier today still serving on the active list in the free world who has
had the same experience.

Times have changed since the campaigns of Marlborough and
Wellington; it could almost be said that they won their campaigns
single-handed. Certainly they were not bothered with the enormous
amount of detailed staff work involved in modern armies. Today a
C.-in-C in the field is the captain of a team, and a large team at that
In the summer of 1945 the question arose whether the nation should
make grants of money to the principal commanders in the field in
recognition of their services, following the precedent of previous wars.
But in modern war, once you start picking out individuals who have
really made a first class contribution to the war effort, great problems
arise. What about those responsible for radar, anti-submarine devices,
intelligence, medical work, and the many whose devoted work in
lower grades made possible the winning of the contest? It was mainly
for these reasons that I made it known in September 1945 that, if
offered a monetary award, I would not accept it. There were, of
course, other reasons.

We were then, financially, almost a bankrupt nation and could
hardly afford to spend about a million sterling on such a purpose.
The average ex-serviceman, officer or other rank, was going to find
life pretty difficult in the immediate post-war years. It would not be
good for him to read of individual soldiers, however much he might
admire and respect them, being given say £100,000 or £50,000 in

311

312 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

addition to their pensions when he (the ex-serviceman) was hard put
to it to support his own wife and family. Millions of people were
going to starve in various parts of the world. I would not have been
able to square my conscience if so large a sum had been given to me,
simply for doing my duty to the best of my ability as so many others
had also done. My view was, and is, that monetary awards, as distinct
from honours from the Crown, are out of date.

High Command today is more complicated than formerly and a
C.-in-C. has got to have a good staff, and a superb Chief of Staff to
co-ordinate its activities. He must also pick his subordinate com
manders with the greatest care, matching the generals to the jobs. He
must know his soldiers, and be recognised by them. I do not believe
the leadership displayed on the Western Front in World War I would
have succeeded in World War II. I would remind the reader that in
World War I although I served in France, I never once saw French
or Haig.

An army today is a self-contained community; it contains every
thing its members need for war, from bullets to blood banks. I will
always remember Churchill's anger when he heard of several dentist's
chairs being landed over the beaches in Normandy! But we have
learnt since the 1914-18 war that by caring for a man's teeth, we keep
him in the battle. The good general must not only win his battles;
he must win them with a minimum of casualties and loss of life.
I learnt during die 1939-45 war that four things contributed to the
saving of life:

1. Blood transfusion.

2. Surgical teams operating well forward in the battle area, so
that a badly wounded man could be dealt with at once without
having to be moved by road to a hospital.

3. Air evacuation direct to a Base hospital many hundreds of
miles in rear, thus saving bumpy journeys by road or raiL

4. Nursing sisters working well forward in the battle area. When
I joined the Eighth Army in 1942, nursing sisters were not
allowed in the forward battle area. I cancelled the order. Their
presence comforted and calmed the nerves of many seriously
wounded men, who then knew they would be properly nursed.
No male nursing orderly can nurse like a woman, though many
think they can.

All these things, and many others like them, have to be in the mind
of the modern general.

On the administrative side there must be a clear-cut, long-term
relationship established between operational intentions and admini
strative resources. Successful administrative planning is dependent on

Some Thoughts on High Command in War 313

anticipation of requirements. A C.-in-C. in the field must, therefore,
always keep his staff fully in his mind as regards forward intentions,
so that the essential administrative preparations can be completed in
time. Many generals have failed in war because they neglected to
ensure that what they wanted to achieve operationally was com
mensurate with their administrative resources; and some have failed
because they over-insured in this respect. The lesson is, there must
always be a nice balance between the two requirements. The acid test
of an officer who aspires to high command is his ability to be able to
grasp quickly the essentials of a military problem, to decide rapidly
what he will do, to make it quite clear to all concerned what he intends
to achieve and how he will do it, and then to see that his subordinate
commanders get on with the job. Above all, he has got to rid himself
of all irrelevant detail; he must concentrate on the essentials, and on
those details and only those details which are necessary to the proper
carrying out of his plan— trusting his staff to effect all the necessary
co-ordination. When all is said and done the greatest quality required
in a commander is "decision"; he must then be able to issue clear
orders and have the "drive" to get things done. Indecision and hesita
tion are fatal in any officer; in a C.-in-C. they are criminal.

No modern C.-in-C. can have any success if he fails to understand
the human approach to war. Battles are won primarily in the hearts
of men; if he loses the battle for the hearts of his men he will achieve
little. This approach, and my general philosophy about command, I
have already tried to explain in Chapter 6.

Throughout any force the organisation for command and control
must be simple and clear cut. In the desert campaign, in Sicily and in
Italy it was so. In the campaign in North- West Europe the organisation
worked well at the start, and with it we won one of the greatest
battles of modern times— in Normandy. Then it was changed, and
smooth and efficient command and control disappeared— as we have
seen.

A commander of national forces is always within his rights to make
dear his views on operational policies to his superior; indeed, it is his
duty to do so. But once his superior commander has given his decision,
there can be no further argument. In this connection I reproduce
below a letter written to me by Eisenhower in February 1946, after
I had sent Mm a copy of a book I had just published. The letter is
noteworthy as making comments on many matters of great interest.

"Dear Monty,

I am truly grateful to you for sending me your book, El Alamein
to the River Sangro. I will carry it home with me tonight and will
start reading it at once. Naturally I take instant advantage of your
kind offer to send me 100 additional copies. Please send them on

314 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

in my care and I will distribute them to various military schools,
including West Point, where they will be of the greatest value
and interest.

Your reaction to the book Soldiers of Democracy is of course
exactly what I should expect. There is nothing I deplore so much
as the writing of so-called military history by people who are con
cerned mainly with rushing, into print so as to catch a market that
is still fresh. It happens that the author of this particular book
dropped in to see me yesterday and I complained about the poor
light in which several very great men were portrayed. He pro
tested that these persons were brought into the book, merely
incidentally, in order to illustrate some particular point and with
no thought of attempting to judge their contributions to the war
effort

The comments you make with respect to that book are even
more applicable to one that is now being published in serial form
and written by my former Naval Aide, Captain Butcher. It is
called My Three Years with Eisenhower. He used the confidential
position he had with me to form his own conclusions about a great
number of things, including personalities and operations, and does
not hesitate to give his judgments with an air of the greatest
authority. Upon reading a portion of the book in Saturday Eve
ning Post I was so embarrassed that I had some correspondence
with Mr. Winston Churchill about the matter and he understands
that I deplore the whole thing as much as he does. Fortunately
he does not hold it against me, as the statements in the book were
made without consultation with me or by my consent. My real
error seems to be that I selected a man to act as my confidential
Aide without checking up to see whether he wanted to be a
"writer" after the war.

I am truly sorry that people like yourself, Alex, Tedder, Brad
ley, Cunningham and so on, cannot, because of holding official
positions, undertake now to write the true story about an un
paralleled experience in international co-operation and under
standing. The fact is that the tremendous accomplishment of the
Allied force is, through its handling by narrow-minded people,
being made to look small and insignificant; great concessions on
the part of two governments in order to establish, field unity are
lost sight of in die anxiety to put over some pettifogging little
idea held in the mind of a writer.

To you personally I can say no more than I have said time and
time again: I have always admired you for definitely outstanding
characteristics that were of the most tremendous value in whip
ping the Germans. Moreover, whenever any question or problem
came to the point that definite decision by me was necessary, you

Some Thoughts on High Command in War 315

never once failed to carry out that decision loyally and with 100
per cent of your effort regardless of what your prior opinions and
recommendations had been. I have written this to you before and
I meant it then just as I mean it now, and if ever you have time to
write anything of your experiences you are at liberty to quote me
verbatim on the subject.

Entirely aside from the damage to British-American friendly
relationship that hundreds of loyal officers labored so hard to
advance, I have the personal fear that writers of the kind we are
now talking about will succeed in damaging warm friendships
that I have formed with men for whom I will always have the
highest regard and admiration. The whole thing makes me a
trifle ill.

Incidentally, one of the defenses made by one of these authors
when I taxed him for bad judgment and inaccuracy, was to pull
out a bunch of clippings taken from the British papers about the
time of the Bulge battle. He said: 'British writers did not hesitate
to criticize you bitterly and unjustly. Why should we be so shy
and retiring?* My answer of course was that those reporters wrote
during the heat of action and were motivated to some extent by
fear. Moreover, in later writings they did their utmost to correct
what they themselves must have felt to have been hasty judgment.
This was an entirely different thing from writing deliberately and
from the attitude of 'pure history/ which these books are cer
tainly not.

I suppose there is no use saying anything further on the point
except that you are free to express my sentiments to anyone who
wants to talk to you about the subject.

Thank you again for sending me the book and I assure you
that I will make excellent use of the additional copies you send
me, when it is convenient for you to do so.

As ever, your friend

Ike"

The point is that honest differences of opinion are almost inevitable
among experienced commanders, especially if they are also men with
very definite views of their own. But such differences must never be
allowed to overshadow the supreme need of Allied co-operation; this
co-operation was brought to great heights under Eisenhower. The
final achievement in the second World War resulted from the good
will of the governments themselves, and from the bigness of the men
who were selected to act in the critical positions— amongst whom
Eisenhower was a shining example.

In November 1945, 1 gave a lecture at the University of St. Andrews
entitled Military Leadership. I tried to equate the lessons of the past

316 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

with the experience of the present To illustrate my arguments I
chose three great captains of the past and examined briefly why they
were leaders, how they led their men, and how as leaders they suc
ceeded or failed. The three I selected were Moses, Cromwell and
Napoleon. The lecture was subsequently included in Forward from
Victory, a book published by me in October 1948 (Hutchinson & Co.).
Each of these three men exercised high command. They had in com
mon an inner conviction which, though founded (and very closely)
on reason, transcended reason. It was this which enabled them at a
certain point— the right one-to take a short cut which took them
straight to their objective, more swiftly and surely than equally careful
but less inspired commanders.
One might put it this way.

There are three types of commanders in the higher grades:

1. Those who have faith and inspiration, but lack the infinite
capacity for taking pains and preparing for every foreseeable
contingency— which is the foundation of all success in war.
These fail.

2. Those who possess the last-named quality to a degree amount
ing to genius. Of this type I would cite Wellington as the
perfect example.

3. Those who, possessing this quality, are inspired by a faith and
conviction which enables them, when they have done every
thing possible in the way of preparation and when the situa
tion favours boldness, to throw their bonnet over the moon.
There are moments in war when, to win all, one has to do this.
I believe such a moment occurred in August 1944 after the
Battle of Normandy had been won, and it was missed. Nelson
was the perfect example of this— when he broke the line at
St. Vincent, when he went straight in to attack at the Nile
under the fire of the shore batteries and with night falling,
and at the crucial moment at Trafalgar.

No commander ever took greater care than Nelson to prepare
against every possible contingency, but no one was ever so well able
to recognise the moment when, everything having been done that
reason can dictate, something must be left to chance or faith. No
commander was ever so careful to ensure that "every captain knew
what was in his Admiral's mind.**

In my own limited experience certain "moments'* come to mind—
at Mareth when we switched the main thrust line to the western
flank on the 23rd March 1943, in Normandy on the 23rd August 1944
when I advocated a strong thrust on the left flank of the Allied advance
to finish the war quickly, and at Arnhem on the i/th September 1944.

Moses and Cromwell believed intensely in a divine mission, which

Some Thoughts on High Command in War 317

never failed them in battle; Napoleon in a human destiny, which in
the end did.

I believe that the one great commander who did not possess this
quality of inner conviction was Wellington. One cannot too much
admire his foresight, industry, patience and meticulous care. Yet he
sometimes lost part of the fruits of victory through an inability to
soar from the known to seize the unknown. Napoleon never surpassed
Wellington's flawless handling of his command at Salamanca and
Vittoria, but the defeated French after Vittoria would never have
escaped to fight another day had Napoleon— or Cromwell— been in
command.

To exercise high command successfully one has to have an infinite
capacity for taking pains and for careful preparation; and one has also
to have an inner conviction which at times will transcend reason.
Having fought, possibly over a prolonged period, for the advantage
and gained it, there then comes the moment for boldness. When that
moment comes, will you throw your bonnet over the mill and soar
from the known to seize the unknown? In the answer to this question
lies the supreme test of generalship in high command.

CHAPTER 22

The Control of Post- War Germany:
The First Steps

THE PROBLEM

a THE 8th May 1945 the war in Europe ended officially, repre
sentatives of the German High Command having signed the
act of military surrender. But it must be noted that this sur
render was made by the high command and not by the German
Government of Admiral Doenitz which, after Hitler's reported death
in Berlin, claimed to represent the German nation. Indeed, the Allies
refused to recognise such a government and it was later arrested at
Flensburg. We were therefore faced with a situation very different
from that which had been envisaged at the meetings between
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin when they had discussed the Allied
organisation for the occupation of Germany. They had agreed that a
Control Council should be set up in Berlin consisting of a British,
an American, a Russian and a French member. Each was to have
under him a Deputy and his own civil and military staff, with a cen
tral inter-allied secretariat. The four members, meeting together in
Berlin, were to dictate to a central German government how the
country was to be run. Furthermore, Germany was to be divided into
zones; each of the Allies would occupy a zone within which it would
supervise the execution of the dictates of the Control Council, which
would come into being on the unconditional surrender of the German
government.

However, when the time came the Allies did not recognise any
German government which could surrender and therefore the Control
Council could not automatically come into operation. No central gov
ernment machine existed through which the Control Council could
work. Berlin had been so destroyed that the Russians said it was not

318

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 319

possible to govern Germany from it Although Eisenhower had been
appointed a member of the Control Council, no British or Russian
member had yet been nominated. In the area occupied by the Western
Allies, therefore, SHAEF continued to function as an operational
headquarters, and we had to begin to govern Germany with the
Military Government machine.

This was, of course, the direct result of the policy of "unconditional
surrender," which policy was, in my opinion, a very great mistake—
and was now to be proved so.

In the area occupied by 21 Army Group there were appalling
civilian problems to be solved. Over one million civilian refugees
had fled into the area before the advancing Russians. About one
Trillion German wounded were in hospital in the area, with no medical
supplies. Over one and a half million unwounded German fighting
men had surrendered to 21 Army Group on the 5th May and were
now prisoners of war, with all that that entailed. Food would shortly
be exhausted. The transport and communication services had ceased
to function, and industry and agriculture were largely at a standstill.
The population had to be fed, housed, and kept free of disease. It was
going to be a race for time whether this could be achieved before the
winter began; if by that time the population was not fed, and housed,
famine and disease would run riot through Germany and that would
prove a most serious embarrassment to the western Allies.

Finally, there was the impact of the Russians on the Western forces.
From their behaviour it soon became clear that the Russians, though
a fine fighting race, were in fact barbarous Asiatics who had never
enjoyed a civilisation comparable to that of the rest of Europe. Their
approach to every problem was utterly different from ours and their
behaviour, especially in their treatment of women, was abhorrent to
us. In certain sectors of the Russian Zone there were practically no
Germans left; they had all fled before the onward march of the bar
barians, with the result that in the Western zones the crowd of refugees
was so great that the problems of food and housing seemed almost
insoluble. I wrote the following in my diary at that time:

"Out of the impact of the Asiatics on the European culture, a
new Europe has been born. It is too early yet to say what shape
it will take. One can only say it will be wholly unlike the old
Europe. Its early infancy and growth will be of supreme impor
tance to our civilisation."

It was vital to tackle this vast problem with the greatest boldness
and speed. Before the war ended I had foreseen this need, and on the
24th April had informed the War Office that in my opinion the man
who was to be C.-in-C. of the British Zone, and British member of the
Control Council, must be appointed at once. Meetings and conferences

320 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

in connection with Control Commission matters were taking place
daily at my headquarters in Germany and also in London, and no
body knew who was going to be the boss. We learnt by bitter ex
perience in the war that to work on the principle of the absentee
commander is most dangerous and always leads to trouble.

But I could not get Whitehall to take any action in the matter.
However, for the time being I was the boss and I decided to get on
with the job in my own way. If, later, someone else was appointed,
good luck to him. Such procrastination on the part of the British
Government at this time was, of course, annoying to me personally;
but it could become dangerous to the cause. What was needed was
decision, followed by action. I therefore decided to make my own
plan for the British Zone and to implement it without further delay.

The first thing was to issue very strict orders about looting and
the use of German transport facilities. In the heat of battle certain
actions are often overlooked which in peace conditions constitute a
most serious offence. Many units had taken German staff cars into use,
and one or two generals were driving about in the captured cars of
German field-marshals. I decided that one and all must be pulled up
with a jerk; if Germany was to recover quickly, she would need trans
port for communication and distribution purposes.

On the 6th May I therefore issued orders on these matters. Looting
by individuals, or bodies of individuals, was of course forbidden at
any time and I made it dear that any contravention of this order
would be tried by court martial, whatever the rank of the individual
concerned. If any commander or unit wanted something for the col
lective use of officers or men, application would be made to the
proper authority and the articles in question would then be requisi
tioned in a constitutional manner. The same rules would apply to motor
cars and other vehicles.

The basis of my plan in the British Zone was to work through the
German command organisation in the first instance, and to issue my
orders regarding the disposal of the German forces to Field-Marshal
Busch, the German C.-in-C. in N.W. Europe. He was to have his
headquarters in Schleswig-Holstein. His Chief of Staff, General Kinzel,
with a small staff and a team of liaison officers, would be at my main
headquarters.

Busch was to have under "him;

General Lindemann— commanding the German forces in Den
mark, who would work under the SHAEF mission in Copen
hagen (in charge of General Dewing).

General Blumentritt— commanding the German forces between
the Baltic and the Weser, who would be under Second British
Army (General Dempsey).

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 321

General Blaskowitz— commanding the German forces between the
Weser and Western Holland, who would be under First Cana
dian Army (General Crerar).

German army boundaries were to be altered to coincide with
British boundaries. All German troops were to be moved into penin
sulas along the coastline, and then sealed off in those peninsulas with
their backs against the sea. There was no other way of dealing with a
million and a half prisoners; we could not put such a number into
camps or P.O.W. cages. The selected peninsulas were on the east and
west coastlines of Schleswig-Holstein, in the Cuxhaven area, and
about Wilhelmshaven and Emden.

Once in these areas, prisoners were to be documented and checked
over. They were then to be demobilised and directed back to their
civil vocations, as and when they were needed and work became
available— the farmers, the miners, the post office workers, the civil
servants, etc., etc. When they left the P.O.W. areas to go back to civil
work, they were to be dressed in plain clothes.

I then organised the British Zone into Corps Districts for occupa
tional duties, as follows:

Berlin District Certain troops to be held ready to go

(General Lyne) to Berlin when Russian agreement

was obtained.

Schleswig-Holstein 8 Corps, with two divisions, and one

(General E. H. Barker) armoured brigade.

Hanover 30 Corps, with three divisions and one

(General Horrocks) armoured brigade.

Westphalia i Corps, with four divisions and one

(General Crocker) armoured brigade.

Certain other formations were kept by me as reserve in case trouble
developed. I had also been given a "stand still" order regarding the
destruction of German weapons and equipment, in case they might
be needed by the Western Allies for any reason, and all these had to
be guarded.

My purpose was to re-establish orderly local government in the
British Zone by using my military command organisation of corps,
division, brigade and regimental headquarters. These would have
areas corresponding to the local civil counties, boroughs, rural districts,
etc., and in all cases would work through the appropriate civil organ
isations. I laid it down that the requirements of the civilian popula
tion were to be met in the following order: food, housing, and the
prevention of disease. Thereafter, transportation and many other
problems would have to be tackled.

The greatest problem was food and much would depend on the

322 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

coming harvest. I ordered that the armed forces were not to purchase
or requisition any foodstuffs from the civil population; the latter would
need it all themselves.

It seemed to me that only by working on these lines could we
establish quickly some form of orderly control and get a grip on the
chaotic situation that existed in the British Zone. I had suddenly
become responsible for the government and well-being of about
twenty million Germans. Tremendous problems would be required
to be handled and if they were not solved before the winter began,
many Germans would die of starvation, exposure and disease.

EXCHANGE OF VISITS WITH THE RUSSIANS

The Russian forces in contact with 21 Army Group belonged to the
White Russian Army Group commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky,
who later became Minister of Defence in Poland. On the 7th May he
had visited me at Wismar, where I entertained him and some of his
officers to lunch. Rokossovsky was an imposing figure, tall, very good-
looking, and well dressed; I understand he was a bachelor and was
much admired by ladies. He invited me to visit him at his H.O.
about twenty miles inside the Russian area, and I accepted for the
loth May. The Russians were clearly anxious to make a good impres
sion and they sent a special envoy to the H.Q. of the 6th Airborne
Division in Wismar to find out what sort of entertainment I liked,
and what were my tastes and habits. The envoy began by asking what
sort of wine I preferred; he was told that I disliked wine, never drank
any alcohol, and preferred water. He then said they proposed to
produce some very fine cigars at lunch. Did I like cigars? He was told
I did not smoke. By this time he was somewhat shaken; but he had
one more suggestion to make. They had some very fine women and
dancing girls and they would produce these for the Field-Marshal
He was told that the Field-Marshal did not like women. That finished
him and he exclaimed: "He doesn't drink, doesn't smoke, and doesn't
like women. What the devil does he do all day?"

However, an agreed programme was drawn up without difficulty
and I motored into the Russian Zone to visit Rokossovsky at the H.Q.
of the White Russian Army Group.

Two things interested me during that drive— I did not see one single
German civilian as they had all fled into the British area; and secondly,
I was impressed by the Russian women police, whose traffic control
was most efficient The visit was a great success, and after an enor
mous feast the Russians produced a concert party which entertained
us for about an hour with songs and dancing.

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 323

Among the staff that accompanied me was a young gunner major
who had recently joined the team of liaison officers at my Tac Head
quarters. He was a delightful person, very popular with everyone,
and the Russian set out to make him drunk— and they succeeded.
This was concealed from me and when it was time to leave he was
taken ahead and put on board my aircraft before I arrived, being
deposited in the lavatory at the rear end of the cabin. When I arrived
and boarded the aircraft I asked if we were all present, and was told
we were. As I did not see the young major I asked where he was, and
was told he was in the lavatory; I then gave the order to take off.
As we taxied to the end of the runway the Russian fired a salute of
21 guns. The major in the lavatory considered he must take part, so
he drew his revolver and fired it through the window, round for round
with the Russian artillery. When he had finished his six rounds, he
continued to operate his revolver and "clicking*' noises were heard
coming from the lavatory for some time. I understand that an ADC
finally persuaded him to discontinue and to go to sleep in the lavatory.
When he arrived at our own airfield and disembarked, I was some
what suspicious and asked to see the young major. I was told he was
not well and he would be taken back to Tac Headquarters in an
ambulance.

There are occasions in this life when it is advisable to leave things
alone and say nothing. But on arrival back at Tac Headquarters I
demanded to be told the trutL I then said I would see tie officer
concerned but was asked if I would delay the interview for forty-eight
hours; he had consumed so much vodka, and had mixed his drinks to
such an extent, that it was considered by experts that it would be
two days before he "surf aced." That delay was good for all of us. The
interview duly took place and he was very upset I explained that I
could not have officers on my staff at Tac Headquarters who were
not able to go anywhere with me and be able to carry out their duties
at all times; he had failed to measure up to this standard, and would
have to go. But as I looked at him my heart warmed towards him;
he was the very best type of young British officer who might well rise
to the highest ranks in the Army, and I could not let one indiscretion
ruin a promising career. On leaving me he would lose his temporary
rank of major and revert to his substantive rank. I told him I would
send him back to regimental duty with orders that he was to be given
the command of a battery as early as possible, which would thus make
him a major again, and that no official report would be made of the
incident He was, of course, delighted, and we parted good friends.
The next time I met him he was an instructor at the Royal Military
Academy, Sandhurst: conspicuously sober and with no revolver!

I had one further experience of ceremonial Russian visits; this took

324 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

place on the loth June at Supreme Headquarters at Frankfurt. A few
days earlier, on the 5th June, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief had
met in Berlin to sign a declaration regarding the defeat of Germany
and the assumption of joint responsibility with regard to that country
by the Governments of the United Kingdom, U.S. A., U.S.S.R., and
France. At that meeting Zhukov informed Eisenhower and myself
that Stalin had conferred on each of us the Order of Victory, a Soviet
decoration which had never been given previously to any foreigner.
Apart from the honour, the decoration is of great intrinsic value, being
in the form of a five-pointed star beautifully set with rubies and
diamonds. After some discussion Eisenhower invited Zhukov to visit
his headquarters at Frankfurt for the presentation ceremony. I said
that as I had served throughout the campaign in Europe under Eisen
hower's command, I would like to receive the decoration at the same
time, and this was agreed.

Eisenhower had his headquarters at the I.G. Farben building in
Frankfurt, a magnificent modern building on high ground overlooking
the desolate and bombed city; the building itself had received prac
tically no damage. On arrival there early on the loth I had a short
private talk with Eisenhower, during which he gave me the Distin
guished Service Medal, the highest American decoration which can be
conferred on a soldier of another nation. I had already been made a
Chief Commander of the American Legion of Merit, Eisenhower
having pinned that Presidential order on me in Sicily in 1943. Later in
the morning Zhukov arrived with a large entourage, composed mostly
of photographers and pressmen. The decoration ceremony took place
in Eisenhower's office. Then on a large balcony outside Zhukov pre
sented medals to twenty-four British and American officers of Supreme
Headquarters; this was a most disorganised and undignified spectacle,
the photographers all jockeying for position. However, the decorations
were in the end conferred without mishap although it seemed to me
that some may easily have got handed medals who were not meant to
get them!

Before lunch some 1700 American and British aircraft flew past in
formation giving an impressive display of Western air power— which
was not lost on the Russians. During lunch the Americans produced a
coloured cabaret show, with swing music and elaborate dancing by
Negro women who were naked above the waist line. The Russians had
never seen or heard anything like this before and their eyes almost
popped out of their heads! Nonetheless they enjoyed it thoroughly and
encored every time. The whole organisation of the day was on a
most elaborate scale, so was the lavishness of the welcome extended
by the Americans. It was a day which revealed undeniably the wealth
and power of the United States.

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 325

SIC TRANSIT . . ,

On the yth June I flew to Antwerp to receive the freedom of the
city. After the ceremony there was a civic luncheon at the Hdtel de
Ville; this was a tremendous affair, with very rich food and many
courses. Rich food always upsets me and it certainly did so on this
occasion; I began to feel ill soon after lunch and asked that the
remainder of the programme should be cut short, so that I could return
to the airfield and fly back to my headquarters in Germany. This was
at once arranged, my car was summoned, and I drove through streets
lined by cheering citizens— with myself sitting on the floor of the car
being violently sick. That sickness was exactly what was needed, and
once it had taken place I felt well again. But the floor of the car was
not in a good state and I apologised very humbly to the driver, who
belonged to the local military headquarters and who had never driven
me before. When I apologised for the mess in his car, he drew himself
up, looked me in the face, and said: "Sir, it's an honour." And he
meant it

BRITISH MEMBER OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL

IN GERMANY

As the days passed after the end of the German war I became
increasingly worried at the lack of any proper organisation to govern
Germany.

I had been informed privately in April that I would probably be
made responsible for the long-term government of the British Zone;
but the proposed appointment was delayed, with the result that there
was a serious lack of co-ordination between the British section of the
Control Commission in London and the Military Government staff
working under me in Germany. I therefore flew to London on the
i4th May to impress on the Prime Minister the urgent need for a
decision in the matter, so that the man appointed could co-ordinate
the planning of the Control Commission with the practical activities
of Military Government. I arrived in England at a politically unfavour
able moment The Coalition Government was coming to its expected
end and the prospects of an early general election discouraged Cabi
net Ministers from taking any but the most vital decisions. My task
was to persuade the Prime Minister that the problems of government
in Germany were of such importance that an immediate decision was
vital. I succeeded. The Prime Minister decided to appoint me Com-
mander-in-Chief of the British Forces of Occupation and British
Member of the Allied Control Council in Germany. I asked that Lieut-

326 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

General Sir Ronald Weeks, D.C.I.G.S. at the War Office (now Lord
Weeks), should be appointed as my Deputy, and this was agreed. The
announcement of these appointments was made on the 2sfod May.

The next day I assembled in London the heads of the British civil
divisions of the Control Commission and spoke to them of the existing
problems in Germany. We did not know each other and it was essential
that they should hear from me personally, in broad outline, how I
proposed to tackle these problems.

I explained that having conquered Germany, all we could do imme
diately was to impose Military Government on it, and that that was
being done— through the Army. But that must not be allowed to last
too long; we must get civil control re-established and that would mean
the civil divisions of the Control Commission dealing with the Germans
themselves. It was therefore essential that the short-term planning of
the Military Government regime should have a definite relation to the
long-term planning of the civil divisions. To achieve this object, we
must all be together. We would make little progress so long as the
civil divisions remained in London; my object was to get them de
ployed in Germany as quickly as possible. They could not go to Berlin
yet; that could come later. But they could come to the British Zone
at once and, after all, that was where the problem lay. I then explained
my own methods of working, and how I used the Chief of Staff system.

This talk did good. It showed the civilian element in the Control
Commission that we wanted them to join us in Germany as soon as
possible, because without them we couldn't do the job.

MY VISIT TO PARIS

Having given orders about the deployment in Germany of the
British element of the Control Commission, so that we could all be
together, I returned to my headquarters via Paris. I had been asked
to open the British Military Exhibition in that city on the 25th. Paris
turned out en masse and £he reception I received was stupendous. I
was decorated by General de Gaulle with the Grand Croix of the
Legion of Honour at a colourful parade in the courtyard of the
Involutes, and later in the day I opened the exhibition. I decided to
speak mainly in English but occasionally to turn over to French, as
I thought this would please the audience. I had some difficulty com
posing the French sentences as my knowledge of that language was
still of the English schoolboy type; however, with the assistance of
certain members of my staff who professed to be fluent in the language,
the French sentences were drafted. This is what I said:

"i. It is my privilege and a great pleasure to speak to you today
in your famous capital— this fair city which, better than any

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 327

other, exemplifies the spirit of our long European history. To
my shame I have to confess that I have not visited Paris for
ten years.

2. Today I come here to open this British Military Exhibition.
In it we seek to show you something of the part played by the
armies of the British Empire in this war— which now happily
is ended in Europe.

In the early days of the war the British and French Empires
suffered some grievous wounds, and to many of our enemies
those wounds looked mortal. The British Empire reeled from
these blows, but in due course managed to fight back.

France was struck a heavy blow, and for a while the home
country lay prostrate under the heel of the invader. But though
you can occupy a country you cannot quell the spirit of a
fighting race. Elsewhere the fight went on, and it grew in
volume as the years passed.

I/esprit frangais vivait toujours. Cette flamme sacree n*a
jainais 6te eteinte. On nourrissait la flamme. Cette flamme a
jailli finalement des abimes lorsque vous et vos allies avez
chasse Tennemi du sol ensanglante de la France: magnifique
episode dont la France a bien le droit d'etre fiere.

Je salue les soldats de la France, mes compagnons d'armes
de tant de batailles.

3. I have many friends among the soldiers of France. And of the
ones I have known best in this war I would mention General
Leclerc. This gallant man fought his way with a small force
from Central Africa and joined the Eighth Army in Tripoli in
January 1943. With no obligation to do so, he freely placed
himself under my command; he played a notable part in the
Mareth battle and in the advance to Tunis, and was 'in at
the kill* in Africa. A fine story and typical of a soldier of
France.

4. But it is not only of your fighting men that I would speak
today. The liberation of France has restored to us that inex
haustible well of literature, art, and science from which we
have drawn so freely in the past. The achievements of the
French genius, of Racine, Cezanne, Berlioz and Pasteur, are
part of the heritage of our civilization: above all for the com
patriots of Shakespeare and Newton.

At this moment Europe needs France. We need not only
your soldiers, your writers, your scientists, but also the simple
but enduring virtues of French family life.

It is not surprising that France has played such a notable
part in these fields. Great arts flourish only among fighting
peoples, and the people of France are a fighting race.

328 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

5. Des ces jours qui suivent la defaite totale de TAllemagne vous
reprenez votre destin historique. Pendant les siecles passes les
Anglais et les Frangais se sont souvent regard^s en adversaires.

AujourdTmi nous marchons ensemble.

Vive La France!"

Later in the day large crowds assembled outside the British Embassy
where I was staying, and kept calling for me. Finally I went out on
a balcony to thank them. I made a very short speech in English; but
the crowd still kept cheering and showed no signs of dispersing; so
I made a second appearance on the balcony and said: "Allez-vous-en."
That finished it! There were shouts of laughter and they all went
away, seemingly quite happy.

THE GERMANS BECOME RESTIVE

I got back to Germany on the 26th May and learnt that there was
disquiet in the German prisoner-of-war camps and among the German
population of the British Zone; they did not know how they were
to be treated in the future. I should explain that I had already experi
enced trouble with the German military command organisation, which
I had kept "in being" in order to implement the surrender and to deal
with the enormous numbers of prisoners.

The German military leaders, having been saved from the Russians,
were only too willing to be friends with the British and to do what
ever was wanted. But in return for this co-operative attitude they
expected to be treated as allies of the British against the Russians, and
in some cases my orders had been queried and delay had occurred in
carrying them out. On the nth May I had sent for Field-Marshal
Busch, the German C.-in-C. in North-West Europe, and told him that
this attitude was entirely unacceptable. I explained that I was making
use of him and his headquarters so long as the job of implementing
the surrender could be more efficiently carried out by that method.
If he did not carry out his orders promptly and efficiently, I would
remove him from his command and find some other senior German
officer to do the job. In the last resort the British Army would do the
job themselves; but this method would result in delay which could
only cause further hardship to the German civil population, and this
I was anxious to avoid. He was to understand that the German Army
had been utterly defeated in the field and must now accept the con
sequences of that defeat.

After this I had no more trouble with Busch or with any other Ger
man commander. When therefore I discovered at the end of May that
the Germans generally in the British Zone were becoming restive, and

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 329

anxious about their future, I decided to issue them a message which
would tell them what I proposed to do—in exactly the same way that
I had issued personal messages to the soldiers in the armies under
my command during the war. The war messages called forth no
political comment so far as I was aware. But these messages to the
twenty million Chilian Germans in the British Zone were viewed with
some mistrust in Whitehall. Was I becoming a military dictator who
would seize power? And so on. Later the need for them was queried
by the Labour Government. But I stuck to my guns and refused to be
"seen off" by my political masters; so long as I was responsible I was
determined to use my own methods. I give the first message in full
below,

TO THE POPULATION OF THE BBTITSH AEEA IN GERMANY
30TH MAY 1945

**i. I have been appointed by the British Government to command
and control the area occupied by the British Army.

This area will be governed for the present by Military
Government under my orders.

2. My immediate object is to establish a simple and orderly life
for the whole community.

The first step will be to see that the population has:

(a) food

(b) housing

(c) freedom from disease
The harvest must be gathered in.

The means of transportation must be re-established.
The postal services must be restarted.
Certain industries must be got going again.
All this will mean much hard work for everyone.

3. Those who have committed war crimes according to inter
national law will be dealt with in proper fashion.

The German people will work under my orders to provide
the necessities of life for the community, and to restore the
economic life of the country.

4. There are in the British Area a very large number of German
soldiers, sailors and airmen, and all these are now being as
sembled in certain localities.

The German Wehnnacht, and other armed forces, will be
disarmed and disbanded.

All German soldiers, sailors, and airmen, are being sorted
out by trades and occupations. In a few days they will start
to be discharged from the armed forces so that they can get on
with the work. The most urgent need is the harvest; therefore
workers on the land are going first; men of other occupations

330 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

and trades will be discharged to work as soon as it can be
arranged.

5. I will see to it that all German soldiers and civilians are kept
informed by radio and newspapers of how the work is going
on. The population will be told what to do. I shall expect it to
be done willingly and efficiently."

THE PROBLEM OF FKATERNISATION WITH THE GERMANS

In March 1945, prior to the assault across the Rhine and when it
was clear that the German war was coming to an end, I began to
consider the problems which would arise when our soldiers were
living amidst the German population under peace conditions. To what
degree should we fraternise with our former enemies? I decided that
one and all must be given guidance in this very difficult matter. We
should be firm to begin with, and later could relax our rules; a reverse
procedure would be unsound. And so I decided to issue a personal
letter to officers and men under my command. It was printed in card
form so that it was easily carried in the pocket of the battledress tunic.
The object of the letter was to explain the problem to officers and
men before it became a serious issue, and to give them a doctrine on
which to base their actions.

I told them that if we mixed freely with the Germans, went to
their houses, danced with their girls, and so on, it would be resented
by our own families in England and by millions of people who had
suffered under the Gestapo. When we entered Germany it would be
too soon to distinguish between good and bad Germans; we must
hold back and not fraternise until we could see our way clear.

The soldiers accepted the basic doctrine laid down in the letter, and
we started well. But when fighting ceased and the peace-time occupa
tion of Germany was becoming established, it was clear to me that we
must review our orders about fraternisation. While the soldier was
fighting his opportunities for friendly intercourse with the civil popu
lation were in any event restricted; but when the fighting ended, and
the soldier had some leisure for recreation, it became necessary to
"let-up" by degrees on the rule of complete non-fraternisation. Such
an order would simply not be obeyed. We must be sensible about it.
Furthermore, if we were ever to re-educate the German population it
would be a good thing to mix freely with them and teach them our
standards of freedom and individual responsibility. I had already
given the Germans "the form" in my first message. It is now necessary
to tell them why we did not fraternise with them. And so I decided
to issue a message on this subject to the German people and it ran as
follows:

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 331

TO THE POPULATION OF THE BRITISH AKEA IN GERMANY

lo-m JUNE 1945

"You have wondered, no doubt, why our soldiers do not smile
when you wave your hands, or say 'Good morning;' in the streets,
or play with the children. It is because our soldiers are obeying
orders. You do not like it. Nor do our soldiers. We are naturally
friendly and forgiving people. But the orders were necessary;
and I will tell you why.

In the last war of 1914, which your rulers began, your Army
was defeated; your generals surrendered; and in the Peace Treaty
of Versailles your rulers admitted that the guilt of beginning the
war was Germany's. But the surrender was made in France. The
war never came to your country; your cities were not damaged,
like the cities of France and Belgium; and your armies marched
home in good order. Then your rulers began to spread the story
(legend) that your armies were never really defeated, and later
they denied the war guilt clauses of the Peace Treaty. They told
you that Germany was neither guilty nor defeated; and because
the war had not come to your country many of you believed it,
and you cheered when your rulers began another war.

Again, after years of waste and slaughter and misery, your
armies have been defeated. This time the Allies were determined
that you should learn your lesson— not only that you have been
defeated, which you must know by now, but that you, your
nation, were again guilty of beginning the war. For if that is not
made clear to you, and your children, you may again allow your
selves to be deceived by your rulers, and led into another war.

During the war your rulers would not let you know what the
world was thinking of you. Many of you seemed to think that
when our soldiers arrived you could be friends with them at once,
as if nothing much had happened. But too much has happened
for that. Our soldiers have seen their comrades shot down, their
homes in ruins, their wives and children hungry. They have seen
terrible things in many countries where your rulers took the war.
For those things, you will say you are not responsible— it was
your rulers. But they were found by the German nation; every
nation is responsible for its rulers, and while they were successful
you cheered and laughed. That is why our soldiers do not smile
at you. This we have ordered, this we have done, to save your
selves, to save your children, to save the world from another war.
It will not always be so. For we are Christian forgiving people,
and we like to smile and be friendly. Our object is to destroy the
evil of the Nazi system; it is too soon to be sure that this has
been done.

332 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

You are to read this to your children, if they are old enough,
and see that they understand. Tell them why it is that the British
soldier does not smile."

My next object was to relax by stages the complete non-fraternisa
tion order and, while doing so, to keep in the closest agreement with
Eisenhower's policy in the American Zone. The British soldier has
always been fond of children and on the 12th June I relaxed the order
to the extent that soldiers might speak to, and play with, children.
They were, of course, doing it anyway.

In July I relaxed the rules still further, allowing conversation with
Germans in the streets and public places but forbidding troops to
enter German homes. Finally in September 1945 I raised the subject
in the Control Council and got it agreed that tie ban on fraternisation
should be lifted, the rules to be the same in each zone.

We were then left with only two rules— no members of the armed
forces were to be billeted with Germans, nor were they allowed to
marry them.

It was a great relief to get this matter settled. I had never liked the
orders which we had had to issue; but it was the Allied policy. After
the German war had been over for some weeks it became practically
impossible to enforce the non-fraternisation orders. The British soldier
is an intensely friendly person; he is kind and gentle in victory, and
is chivalrous to his enemies. He is usually liked by the inhabitants of
other countries because of his knack, despite his ignorance of the local
language, of fitting in with the people and making himself at home:
which is sometimes called "getting his feet under the table." That is
why he is such a good representative of his country abroad. It was
almost hopeless to stop him talking to the Germans.

THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE GERMANS
DURING THIS PERIOD

In the days that followed the surrender, the general attitude of the
Germans, both civilians and soldiers, was on the whole correct. They
were willing to carry out whatever orders were issued to them, their
chief fear being that they might be handed over to the Russians. The
arrest and interrogation of Himmler is of interest in this connection.
He left Flensburg on the gth May under an assumed name, intending
to roam the country for some weeks until the tumult of victory had
died down. He then hoped to obtain an interview with me so that he
could expound his views on the situation. He was, however, arrested
by a British patrol on the 2ist May and taken to an internment camp
where he eventually disclosed his identity. He needed no encourage-

The Control of Post- War Germany: The Fkst Steps 333

ment to speak. He said that before leaving Flensburg he had called
off all German resistance movements and that for some time before
then he had been urging the conclusion of peace with the Western
Allies. His purpose in seeking an interview with me was to stress that
sooner or later there would be another war to stop the march of the
Asiatic hordes into Western Europe, led by Russia, Now that Ger
many was beaten, Britain was left alone to face the Asiatic onslaught.
It was essential to save the fighting man-power of Germany from
falling into Russian hands, since it would be needed to fight with the
British against the Russians in the near future— such a war, in his view,
being inevitable. This attitude of mind as expounded by Himmler was
general throughout the civilians in the British Zone. Subsequently,
while being searched to ascertain if he carried poison, Himmler bit
on a concealed phial and committed suicide.

At the end of 1945 ^e following conversation between a British
officer and a German boy was published, in translation, in the Rhine
Army Intelligence Review. It shows the type of young chap we had
to deal with.

THE BOY FROM THE WAFFEX SS

"He is 19 years old, fair haired, well built, good-looking. An
officer saw him in an internment camp and the following con
versation ensued:

O: Why are you here?

SS: Waffen SS, sir.

O: Did you volunteer or were you put into it?

SS: Volunteered

O: Why?

SS: Most of my friends were already in it, so I joined too.

O: Did you see any atrocities?

SS: I never saw any myself, but I know they have happened.

O: Did you believe in National Socialism?

SS: Of course I did. What else do you expect? My father was
an admiral. Both my parents were convinced Nazis. At school I
was taught National Socialism; in the Hitler Youth I was taught
National Socialism; in the SS I was taught National Socialism.

O: How were you arrested?

SS: I was wounded and in hospital near our home. As an SS
man I was under arrest there. My parents came to see me. My
father said SS men would be imprisoned for twenty years; he
heard it over the wireless. There was no alternative for me, I
should escape, he said; and my mother agreed. Then they went
away and committed suicide. I have always obeyed my parents
and it was their last wish that I should escape, and I did not want
to be imprisoned for twenty years. I fled. I tried to get a job as

334 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

a forestry apprentice. It didn't work— eventually I was arrested
again.

O: Do you still believe in Nazism?

SS: No, but I am trying to sort it out You see, for the first
time in my life I hear the other side. I am 19. I only knew one
thing— National Socialism; now I begin to see other things. For
the first time in my life I am going to church. My parents had not
allowed it Now I think I can find something there. I don't know
yet. But, for God's sake, give me a chance.

O: But has it never occurred to you that there was something
inherently bad in National Socialism?

SS: No, I did not know about the concentration camps and of
the atrocities. I only heard at the very end.

O: What about -the injustice of the racial theory?

SS: Why injustice?

O: Well, why should a man be treated differently just because
he belongs to another race?

SS: But if it's an inferior race?

O: This is quite a wrong term; we are all human beings.

SS: No, I don't agree. You cannot tell me that you believe a
Negro is not inferior to us—to you and me.

O: He might be in some ways, but not because he is a Negro.
He may perhaps be less civilised, or less intelligent or of lower
moral character, but he is still a human being and has to be treated
as such.

SS: But surely you cannot treat all men alike.

O: No, but it is not a question of race, but, as I have tried to
explain, a question of individual value. I prefer a decent Negro to
a criminal Englishman. I treat everybody according to his moral
value. It may be that there are more valuable people among the
English who have the benefit of an old culture and education than
among the Negroes. Even so, I respect the uncivilised Negro as a
human being, perhaps more than the uncivilised Englishman.

SS: I see what you mean. In effect by treating them as individ
uals it sorts itself out anyhow that more Englishmen deserve
recognition as Valuable' than Negroes, but the principle remains
you do not go by race but by an ethical conception of the individ
ual. I think you are right

O: You only need to think and you will see the gross injustices
and immorality of Nazism.

SS: But how could it ever occur to me? The only time I came
into conflict with the Nazi organisation was over something quite
plain that I could see.

O: What was it?

SS: I am very keen on tennis. But, whenever I wanted to play,

The Control of Post-War Germany: The First Steps 335

there was always duty in die Hitler Youth. The duty was silly
and I did not go. There was a lot of fuss over it, but in the end
I won.

O: You should now think and have the courage to come to
decisions just in the same way.

SS: Yes, that is what I am trying to do. But what have I to look
forward to? My parents are dead and I am a prisoner. Germany
is destroyed. Do you think I'll ever get out?

O: Yes.

SS: But don't you think my attempted escape will be held
against me? It was very silly, but I told you how it came about.

O: I certainly think it will be held against you. However, if
you have not committed any crime I am certain that you will
eventually be released. In the meantime you have leisure to think
and to continue on the lines you told me about The main thing
is not to lose courage. You have been misled, now find your own
way out, keep trying and help to rebuild from the debris.

SS: I have every intention of doing so. But you must under
stand, most of us here, especially the younger ones, are in the same
fix as I am. We cannot teach each other much, we have no books
or things to read and no lectures from outside. I wish you could
do something about this. So far my mind has been made up for
me; now I want to make it up myself."

CHAPTER 23

Difficulties with the Russians Begin

ON- THE asrd May 1945, &e K^g signed a declaration giving me
full powers under the Great Seal to sign the Allied declaration
regarding the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany,
and to negotiate with other Powers and States about all matters rela
tive to that surrender. I was later directed to ensure that the provisions
of the declaration were strictly carried out The actual signing cere
mony, and the inaugural meeting of the Control Council, were to
take place in Berlin on the 5th June, so I arrived at the Templehof
airfield at i p.m. on that day, having flown up from the British Zone.
I was met by a number of senior Russian officers in the midst of a
jostling crowd of pressmen of every nationality. After inspecting a
guard of honour of tough-looking young soldiers, the British delegation
was driven to a group of small villas in a suburb which had been
placed at our disposal. We were then left to ourselves, with one
Russian officer as our host. I asked to see Marshal Zhukov but was
told he was busy. I then became very insistent and said that if I was
not taken to see the Marshal I would leave Berlin and return to the
British Zone— which, of course, I could hardly have done!

However, this did the trick and I was taken to Marshal Zhukov's
residence, which was in fact quite close to our group of villas. I was
delighted to meet the man about whom I had heard so much and we
had an interesting conversation. He suggested that the declaration
should be signed by the four Allies at 4 p.m. The ceremony would be
followed by an official dinner after which General Eisenhower pro
posed to leave Berlin. I said this would suit me and that I also must
leave Berlin that evening.

I then began to discuss with Zhukov the stages by which the

336

Difficulties with the Russians Begin 337

machinery of the Control Council could be built up, and how the
Council would operate. I suggested that the first need was for a
Secretariat in Berlin, and that the Deputies should meet at once to
examine the many pressing problems awaiting attention and to prepare
the ground prior to the meeting of the four members of the Council.
Zhukov disagreed. His view was that no useful work could begin until
the Western Allies had handed over to the Russians those portions of
the Russian Zone which they still occupied; in other words, we must
withdraw at once within the Zonal boundaries that had been agreed
at the Yalta Conference. During the fighting of the last few weeks of
the war the British and American forces had advanced far beyond
them. I pointed out that there were many problems of disentangle
ment which would have to be solved before the withdrawal to our
own zones could take place, and that the date of handing over would
have to be decided by our Governments. Zhukov agreed with this.
But he counter-attacked by saying that Berlin would not be in a fit
state to receive any part of the Allied Control Council for some weeks.
This sounded ominous to me.

When I left Zhukov I went at once to visit Eisenhower at his villa;
I wanted to discuss with him the result of my talk with Zhukov and
the trouble which seemed to be looming ahead. It was obvious that we
would not be able to do any business with the Russians until we had
withdrawn back within our own zones.

The boundaries of these zones had been agreed by the European
Advisory Commission in London on the 12th of September 1944, and
its findings had been approved by the three Governments.

At the Yalta Conference the following statement had been issued
by the Prime Minister, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin on the
nth February 1945:

"Under die agreed plans the forces of the Three Powers will
each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Co-ordinated adminis
tration and control has been provided for under the plan through
a Central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Com
manders of the Three Powers with Headquarters in Berlin.

It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three
Powers, if she should so desire, to take a zone of occupation, and
to participate as a fourth member of the Council Commission.
The limits of the French Zone will be agreed by the Four Govern
ments concerned through their representatives on the European
Advisory Commission."

The agreement regarding the boundaries of the French Zone were
not decided by the European Advisory Committee until the 26th July
1945, ie. until after the Potsdam Conference had assembled on the
i6th July.

338 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

But in spite of these international agreements the British Govern
ment considered, and instructed me accordingly on the day before I
went to Berlin, that the de facto occupation hy British and American
armies of large parts of the Russian Zone was an important bargaining
counter for obtaining satisfaction from the Soviet Government on a
number of outstanding questions, such as our policy towards Germany
and its treatment as one whole economic unit, the problems of Poland,
the Balkans, and Austria, and other related matters.

I knew that the Prime Minister (Churchill) attached the utmost
importance to the British and American armies standing firm on the
existing tactical boundary line reached by VE Day; he reckoned that
they should not withdraw until the impending meeting of the three
Heads of Government in Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), when
these and other questions could be discussed and settled.

I also knew that the attitude of the American Government was
different While they would have liked to reach a settlement of the
German and Austrian problems before withdrawing the American
armies, they were not prepared to link any outside question such as
Poland or the Balkans with the question of withdrawal; nor would
they give an assurance to stand firm until the Heads of Governments
had met. Indeed, the American Government had said that if the
Russians insisted on an immediate execution of the zones agreement,
they would not delay their own withdrawal.

All this looked a bit awkward to me. I discussed with Eisenhower
the divergent views of our two Governments. His view was that we
could not challenge the pledged word of our respective Governments;
to do so would wreck any possibility there might be of working in
friendly co-operation with the Russians. I agreed with him, especially
after my talk with Zhukov. But I was of course bound by the instruc
tions I had received from my Government; if the question was raised
I was to say it was a matter for inter-governmental decision. Eisen
hower agreed to adopt the same line.

Meanwhile Eisenhower and I were waiting impatiently at his villa
for information about the signing of the declaration. He was getting
very angry at the delay; so was L Finally we sent a combined ulti
matum to Zhukov that we would both return to our own zones unless
the four Commanders-in-Chief met at once. That produced quick
results and we were summoned to the conference, which was held in
a clubhouse nearby. But, on arrival, there was further delay owing to
a Russian objection to one word in the English text which disagreed
with the Russian version* I had no idea what the word was, or what
effect it had on the general problem. But I was so fed up with the
whole affair that I suggested the offending word be deleted from the
text; this suggestion was at once agreed by the Russians and by every
one else, and to this day I do not know what difference it made.

Difficulties with the Russians Begin 339

The declaration was then signed at 4.30 p.m. in a blaze of arc lamps
and before a milling crowd of pressmen and photographers.

Following the formal signing, the four members of the Control
Council and their advisers withdrew for a private meeting. Eisenhower
began the discussion by saying that the Four Power Declaration we
had just signed made the four Commanders-in-Chief, in effect, a
governmental autonomy. We must now decide on the machinery
which would make the governmental autonomy work. He suggested
that our staffs should at once begin the study of Control Council
problems and, upon approval by the Council, the results would be
submitted to Governments.

But Zhukov made it very clear that the setting up of the Control
Council machinery could not begin until the British and American
forces had withdrawn to their own zones; until this was done there
could not even be any joint exploratory work by the Deputies or staffs.
I explained that all our troops had arrived in their present positions
as a result of the war, and that it would take some time to sort them
out and get them back into their proper areas. Zhukov asked how
long this would take. I said at least three weeks. He accepted this at
once, and added that during those weeks the four Commanders-in-
Chief could gather together their staffs for the Control Council. He
indicated that in due course he would have no objection to the Control
Council being in Berlin.

Eisenhower then made a very good speech which brought the
meeting to a close. He said that he had come to the meeting with the
definite view that the setting up of the machinery of the Control
Council, and the withdrawal of the Western forces from the Soviet
Zone, could be done simultaneously. It was now clear from Zhukov's
remarks that this was not so, and that the Russians were not prepared
"to play** on Control Council matters until the British and American
forces withdrew to their proper zones. There was therefore nothing
further that could be done at the moment, other than to report to our
respective Governments what had taken place and to ask for new
instructions.

We were then taken to a room nearby to partake of a large banquet.
It was now 6 p.m. There were many speeches and we developed into
a sort of mutual congratulation society. Soon after 7 p.m. Eisenhower
insisted on leaving for the airfield and we left the banquet, which by
that time was beginning to get lively. Eisenhower, Zhukov and I all
crowded into one car and drove at high speed through Berlin to the
Templehof airfield; there we had very friendly farewell greetings
with Zhukov and took off for our respective headquarters.

The direct result of the meeting in Berlin on the sth June was to
make the Russian position crystal clear. They were not prepared to
operate the machinery of the Control Council, or even to begin staff ,

340 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

discussions on the many problems that lay ahead in Germany, until
the Western Allies had handed over those portions of the Russian
Zone they still occupied. No central organisation for the control of
Germany was therefore possible for the time being. I reported accord
ingly to the British Government and gave it as my view that, because
of the Russian attitude, we should get back into our agreed zones at
once. If we had captured Vienna, Prague and Berlin before the Rus
sians, as we could have done (see Chapter 19), the position would
possibly have been different. We now had to begin to pay the price
for that failure. There were no military reasons for staying where we
were; there were many political reasons for withdrawing, and unless
we did so we couldn't even begin to control the Germany we had
conquered.

The Prime Minister did not agree with this view; indeed, as I have
already indicated, his opinion was that we should stay where we were
until the Russians had become more amenable. I remember discussing
the subject with Eisenhower when I was staying with him in Wash
ington in 1946; he was then Chief of Staff of the American Army, and
I was C.LG.S. On reflection he reckoned that if we had stood firm the
Russians would eventually have given in, and if they had used force to
make us go back, we would have fought them. I could not agree. The
British people were completely fed up with war and would never
have been persuaded to fight the Russians in 1945. The Russians had
been built up as heroes during the German war, and any British
Government that wanted to fight them in 1945 would have been in
for trouble at home. Furthermore, Britain had reached the limit of
her man-power resources and could not have sustained further active
operations in Europe; the American armies in Europe were being
rapidly re-deployed for the intensifying of the war against Japan. And
whatever I may have said in Paris, on the 26th May, France was still
down and out.

PROBLEMS ARISE IN THE BRITISH ZONE

As we have seen, the first meeting of the Allied Commanders-in-
Chief had not achieved results. The Russian attitude, though out
wardly friendly, was very uncertain and difficult to fathom. There
were definite indications of Russian communist propaganda in certain
areas of the British Zone, and "cells" were being formed in all the areas
occupied by the Western Allies. This needed most careful watching
since communist cells would "turn the heat on" whenever there were
signs of dissension in the Western camp. Communist propaganda was
particularly active in our Displaced Persons* camps.

The food position was causing me concern and, unless it could be

Difficulties with the Russians Begin 341

improved, we were to be faced with serious famine in the winter.
The British Zone could not at any time produce even half the food
needed for its twenty million inhabitants. The present ration was only
1200 calories a day; if we were to step this up to about 1800 calories
a day we would require two million tons of imports of wheat equiva
lent during the next twelve months. Furthermore, much would depend
on transportation and distribution, and facilities for these were lacking.

The great and crying need everywhere was going to be coal. We
had 140 mines working, producing 40,000 tons a day; not nearly
enough. If we wanted more coal, we would have to feed the miners
properly.

Then we had two and a half million German prisoners of war; these
were being discharged to work at the rate of 12,000 a day. My policy
regarding these prisoners was to discharge the harmless ones to work,
to keep the S.S. in camps, and to disperse those of the General Staff
in camps on the lines of communication.

In addition to these prisoners, we had over one million Displaced
Persons, nearly all from the East. Some 400,000 of these were Russians
and we could reasonably hope that Zhukov would take these off our
hands. But the remaining 600,000 would probably remain with us for
all time.

It was obvious to me that we must get the Germans down to hard
work; only in this way could we get things right. The Russians were
encouraging Trade Unions; I decided not to do so. I was anxious the
Unions should grow slowly and naturally, and not be "forced"; this
policy would, I hoped, ensure that the right leaders would be thrown
up gradually as time went on; if we proceeded too quickly, the Unions
might get into the wrong hands and we would then be in for trouble.

If we were to get the Germans all working to resuscitate their
country, we had to stop cursing them. The German war was over. We
must give them definite orders and see they were obeyed; we must be
very firm., but just It would be important to get our propaganda across
to the Germans by the use of newspapers and cinemas, keeping at all
times a tight control over editors and cinema managers. It would be
useless to try to make the Germans like unto ourselves, as some people
wanted to do; our aim should be rather to turn them into good and
right-thinking Germans.

I then had to turn my mind to our own army. We must not let the
soldiers become fed up with occupational duties, or weary them with
too many guard duties. We could not watch everything, and I decided
that we would only guard food, explosives and certain weapons, and
dangerous prisoners. The British soldier was to have at least three
nights in bed out of four.

I explained to the troops that Germany was in a bad way; great
privations, and probably actual starvation, would be undergone by

342 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

many of the people. There would be much hardship all over Europe,
and definitely so in the British Isles. Our own living standards and
habits must be simple and not extravagant We ourselves were well
off in Germany; we must not flaunt our well-being in the sight of the
impoverished and hungry inhabitants.

Britain was still at war in the Far East. In order to prosecute that
war, and to accelerate reconstruction at home, economy was essential.
Sports and games would be on a wartime, and not peacetime, basis.
There would be no hunting or racing for the time being.

Then there was the problem of wives. I decided that for the time
being no wives or families would be allowed in Germany, or anywhere
else in North- West Europe. This order was to be 100 per cent, and to
apply to Navy, Army, Air Force, and civilians; it would obviously be
reviewed should conditions change. Military wives would of course be
allowed, i.e. those who were in the Services and worked in uniform;
but these were not to be in the same area as their husbands, i.e. they
must not set up house together. I may say that this order was not
popular!

As regards leave to the U.K., I ordered that there must be a fair
deal to everyone. Our figures early in June were 7500 daily, which
gave each officer and man leave about once every 5 months. It would
be necessary to step up the leave facilities in the Italian theatre, and
the overall problem for both theatres would be affected by the rolling
stock situation.

The release scheme was beginning to operate. I did not feel I could
let those who had fought so well go away without some word of thanks
for what they had done. I decided to give to each officer and man a
personal message, which was printed on a card and ran as follows:

cl feel I cannot let you leave 21 Army Group on your return to
civil life without a message of thanks and farewell. Together we
have carried through one of the most successful campaigns in
history, and it has been our good fortune to be members of this
great team.

God bless you and God speed/*

Finally I decided that, as the atmosphere in Germany was highly
charged with electricity and politicians were eyeing us with suspicion
now the war was over, all Press conferences by commanders were
forbidden. The background would be given to the Press by my Chief
of Staff and by no one else.

Immediately after our conference in Berlin on the 5th June, I had
decided to deploy the Main Headquarters of the Control Commission
(Military and Civil Divisions) in the British Zone between Hanover
and Osnabriick. Berlin was clearly impossible at present. I decided to
have a Tac Headquarters with the Americans at Frankfurt, and

Difficulties with the Russians Begin 343

Eisenhower welcomed this move. By this means I hoped to get orderly
government working in the British Zone as quickly as possible and
at the same time to keep in step with the Americans. When we were
allowed into Berlin, I would move there the Tac Headquarters from
Frankfurt. In fact, I proposed to keep the main body of the Control
Commission "built-in" in the British Zone, since there was where the
problems lay. What we kept in Berlin was entirely our own affair and
I was not going to submit to Russian dictation on that score.

WE WITHDRAW TO THE AGREED ZONES

Having given orders on all these, and many other, matters I went
to London on the i6th June to try and get decisions on certain matters
of policy. The major problems I raised were the following three:

(a) The Russians would not co-operate with us on Control Com
mission matters, or allow reconnaissance parties into Berlin,
until all the Allies withdrew into their proper zones. There was
no military reason for staying where we were, and the man
power situation made it disadvantageous to do so. It was
essential to begin discussions on Control Commission matters
as soon as possible; much valuable time had already been lost,
and many decisions were being held up pending discussion by
the Control Commission. I therefore strongly recommended
the agreement of an early date by which the withdrawal to
agreed zones should be completed.

(b) The intended operation of the release scheme was such that,
unless a large number of officers were retained under the
military necessity clause, certain branches of the staff would
lose the majority of their trained officers, and their quick
replacement would be a matter of the greatest difficulty.

(c) Immense quantities of German arms and equipment were
being collected, and, in addition to all his other commitments,
the British soldier was now having to guard these dumps of
arms. Owing to the number and size of these dumps, adequate
guards were difficult to arrange, and there was a serious
danger that a number of the weapons would find their way
back into enemy hands. I had been told that these weapons
were to be kept intact I pressed that this order be cancelled
so that I could destroy the weapons.

While in London I made clear to the British Government the prob
lems with which we were faced, and the impossibility of making
much progress in the government of Germany until the machinery of
the Central Commission could be got going. I learnt that discussions

344 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

were then in progress between the Prime Minister, President Truman
and Marshal Stalin, on the occupation of agreed zones both in Ger
many and also in Austria—where the Russians had to hand over a
considerable area to the Western Allies. On the igth June, I was in
formed that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the simultaneous withdrawal
into agreed zones in Germany and in Austria, and to the move of
Anglo-French-American garrisons into Berlin, such moves to begin
about the ist July. Considerable importance was attached to this
agreement, since the Big Three Conference had been arranged for the
middle of July in Berlin, and it was considered that the Allies should
all have occupied their agreed zones by that date.

Following this agreement by Governments to the simultaneous
withdrawal to agreed zones, General Weeks and General Clay, the
British and American Deputies on the Control Commission, flew to
Berlin on the 2Qth June, for a conference with Marshal Zhukov to
settle how the withdrawal should be carried out. At this conference
it was agreed that withdrawals should commence on the ist July; the
British would evacuate the Wismar "cushion" in one day, and the
Magdeburg "bulge" in two days; the Americans would evacuate their
portion of the Russian Zone in six to nine days. British and American
advance parties would take over their sectors in Berlin on the ist
July, and main bodies to occupy Berlin would follow on the 4th July.
There was considerable discussion about communications from the
British and American zones to their sectors in Berlin. The necessity
for free and unhampered access was emphasised, and the Russians
agreed to the allotment of a road and a railway over which the British
and Americans would have full running rights, the Russians retaining
responsibility for maintenance and control. The allotment of an airfield
for the period of the Big Three Conference was also agreed, but the
subsequent allotment of airfields was reserved for further discussion.
An air corridor to Berlin twenty miles wide was to be established,
and the free use of this corridor was permitted subject to one hour's
notice being given to the Russians of an aircraft entering their zone.

As a result of this conference, withdrawals to agreed zones began
on the ist July and on the same day advance parties started for Berlin.
Arrangements for the Big Three Conference in Berlin were also agreed,
and work on the British sector in Berlin for the conference was pushed
ahead. The hand-over of the Wismar and Magdeburg areas to the
Russians went smoothly and was completed on the 4th July. At the
same time, a force drawn mainly from yth Armoured Division went
to occupy the British Sector in Berlin. This force took over the sector
from the Russians, who withdrew the majority of their troops; but
they refused to withdraw their troops carrying out Military Govern
ment there unless the British would take over the responsibility for
feeding the 900,000 Germans living in the sector. The Americans were

Difficulties with the Russians Begin 345

faced with a similar request in their sector. Berlin as a whole had
normally drawn its food from the area within 50 miles of the capital,
all of which was now occupied by the Russians; this therefore seemed
an unreasonable request After considerable discussion and several
conferences, it was finally agreed that the British and the Americans
would provide food for one month for the population in their sectors
of Berlin, without prejudice to any future decision on the question of
principle— which would be discussed at the Big Three Conference.

MY GENERAL POLICY IN THE BRITISH ZONE

Meanwhile the future of Germany and the function of the Control
Council was left to be decided at the Big Three Conference, due to
open in Berlin on the i6th July. It was already clear to me that the
Russians were not going to agree to the reconstitution of Germany as
one economic whole. In their zone the Russian armies were living off
the country, which they had systematically sacked, I wrote the fol
lowing in my diary at the end of June 1945:

"The immensity of the problem of the future of Germany, and
of Europe, to be settled at the Big Three Conference is becoming
clear. So is the divergence between the views of the Western
Allies and the Russians as regards the solution. It remains to be
seen whether a workable solution can be achieved. It is far more
likely that eastern Europe up to the line from Liibeck to Trieste
will fall under solely Russian domination, and will remain so for
many years."

Following my nomination as British Member of the Allied Control
Council, I had received a wide and loosely worded directive to cover
the course of action I was to pursue. This directive assumed that the
Control Council would be functioning and would by unanimous deci
sion settle all problems which arose. The situation however was, in
fact, other than that which the politicians had envisaged. The Russians
were not prepared for the Control Council to begin to operate; fur
thermore, no central authority existed in Germany through which the
Control Council could function. To meet this situation I required
further guidance from Whitehall on the course of action which I
should pursue. Eventually I received authority from the Secretary of
State for War to act on my own initiative but to endeavour to work in
line with the Americans as far as possible. I subsequently issued a
series of memoranda to my staff giving them my general policy for
the government of the British Zone of Germany. These memoranda
showed at once how different from the problems of war were those
with which I now had to deal. It was brought home to me every day

346 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

that I had much to learn. But I had some first-class civilian advisers
My Chief of Staff, General Weeks, was a tower of strength. Then the
heads of the civil divisions of the Control Commission were the best
that Whitehall could produce for me. The ones with whom I dealt the
most were:

Political Adviser Sir William (now Lord) Strang.

Political Division Christopher Steel (now Sir Christopher).

Finance S. P. Chambers.

Industry Sir Percy (now Lord) Mills.

Transport Robert Inglis (now Sir Robert).

Labour R. W. Luce.

I could not have had a better team; each was an expert in his own
particular sphere.

As the summer of 1945 wore on it became clear that things were
not going to work out in the way we had hoped. This was due to
trouble with the Russians and also to somewhat divergent viewpoints
among the Western Allies. We were committed to the Potsdam Proto
col which entailed, among other things, the provision of reparations
from the British Zone to Russia, the settlement of refugees in the
British Zone, and the treatment of Germany as an economic whole
under a central German administration. Because the British Zone
never had been economically self-sufficing and because, owing to the
past bombing and future reparations, it would become eventually
even further from that desirable state, we obviously wanted Germany
treated as one economic entity. For us, the battle of the winter lay
ahead.

A further trouble was the fact that if Germany was to pay for the
cost of the British occupation, she must be made capable of doing so.
But her industrial capacity was to be immensely reduced, her shipping
removed and her foreign assets frozen. There was to be an influx of
refugees into Western Germany; this would entail a larger population
to feed, a greater population for which to find employment, and an
inability to export. Unless Germany could rebuild her foreign exchange
position, she could not pay.

The Russians did not mind that. For them Germany must pay by
immediate reparations in machinery and labour; a dismembered and
discontented Germany would help the spread of Communism. The
French saw the British point of view but were suspicious of any
attempt to rebuild Germany, their ancient foe. The Americans were
not sympathetic to a viewpoint which might put Germany on its feet
with American aid, merely to provide a market for Britain or to save
the British taxpayer.

Failing Quadripartite control, we would presumably run our zone
like a colony, and the French would act the same way in their zone.

Difficulties with the Russians Begin 347

But the difference in our colonial theories was considerable; the
French would run their zone by holding it down and we would try
to hold ours up.

The job of the Control Council was to evolve a new Europe, and
one in which seventy million Germans would live peaceably as one
entity. We could achieve this only by Quadripartite control of a
central German Government. Upon our ability to succeed rested more
futures than Germany's alone.

What would happen if we failed?

That is how it appeared to me in the summer of 1945. Possibly my
impressions were painted with too broad a brush, and possibly the
colours used were too obviously red, white and blue. Anyhow, it was
becoming obvious that we were going to fail in our aim of Quad
ripartite government of Germany. However, my immediate concern
was with the British Zone, in trying to establish there some order out
of the existing chaos, and in getting our twenty million Germans
through the winter which lay ahead. I did not propose to be drawn
away from that purpose because of difficulties with the Russians.

CHAPTER 24

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany

IN THE middle of July 1945, SHAEF was disbanded, but Eisen
hower remained as C.-in-C. and Military Governor of the American
Zone. I have always considered this to have been a major error
on the part o£ the Western Allies. The whole of eastern Germany was
one zone controlled by one man (Zhukov); we split western Germany
into three separate zones, each controlled by a separate Military
Governor. I hold the view that Eisenhower should have been left in
overall control of the western half of Germany; we would then have
confronted the Russians with a united front. We were to pay the
penalty for this nationalistic self-importance.

When Supreme Headquarters was disbanded, Eisenhower wrote
me the following letter:

"Dear Monty,

Combined Command terminates at midnight tonight, 13 July
1945, and brings to a close one of the greatest and most successful
campaigns ever fought.

History alone will judge the Allied Expeditionary Force in its
true perspective, but we, who have worked and struggled to
gether, can feel nothing but pride in the achievements of the men
we have been honoured to command, and sadness at having to be
parted now.

Whatever history may relate about the exploits of this Allied
Force, and the memory of man is short and fickle, it is only we, at
this time, who can fully appreciate the merit and due worth of the
accomplishments of this great Allied team.

These accomplishments are not limited to the defeat of the Nazi

348

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 349

hordes in battle— a continent has been liberated from all that is
an antipathy to the ideal of democracy which is our common
heritage. Above all, we have proved to the whole world that the
British and American peoples can for ever be united in purpose,
in deed and in death for the cause of liberty.

This great experiment of integrated command, whose venture
was cavilled at by some and doubted by many, has achieved
unqualified success, and this has only been made possible by the
sympathetic., unselfish and unwavering support which you and
ail other commanders have wholeheartedly given me. Your own
brilliant performance is already a matter of history.

My gratitude to you is a small token for the magnificent service
which you have rendered, and my simple expression of thanks
sounds totally inadequate. Time and opportunity prohibit the
chance I should like to shake you and your men by the hand, and
thank each one of you personally for all you have done. I can do
nothing more than assure you of my lasting appreciation, which I
would ask you to convey to all those under your command for
their exemplary devotion to duty and for the most magnificent
loyalty which has ever been shown to a commander.

As ever

Ike"

I had always had a tremendous admiration for Eisenhower and his
intensely human qualities; now, in the middle of 1945, that admiration
was turning to a personal devotion that was to grow as the years
passed, and today I count him one of my closest friends. In November
1945 he left Germany to return to Washington as Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army. I then lost his wise counsel and willing assistance and it was
brought home to me very forcibly what— to use Mary Martin's words
in Sotfth Pacific— "SL wonderful guy" he was.

THE GENEBAL SITUATION IN JULY 3-945

By the time SHAEF had ceased to exercise control, each of the
four occupying Powers had already taken over its zone in Germany
and Military Government was becoming well established. Free move
ment within and between the zones of the Western Allies was per
mitted, but access to the Russian Zone was still not allowed. In order
to reach their sectors in Berlin, the Russians had allotted a road,
railway and air route for the use of the Western Allies, but no deviation
off this route could be made. Only within Berlin was circulation
between all Allied sectors allowed.

In the zones of the Western Allies close liaison on all matters of

350 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

high policy was being maintained. The British section of the Control
Commission kept a strong liaison detachment with the American Head
quarters at Frankfurt, and General Weeks paid frequent visits there
for meetings to co-ordinate British, American and French policy. No
liaison on similar lines had as yet been arranged with the Russians.

In the British Zone the disbandment of the German Army was
proceeding well, and sufficient men had been discharged for work on
the land to ensure adequate labour for the harvest. But to offset this,
large numbers of fresh prisoners were arriving from Norway, and the
total number of German prisoners held in the British Zone now
amounted to 1,850,000. Coal production was slowly being raised as
more food was given to the miners, and the services of transportation
and distribution were being restarted as the supply of vehicles and the
repair of roads and railways permitted. The fishing industry had been
revived all round the coast and stocks of food were being supplemented
from this source. The problem of Displaced Persons, of which some
1,300,000 remained for disposal, was still a very difficult one; the
Russians were most irregular in their acceptance of Russian D.P.S,
and in any event refused to accept Polish D.P.S until all their own had
been repatriated.

Furthermore, it was now becoming clearer how the Russians were
governing their zone in Germany. On the cessation of hostilities the
Russians had systematically plundered it, removing and sending east
wards all machinery and stocks on which they could lay their hands.
They regarded this action as partial reparation for what they had
suffered at German hands, and for what the Germans had looted in
Russia. In addition, the Russian Army was living off the country and
thus eating up food supplies in their zone. Finally, all territory east of
the Oder-Neisse line had been given by the Russians to Poland. Many
of the Germans in this region, which before the war supported about
ten million people, were being evicted by the Poles into the Russian
Zone in Germany, and the small remaining population in this rich food-
producing area was now unlikely to be sufficient to cultivate the area
to anywhere near its previous productivity. From this it was clear that
far from having a surplus of food, as in the past, to feed western
Germany, the Russian Zone in Germany was likely to go very hungry
and might well starve. Furthermore, the industrial capacity of eastern
Germany in the future would be negligible.

THE BIG THREE CONFERENCE AT POTSDAM

The Prime Minister, President Truman and Marshal Stalin arrived
in Berlin for the conference at Potsdam on the isth July. I went up
to Berlin to receive the Prime Minister on his arrival, and took the

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 351

opportunity then, and on the following day before the conference
began, to inform him, Anthony Eden, and the C.I.G.S. of the problems
of government in the British Zone in Germany, and of the questions
which urgently required a decision at the forthcoming conference.
The main question was whether there was in future to be one Germany
or two. I gave it as my opinion that if Germany was to be treated
as one administrative and economic whole, then the following implica
tions of this decision would have to be accepted:

(a) Free circulation of Allied nationals between all zones.

(b) A central German administrative machine, to deal in particu
lar with finance, transportation and communications.

(c) A common policy regarding the reconstruction of industries,
wage rates, and price controls.

(d) The exchange of resources and services, including food, be
tween zones so as to preserve a balanced economy throughout
Germany.

(e) Consequential on (d), global demands on outside sources to
make up deficits.

Just when the conference looked like reaching some decisions on
these matters, the British delegation had to return to England for the
opening on the 26th July of the ballot boxes in order to discover the
results of the General Election. All arrangements were however made
for the return of Mr. Churchill and his delegation on the morning of
the 27th July. But it was not to be.

The decisive defeat of the Churchill government came as a great
surprise to all, and the formation of a new government caused a slight
delay in the return of a British delegation to Potsdam. There was not
unnaturally some uncertainty about the effect that the change of
government would have on the deliberations of the conference. All
doubts were, however, set at rest when Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin
arrived in Potsdam; these two grasped the problems with both hands
and created a very good impression on everyone.

The results of the conference appeared on the surface to be gratify
ing. The main results as far as they affected Germany were as follows:

(a) The establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to pre
pare peace treaties with Italy and with the Axis satellites; to
prepare a peace settlement with Germany, for use when a
German Government was ultimately set up; and to consider
certain European territorial questions.

(b) Three-Power agreement to treat the German population uni
formly throughout Germany, as far as practicable; to remove
all Nazis from office; to permit freedom of speech, of the
Press and of religion, and the formation of free trades unions,

352 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

subject to military security; and to decentralise the political
structure— no central German government being contem
plated for the time being.

(c) Agreement that Germany should be treated as an economic
unit; that the German economy should be decentralised and
that the first charge on the proceeds of exports from current
production and stocks should be the payment for essential
imports approved by the Control Council.

(d) A settlement was reached whereby the occupying authorities
should take reparations from Germany in the form of capital
goods to the extent of Germany's ability to surrender indus
trial equipment.

(e) Agreement to transfer to Germany the populations remaining
in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; this to be effected
in an orderly and humane manner.

THE CONTROL COUNCIL BEGINS TO FUNCTION

All this looked good— to me too good, and I could not see much of
it happening. However, the great point now was to push ahead and
I relied very much on Eisenhower to give a lead in the matter. He
played up well and insisted that the Control Council should now meet
and get on with the job. The Council held its first executive meeting
in Berlin on the 30th July.

No central machinery for governing Germany any longer existed.
But, largely due to the great energy of General Weeks, Chief of Staff
British Zone, various boards on a Tripartite basis had been set up to
ensure that at least in the British, American and French zones, the
Military Governments of each zone were marching in step and that
the economic problems within these zones were being considered as
a whole. However, these boards now ended with the setting up of
the Quadripartite machinery.

The Quadripartite machinery began to function after our meeting
on the soth July, the whole organisation being called the "Allied
Control Authority." This was divided into three bodies:

The Council The heads of the British, American, Rus

sian and French zones.

The Co-ordinating

Committee Their four deputies.

The Control Staff Divided into twelve divisions, and working

frequently together to evolve an agreed
policy.

At the end of July, General Weeks was forced by ill-health to resign
his post as my Deputy, and Chief of Staff of the British Zone. His

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 353

departure was a great blow to me. Apart from our friendship, I was
to lose his wise counsel. It is not too much to say that without his
efforts we would not have progressed so far as we had in the organisa
tion of government in the British Zone, and in the initial arrangements
for getting the Control Commission organised in Berlin. I was lucky
to secure as his successor General Sir Brian Robertson, who had served
with me in the Eighth Army.

Meanwhile I was pondering deeply over the problem of the rehabili
tation of the mentality of the German people on the right lines. There
must be a plan for this, and at present we had none. I therefore
decided on the following outline plan;

(i) To allow the people to discuss their problems amongst
themselves, and generally to set on foot measures for self-
help.

(ii) To eradicate the best allies of Nazism— idleness, boredom,
and fear of the future— and to replace them by good ideas
and by hope,
(iii) To work particularly on the youth of the German nation.

The next thing was to tell the Germans about this plan. While the
Potsdam Conference was in session I had written a third message to
the German people in the British Zone. It was dated the 2$th July,
1945, but I held it up until the results of that conference were pub
lished and it was finally issued on the 6th August. It ran as follows:

TO THE POPULATION OF THE BRITISH ZONE IN GERMANY

**i. Three months have now passed since Germany surrendered
and your country passed to the control of the Allied Nations.
The Allies are proceeding to the complete disarmament and
demilitarisation of Germany and to fie final destruction of
the Nazi Party and its affiliated organisations. These aims will
be carried through to the end.

S. During this time the British Zone has been under Military
Government.

Members of the German armed forces have been sorted out
by trades and occupations; many thousands have been dis
charged to work on the land and in other spheres, and this will
continue.

There is every prospect of a good harvest, and you must see
that it is all gathered in.

My officers have been active in their endeavours to arrange
that the German population have adequate food and housing
and are kept free from disease.

The first stage in the rehabilitation of Germany is under way.

354 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

3. I am now going to proceed with the second stage of the Allied
policy.

In this stage it is my intention that you shall have freedom
to get down to your own way of life: subject only to the pro
visions of military security and necessity.

I will help you to eradicate idleness, boredom, and fear of
the future. Instead, I want to give you an objective, and hope
for the future.

4. I will relax by stages the present restrictions on the freedom
of the Press.

It is Allied policy, subject to the necessity for maintaining
military security, to encourage the formation of free trade
unions in Germany.

It is also Allied policy to encourage the formation in Ger
many of democratic political parties, which may form the
basis of an ordered and peaceful German society in the future.

We aim at the restoration of local self-government through
out Germany on democratic principles. And it is our intention
that Nazis removed from office shall be replaced by persons
who, by their political and moral qualities, can assist in
developing genuinely democratic institutions in Germany. It
is our purpose also to reorganise the judicial system in accord
ance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law
and equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race,
nationality or religion.

You may hold public meetings and discussions; I am anxious
that you should talk over your problems among yourselves,
and generally set on foot measures to help yourselves.

5. Your children are at present lacking juvenile organisations
and facilities for education.

I intend to encourage the forming of such organisations, on
a voluntary basis, for the purpose of religious, cultural, health
or recreational activities. Educational facilities will be pro
vided at a relatively early date.

6. I have relaxed the rules about fraternisation. Members of the
British Forces are now allowed to engage in conversation with
the German people in streets and in public places; this will
enable us to have contact with you and to understand your
problems the more easily.

7. The coming winter will be a difficult time; there is much to
mend and put right and time is short. We are faced with the
probability of a shortage of food, a shortage of coal, insuffi
cient accommodation, and inadequate services of transporta
tion and distribution. It is well that you should realise this now.

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 355

I will do all I can to get the population of the British Zone
through the coming winter. But you, the German people,
must plan for these contingencies now; you must work to help
yourselves.

8. I will continue to see that you are all kept informed by radio,
and by the newspapers, of how we are progressing; I -will
give you German news as well as foreign news.

9, I expect the co-operation of you all in the second stage of the
Allied policy."

I then began to consider German education. We were opening
schools and universities as soon as possible. New school books must
be printed which were not tainted with Nazi ideologies, and all Nazi
teaching and ideas must be eradicated from educational establish
ments. There would be a shortage of suitable teachers and that matter
must be tackled energetically.

MY AEROPLANE CRASH

On the zsnd August I flew in my light aircraft, a Miles Messenger,
to visit the 3rd Canadian Division (General Yokes). As we were cir
cling the airfield preparatory to landing, the engine cut out; we had the
flaps down and so lost speed rapidly. My pilot could not make the
airfield and we crash-landed nearby; the plane was completely written
off, but the pilot, and an ADC who was with me, were unhurt I
was not so lucky, being severely shaken and bruised and breaking two
lumbar vertebrae. It was a lucky escape but, with a less skilful pilot,
the results might have been much more serious.

I managed to begin my address to the officers of the 3rd Canadian
Division but had to break off in the middle as I felt too ill. It was sug
gested that I should return to my headquarters (about 100 miles) by
car. I refused, as I could not face a car journey of that distance with a
damaged back; I said I would fly back in another light aircraft This
upset the Canadians who said I might have another crash. I replied
that no one had ever crashed twice in the same day and the flight
back to my headquarters would, therefore, be the safest I would ever
make.

It took me some time to recover and during the winter of 1945-46
I got frequent attacks of influenza and finally contracted pleurisy. I
suppose my resistance to illness had become weakened during five
years of war, and the aeroplane crash was the last straw. Finally, in
February 1946, 1 had to go to Switzerland for a month to recover my
health. My back continued to give trouble and some years later I

356 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

began to get arthritis. An X-ray examination then showed that my
spine had been left somewhat out of shape; this was dealt with, but
it was some } ears before I fully recovered.

DEADLOCK IN THE CONTROL COUNCIL

Early in October 1945 the London Conference of Foreign Ministers
ended in disagreement. It had been assembled to prepare the way for
the peace treaties with ex-enemy States, as agreed at the Potsdam
Conference. It was now fairly clear that we were heading for trouble
in a big way.

About the same time the Control Council machine in Berlin came
up against serious obstacles and a position near deadlock had been
reached. The immediate cause of this was the opposition of France to
the creation of central German administrations; having been attacked
three times in a century France wanted security above all else, and a
dismembered Germany was held to be less dangerous. Furthermore
the French wished the Ruhr area, which contained a very substantial
part of Germany's war potential, to be separated from Germany and
internationalised, and they considered that the setting up of central
German administrations while the Ruhr remained within Germany
would prejudge its fate.

All the really important work in progress within the Quadripartite
machine had been based upon the idea of establishing central German
administrations. The effect of putting this idea into cold storage would
virtually bring the Quadripartite machine to a standstill. The results
of the last meetings of the Control Council and Co-ordinating Com
mittee had proved this. Every measure of consequence at those
meetings was blocked either by French opposition to central admin
istrations or by Russian intransigence, for the Russians took full advan
tage of the fact that they were no longer the only or even the chief
obstruction to progress and agreement. A continuation of this state
of affairs would put a strain on this delicate machine from which it
might never recover. The importance of this consideration would de
pend upon the value which was attached to Quadripartite working in
Germany as a prelude to inter-Allied co-operation in wider fields.

The Russians were creating a desert in their zone; anything in it
of value was being sent to Russia, and conditions were already appal
ling ia the area. Our reconnaissance parties in search of routes and
camps for Poles returning to Poland reported that the Germans in
the area were living like beasts on whatever they could get, and that
starvation was already evident.

As a result of the terrible conditions in the Russian Zone, and

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 357

because of the eviction of Germans from the territory given by the
Russians to Poland, from Czechoslovakia, and from elsewhere, 40,000
German refugees were infiltrating into the British Zone weekly; and
this movement looked likely to continue.

The Russians had altered the gauge of the German railways in their
zone to the Russian gauge. This was an ominous step. The only railway
as yet unaltered was that leading from the western zones to Berlin,
which was being used for the transport of supplies to Berlin.

When the Foreign Ministers failed to reach agreement about Ger
many, I went to London to see the Prime Minister (Attlee). I saw
him early in October 1945 and gave him my views as follows:

(a) I had once thought Four-Power government of Germany was
possible. I now considered that it could never be made to
work. Agreement could not be reached in the Council, and
the Americans in particular were becoming restless. They had
now tabled a motion that, when unanimous agreement in the
Council was not possible, each zone might act as it thought
best This was the first rift in the lute. It was clear to me that
the Western Powers must now prepare for a continuous strug
gle with the communist East, which would last for many
years. Basically, this struggle would be for "the soul" of
Germany. We had got half of Germany and we must hang
on to it

(b) It seemed to me, as a soldier, that it was not really a prac
ticable proposition to de-industrialise the Ruhr, when Ger
many and all the Allied States on her frontiers were suffering
great privations due to the destruction of industrial potential.
Provided the industry of the Ruhr was properly controlled it
would fulfil a very useful function in supplying the needs of
the Western Allies, and thereby indirectly in providing food
for starving Germans.

(c) Having in view the troubles that were descending on us, did
Britain really want a unified Germany just at present? If
Germany was unified too quickly, the British Zone would have
to supply the desert in the Russian Zone, and those living in
the Russian Zone would all want to come into the British
Zone— which we hoped eventually would become a thriving
place.

(d) The Russians were very difficult people to deal with, and we
must be very sure about what points in our strategy mattered
and what points did not matter. In my opinion, Western
Germany, the Mediterranean, especially the eastern part, and
Libya mattered; for the present the Balkans did not matter

358 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

since Russia had too firm a grip on that area for us to do
anything about it.

(e) Finally it was vital at the present time to maintain adequate
strength in the fighting services. If we did not do this, we
should cut no ice with anyone, particularly the Russians. It
was therefore most important to reach a decision about Na
tional Service in peace-time as soon as possible.

I made it dear to the Prime Minister that the immediate bar to
Quadripartite progress was the French opposition to central German
administrations. The Russian "iron curtain" policy, if it was continued
indefinitely, would later be the real obstacle, since without freedom
of movement of Allied and German officials, Press and aircraft, central
German administrations could not work. If the Russians insisted on
keeping the "iron curtain" drawn over their zone, there was no hope
for the continuance of Quadripartite control.

A quick solution had to be found to our problems, as Germany
was drifting towards economic chaos. This could only be avoided if
important decisions were quickly taken on currency, taxes, loans, etc.,
establishing for the purpose either a central financial administration or
zonal administrations. The choice must be made soon; once taken it
could not easily be reversed.

EVENTS IN THE BRITISH ZONE

With the approach of winter all my apprehensions about epidemics
of disease appeared likely to be fulfilled. Food was very short; owing
to bad weather the harvest had been poor, contrary to my earlier hopes,
and no coal would be available for the heating of private houses. The
German people had not the resistance to withstand any serious epi
demic. In addition, reports from the Russian Zone indicated that many
Germans, especially children, were akeady slowly starving in parts of
Eastern Germany; epidemics starting in that area would be likely to
spread rapidly among people seriously weakened by hunger and with
out adequate housing, clothes or fuel.

From the point of view of our own organisation, things were going
smoothly. A gradual transition was taking place from the completely
military machine set up by 21 Army Group to an eventual civilian
organisation in which there would be a German administration with
British control at the top. Two important steps had been taken: the
Control Commission and Military Government had been integrated,
and civilians had been brought out from England. The future develop
ment of the organisation would be gradual and would continue slowly
until completed. It would start at the bottom and work up, and

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 359

eventually the Corps Commanders would have to be withdrawn from
the administrative machine and become exclusively commanders of
troops. It was unlikely that this would happen until the "Battle of
the Winter" was over; or before the problems of Displaced Persons
and prisoners of war were more manageable; or before the German
administrative machine was capable of functioning without large-scale
assistance from Corps Districts.

Meanwhile I had issued a directive on the evolution of Government
in the British Zone. It was based on the principle that Military Gov
ernment of Germany must be succeeded as soon as possible by a
system of control on a Chilian basis. The speed with which this change
took place would depend on the progress made in demilitarisation,
denazification, and the foundation of a democratic system of admin
istration. In order to enable the process of change to proceed smoothly,
a phased programme was to begin at once. In the first phase Corps
District Commanders were already dealing with their Military Gov
ernment responsibilities through their own Military Government staffs.
In the second phase Regional Commissioners would be trained to
replace Corps District Commanders as Military Governors. In the
third phase Corps District Commanders would cease to be Military
Governors. And in the fourth phase personnel of Military Government
detachments would gradually be transferred to a civilian status and
their strengths much reduced. On the completion of Phase Four, the
Germans would be governing themselves, subject to a general super
vision by us, and the head of the administration would be a civilian
and not a soldier. Phases three and four were very important and
this is how I described them,

PHASE in

"At this stage Corps District Commanders cease to be the Mili
tary Governors of their Corps Districts. They will have no respon
sibility for civil administrations other than as Commanders of
troops which may be required to act in support of the civil power
or to assist the civil administrations with the administrative re
sources at their disposal. This question of assistance is important.
At present Military Government relies a great deal on the assist
ance which it obtains from the troops. This is one of the reasons
why Phase III cannot take place immediately. The degree of
assistance which will be required when the change does take
place will be considerably less than it is now, but the need for
some assistance will remain and Corps District Commanders will
have a responsibility to furnish it so far as their resources permit.

A Regional Commissioner will be appointed at each Provincial
Headquarters, including Hamburg.

360 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I am not prepared at this moment to fix the date on which
Phase III will take place, but I shall aim at putting it into force
in April 1946.

PHASE IV

This involves the gradual transference of the personnel of Mili
tary Government Detachments from a military to a civilian status,
and a reduction in the size of these Detachments at lower levels.
The reason for such reduction is that the principle of civil control
implies an exercise of control over German administrations at
higher levels, while at the lower levels no control will eventually
be exercised other than such inspection as may be necessary to
ensure that instructions given to the higher echelons of adminis
tration are being faithfully executed by the lower.

It is not necessary to fix any time for this Phase at present. It
will be carried out by the Regional Commissioners after they have
assumed their responsibilities.

I am holding a Corps District Commanders* Conference on the
14th December. An opportunity will then be provided for dis
cussing the detailed implications of the plan which I have set out
above. It must, however, be clearly understood that the general
framework of this plan is a matter on which I have already made
my decision.

Finally I want to emphasise that the essence of the change from
Military Government to civil control does not lie in the substitu
tion of civilians for soldiers in administrative appointments. It
is desirable that the principal appointments should be handed over
to civilians because this emphasises the fact of the change and has
a psychological importance.

The real essence of the change, however, is that under Military
Government we govern our zone through the Germans. Our gov
ernment depends on the Commander-in-Chief and his Corps
District Commanders and it is supported immediately by our
military forces. Civil control, on the other hand, means that the
Germans govern themselves, subject to control and supervision by
us, that our administration is headed by someone other than the
Commander of the troops and that military forces are regarded
as a reserve to be used in support of our administration in
emergency only.

I have thought it important to emphasise this point because it is
not my intention that officers who are doing a competent job in
Military Government now should automatically be replaced merely
because they are not civilians/'

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 361

ZHUKOV ACCUSES THE BRITISH

In November, just when I was thinking we were beginning to get
our affairs in the British Zone into good working order, Zhukov
circulated a memorandum to the Control Council in which he accused
me of retaining organised units of the former German Army in the
British Zone.

The presence of organised disarmed units of the German Army in
the British Zone had first been discussed in the Co-ordinating Com
mittee on the 17th September; had again been brought up on the
23rd October; and had been the subject of two letters by General
Robertson to Marshal Zhukov and General Sokolovsky.

The question had originally been discussed in relation to the "Law
for the Elimination and Limitation of Military Training," but it had
become apparent that the Soviet authorities were suspicious of the
intentions of the British Government in retaining in their zone large
numbers of ex-Wehrmacht personnel, and Marshal Zhukov's memo
randum was, in effect, a direct attack upon us. It was based on the
Potsdam Declaration which laid down that all German units and
headquarters must be immediately disarmed and disbanded* The
memorandum alleged that organised German headquarters with full
"operations" staffs existed from army group level down to the military
and air districts into which the British Zone was divided. It also
claimed that two corps groups existed, each 100,000 strong; that
tank detachments were in being; and that we were maintaining con
siderable numbers of Baits and Hungarians in organised units. In
conclusion, the memorandum stated that it considered it imperative
that a commission of the Control Council should visit the British
Zone to examine the situation on the spot.

This meeting was the first occasion on which one Ally had criticised
the conduct of another in the Control Council. It was important to
allay at once all Russian suspicions of our good faith, but at the same
time the Russian method of approach and the direct challenge thrown
out called for a blunt reply. I decided that a heavy counter-attack must
be launched against the Soviet delegation.

There were two main reasons for the presence of the 700,000 ex-
Wehrmacht personnel in concentration areas awaiting disbandment.
First, we had nowhere to put them if they were disbanded, and we
could not guard them if they were dispersed in prison camps over our
area- Second, the British Government required 225,000 Germans as
reparations labour for the United Kingdom. All had been disarmed,
and their headquarters only had sufficient staffs to enable them to
administer their troops. I cabled my views to London, and at the

362 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Control Council meeting on the soth November I read out a statement
in which, after expressing my astonishment that Marshal Zhukov
should have ignored General Robertson's letters and chosen to directly
challenge British policy, the following main points were made:

(a) Ex-Wehrmacht personnel were not described as Prisoners of
War because we did not wish to apply the Geneva Conven
tion to them.

(b) German headquarters were retained for administrative pur
poses, since it was ridiculous to employ British to administer
Germans.

(c) The numbers contained in the Soviet memorandum were
grossly exaggerated: there was only one corps with 99,000
personnel in it.

(d) There was no army group headquarters in the British Zone;
none of the staffs had operational branches; and none of them
was capable of doing anything but administrative work.

(e) The military and air districts only administered labour gangs,
and the tank detachments were all completely disarmed and
waiting in concentration areas to be discharged.

(f) The presence of Hungarians and Baits was extremely unwel
come to the British, and in the case of the Hungarians the
only reason for their continued presence in the British Zone
was the refusal of the Soviet authorities to afford them trans
port facilities through the Russian Zone.

(g) The proposal to send a Commission was accepted on two
conditions: first, that it visit all zones, and, secondly, that it
be the forerunner of similar commissions which would in
vestigate other matters within the scope of the Control
Council

Marshal Zhukov in his reply to this statement accepted the idea of
a Commission to visit all zones but rejected the second condition. He
re-affirmed that in his opinion the British were not fulfilling the terms
of the Potsdam Agreement It was finally agreed, on my proposal,
that the matter should be referred to the Co-ordinating Committee for
consideration, and that the British Delegation should submit to the
Co-ordinating Committee full facts and figures.

The meeting was throughout very friendly. But it was undeniable
that, in spite of the excellent personal relationship existing between
Marshal Zhukov and myself, the Soviet authorities were deeply suspi
cious of our holding of 700,000 German troops. The Control Council
meeting had not gone badly for us, but it was now essential to disband
the German headquarters and to discharge all German disarmed
personnel held in concentration areas. I therefore urgently requested

The Struggle to Rehabilitate Germany 363

permission to be relieved of the order which made me hold 225,000
Germans as reparations labour for the United Kingdom.

Without waiting for authority from London, I gave out orders to
my Chief of Staff to organise the disbandment of all ex-Wehrmacht
personnel held in concentration areas. Conferences were immediately
held at H.Q. British Army of the Rhine, and on the loth December
Operation CLOBBER began. The object of the operation was to disband
the German headquarters and to discharge the personnel by the 3oth
January. After that date the only Germans held by us would be those
required by the three services and certain categories that could not
be discharged without trial. It was hoped to persuade our Allies to
accept Austrians, and to induce the Russians to grant transport facil
ities for Hungarians and Rumanians. The matter was thus brought to
a successful conclusion, and it had been done without upsetting
friendly personal relations on the Control Council— which had always
been good.

THE WINTER OF 1945-46

Towards the end of the year I pondered deeply over the progress,
or lack of progress, we were making in the British Zone. The "Battle
of the Winter" was proceeding and I reckoned that we would win it.
The Control Commission was well established, and was working. We
seemed to be marching forward. Our danger now was complacency;
we had made a good beginning but there was still much to be done.
I saw stormy weather ahead.

While we had been proceeding methodically with our plans to
rehabilitate Germany, the British Zone had remained quiet; the Ger
mans were busy with their own immediate troubles, chiefly concerned
with getting food and keeping warm. But I considered that our conflicts
with them lay ahead. If we could get them safely through the winter,
they would be feeling better in 1946. They would then see their fac
tories and coal being removed, and would realise that they themselves
were not to be allowed to benefit from the recovery of their country.
Our industrial and economic policy was such that there was bound
to be widespread unemployment in Germany as time went OIL We
had removed from positions of responsibility large numbers of Nazi
Germans, many of them immensely capable people and first class
organisers; these people were now idle and might well cause unrest
We had demobilised into the zone about two million fighting men and
another half million remained to be added to the figure. Clearly there
was much fertile ground in which evil persons could sow the seeds of
discontent and trouble.

364 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

As these thoughts passed through my mind I came to the conclusion
that we must not let the strength of our armed forces in Germany run
down too quickly. We must keep sufficient troops to back up the
police in maintaining law and order, and to aid the civil power should
things show signs of getting out of hand.

There were so many possibilities of trouble, and so many things
that could go wrong, that I decided we must be sure of our ground
as we went along, llie tendency in Whitehall was to push things along
quickly. My view was that to go too quickly might involve us in
unpleasant repercussions.

For instance, to me it was clear that political and trades union
activities should be allowed to grow from below, steadily and pro
gressively. We had planted the seeds; if they were "watered" unduly
they might grow too quickly and become unpleasant weeds. If they
maintained a sturdy growth from below, throwing up the right type
of leader, then all would be well. But if we tried to hasten the crop
by imposing a top dressing from above, we might well land ourselves
in trouble. But my Socialist political masters in Whitehall did not
altogether agree, saying they knew more about politics and trades
unions than I did— which was of course true. But I was responsible
for what might happen. So I stuck to my guns and refused to change
my policy, though I understand things were pushed along a bit more
quickly after I left Germany in May 1946.

CHAPTER 25

Last Days in Germany

Ox THE 26th January, 1946, I received official intimation that I
had been selected for the appointment of Chief of the Imperial
General Staff and was to take over the post on the 26th June.
It was of course an immense honour to become professional head of
the British Army; I little thought in my Sandhurst days that I would
ever rise to that position. Nor did anyone else. I wondered how I
would get on with my new political masters. I had already had deal
ings with Atdee and Bevin which had given me much confidence* But
I was not so sure about other personalities in the Socialist hierarchy.
In August 1945, very soon after the new government assumed office,
two Socialist M.P.S (one a junior Minister) visited the British forces
in Germany and stayed a night with me at my Tac Headquarters. The
next day they left on a tour of army units and I had agreed that they
could address gatherings of officers and men if they wished. I was
informed the next day that at the first unit, they had asked the officers
to leave the hall so that they could speak to the soldiers alone, and
that had been done. I was extremely angry and at once issued an order
to all British forces in Germany forbidding such action. I was respon
sible for discipline in the armed forces in Germany and I was not
going to have it undermined by wandering Members of Parliament.
I had these views conveyed to the two M.P.S concerned, explaining
that I had no objection to their addressing the troops, but it must be
in the presence of their officers. I also heard that one of the M.P.S had
asked the batman to the general with whom he was staying the night,
what he thought of the general. The batman rightly reported the con
versation. These incidents had disturbed me. I well knew that good
and friendly relations between Service chiefs and their political masters

365

366 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

were essential. My dealings with members of the Conservative Gov
ernment had always been most friendly. In January 1946 I had sent
Churchill a copy of my book Alamein to the River Sangro and had
written in it a tribute to him; I wanted him to realise how much we
all owed to him, even though he was no longer our political master.
I give below the reply he had sent me. The book he refers to (in his
second paragraph') was my autograph book which I have quoted in
earlier chapters.

28, Hyde Park Gate,
London, S.W.y.
January 8, 1946.
"My dear Monty,

I am most deeply obliged to you for sending me a copy of the
story of your Campaign from Alamein to the Sangro River, and
particularly touched by the all too kind and complimentary in
scription which you have written in it. This is indeed a most
generous tribute from a great Commander to his Political Chief,
Certainly the relations which I had with you, with Alexander, and
with the High Command of the three Services generally, were of a
most friendly and intimate character in spite of the great stresses
through which we went. How different from the rows of the
'frocks* and 'Brass hats* which characterised the last War! I am
proud that you feel that contribution of the Minister of Defence
made your great task easier of accomplishment.

I hope one day that your book, in which I wrote so many
entries will be published in facsimile to a wide public. There is set
out, milestone by milestone, the glorious advance of the Eighth
Army and of the British Army of the Rhine, and almost all the
forecasts of the Political Chief were vindicated superbly by the
sword of the Commander.

I am so glad we had that day on the Rhine together and saw a
few shells playing about.
With every good wish,

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) Winston S. Churchill"

THE PROBLEM IN GERMANY: FEBRUARY 1946

As I was to leave Germany in a few months, I turned my attention
to the two matters which in my opinion were the root of the whole
matter— the problem of the German people, and the evolution of
government in the British Zone in order to cope with that problem.

Last Days in Germany 367

In my opinion one of our most important objects in Germany was
to change the heart, and the way of life, of the German people. For
the past thirteen years the Germans had had nationalistic and dic
tatorial ideas forced into their minds; the authority of the family had
been minimised, the influence of the Church reduced, and the power
of the State had increased. This period had been one of full employ
ment and a high standard of living for the German people. Now there
was nothing but misery. There was a danger that the people would
soon begin to look back with longing on die old regime; my informa
tion was that a large percentage, probably 60 per cent were out-and-
out Nazis. Opinion in the zone was hardening against the British and
a subversive organisation had recently been uncovered. The fact was
that we had some twenty million Germans in the British Zone who,
due to the shortage of food, were going to experience a hard time.
Without doubt conflicts with these people lay ahead; in some way
they must be influenced for good so that they would not cause trouble
in the future. How was this to be done?

It seemed to me that we could divide this mass of human material
into three categories for the purpose I wanted to achieve.

First, there were the children. These should not be difficult to
handle, though of course there was always the danger of a bad home
influence if the elder members of the family were Nazis. Then came
the young men, and young women too, between the ages of say 18
to 25. Here was a much more difficult problem and this age group
was probably the crux of the problem; they had been brought up in
an atmosphere of National Socialism— having been taught it at school,
in the Hitler Youth, and many of them in the S.S. also. And lastly
there were the older people; amongst these were many who could
probably be got on our side.

I decided that the best way to begin influencing all these groups
was through economics; this was probably the foundation of the
overall solution. We must give the German people hope for the future;
they must be made to realise that they could reach a worthwhile
future only by their own work. That meant fixing the level of industry
so that there would be a decent standard of living with the minimum
of unemployment If this were not done the Germans would merely
look to the past and be ready to follow any evil leader who might arise.

With this foundation, and having got the Germans down to work,
we must then tackle the political problem. On the practical side, this
meant the decentralisation of the Government and the Civil Service.
I also reckoned that we should encourage contacts with the outside
world so that the Germans could study a new ideology to replace that
of the Nazis. On the psychological side, we must tell the Germans
when the process of de-nazification would be completed.

And then there was the educational problem. For children still at

368 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

school we must ensure a good supply of books, reliable and trust
worthy teachers, and decent buildings. The troops were living in many
of the school buildings; they must hand them back to the Germans
at once. Of the age group 18 to 25, a small minority were being
educated in universities. But the vast majority of this group were un
touched by such advantages; for them the important things were good
cinemas, the Press, books, and so on, all controlled and run by the
Germans themselves. I thought selected members of this age group
might well be sent to England to learn a new way of life, and one
which they had never known; they had been children when Hitler
came to power and National Socialism was the creed in which they
had been brought up.

THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT IN THE BRITISH ZONE

I had already ordered that on the 15th April 1946, Corps Com
manders were finally to hand over their responsibilities for civil admin
istration. Phase Three of my instructions issued in December 1945
would then be complete. It was now necessary to issue instructions
to initiate the execution of Phase Four, and on the 2561 March 1946
I circulated a memorandum which was intended to do so. In the
memorandum I pointed out that the "Battle of the Winter'* had been
won. No epidemics had broken out and the general health of the
German people had been maintained. But the outlook for the future
was now worse than ever before. The food situation overshadowed
everything else, and other factors would soon aggravate the situation.
The future level of German economy would cause distress and un
employment; the influx of refugees was just beginning; all stocks of
consumer goods had now been used up. The next battle was going to
be more serious than the "Battle of the Winter" just concluded. It
could not be tackled by Military Government because of the drastic
cuts in establishment and the speed of demobilisation. It must be
tackled by the Germans themselves, but with our aid, especially by
the import of food. Moreover, we must give them clear orders on
such questions as de-nazification. In order to make my scheme possible
we should have to build up German administrations, staffed by vigorous
men who must be supported by us. The most important of these ad
ministrations was the Zonal Advisory Council which I had had formed.
All domestic matters should be put to it for advice, it should be
encouraged to discuss as many matters as possible, and its advice
accepted whenever we could do so. These principles also applied to
the other functional bodies which were being gradually set up in
the zone. All these administrations should eventually be given execu
tive power. What it really amounted to was that the Germans must

Last Days in Germany 369

now be entrusted with the responsibility for their own problems. We
would have to help them, but also continue to supervise and control
their activities indirectly.

MY MEMORANDUM FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

I was to leave Germany on the 2nd May 1946, being due to take
up my new duties at the War Office in June. After prolonged thought
I decided it was my duty to prepare a memorandum for the British
Government on the situation in Germany as I believed it to be.

My time in Germany since the war ended had convinced me that
a united Germany was at preesnt not possible. I doubted if it would
ever be possible without fighting. But the Western Allies had half of
Germany, and they would have to continue to strive for a united
Germany.

Our object must now be to bring the Western Germans into the
community of Western nations, and to make their territory so attractive
and prosperous that the Eastern Germans would regard it enviously
when comparing it with their own miserable lot But if we were to
do this, we would have to grasp the nettle firmly with both hands.
Courageous decisions would be necessary— and without delay.

I devoted my last day in Germany to writing the memorandum.
I took it to England with me on the 2nd May and handed it personally
to the Prime Minister. This is what it said:

**i. I leave Germany tomorrow. I have set out below a concise
statement of the situation as I believe it to be. I am not
happy about it. I consider the general overall picture is
sombre, if not black.

For the present the food crisis overshadows all else, but it is
not by any means the only serious factor in the situation.

2. We have a sick economy.

Coal is short; only the basic industries can be developed;
the others lie idle, and there are few consumer goods being
produced, and nothing in the shops for people to buy.
We have reached agreement on the future level of the German
economy; there will soon begin the removal and destruction
of a large part of German industry; this will cause distress to
the German people and may produce unemployment on a
large scale in the British Zone.

The present level of production is such that our exports do
not pay for our imports.

3. A sick economy means that we cannot have a sound currency.
There is little to buy with marks and the people are tending
to use a system of barter to get food. Marks are gradually

370 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

'becoming of no value to people. Under such a system indus
try cannot be got going, since there is no incentive; this is
the beginning of inflation, i.e. the phase when money begins
to lose its value.

4. In my Memorandum entitled "Hie Problem in Germany:
February 1946," I dealt with the subject of how we should
handle the great mass of human material we have in Ger
many. I said we must work on a definite and concrete plan
designed to bring about a change of heart in the German
people.

I stated that the foundation of the plan must be the economic
line of attack.

I said that the Germans must know what is to be the future
of their country; they must be given a reasonable standard of
living; they must be given some hope for a worthwhile future.
I gave it as my opinion that if we did not do this, we would
fail in Germany.

We have not done it and I would say that at the moment
there is a definite danger that we may fail. By that I mean
there is a danger that if things do not improve the Germans
in the British Zone will begin to look East. When that hap
pens we shall have failed, and there will exist a definite
menace to the British Empire. In this connection, much com
munist propaganda is coming westwards over the iron curtain.

5. If we are to progress at all we must have:

a sound economy,

a balanced budget,

central financial control.
We must produce more consumer goods.
The essential financing of the cost of reparations must be
borne by Germany as a whole; at present it falls heavily on
the British Zone, which has most of the industries.
I still consider that the real answer to the problem is con
tained in my memorandum of ist Feb. 1946 (see page 366
The Problem in Germany: February 1946). But adequate
economic conditions must be established before we can make
any progress with the plan set out in that memorandum; at
present these conditions do not exist.

6. While we are in this sorry economic condition, good progress
is being made with the formation of political parties and
trades unions. But we want to be clear that herein lies a
possible danger.

There is no doubt that in a contented Germany, a strong
Social Democratic party would be a great asset and one
making for peace and security in Western Europe.

Last Days in Germany 371

But, if the Germans become discontented and we get organ
ised hostility of the people against the occupying Power, then
they have machinery in the political and trades union spheres
which could be used to implement their nefarious purposes.
This aspect of the problem needs to be carefully watched
during the next few years; close touch must be kept with
propaganda coining from the Russian Zone.

BASIC FUXDA^fENTALS IX THE SOLUTION" TO THE PROBLEM

7. We must decide what is to constitute "Germany." The eastern
frontier of Germany was agreed at Potsdam. The western
frontier is not yet agreed; it is wrapped up in the whole
problem of the future of the Saar, the Ruhr and the Rhine-
land.

We must tell the German people what Germany is to consist
of.

8. The people living inside that Germany must be given a
reasonable standard of living, and hope for a worthwhile
future. A reasonable standard of living can be set up in
Germany on the basis of the level of industry which has been
agreed, but only under certain conditions. These conditions
were emphasised in our acceptance of the level of industry
agreement The principal one is that Germany should be
treated as one economic whole* This is not happening at
present, firstly on account of French opposition and, secondly,
because of the attitude of the Russians. I do not feel confident
that die Russians ever intend to treat Germany as an eco
nomic whole as we understand that phrase. I am certain that
they will not do it unless we join with the other Allies in
exerting strong pressure upon them.

9. The whole country is in such a mess that the only way to put
it right is to get the Germans "in on it" themselves. This is
being done by Zonal Advisory Councils; but fhig is not
enough.

It means Central Administrations; we do not have these; we
must have them. We must secure French agreement to their
establishment We must then take great care to ensure that
they are set up under genuine Quadripartite control, and that
neither their constitution nor their functions shall be such as
to make them susceptible to the influence of one Power more
than of others.

10. We must decide whether we are going to feed the Germans,
or let them starve. Basically, we must not let them starve;
if we do, then everything else we do is of no avail.
It does not look at present as if we can increase the ration

372 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

beyond the present rate o£ 1042 calories; this means we are
going to let them starve: gradually.

In spite o£ the difficulties of the world food situation, we must
get back to a reasonable ration standard in the British Zone
as quickly as possible. The discrepancies which exist between
the standard of feeding in our zone and that in other zones
must be removed by agreement on a common standard.

CONCLUSION

11. I regard the four points outlined in paras. 7 to 10 as the four
pillars on which we must build the new Germany out of the
ruins of the old. The master pillar is the fourth, or food pillar;
if that breaks, the other pillars fall down.

12. So far, the four pillars do not exist. Therefore we cannot
progress.

13. We must start to build the four pillars. And above all, we
must tell the German people what is going to happen to them
and to their country. If we do not do those things, we shall
drift towards possible failure. That "drift" will take the form
of an increasingly hostile population, which will eventually
begin to look East.

Such a Germany would be a menace to the security of the
British Empire.

14. On the other hand, a contented Germany with a sound
political framework, could be a great asset to the security of
the Empire and the peace of the world."

CHAPTER 26

Prelude to Whitehall

IN MY farewell address to the officers of the British Army of the
Rhine I referred to the fact that I had reached a stage in my career
when I would not again exercise direct command of British sol
diers. This made me sad. On the other hand, as C.I.G.S. I would be
responsible for the organisation of the Army and the welfare of every
one in it There were some seven weeks before I was to begin work
at the War Office and I decided to use that period as a time for think
ing about how I would tackle the job, and for trying to fit myself for
my new task.

While in Germany I had been observing the political and military
scene in Britain. Political minds seemed to be concentrated on the
creation of a welfare state, on a complete reorganisation of industry
moving towards nationalisation, and on the raising of the school
leaving age— all these to be carried out simultaneously and as quickly
as possible. The state of the world, British commitments overseas,
and a long-term plan for the armed forces all seemed to have been
pushed into the background; I had been chafing at the way the
pressure of home events had forced delay in the consideration of these
problems. It seemed to me important to clear my own mind, to
formulate a policy and prepare the way so that no time would be lost
when I took office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 26th
June 1946. The British Army must not, as after World War I, be
allowed to drift aimlessly without a policy or a doctrine.

Looking back, I reckon that the seeds of anything I was able to
achieve during my two and a half years at the War Office were sown
during the first six months: in 1946. These were months of terrific
work and during them we made definite progress— and, because of

373

374 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

my direct methods of tackling problems, I made many enemies. I
propose to deal, very fully, with those first six months, and thereafter
to select for mention only certain important subjects which require to
be followed up in order to present a balanced picture of the whole
period up to the end of October 1948— when I left the War Office.

On my return from Germany I went to live at Hindhead, in the
house of my friends Major and Mrs. Reynolds. That had been my
home all through the war and they had looked after David for me,
who was now seventeen and still at Winchester. I had no other place
to go to, and they allowed me to continue on there until I could make
a home for David and myself somewhere else. I had brought my
caravans back from Germany and parked them in the grounds. I was
supposed to be on leave; but I soon realised that no rest was possible;
there was too much to be done. I worked all day and every day, in
my office caravan.

Certain matters were essential and urgent and, so far as I know,
no action was being taken about them. There was a grave danger that
the Army would drift along, shaping itself to events as they occurred;
this was not at all what I had in mind. Therefore, the first point to
tackle was the organisation of the post-war British Army, in order to
design it on a sound basis which would last for the next ten to fifteen
years. It was vital to have a long-term plan. And so I began work on
a paper called The Problem of the Post-War Army and decided to pro
duce it for Army Council approval the day I became C.I.G.S. In this
paper I also described how we must modernise the way of life of
officers and men, and create an efficient army with a high morale to
which all would be proud to belong. I planned to do this not only by
action within the War Office, but also by enlisting the aid of the
Press and by taking advantage of official occasions when I had to
speak.

Then it would be necessary to evolve a broad tactical doctrine for
the Army, which would be capable of application in all theatres, with
variation in detail according to local topographical and climatic condi
tions. This would obviously take time. I decided to tackle this problem
by holding a series of exercises at the Staff College, Camberley, which
would be attended by all general officers in the Army at home and
overseas, and to which Chiefs of Staff of Dominion armies would be
invited. The first thing was obviously to get inter-Service agreement
to the fundamental principles of modern war, and I drafted out these
principles as I saw them, and got them agreed by the First Sea Lord
(John Cunningham) and the Chief of the Air Staff (Tedder). I then
began work on the first War Office Exercise, which I planned to hold
in August, six weeks after I had become C.LG.S. The object of this
exercise was:

Prelude to Whitehall 375

"To take the basic principles of modern war and, with that back
ground, to study the stage-management and conduct of offensive
land operations, and to enunciate in broad outline a tactical doc
trine for the Army."

Finally, it was my aim to obtain a personal grip on the Army; I
must be the commander to whom all C.s-in-C. looked for orders. This
would have to wait until I became C.I.G.S. But I decided to hold
conferences of home Army Commanders every three months, at the
War Office. At these conferences I would give a general survey of
world affairs, and my main plans and orders for the future. The com
manders would produce their problems and the War Office would
give decisions where they were needed. In general, I decided that I
would spend two months in the United Kingdom followed by one
month on tour overseas, and on this basis I planned tours up to the
end of 1947. These tours took in every part of the British Empire,
some of which had never before been visited by a CJ.G.S. when in
office.

All the foregoing concerned me in my capacity as professional
head of the British Army but not in my capacity as a member of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. In this latter respect I realised that I would
be required immediately on taking up my duties in Whitehall to give
my views and assist in making decisions about problems in all parts of
a troubled world. Without visiting the countries concerned, it would
clearly be impossible to speak with the authority which was essential.
I came to the conclusion that I ought to visit at least the Mediterranean
countries where British troops were stationed— Malta, Egypt, Palestine,
Greece and Italy, and also look in on Trans-Jordan— and that I should
do so before beginning work in Whitehall. This would enable me to
absorb the atmosphere in which the problems were evolving in those
countries, and meet the men who were grappling with them; I would
then be better able to advise about the problems on a Chiefs of Staff
and Cabinet level after I had become CJ.G.S. And so I intensified
the work in my caravan at Hindhead, and completed it in time to set
off on this tour on the gth June. The tour was planned to end on the
22nd June. But when I arrived in Cairo a signal was received from the
Viceroy of India, my old friend Archie Wavell, asking me to visit him
in Delhi and discuss urgent matters with him and Auchinleck (who
was C.-in-C., India). I accepted the invitation and did not arrive back
in London till the evening of the 26th June— having become C.I.G.S.
that morning. The tour was absolutely invaluable as a preparation for
meeting the many difficult problems looming ahead. But it was tiring
and I was not exactly fresh when I entered the War Office on the
27th June.

376 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

EGYPT

At the time o£ my visit, June 1946, die Treaty negotiations had been
going on for some time and had reached a temporary standstill. I
knew enough about the Middle East to realise that in war, or threat
of war, we would require similar facilities to those which we had
enjoyed under the existing Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. In peace it was
necessary to have the use of the Suez Canal and such other facilities as
we needed for our imperial communications to India, Australasia and
the Far East; we must also be able to maintain our base installations
for use by our forces in war, and have the right to station forces in
strategic areas and to move them in and through the Middle East

But the British Delegation, then in Egypt, had reported that any
attempt to insist upon our full requirements would lead to grave
disorders, to the necessity to use force and, ultimately, to reference to
the Security Council of the United Nations. As the (seemingly) only
possible alternative, they had suggested that we should propose to
withdraw all British armed forces from Egyptian soil, and then
negotiate with the object of making satisfactory alternative arrange
ments. It was considered that this alternative would be the lesser of
two evils. An announcement to this effect was accordingly made, but
it did not achieve the desired results; the Egyptians displayed no sense
of gratitude nor did they show any intention of meeting us half
way.

By the time I was due to leave England on the gth June the nego
tiations had reached a standstill. The Foreign Secretary (Bevin)
wanted to start the ball rolling again and he saw me in London on
the 8th June. He said we must stand firm on our basic requirements,
but asked me to investigate and if possible "ginger up" the evacuation
of the Delta cities; he hoped by this demonstration of the sincerity of
our intentions to get the Egyptians to advance some way towards
meeting our requirements.

With this background I arrived in Egypt on the loth June, having
spent the previous night in Malta. I had long talks with the British
Ambassador (Sir Ronald Campbell), with the C.-in-C. Middle East
(General Sir Bernard Paget), and also with the King of Egypt and his
Prime Minister (Sidky Pasha). To the two latter I spoke very plainly.
I said that what was wanted in Egypt was a clear understanding that,
in the event of world war, it was to the best interests of Egypt that
British forces should co-operate with Egyptian forces in maintaining
the integrity of Egypt and of the Arab States in the Middle East. It
followed that there must be maintained in peace-time adequate base
facilities for the British forces, and that these must be maintained on

Prelude to Whitehall 377

a scale commensurate with war needs; if this was not done, both
countries would start the war with a series of disasters from which they
might not recover. The base must be in Egypt The details about
exactly what base facilities were required for the British forces was
a matter for careful examination by the Service Chiefs of the two
delegations, and discussions to this end should be going on with great
intensity. But nothing was happening because the Egyptian Service
Chiefs had no clear terms of reference from their political chiefs.

I rubbed into the King and to Sidky that both sides must approach
the problem in an atmosphere of mutual confidence; the Egyptians
should realise that the British desire for a base to be maintained in
Egypt in peace-time was exactly what they themselves should most
desire, and that the more such a base could be on a regional basis,
with other Arab States showing interest and approval, the better for
all concerned. The natural custodians of the base would be the Egyp
tians, since it was in their country; but we would like to have repre
sentatives in touch with it so that when an emergency appeared on
the horizon we could all get busy and thus be well prepared should
war break out later.

The King didn't seem interested in all this; he kept on saying that
what Egypt was suffering from was forty years of British misrule! So
I did not waste any more time on him. Sidky displayed much more
understanding. He agreed with my presentation of the problem and
promised to co-operate. I said that we would evacuate the Delta cities
as soon as possible; a plan to do so would be begun at once, and we
might hope to be out in two to three months. The rapidity of this
move would possibly lead to a longish time being required to evacuate
from the Canal Zone, and this might take anything up to five years-
depending on how the international situation was developing.

I made it clear to the British commanders in Egypt that the business
of evacuation from the Delta cities to the Canal Zone was a live and
pressing question; it was to be tackled earnestly and at once, and that
when I became C.LG.S. on the 26th June I would want to see definite
progress.

I reported to Whitehall the result of my talks in Egypt.

As a result of my visits to Malta and Egypt I came to the conclusion
that, without occupying Egypt, we could still dominate the eastern
Mediterranean and be in a position to protect our vital interests in
war, provided that we could ensure the following minimum require
ments:

(a) Some agreement by which we had full rights to station such
forces as we wished in Libya. This was a good base for
air forces. With Malta in our possession, and with air and

378 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

ground forces in Libya, we would be well placed to pro
tect our vital interests in the Mediterranean and in North
Africa.

(b) Advanced forces, air and ground, in Cyprus— and air forces in
Trans-Jordan, by agreement.

(c) The retention of full military rights in Palestine.

(d) The right to return to Egypt on the threat of war, a nucleus
of our base requirements being maintained for us in peace-time
by the Egyptians.

(e) It was vital to remain strong in the Sudan, in case of difficulties
with the Egyptians. The weaker our position in Egypt the
greater our need for strength in the Sudan— so as to be able to
control the Nile, the life-blood of Egypt.

My last engagement in Cairo was to address a gathering of about
one thousand British officers of the Middle East Command. I outlined
the steps I proposed to take to try and make the Army more attractive
for officers and men in peace-time, and how I was going to work to
shape it into an efficient fighting machine for a generation ahead.

PALESTINE

My next port of call was Palestine. For many months the situation
here had been deteriorating and acts of terrorism were being perpe
trated by illegal Jewish armed organisations, such as the Irgun and the
Stern Gang. Shortly before my visit the Anglo-American Committee
had issued its report, advocating amongst other things the immediate
admission of 100,000 Jews, and the report was still under consideration.
Its issue had caused a temporary lull in terrorism; but there were
signs that the Jews were becoming impatient at the delay in an
announcement in their favour, and it seemed that the quietness would
not continue much longer*

I was much perturbed by what I heard and saw. A political decision
was, of course, needed in Palestine but the terms of it were not at the
moment my concern. What was very definitely my concern was the
action of the Army in aiding the civil power to maintain law and order,
and in this respect the outlook was dismal. The High Commissioner
seemed to me to be unable to make up his mind what to do. Indecision
and hesitation were in evidence all down the line, beginning in White
hall; a policy was required, and then decisions. The Palestine Police
Force was 50 per cent below strength, and this at a time when the
situation was clearly about to boil over; its morale was low and it was
considered as a force to be no more than 25 per cent effective— through

Prelude to Whitehall 379

no fault of its own. All this had led to a state of affairs in which British
rule existed only in name; the true rulers seemed to me to be the
Jews, whose unspoken slogan was— "You dare not touch us.**

I made it very clear to the G.O.C. in Palestine (Lieut-General Sir
Evelyn Barker) that this was no way to carry on. The decision to re
establish effective British authority was a political one; we must press
for that decision. If this led to war with the Jews, from the Army's
point of view it would be a war against a fanatical and cunning enemy
who would use the weapons of kidnap, murder and sabotage; women
would fight against us as well as men, and no one would know who
was friend or foe. All this demanded a drastic revision of the way of
life of the serviceman in Palestine; social activities would have to
cease, the fullest precautions must be taken and, generally, everyone
must be given a proper understanding of the task that lay ahead. I
would insist that the Police and the Army be given a firm and very
clear directive, and I would then give the troops the fullest support in
their difficult job. Before leaving Palestine I expressed my views very
forcibly by cable to Whitehall. As I had done in Cairo, my last act
was to address a large gathering of officers in Sarafand Camp, at which
I told them what was going on and my ideas about the future.

TRANS-JORDAN

Before leaving for India, I flew to Amman and had lunch with
King Abdullah, who was an old friend. We had a tremendous recep
tion in Amman, which was a welcome experience after the somewhat
chilly atmosphere of Cairo and Jerusalem. The King said he would use
all his influence to support the British cause among the Arab States.
He added that a decision on Palestine in favour of the Arabs was
essential to British interests in the Middle East I said this was a
matter for politicians and that I would pass on his remarks to the
British Prime Minister— which I did.

BASRA

I stopped for one night in Basra on the way to India. The main
preoccupation here was the alarming way in which events were
developing in Persia, and, in particular, in the south Persian oilfields.
The Tudeh party, through Russian influence and support, had set up
its own Government in the newly declared autonomous province of
Azerbaijan and was engaged in furthering Russian policy throughout
the rest of Persia; this included attempts to embarrass British interests

380 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

in the oilfields. I discussed the problem with the O.C.* British Troops
in Iraq; he had the task of protecting British and Indian lives and
interests in Abadan, and in the five main oilfields about 150 miles to
the north-east and east of Abadan. He had insufficient troops for these
two tasks and needed an additional infantry brigade. I agreed and
reported accordingly to London, recommending that the brigade
should be located at Shuaiba, with an air lift for one battalion. The
climate in this part of the world was not suitable for young British
soldiers for any length of time and I decided to ask the Viceroy and
the C.-in-C. India if they would send an Indian brigade, as the
importance of these oilfields was as great for India as for Britain. (This
wks later agreed, and the brigade sailed from India early in August
1946.)

INDIA

The major military problem in India was dependent on future
political decisions. Wavell told me that he was convinced the British
would have to hand over the country to the Indians; there had been
no recruitment into the civil service and we could not continue to
govern it much longer. He wanted to do it gradually, beginning in the
south; the British Government wanted it done quickly. The Cabinet
Mission was in Delhi at the time. I was concerned with the military
repercussions of whatever plan was finally adopted. If developments
resulted in civil disturbances, then the military would be faced with
the task of safeguarding British lives and interests; in this connection
the attitude of the Indian Army would be a factor of the greatest
importance.

In addition to long talks with the Viceroy and Auchinleck, I had
discussions with the late Maulana Azad, leader of the Congress Party,
and with Mr. Jinnah of the Muslim League. Mr. Gandhi sent his
regrets that he could not get to Delhi to see me as he was attending
a meeting of the Congress Higher Committee.

While talking with Maulana Azad I overheard him say something
to his interpreter about British troops; the Maulana did not know I
could speak Urdu. (I had passed an examination in that language in
Peshawar in 1910.) I at once asked him if he supported the popular
demand for tie withdrawal of British troops from India, and he said
he did. At this I expressed delight and, referring to the extensive
demands on British man-power in other parts of the world, I asked
him if he would agree to their immediate withdrawal; if so, I would
begin at once to get them away. Azad was horrified and said: "No,
no; not for a long time/* He replied in the same terms to my re-
* Officer Commanding.

Prelude to Whitehall 381

quest that he should agree to release British officers from the Indian
Army.

Jinnah, in his talk, made it very clear that he would never tolerate
Hindu rule over Moslems. He gave it as his opinion that collaboration
between the two was impossible. When I asked why this must be so
he said: "How can the two lie down together; the Hindu worships
the cow, I eat it." Jinnah also said that civil war was inevitable if British
troops were withdrawn.

These talks were of great value to me, not only as background to
what might come but also because they revealed that, whatever they
said in public, the political leaders of both parties were equally desir
ous for the continued presence of British troops in India.

I myself was uneasy in my mind at the treatment British troops
would receive in India if and when a purely Indian Government took
over the reins. It seemed to me that Auchinleck was wrapped up
entirely in the Indian Army and appeared to be paying little heed to
the welfare of the British soldiers in India. I therefore decided, with
the full approval of Wavell, to arrange for the appointment of a
"Major-General, British Troops" at G.H.Q. in Delhi, and to get him
sent to India at once. This was agreed in London and I nominated
Major-General Whistler for the job; he was a first-rate infantry soldier
who had served under me during the war, and he proved to be the
right man.

All these talks in Delhi were crammed into two days. But they gave
me a good picture of the general situation in India, and the extension
of my tour had been shown to be well worth while.

HALTS IN PALESTINE AND CYPRUS

My return journey to England lay by way of Athens and Naples.
But I decided to halt for an hour at Lydda, in Palestine, for a further
talk with General Barker. I had also asked General Paget to meet me
there. I re-emphasised that there must be no weakening towards the
maintenance of law and order as regards terrorist outrages. I said that
General Barker, as the confirming authority for death sentences on
Jews convicted by military tribunals, must not be deterred from his
duty by threats of the murder of five British officers who had been
kidnapped since my visit a few days earlier. This did a good deal to
strengthen his resolve. Barker was suffering from a lack of support
by the Government authorities; I promised him my full support in
his difficult task.

And so on to Athens, with a halt for refuelling in Cyprus. I wrote
in my diary:

382 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

"The atmosphere in Cyprus was indeed one of peace and quiet;
there were no problems (as yet) to disturb the even tenor of the
daily round."

GREECE

The situation in Greece was explained to me by the British Ambas
sador, Sir Clifford Norton, and by General Crawford, the GOC.
There was a great lack of faith in paper money.

The struggle between "Right" and "Left** was becoming a serious
problem, and the atrocities committed by left-wing elements during
the recent elections had given rise to deep bitterness against the
Communists on the part of the majority of the Greek people. But for
the presence of British troops, the Communist minority, supported by
Russian influence, might have succeeded in seizing power by terrorism
and force of arms. At this time the Greek police, even with the support
of the Greek Army, were not capable of keeping law and order.
British civil and military authorities in Greece considered that there
was a real danger of external interference in Greek affairs by Yugoslavs,
Bulgarians, or Russians. I was told that the size of the British Army
in Greece must depend, amongst other things, on the need to prevent a
coup $&tat backed by foreign arms. But I pointed out that our policy
in Greece must be based on the fact that it was the task of the Greeks
to maintain law and order in their country, and that this was their
first responsibility. Man-power would not permit of British forces
remaining in Greece indefinitely; the most pressing task of the British
Army in Greece was to assist in the training of the Greek Army, with
a view to fitting it in the shortest possible time to control the internal
situation in the country. External aggression was unlikely to materialise
unless grave and uncontrollable internal disorders broke out.

Before leaving Greece, after only two days, I inspected a parade
of the Greek Army. The smartness, fitness and enthusiasm of the
soldiers contrasted sharply with the adiposity and lethargy of many
of the senior officers; at dinner that night I commented jokingly on
this to the Greek C.-in-G, and recommended that physical training
should be made compulsory for the senior ranks in the Army.

After the parade, at which I was decorated with the Gold Medal
for Gallantry by the War Minister, I addressed the assembled senior
officers. I stressed the need for high morale, discipline and the pro
duction of the basic qualities of leadership. I also laid it down as an
axiom that an army must be above politics and must be loyal to the
Government of the day; a soldier's allegiance is given to the State and
it was not open to him to change his allegiance because of his political
views. I did not say in my address that this quality of loyalty to the

Prelude to Whitehall 383

Government of the day had not been much in evidence among Greek
armies of the past.

Finally, I addressed in Athens a large gathering of British officers,
my talk being on the same lines as those given in Cairo and Palestine.
I had been greatly impressed by the high standard of smartness and
turn-out of die British forces in Greece, and this was a striking testi
mony to their high morale and also a good example to the Greeks.

ITALY

The alteration in the tour to include a visit to India had resulted
in reducing the time in Italy to eighteen hours, in order that I could
arrive back in England on the 26th June— the day I was to take up
my new appointment After landing at Naples we drove to Caserta
and began work at once. The great fear in Italy was of a Yugoslav
invasion into Venezia Giulia; this was emphasised by Allied army, navy
and air force speakers, who all emphasised the weakness of their forces.
Just as in Greece, a far more serious view was taken of the local picture
than was justified; the Russian war of nerves, or battle of wits, was
looked on not as a bluff but as an indication that hostilities would
break out at any moment

I said that there could be no minor war with Yugoslavia which
would not entail a major world war; and that the other side knew
that very well. If we were forced to fight for Venezia Giulia it would
be the duty of the Western Allies to ensure that our forces were in a
position to meet the enemy on advantageous terms; this was not at
present the case. I promised to keep the matter under continual review
and to get agreement for the evacuation of Pola, a commitment which
was unacceptable from a military point of view. It seemed to me that
the commitments in Austria and Italy were closely connected, and
I agreed to reduce the British troops in Austria and thus provide extra
strength in Venezia Giulia. Finally, I gave it as my opinion that,
apart from minor incidents and terrorist activities designed to work to
the disadvantage of the West, I did not believe that Tito would receive
sufficient Russian backing to allow him to pull off or even attempt a
coup in Venezia Giulia. In my view there was no danger of open war
at present.

Later, after Tito had broken3* with Russia, he invited me to visit
him in Yugoslavia as his personal guest; the visit was repeated every
year and we became— and remain— very good friends.

I left Italy on the morning of the 26th June and arrived back in
London later that day— tired, but feeling that I was now far better
equipped to advise on the handling of our external problems than I

384 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

had been when I left Germany in May. I had learnt that our senior
commanders overseas were grappling with many difficult problems
and generally with totally inadequate forces. Everywhere I endeav
oured to instQ confidence, and I promised my help in solving the
problems and my support in facing up to unpleasant situations.

CHAPTER 27

Beginnings in Whitehall

I HAD never before served in the War Office and knew little about
its organisation nor how it conducted its business. I was soon to
learn about the great work it had done during the war, and before
I left it in 1948 I had come to the conclusion it was easily the best
Ministry in Whitehall. I was once asked which was the worst, and
replied without any hesitation: the Colonial Office.

I should begin by saying that I served under three Secretaries of
State in succession. The first was Jack Lawson, now Lord Lawson
and Lord Lieutenant of Durham. One could not have had a nicer boss;
he had been a miner in his early days and his book about it, called
A Mans Life, is one of the best of its type that I have read. In the
autumn of 1946, Lawson was obliged to resign owing to ill health and
was succeeded by Fred Bellenger. He also was easy to work with and
had possibly a better brain than Lawson. I often used to think he was
not very popular with the Cabinet; he got rough-housed by the
Prime Minister quite a bit and this had its repercussions on the War
Office. But we liked him and he fought our battles in Parliament with
considerable success, at any rate, to begin with.

The third one was Emanuel ShinwelL I would describe him as the
best of the three, and this is no reflection on the other two. Shinwell
had a quick and clear brain and his heart was in the right place; he
could understand and decide, quickly. Once we had satisfied him that
some line of action was essential, he would fight for it in the Cabinet
and in Parliament. He and I became great friends. I used to tell him
that when he was in his chair in the War Office from Monday to
Friday he was excellent, and just what we wanted as our political
chief; I added that he slipped back when he went to his constituency

386 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

in the week-ends and made political speeches. He would retaliate
by saying that I was much the same, my reply being that I never made
political speeches.

Overall, therefore, I was lucky in my political masters at the War
Office. The same was generally true of the Junior Ministers, except in
one case. This one had planned an overseas tour, and he took it on
himself to issue an order to the Adjutant General telling the latter to
lay on the tour and giving the most amazing instructions about how
he was to be treated. The following are some extracts:

"I give advance warning that from time to time I shall see
troops without officers being present.

My working day will be from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.

I should like to lunch sometimes with officers, sometimes with
other ranks.

I want no guards of honour, special parades, special meals. This
is to be treated as an order which I expect to be obeyed.

It will generally be desirable for me to meet as early as possible
... the C.-in-C.

I shall listen to complaints on any military subject from any rank.

I wish Commands to be prepared to answer detailed questions."

This order caused the father-and-mother of a row. The Adjutant
General went to see the Secretary of State and tendered his resignation
unless the letter was withdrawn; he then blew in to my office. My
reactions were a mixture of anger and amusement The letter was too
silly to cause anger; it could only have been written in colossal igno
rance or colossal conceit, and it seemed more charitable to accept the
former, I saw the Secretary of State myself and made it clear to him
that, quite apart from the other considerations of this case, on no
account would any outside agent ever be allowed to address bodies of
troops in the enforced absence of their officers. The letter was can
celled. The Junior Minister then requested me to detail a General Staff
officer to accompany him, and asked for an operational brief covering
the theatres he proposed to visit I refused both requests. Finally, in
order to clarify his position I informed C.s-in-C. overseas that the
Junior Minister's job was to look into all matters connected with the
living conditions and general welfare of the troops. He was in no sense
the "superior officer" of any C.-in-C. He was a civilian and was only
empowered to tour in his capacity as a civilian member of the Army
Council. He was in no way a proper person with whom to discuss
operational or strategic matters. I think the real trouble was that the
Junior Minister had once been brigade major to one of the generals
in the War Office, and he reckoned the time had now arrived when he
would give orders to generals.

Beginnings in Whitehall 387

But in spite of all this I was determined there should be no rift
between the civil and military sides of the War Office. Being well
aware that those on the civil side were apprehensive of what I might
do, I took great trouble to put them at their ease. In particular, I made
friends with the Permanent Under-Seeretary (Sir Eric Speed) and he
lunched with me every Monday at my flat, when we would discuss
our problems and agree on plans to solve them. This human approach
I carried a stage further. If the policy was to promote high morale
throughout the Army, the War Office must itself set the tone. For
this reason I started the custom of addressing gatherings of staff officers
and civilians in a nearby cinema hired for the purpose. I outlined
the steps which were being taken to improve conditions and my
general plans for the Army, calling for a great effort from the team
as a whole. I said it should be regarded as an honour to serve in the
War Office and proposed the introduction of a formation sign to be
worn by all military personnel, and by those civilians who wished
to do so; this sign has been worn ever since.

At one of these addresses I described the unsatisfactory state of
affairs by which unmarried officers posted to the War Office were left
to their own devices to find accommodation. Apart from the difficulty
of finding anywhere to live, these officers had a lonely life once their
day's work was over. We tackled this problem energetically and
arranged that the former Royal Military Academy at Woolwich should
be organised as a mess for 250 officers.

These talks to War Office audiences had never been given before;
they produced a good dividend as they ensured that everyone knew
what was going on. All agreed that my proposals ware excellent; but
there were some who said: "it sounds good, but we must wait and see."
The quick arrangements for the unmarried officers were a good tonic
for the doubters.

I used to address the War Office audience whenever I returned from
an overseas tour, and would tell them of the local problems, of the
decisions I had given, and what further action was necessary in the
War Office.

Turning to the wider sphere outside the War Office, I appointed a
special committee under Major-General Macmillan to examine the way
of life in barracks of the British soldier, and to recommend in what
respects it could be made more in keeping with the times; the com
mittee was also to bear in mind the needs of the young officer.

I regarded all these human problems as immensely important and
they were the first to be tackled by me when I went to the War Office.

At the first meeting of the Army Council which I attended, I
presented my paper on The Problem of the Post-War Army which
I had prepared at Hindhead immediately on my return from Germany

388 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

in May 1946. In introducing it I said that I had attempted to include
in one document the main problems that would affect the post-war
Army; some such document was necessary for planning purposes, so
that everyone might work to a common target I realised that action
was already being taken on a number o£ points, and that other points
would require considerable investigation and discussion. But mean
while I asked the Army Council to give general approval to the paper
so that it could be used as a basis for planning within the War Office,
and this was agreed. Among the points covered in the paper were
the following:

(a) The need for agreement on the shape of the Army for the next
ten to fifteen years.

(b) The importance of a contented army and the factors necessary
to this end.

(c) The regular and citizen Armies together to form one balanced

whole, capable of the necessary action quickly on the outbreak
of war. Specialised units which could not be economically
maintained within the man-power ceiling of the regular
Army to be provided by the citizen Army.

(d) The need for good liaison with Dominion armies.

(e) The shape and size of the regular Army; garrison and internal
security troops throughout the Empire, with strategic reserves
in the U.K. and Middle East.

(f ) The shape, size, and role of the citizen Army.

(g) The importance of scientific research and development; the
Army must be able to take the field with confidence against
any enemy.

(h) The conception of modern war; a clear doctrine to be evolved
from the lessons of the past and to be taught throughout the
Army.

(j) Collective training to be imaginative, realistic, in keeping with
modern battle conditions, and to be carried out in all seasons
of the year— and not only in the summer, as had been the pre
war custom.

(k) Army schools to cover the over-all education of the officer, not
only in his own arm but also in a wider sphere embracing the
the co-operation of all arms, organisation, and administration.

(I) Training in command for senior officers, and the training of
higher commanders.

(m) Morale: the need to study this subject, and to teach how to
create high morale.

(n) The importance of developing close co-operation with the
Royal Air Force.

Beginnings in Whitehall 389

Attached to the document were notes on the fundamental principles
of war. There was also a memorandum on staff organisation in which
I urged the introduction of the Chief of Staff system in the Army, The
existing British system placed on the commander the responsibility for
co-ordinating the work of his staff; the experiences of World War II
had convinced me that this system was out of date. A commander has
got to be left free to tackle the essentials of the problems which con
front him, together with those details, and only those details, which are
vital. It is only in these conditions that the plan can be made by the
commander himself; nobody else can make it and it must not be forced
on him by his staff, or by circumstances, or by the enemy, I stated that
our existing staff system did not produce the best results, senior
commanders becoming involved in far too much detail and thus being
liable to neglect the major considerations; details were the province
of the staff, and a Chief of Staff was essential in order to free the
commander for quiet thought and reflection. There was much opposi
tion in the War Office to this change in the staff system, both on the
military and civil sides. Believing as I did that it was vital for successful
administration in peace and command in war, I finally said that if the
Chief of Staff system was not introduced into the British Army, I would
resign and the Prime Minister could get another C.LG.S. That finished
the argument and the change was introduced; but it took me some
few months to get it.

After a few weeks in the War Office I reached the conclusion that
there was no clear policy between scientific research and the need to
go into production at some date; a never-ending tug-of-war seemed
to be going on* I realised it was useless to ask the politicians for
guidance on this subject After studying all relevant reports, and think
ing the matter over, I laid it down that the Regular Army must within
five years (by 1951) be adequately equipped to handle any small
troubles which might arise. I further said that the balanced whole,
Regular and Territorial Armies, must be ready within fifteen years
(by 1961) as regards equipment, man-power, ammunition, reserves,
etc., to fight a major war, and thereafter must be kept so ready. To get
a firm decision on this matter was a great relief to all in the War Office.
I naturally informed the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for
War, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the ruling I had given.
There was no comment Later, I informed General Eisenhower, and
the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominion Armies, of my action; they all
agreed. So much for the shaping of the Army; the biggest step had
been taken.

I next came to the conclusion that there was in ministerial and
military circles in Whitehall no clear conception about how we would
fight a major war. In a paper on Imperial Defence written prior to

390 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

my becoming a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Middle
East had been classified as one of our vital "main support areas." The
Prime Minister (Attlee) had not accepted this contention, and had
argued against it at the first meeting I had with him. After that meet
ing I told my two colleagues that the Chiefs of Staff should write a
paper on western strategy in a major war, and submit it to the Prime
Minister. They did not agree, pleading lack of sufficient evidence of
the power of future weapons and lack of time for their staffs; I then
said I would produce the paper in the War Office within a week. In
accordance with my usual practice I gave my staff the framework of
the paper on the following lines:

(a) We must plan to build up the strength of our potential allies
in Europe and establish a strong western bloc, so as to protect
the peoples, territories and civilisation of the western world
against any invasion from the east. We ourselves must be
prepared to fight on the mainland of Europe, alongside our
Allies, with aU that that entailed.

(b) We must ensure our freedom to use the major oceans and
seas. In particular we must fight for the North African coast
line and thus enable our communications through the Mediter
ranean to be kept open.

(c) We must fight for the Middle East, which, with the United
Kingdom and North Africa, would provide the bases for the
launching of a tremendous air offensive against the territory
of any aggressor from the east. The Army must maintain a
Corps H.Q. in the Middle East, available to go off anywhere
to handle an emergency.

The paper was written in a week and I sent copies to the First Sea
Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff; although these two disagreed
with me only on the first of the points set out in the paper, they were
unwilling to adopt it as a Chiefs of Staff memorandum for submission
to the Prime Minister. Such was the beginning of my struggle in
Whitehall to get an agreed British strategy on which all would work;
it was also the beginning of much friction in the Chiefs of Staff
Committee.

I continued unceasingly to advocate the need for a Chiefs of Staff
memorandum on the lines outlined above. But my colleagues did not
agree with me about the need to be prepared to fight in the mainland
of Europe alongside our Allies. They agreed with the second and third
points. Indeed, in January 1947, when the Prime Minister challenged
the Chiefs of Staff about the necessity to hold the Middle East, I asked
them if they were prepared, with me, to resign rather than give way
over that area. I added that I would do so, with or without them.

Beginnings in Whitehall 391

They both agreed whole-heartedly and this information was conveyed
privately to Attlee. We heard no more about it. In the end the strategy
advocated by the War Office in July 1946 was the one eventually
adopted.

A major point of disagreement in the Chiefs of Staff Committee
was on the subject of how to handle future planning. I maintained that
the Chiefs of Staff should provide broad outline guidance to the Joint
Planners when the latter were asked to examine problems, and particu
larly when the problems involved strategy and the conduct of war.
My two colleages considered it was preferable to let the planners
tackle the problems with an open mind. I argued that when it came
to consideration of problems involving the handling of vast armies,
air forces and navies, it was preposterous to ask junior officers to begin
work without some guidance; it was our duty to lay down in broad
outline the general direction in which the answer lay. My arguments
failed to influence the other Chiefs of Staff and, consequently, no
official guidance was ever given to the Joint Planners. However, I
informed my colleagues that, whilst I was C.I.G.S., the Army repre
sentatives on all joint planning endeavours would always be given my
views on the subjects under consideration. As the planners from the
other Services were not given the opinion of their own Chiefs, the
War Office views generally swung the discussion in the way we
wanted!

One further point of disagreement must be mentioned. There was
uneasiness on both sides of the Atlantic about where our troubles with
the Russians might eventually lead us, and it became clear early in
August 1946 that the British and Americans ought to engage in some
combined thinking. Discussion about this had been going on with the
Americans but on a low level; the top level had not yet been brought
in and nothing definite had emerged. My colleagues on the Chiefs of
Staff Committee considered that we must first make a short-term
review of world problems, and use that as an introduction to a long-
term review which might follow later. This was also the American
view, as disclosed by the low-level talks that had been going on. I
disagreed. I argued that it was unsound to consider local operations
in Venezia Giulia, or Germany, or elsewhere except within the frame
work of our strategy for a possible third World War; local fighting
might spark off a major war, and our local plans must fit into the wider
picture. After much argument I got the First Sea Lord to agree with
the War Office view, and the Chief of the Air Force then withdrew
his opposition.

The points covered so far in this chapter will be sufficient to explain
my activities both inside the War Office and in the Chiefs of Staff
Committee up to the igth August 1946, on which date I sailed from

392 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Liverpool for Canada to pay visits to that country and to the
U.S.A.

My visits to these two countries resulted from invitations extended
respectively by Mr. Mackenzie King, on behalf of the Government of
Canada, and by General Eisenhower. The original intention was to
enable me to see these two countries, which I had never yet
visited and whose armies had at varying times served under my
command during the war; naturally there were, in both cases, more
important subjects with which I proposed to deal. In the event, cir
cumstances provided me with the opportunity to go far beyond the
field originally envisaged and to initiate action which at the outset of
the tour was thought to be quite out of the question.

The Canadian tour embraced visits to the capitals of each Province,
and to Ottawa the Canadian capital. I met all the Lieutenant-Gov
ernors, civic officials and Veteran organisations, and many prominent
Canadians who did not figure in official civic circles. I met so many
people, and learnt so much from them about Canadian thinking, that I
had little time to consider it all quietly and make up my mind about
what should be the next steps. However, the programme allowed for
two days* rest at Jasper National Park in the Rockies, and we arrived
there on the 5th September. That gave me the time I needed to consider
the future. In Ottawa I had discussed the standardisation of weapons,
equipment, and operational procedures between Britain, Canada and
the U.S.A. I had reported to the Chiefs of Staff in London, suggesting
that the top level should now be brought in so as to thrash out the
whole business, and asking if there was any Whitehall objection to my
discussing the matter in Washington. On arrival at Jasper I received a
cable giving permission for me to go ahead on the lines I had proposed.
But my thoughts at Jasper went well beyond standardisation. The idea
matured in my brain that the time had come for Britain, Canada, and
the U.S.A. to co-operate closely in all defence matters; discussions
should deal not only with standardisation but should cover the whole
field of co-operation and combined action in the event of war.
Obviously it would save time, and help me when I got to Washington,
if I could get the agreement of the Canadian Prime Minister before I
left Canada. I therefore asked if I could stop for a couple of hours at
Ottawa on my journey to the U.S.A. and see Mr. Mackenzie King,
and this was arranged. He agreed in all respects with my suggestions
and authorised me to inform the President of the United States
accordingly. I reported the result of this meeting to the Chiefs of Staff
in London, and wondered how my activities would be viewed in
Whitehall circles.

On leaving Canada, I was asked if I would make a nation-wide
broadcast. I agreed and wrote it at Jasper in the Rocky Mountains.

Beginnings in Whitehall 393

Since that first tour I have paid many visits to Canada, and I often
recall my broadcast message to the people of Canada made in Septem
ber 1946. This is what I said:

"It is difficult for me to express adequately my feelings on leaving
Canada.

I have travelled your country from coast to coast, from the Mari-
times to British Columbia. My object was clearly stated at Halifax:
to see in their home surroundings the men who fought with me on
the battlefields of Europe, to see something of the life of the
people, to capture something of the 'Spirit of Canada.*
I like to feel that I have succeeded in part. I have met a very
large number of my old comrades in arms; I have talked with
many people in every Province and have gained an impression,
possibly a small one, of the life of the people. I could not have
done more in the time.

Always during my travels I have searched for the spirit of Canada.
And while resting for a day in your Rocky Mountains of super
lative beauty, I reflected on all I had seen and I feel that I caught
a fleeting glimpse of the spirit I sought.

I saw a great and wonderful country; a land containing in its soil
everything that man desires; a proper land, fit for proper men to
live in and to prosper exceedingly.

And I saw that this country produced a people of sturdy independ
ence, of enterprising versatility, of robust mentality—a people of
great courage and character.

The former Canadian son of two good bloods, French and British,
has grown to full manhood; a worthy son has now become a full
partner, whose advice and counsel is eagerly sought in the old
home and whose strong right arm is ever ready to be raised in the
cause of freedom. But how few are the people living in this
country: this country with such limitless possibilities!
In the distance I seem to catch a glimpse of a great nation of 50
million people, and more; a virile people, ideally located, who
through its strength enjoy peace and security. This great Nation,
joined by close ties of blood and battle to the Old World and the
New World, seems to me to form a hinge between the two.
You may say that all this is but a vision, the daydream of a soldier
resting for a day in the Rockies of Canada.

But we soldiers try to reduce every problem to its simplest form
and to avoid all complications.

Twice in a generation we have taken part in a great World War.
In each case we entered it with high resolve and determined
resolution, and we fought through to victory with great devotion

394 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to the cause; in each case the youth of our Nations have willingly
given their lives that our countries might survive; in each case the
harvest o£ victory has been difficult to gather in.
We do not want it all to happen again. Our young men died on
the battlefields in World Wars I and II in order that the present
youth of our Nations might grow up as citizens of free countries in
a peaceful world.
We want peace.

There could be no stronger factor for peace than the working
together of the English speaking peoples; all bound together by
common language, the same common law, the same religious
tolerance, the same love of democracy and the freedom of men.
Such a partnership would be a strong shield against the evil things
we have fought to overcome. These evil things might well rise
up again and spread: unless faced by a union of free and freedom-
loving peoples, which could be linked to any peace-loving Nations
within the framework of the United Nations Organisation.
And in such a conception there seems to stand poised the 'Spirit
of Canada/ a hinge between the Old World and the New: a
priceless hinge of pure gold.

On my departure from Canada I want to thank the Prime Minister
and the Government for having invited me, and the people of
Canada for the wonderful welcome I have received wherever I
have been.
I shall never forget my first visit to Canada.9'

I arrived in the United States on the loth September. My tour
was to include visits to the major military installations, and time was
allowed for talks in Washington with the President and the American
Chiefs of Staff. Whilst in the U.S.A. I was the guest of General Eisen
hower and the American Army.

On arrival in Washington I received a reply to my message to the
British Chiefs of Staff, in which I had reported my discussions with
Mr. Mackenzie King. I was urged to confine my talks to the American
Chiefs of Staff, and on no account to make any reference of my ideas
to the President of the United States; it was stated that no Ministers
knew what was going on. This reply was in the nature of a damper
on my activities, but it did not deter me in any way. I discussed the
whole matter with Eisenhower as soon as we were alone in his house,
where I was going to stay, and told him of my talk in Canada with
Mackenzie King. Eisenhower agreed that the time had come to get
down to the study and planning of combined action, not only in
standardisation but in all aspects of defence and preparedness. He said
that, contrary to the information available to the British Chiefs of
Staff, in Washington the Secretaries of the Army and Navy were fully

Beginnings in Whitehall

in the picture about what had already been going on below the surface,
and he thought it was high time the Heads of State were brought in.
He did not wish to approach the President himself, but urged me to
do so when I saw him at the White House the next day. And this I
was determined to do, in spite of the rebuff from London.

I saw the President the next morning; we were alone. I opened
the conversation by saying that Eisenhower and I considered the time
had come to begin discussions covering the whole field of defence.
Seeing at once that I was on very receptive ground, I went on to tell
the President of Mackenzie King's approval. I finally said that if the
Heads of State would merely give their approval, die military staffs
would get on with the job at once. The President replied without
hesitation: "That's O.K. by me, go right ahead/*

I had met Mr. Truman before at the Potsdam Conference but had
not talked with him; I was much impressed. He seemed to me to be
alert and vigorous, and had the great quality of decision. After our
talk we went out to the rose garden where the photographers were
waiting. He told me about the White House, saying it was in bad
repair and needing rebuilding. I said that perhaps I should apologise
for the burning of the house by British troops many years ago, and he
replied: "No need for that; as far as I am concerned you can burn
it again."

After leaving the White House I went back to Eisenhower and told
him of my talk with the President. He was delighted and at once began
to arrange for me to meet the American Chiefs of Staff. He had to
be careful and so the meeting was to be represented as a social gather
ing on board the S.S. Sequoia, during which we were to cruise down
the Potomac and have a look at George Washington's house at Mount
Vernon. I reported all these happenings to the British Chiefs of Staff
and asked them to tadde the Prime Minister. I received in reply a
second "cold breeze," which showed apprehension and a lack of a
full appreciation of the earnestness of the Americans to sit round the
table with us and discuss these matters. This telegram was followed by
one from the Prime Minister; he stated that he fully realised the
importance and potential value of the issues being raised, and that
while there was no objection to further exchanges of information and
of methods of procedure, he asked me to avoid entering into any
specific commitments. I replied saying that I fully understood the
situation and that, being on a private visit, I had no power to negotiate.

The next day, the i6th September, we boarded the Sequoia for our
"social gathering" on the Potomac. The American Chiefs of Staff
were represented by Admiral Leahy who was present in his capacity
as Chief of Staff to the President, General Eisenhower, Admiral
Nimitz, and General Spaatz. We reached agreement that discussions
should begin as soon as possible and should cover the whole strategic

396 The Memoirs of Jtueld-Marsiial Momgomeiy

concept of the West in a third World War, together with the best way
of handling the business of standardisation and combined action. It
was agreed that the first meeting might well be held in Washington
and that a planning staff from Canada should be included.

I asked the American Chiefs of Staff what value, if any, they
attached to Middle East oil; the reply was immediate and unanimous
—vital.

A most interesting feature of the meeting was the immediate and
favourable reaction of the American Chiefs of Staff, and their appre
ciation of a direct approach on this subject; they said with one voice
that they had been hoping and waiting for such an approach for a
long time.

That evening I reported the results of the meeting to the British
Chiefs of Staff and asked that the Prime Minister be informed. In the
telegram I said that all further action should now be handled by them.
I reckoned I had done my bit, in spite of cold showers from Whitehall!
I added that our team of planners from London must not arrive in the
U.S.A. without the clear and definite views of the British Chiefs of
Staff about the grand strategy of the West in the event of war. For
them to arrive with an open or blank mind would be useless and
would create a bad impression. I thought it wise to make this point
at once since I knew the other two members of tie Chiefs of Staff did
not agree with my views on this point.

And so ended a remarkably successful visit— successful beyond my
wildest dreams. It had been established that the continued functioning
of the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was accepted with
out question by the President and the American Chiefs of Staff.
Although I had to represent myself as being engaged on nothing but
a private visit, I had managed to do an enormous amount for the
British Chiefs of Staff. It was obvious to me from the many telegrams
which had passed, that I had stepped into the middle of the political
stage, and there was apprehension in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in
the War Office, in the Foreign Office, and at No. 10 Downing Street,
about what I was doing and what I would do next. The truth was that
they, sitting in England, could not catch the same spirit of enthusiastic
realism which was to be found in Canada and the U.S.A. They had
had to deal with the American politicians for so long on a sticky wicket,
that they were mentally unprepared to find that it was the Americans
who were now wondering when on earth the British would face
realities and frankly broach the question of co-operation in all spheres
of defence.

The fact remained that within a matter of a few days I had managed
to obtain the approval of the Heads of State and the Chiefs of Staffs of
Canada, America and the United Kingdom to the opening of military
discussions on a wide basis, and this should now lead to the unification

Beginnings in Whitehall 397

of the defence policy and plans of the British Empire and the United
States before another war was thrust on us. Indeed, such unity might
well prevent the outbreak of just such a war.

I left Washington by air for London on the afternoon of the igth
September. As we flew eastwards, I wondered what my reception
would be in Whitehall. I didn't fancy that the red carpet would be
out; some form of mat, perhaps.

CHAPTER 28

Overseas Tours in 1947

DCJRING the war I had commanded military contingents from
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia, India, and many of the Colonies. When the war
ended I received invitations from die Governments of these countries
to visit them. I was delighted, since this would enable me to meet in
their home surroundings my former comrades-in-arms and also to dis
cuss future problems on a Chiefs of Staff level. I am not so certain
that my colleagues on the British Chiefs of Staff were equally pleased
—they were apprehensive of what I might be up to. However, I got
Governmental agreement to the visits and made my plans.

But first there was an urgent matter that had to be settled quickly,
and that was the problem of a home for myself and David. We could
not continue to live with the Reynolds much longer; it would not
be fair to them.

For the period of my time at the War Office I had taken a flat in
Westminster Gardens. But although I am a Londoner by birth, I like
the country and everything that goes with it. And so, after due
reconnaissance, I found what I wanted in Hampshire— an old mill on
the River Wey, Isington Mill. Once I had established that the main
structure was sound, I bought the mill, the meadow in which it stood,
and a field or two on either side. The mill itself was full of machinery
and nobody had ever lived in it. "Main" supplies of water, gas, and
electricity would have to be brought some distance, the electric "grid"
being a mile away; whereas the outer shell of the building was intact
it needed repair, and the inside would have to be turned into a resi
dence. I decided to go ahead. One of my friends said— "You are mad."
And when one surveyed the scene, there was some justification for his

398

Overseas Tours in 1947 399

remark But I had a good architect (Robert Bostock) and a good
builder (Mardon Ball of Farnham) and we agreed I was not mad— yet

But how to get a licence for the work? That was the immediate
problem, since in the first few years after the war ended there was a
scarcity of materials and labour, and all building was strictly controlled
by the Minister of Health (Mr. Aneurin Bevan).

I applied for a licence to the Alton Rural District Council, in whose
area the mill was; my application was referred to the Regional Head
quarters at Reading, and was refused. I then wrote direct to Aneurin
Bevan and asked him to intervene on my behalf. He was very sympa
thetic but said I placed him in a constitutional difficulty; if he took
the initiative and asked the local authority to grant a licence in my
particular case, it would stimulate the liveliest curiosity and publicity
and neither he nor I would benefit from the result; he advised me to
wait until the edge had been taken off the housing shortage a little
further. Finally I appealed to the Prime Minister and explained that
all I wanted was to be allowed to spend my personal savings on
making a home for myself and my son, and that the licenceable portion
of the work was small. My only alternative would be to live in my
war caravans in the meadow by the mill stream. I was given the
licence.

The photographs of Isington Mill and meadow, before and after,
show what we were able to achieve. The interior owes much of its
character to the timber presented to me by various organisations in
Australia and Tasmania, all handled by the late Mr. Chifley— the then
Commonwealth Prime Minister. The whole of the flooring is Tasmanian
oak, and the stairs, doors, and built-in cupboards are mountain ash
from Victoria, The Australian Government also gave me the barn
in which my war caravans are housed, except the roof which is of
cedar shingles given by the Canadian Government Australia and
New Zealand, knowing that I had no furniture for my home, both
gave me various articles. So while I had some difficulty in getting the
British Government of the day even to let me spend some of my own
savings on a home, all my worldly possessions having been destroyed
by German bombing during the war, the Dominion Governments did
their best to help me as soon as they heard of my plight.

It will be convenient to describe my main overseas tours in the
order in which they were carried out— excluding that in Canada and
the U.S.A., which has already been dealt with in an earlier chapter.

MOSCOW: GTH TO IOTH JANUARY 1947

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 I had got to know Marshal
Stalin, and he had invited me to visit him in Moscow at some future

400 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

date. The Prime Minister (Churchill) had agreed. Later, when I left
Germany in May 1946, General Sokolovsky said that Stalin had been
enquiring when I was going to visit him. I informed the Foreign
Office; they replied on the 25th September 1946 to the effect that
Anglo-Soviet relations had so deteriorated that they doubted whether
the invitation was still valid.

However, I decided, with the approval of the Prime Minister and
the Foreign Secretary (Mr. Ernest Bevin), that I might possibly be
able to improve this state of affairs if I could get myself invited to
Moscow. I planted the "birdseed," curiously enough, when I was in
New York. I also sent a copy of my book Normandy to the Baltic to
Marshal Vassilievsky, Chief of Staff of the armed forces of Russia. In
due course the invitation was received and the Prime Minister agreed
it should be accepted; he thought that I "might be able to do much to
dissipate the cloud of suspicion with which the Russians were in
volved." I also obtained Government approval to invite the Soviet
Marshals to pay a return visit to England.

I arrived in Moscow on the 6th January 1947 in a R.A.F. York
aircraft Marshal Vassilievsky headed an ugly rush of Marshals, photog
raphers and newspaper correspondents towards the aircraft and with
some difficulty I made my way to the Guard of Honour. The airfield
was decorated with Union Jacks and the Red Flag, and the whole
atmosphere was most friendly. That evening I had a long talk with
Vassilievsky during which we discussed the programme for my
stay in Moscow. I asked particularly that I might visit the follow
ing: the Voroshilov Military Academy, the Stalin Academy for
Mechanised Troops, and the Frunze Military Academy. This was

Every day there was a lunch party, and a banquet at night; these
were tremendous affairs of never less than twelve courses, with
speeches between every course. On one night we were the guests of
the Red Army at the Bolshoi Theatre, where we witnessed a mag
nificently staged ballet, Romeo and Juliet; the prima ballerina of
Russia, Ulanova, gave a wonderful exhibition of graceful movement
and dancing, and the whole evening was most enjoyable.

I found the long meals and rich food rather trying. But I soon
discovered that there was no need to eat any of the food unless you
wished. On the other hand, it was necessary to be served with every
course, since to refuse would be regarded as an insult; after an interval
your plate would be removed whether you had eaten what was on it,
or not Similarly with your glass, whether or not you had drunk the
wine. Each guest had an array of glasses, all of which were filled with
different coloured drinks; but there was no need to drink any of them.
I noticed that the senior Russian officers never mixed their drinks;
they would stick to red wine throughout, or vodka, or white wine.

Overseas Tours in 1947 401

Personally, I always asked for mineral water and this caused no
comment.

In my speeches at these meals, I used to praise the Russian Aimy
for their great feats and the people for their stoical endurance of many
hardships. I said that nations which had fought together for so many
years against aggression should not become irritated with each other
if there were misunderstandings and delays in framing the conditions
for a long period of peace. I added that the soldiers of our two nations,
by themselves fostering the bonds of mutual confidence built up on the
field of battle, could help the statesmen to overcome suspicion and so
contribute to the development of friendly relations.

On one morning we were taken to see the Kremlin. We began
with an outside tour to see the great mortar which had never fired its
two-ton cannon balls, and the biggest bell in the world which broke
in manufacture and was never rung. It was a bitterly cold day with
driving snow and I asked if we could see the inside of the ancient
cathedrals; the guide explained that they were being repaired, an
excuse which was always made to visitors. I said that my great passion
in life was to see things being repaired as this was so much more
interesting than seeing them whole! There were embarrassed looks
between the various Russian officials and eventually my request was
granted; we visited the three cathedrals, the old and new palaces, and
the museum—altogether a most interesting morning.

The highlight of my visit was the talk I had with Stalin, which
took place in his office in the Kremlin at 5 p.m. on the loth January,
die last day of my stay in Moscow.

I began by presenting to Stalin a case of whisky, and a copy of each
of my two books: Alamein to the River Sangro (Eighth Anny) and
Normandy to the Baltic (21 Army Group). He thanked me with great
warmth and said, with a twinkle in his eye: "You bring me these pres
ents; what do you want of me?" I replied that I wanted nothing
tangible but would like his help in a matter which I would explain. We
were alone, except for two interpreters— his and mine.

I said that in order to get the best results from the British and
American armies during the war, we had become very closely linked
together; we had used each other's schools and equipment; we had
integrated our two armies to a great degree and a close comradeship
had grown up between us. Stalin said he quite understood this and he
realised that such an integration and comradeship was very natural
because as soldiers we spoke the same language.

When peace came, I continued, we had automatically continued
our close relations with the American Army; some warm friendships
had grown up between our officers during the war, from Eisenhower
and myself right down the chain of command to the individual man
in the ranks. I felt that this was good.

402 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

When the war ended, we soldiers were somewhat inclined to sit
back and let the politicians struggle alone with the problem of winning
a good peace; and indeed we were apt to laugh at the politicians for
not making quicker progress at the various peace conferences. It
seemed that this was not right. We fighting men did not win the war;
our swords were drawn and wielded in accordance with the orders of
our political chiefs; the war was won by great national teams, civil
and military, directed by Heads of States. We fighting men might well
be able to help in the matter of getting a good peace. Our contribution
must not be a political one. But I felt that we could help our politicians
greatly by establishing friendly relations between our respective
armies; this would help to produce mutual confidence and good will,
and thus would tend to eliminate suspicion and mistrust. Stalin said he
agreed completely.

For this reason I had come to Russia to establish friendly contact
with the Soviet Army. I had been received with the greatest warmth
and cordiality. We had had free and frank talks on all military sub
jects; we had discussed the whole subject of the organisation of armies
and the conduct of war on land.

I had been told everything I wanted to know and I had seen every
thing I wanted to see— including the new Russian tank (which no
foreigner had ever been allowed to examine before). And above all,
I had met all the Marshals of the Soviet Union, and had made many
friends. I wanted him to know this; and I wanted to thank him.
Stalin said he already knew all this as it had been reported to him;
for his part, he wanted to thank me.

I then said that this was only the beginning of what I wanted to
achieve. A close link and real comradeship between our Armies would
not be easy, as we lived so many miles away from each other and we
spoke different languages. Both sides would have to make a real
effort. We British would make the effort; the Russian Army must
do the same, and this was where I wanted his help. The Russian Army
must now visit the British Army in England. I had invited Marshal
Vassilievsky to come to England in June and to bring with him
Marshal Koniev (C.-in-C. Land Armies) and Marshal Rybaltko
(C.-in-C. Armoured Forces). I would show them our schools and
establishments in. the ILK. Stalin said he had given his approval to
this visit.

I added that the next step would be to have an exchange of officers
at our various military schools; the language difficulty would be a
problem and would probably dictate the numbers to be exchanged.
But we must make a start, even with only one or two officers; the
scheme would grow and develop gradually as confidence was estab
lished and interest awakened, and it was better so.

What had he to say to this?

Overseas Tours in 1947 403

Stalin said he was much interested in my scheme. But he con
sidered that the time had not yet come for an interchange of officers;
such action might be misunderstood in political circles and he might
be blackguarded in the world Press for being a warmonger. What did
I think of that?

I replied that I understood his point of view but did not agree. I
said that I personally always did what I thought was right and did not
care in the least what anybody thought or said about it We British
were so used to being blackguarded in the Press of various countries
that we now regarded it as normal and did not bother about it; the
great point was to be open and frank in all matters, to have nothing
to hide from anybody, and to go quietly forward with a clear
conscience.

Stalin said he realised we had a dose tie-up with the Americans in
the matter of military talks about the conduct of war and of training;
he also understood that we had a definite plan for standardisation of
weapons and equipment He did not see how we could do these things
unless we had a definite military alliance or agreement with the United
States. He added that he wished to make it quite clear that he did not
in the least object to any such alliance, provided it was not directed
against the Soviet Union. He assumed that there was such an alliance
or agreement. Would I care to say anything on this matter?

I said he had mentioned "standardisation7* and I would deal with
that first

During the war our officers had attended each other's schools and
had got to know and like certain types of weapons and equipment;
this had led to a demand for certain types of equipment, each from the
other. Indeed, in the very early days of the war, while Russia was a
neutral, we had had to borrow a good deal of American equipment as
we had lost so much ourselves at Dunkirk. As the war progressed we
often used each other's equipment. For the landing in Normandy
three of my divisions had their artillery completely equipped with
American guns; during the Ardennes battle in December 1944, the
Americans lost a good deal of equipment and I lent them British
equipment, including a number of 2$-pounder field guns. We had
thus got to know and like certain types of American equipment,
weapons, W/T sets and so on. When the war ended we began to
consider the equipment of our post-war Army and we decided we
would adopt certain American weapons that we liked— making them
in our own factories in England and altering them as necessary to suit
our British ways and methods. That was all there was in this matter of
standardisation. But it had been taken up by the Press of certain
nations and tossed about the world as if there was something sinister
about it; there was nothing sinister about it; it was all just a natural
outcome of a very close integration in war. I said I would be delighted

404 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

to have a similar arrangement with the Soviet Army, each examining
each other's equipment and each adopting in his own Army anything
he liked. Was this now clear? And did he now understand that there
existed no plan of any sort for a sinister standardisation of equipment?
Stalin said it was now clear and he was glad I had explained it to
TifmT

Next I dealt with alliances,

Any military alliance between 'two countries was a political matter
and could not be concluded by soldiers. I was the professional head of
the British Army and it would be quite impossible for any military
alliance to be made between Britain and America without my knowl
edge. I wished to assure him that there existed between Britain and
America, or between Britain and any other country, no military alli
ance, no military agreement, and no sinister plan for the standardisa
tion of weapons and equipment. I hoped he would believe me.

Stalin looked me straight in the face and said with great earnest
ness: "I do believe you, absolutely.** He turned to his interpreter, and
said: "Tell the Field-Marshal again that I believe him.**

I said that he had talked a good deal about military alliances, and
had said he had no objection to an alliance between Britain and
America provided it was not directed against Russia. I would now like
to ask him a question:

"Did he think there should be a military alliance between Britain
and Russia?"

He said at once:

"That is what I would like, and I think it is essential."

I then said that I thought we already had a treaty or agreement
between our two nations which had been signed in 1942, and I was
under the impression that it was still in operation. He asked if I would
let him explain his view about that treaty, and he gave the following
explanation.

The Treaty was in two parts. Part I provided for mutual co-operation
and combined action in the war against Germany; the war against
Germany was now over and therefore Part I of the Treaty ceased
to apply.

Part II provided for mutual assistance and non-aggression for a
period of 20 years after the end of the German war, or until some
World Organisation or League of Nations had been formed and was
in working order. The United Nations had been formed and was
working, and therefore Part II was, in theory, what he described as
"suspended in the air." Therefore it could be said that the whole
Treaty was now inoperative and in suspense. But on the other hand it
had been provided that the Treaty was not "washed out" until an
agreement to that effect had been signed; such an agreement had not
been signed; therefore the situation was not clear.

Overseas Tours in 1947 405

I said that his explanation was quite clear. Was I to understand
that he wished me to tell the British Prime Minister that he (Stalin)
would like a new Treaty and a definite military alliance with Britain?
He said he would hesitate to give me such a commission as he felt he
would merely be accused of some sinister move and would be black
guarded accordingly. I replied that I would hesitate to accept such a
commission as I was not an accredited agent of my Government. I
had come to Russia as a soldier, and I imagined that die proper person
to be given such a commission would be the British Ambassador in
Moscow. Stalin agreed. He added that he had no objection whatever
to my telling anyone I liked, as a matter of interest, that he (Stalin)
would welcome a military alliance with Britain and considered it was
very necessary; he repeated this statement twice, and seemed anxious
that I should understand his views.

I told him that Marshal Vassilievsky had asked me the reasons for
the continued existence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation;
I had explained the reasons, and he had said he was satisfied. The
reasons were obvious. During the war, the combined effort of Britain
and America had required the closest integration and handling; we
had established Allied H.Q. in S.E. Asia, in the Mediterranean, and in
N.W. Europe. The international problems were so great that a Com
bined Chiefs o£ Staff organisation to handle them had grown up
naturally. Even in 1947, we still had an Allied H.Q. in Italy and
British forces under American command in Japan. There were a
tremendous number of problems still to be handled which remained
as a hang-over from the war; there were a very great many Anglo-
American matters still to be cleaned up. All that was done through the
Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation.

We had now been talking for well over one hour and Stalin looked
at the clock. I was to return at 8 p.m. to have dinner with him. I said
I would like to raise one more question. During the war certain
British service and civilian personnel had married Russian wives; they
wanted their Russian wives to join them in the U.K. but could not
get permission. There were now only seven such service people. If I
gave him a list or nominal roll of these seven, would he look into
the matter and see if he could help? Stalin said "Certainly," and he
gave me his assurance that he would personally look into the matter
and give his help* I gave linn the list.

I then got up to leave. We parted with great friendliness. Stalin
was in good health; his brain was very clear; he gave me the im
pression that if you did not know your subject you would quickly
get tangled up in argument with him.

I returned to the Kremlin at 8 p.m. for dinner. Among the thirty
or so at dinner were:

Generalissimo Stalin.

406 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Molotov and Vyshinsky.

ganm I ^ ^ Politburo.

Vorosnilov J

Marshal Vassilievsky and some seven other Marshals of the Soviet
Union.

A number of Russian generals.

The British Ambassador and Mr. (now Sir) Frank Roberts.

The three Service Attaches of the British Embassy.

Conversation was very restrained to begin with and it was clear
that the Marshals, Ministers (including Molotov and Vyshinsky), and
Generals were all in the greatest awe of Stalin and shut up like an
oyster in his presence.

I sat on Stalin's right; Molotov sat opposite Stalin, with the British
Ambassador on his right. Bulganin sat on the left of Molotov and
next to Vyshinsky. In the somewhat frigid atmosphere that existed at
the table, I felt I would have to make a real effort to open up the
battle and get some joie de vivre going; it was obvious that everyone
was frightened of Stalin, and nervous; something must be done. So
I decided to rag Molotov. I asked him about his f life in New York,
and made him describe a typical day. I said it was obvious that he
spent the mornings planning how to outflank his opponents in the
afternoons; he spent the afternoons in developing his outflanking
movements; and he spent the evenings in dancing and drinking. Obvi
ously the politicians did no work.

This promised very badly for the Moscow Conference in March
1947; nothing would be accomplished, except to decide to have some
more conferences; would he give me the programme of conferences
for the next two years.

Stalin enjoyed all this hugely. He joined in with great keenness,
taking my side; he talked about "we soldiers'* as against "you politi
cians,** and obviously liked to be considered a soldier. He ragged the
politicians with great enjoyment. I urged him on and said some
dreadful things about politicians, for which I hope I may be forgiven*
Stalin said I ought to join with him; between us we would defeat any
combination of civilian politicians. I said I was a soldier only. He said
that he welcomed the present world tendency for soldiers to take over
the direction of affairs and become Ambassadors, eta, etc. He was
delighted that General Marshall had become the American Secretary
of State. He said that soldiers of experience made very good soldier-
politicians, because they were much more sensible than civilian-
politicians. I said I would give hfm my views on this matter privately;
when no one else was about!

In this way we passed a very pleasant evening. There were no
formal speeches. Molotov proposed all the toasts, about seven, in-

Overseas Touts in 1947 407

eluding The King. He made no speech with any toast; he merely got
up and said we would now drink a certain toast

After dinner we retired to an ante-room where we sat at small tables
for coffee. I now asked Stalin if I could make a speech, and he called
for silence. In my speech I referred to the great war effort of Russia,
Britain had gone through some bad times in 1940, 1941 and 1942, and
for a long time we fought alone against the combined might of Ger
many and Italy. But we were lucky in that the German armies failed
to carry the land war into England, and we were saved from having
our homeland destroyed by the Fascist hordes. Not so with Russia.
While Britain and America were gathering their strength, the German
armies overran and ravished the homelands of Russia, causing terrific
destruction and great loss of life, Britain and America in those early
days could do little to help, except to supply equipment by sea;
Russia had to bear, almost unaided, the full onslaught of Germany on
land. We British would never forget what Russia went through; she
had suffered more severely than any other nation. And then came
peace. I referred to the need for happy relations in peace between
armies, and thanked the Generalissimo and his Marshals for the very-
friendly reception I had been given in Moscow. As professional head
of the British Army I extended the right hand of friendship to the
Soviet Army and to its great Generalissimo. I then advanced with out
stretched hand to Stalin and we shook hands warmly.

Earlier in the day I had been presented by Marshal Vassilievsky
and the Soviet Army with the full dress overcoat and hat of a Marshal
of the Soviet Union. After my speech I told Stalin that I would like to
put on my coat and hat and, dressed as a Russian Marshal, salute the
Generalissimo. He was delighted and said we must both be photo
graphed. So I dressed as a Russian Marshal and was photographed
with him. Stalin then asked what I would like to do next Would I
like to have some music, or see a film in his private cinema, or go
out in the city to a theatre? I replied that I would like to go home to
bed* It was 10 p.m. and I had an early start the next day for my flight
back to London. Stalin said: "Certainly, let's all go to bed." And I
suppose for the first time in the history of Russia an official banquet
in the Kremlin broke up soon after 10 pan.

Stalin was an interesting personality. He had a keen sense of
humour, was a good host, and was courteous to his guests. I noticed
that he was abstemious both with food and drink, and gave the
impression that he was dieting; he was a chain cigarette smoker. He
showed his age, about 68 or 70, 1 thought; he seemed to have shrunk
in size and was thinner since I had last seen him in Potsdam in July
1945, and was not so firm on his legs. At dinner he talked little; but
he opened up readily if you made the running.

408 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

The difficulty of language was overcome by each of us having his
own interpreter; Stalin could not speak French nor any other Euro
pean language. He asked me once, rather quickly, what I thought
about a certain thing; without thinking I replied that it was the "cat's
whiskers.** Stalin and I had to sit and wait while the two interpreters
argued about how to put that expression into Russian. They finally
decided that it was impossible, and we passed on to the next subject

From what I saw and heard I gained the definite impression that
Russia was in a poor state. Very great destruction had been caused
by the German invasion of Russia. In White Russia (Minsk, Smolensk,
and the north-west generally) the towns and villages had been
destroyed. In the Ukraine (Odessa, Kief, Karkov, Don Basin, Dnieper)
the fighting had been fierce and the destruction terrific. This area
contained about 60 per cent of the Russian industrial potential and it
was knocked out Food was scarce; the 1947 harvest had been poor.
Housing conditions were appalling. Moscow was a drab city; it had
been built for a population of 800,000 and the total inhabitants in
January 1947 numbered seven million; the people looked depressed
and miserable. I was left with the impression that the Russians were
worn out; it was not just war weariness; I was told that the whole
nation was tired. All-in-all, I reckoned that Russia was quite unfit to
take part in a world war against a strong combination of allied nations,
and that she knew this very well. She needed a long period of peace
in which to recover. I came to the conclusion that she would watch
the situation carefully and ensure that she did not "overstep the mark"
anywhere by careless diplomacy and thus start another war, which
she could not cope with. I reckoned then that it would be fifteen to
twenty years before Russia would be in a position to fight a major
war with a good chance of success. She would go as far as she could
to get what she wanted, and if opposed only by weakness would be
prepared to go a long way— short of actual war. If always opposed
by strength, or by apparent strength with robust methods, she would
pull in her horns very quickly— owing to her fear of war and her knowl
edge that she was not fit for it After some fifteen to twenty years, if
Russia had recovered by that time, then matters would be different;
she would be in a position to "thump the table/' and to fight for
what she wanted— if she wished to do so.

I reported accordingly to the British Government and the Chiefs
of Staff.

VISIT TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

On the 2ist June 1947 I left London by air to visit Australia and
New Zealand at the invitation of the Governments of those countries.

Overseas Tours in 1947 409

At the conference of Dominion Prime Ministers in 1946, both countries
had declared that they wished to take on more responsibility for
defence matters in the Pacific. My "standing" whilst on this tour there
fore became a matter of some moment in Whitehall, and I considered
that I must be prepared to discuss the problem with the respective
Dominion Governments. I knew very well that both Tedder and
Cunningham disliked my overseas tours, in which I discussed major
problems with Governments and, in their view, acted as a sort of
Ambassador Extraordinary. They never allowed me to "represent"
the British Chiefs of Staff. They made it very clear that I travelled
only as professional head of the British Army and a "member" of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. This suited me very well. Indeed, I
preferred it that way, since it left me free to give my personal views
on a wide range of subjects, often to the extreme annoyance of my
two colleagues in London, especially when they found that my per
sonal views, with which they mostly disagreed, often carried the day
in the end.

DELHI: SSRD TO 25x11 JUNE 1947

I had arranged to visit India on the way to Australia for two reasons
—first, to settle the programme for the withdrawal of British troops
from that sub-continent and, secondly, to get agreement in principle
for the continued use of Gurkha troops in the British Army after India
had gained its independence.

I arrived in Delhi at noon on the 23rd June and began discussions
with Nehru and Jinnah that afternoon- By that time the Partition
Plan had been accepted.

There was no difficulty about the first point; both Nehru and
Jinnah agreed that the withdrawal of the British troops should begin
on the isth August 1947 (the date of the transfer of power) and be
completed by the end of February 1948.

The second point was discussed with Nehru alone. He raised many
objections and I did not get his final agreement till the evening of the
next day, the 24th June.

I was intensely interested in the personalities of the leaders of the
two parties, Hindus and Moslems. Nehru I had not met before. He
was calm and self-confident, had a marked sense of humour, and was
easy to deal with. We became very good friends; it was impossible
not to like him. Jinnah was totally different. He was keyed up to a
high state of tension; he openly expressed his deadly hatred of the
Hindus, saying he would have nothing to do with them. He was
deeply suspicious of being asked to share anything with the Indian

410 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Union and was determined that Pakistan should stand alone. He
expressed his intense distrust of Auchinleck, and his hatred of Mount-
batten (the Viceroy) who, he said, was "in the pocket" of Nehru.
I wrote the following in my diary on the 24th June 1947:

"The division of India into Pakistan and the Indian Union at
such speed raises terrific problems. These can only be settled
satisfactorily by the closest co-operation between die two new
Dominions. Failing this, there will be the most awful chaos and
much bloodshed.9*

There was to be a terrible fulfilment of this prophecy.

SINGAPORE: z6xH TO SQTH JUNE 1947

I left Delhi on the 15th June and flew, via Ceylon where I spent
that night, to Singapore. I sparked off quite a lot of trouble here when
I gave it as my opinion that the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the
Far East should have his headquarters in Singapore with his colleagues
of the Army and Air, and should not sit by himself in Hong Kong.
I reported my views officially to the Chiefs of Staff in London and,
simultaneously, the local sailors reported me to the Admiralty* The
First Sea Lord was intensely angry and I was informed that in the
London clubs the sailors would hardly speak to the soldiers* In
Singapore, on the quarter-deck of the flag ship, the staff officer who
was accompanying me (Lieut-Colonel George Cole) got ticked off
in no uncertain voice by the wife of the Naval C.-in-C. I rode the
storm, though somewhat uneasily, and demanded that the question
as to where the Naval Headquarters should be located be referred to
the Prime Minister for decision. Eventually I won my point, and the
Naval H.Q. in the Far East was moved to Singapore. All-in-all, I was
glad to get away from Singapore on the 3oth June. As my aircraft
took off the Naval C.-in-C. was heard to remark: **I hope that chap
won't come back here again; the trouble he has caused will last us
for some time.'*

AUSTRALIA: 30x11 JUNE TO iGxn JULY 1947

I reached Darwin on the soth June and went on to Canberra the
next day, the ist July. I was simply delighted to see the home country
of the magnificent Australian soldiers who had fought so well at
Alamein. My tour included visits to every State, and of course to
Tasmania where I had spent my boyhood. In Hobart I was presented
to a group of oldish ladies, each of whom claimed to have been my

Overseas Tours in 1947 411

nannie when a baby and remembered how difficult I was in the bath.
I did not know I had had so many nurses: or so many baths.

In replying to an address of welcome in Hobart, I said how nice
it was to see the place again and even the railway station looked just
the same. This caused a tremendous laugh and was taken up at once
by the local Press; the station was the same one I had known fifty
years earlier, in spite of repeated representations for it to be mod
ernised.

Everywhere I went in Australia there were assembled to meet me
the local branches of the Returned Servicemen's League; this was a
great joy to me since so many of them were my former comrades-in-
arms.

I had prolonged discussions with members of the Australian Gov
ernment and made many friends; I liked particularly Sir William
McKell (the Governor General) and Mr. Chifley (the Prime Min
ister). Our talks were concerned with two main subjects. First was the
degree of responsibility which Australia was prepared to accept in the
development of defence problems relating to security in the Pacific
region. In London it had been assumed that Australia was willing to
undertake primary responsibility for Commonwealth strategic interests
in the Pacific at once. But I very soon found out that this assumption
was not correct What Australia wanted in the first instance was the
creation of some suitable machinery, and then to use that machinery
to develop gradually the final scope of responsibility. Personally, I
agreed with the Australian view and reported accordingly to Whitehall.

The second point concerned the question of British Service repre
sentation in Australia. Here I disagreed acutely with my two colleagues
on the British Chiefs of Staff, and the continued argument provoked
much ill-feeling. Under the existing system the British Chiefs of Staff
were represented in Australia by a trinity— one from each of the
Services. Each of these three received separate guidance and instruc
tions from his own Service Ministry in Whitehall; for instance, the
Admiralty and Air Ministry, through their representatives, had briefed
the Australian sailors and airmen with opposite points of view regard
ing the control of the Australian Fleet Air Arm. The Australians were
determined that this system must cease, and instead, that the British
Chiefs of Staff should be represented by one single joint-Service
representative, with an integrated inter-Service staff working under
hiTn, Furthermore, this one representative should not be a member
of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, as were the existing three
representatives; he should attend their meetings only when matters
affecting British interests were to be discussed. I agreed whole
heartedly with this viewpoint and told the Australians so; I reported
accordingly to London, and urged that the Australian view be ac
cepted. The reply came that the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the

412 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Air Staff did not agree and that the Minister of Defence (A. V. Alex
ander, now Lord Alexander of Hillsborough) had been asked to give
a decision. To cut short a long story, the matter was finally settled in
accordance with the Australian view— as of course it had to be.

NEW ZEALAND: i6xn TO SIST JULY 1947

On the i6th July 1947 I left Australia by air and arrived in New
Zealand later the same day. My tour embraced visits to all the chief
cities of the Dominion, in both the north and south islands. As had
happened in Australia, so in New Zealand I met again many of my
comrades-in-arms who had fought with me in the Desert and in Italy.
It was a real joy to see so many of them again, and splendid soldiers
they were.

Military discussions turned chiefly on the method of the repre
sentation of New Zealand in the Commonwealth defence machinery
in that part of the world. The Prime Minister (Mr. Peter Fraser)
wished to have the closest co-operation with Australia and said he
would accept one integrated defence organisation; but he added that
the New Zealand Government must be allowed an effective voice in
the execution of policy, and their integration with Australia must be
on a basis of equality. There was no difficulty about this and an agreed
integrated organisation was eventually established.

IMPRESSIONS GAINED IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

It would be difficult to find words to describe my feelings during
my visit to these two Dominions, whose soldiers had fought under
my command in the war. I was received everywhere with a depth
of affection which seemed at all times to be genuine, warm and sincere.
I knew that the warmth of the greeting was not meant for me per
sonally but for that which I represented; it was an expression of
appreciation for the bravery and devotion to duty of the men I had
commanded.

Everywhere we saw the intense loyalty of both Dominions to the
Mother Country, and their desire to help her in the economic diffi
culties which she was then experiencing. Coupled with this was the
desire for closer understanding and closer bonds in the future. The
devotion to the Crown was absolute. In the face of these feelings it
was embarrassing to reflect on the almost complete lack of apprecia
tion, knowledge, and understanding of these Dominions and their
problems back in Whitehall.

Overseas Tours in 1947 413

The broad picture of the tour was one of a hurried rush from one
town to another, and from one reception to another. I made some
eighty speeches in four weeks, most of them impromptu and all fully
reported. As I said once in Sydney: "there are more speeches per
square meal in Australia than there are people per square mile/' I was
laden with gifts, ranging from 126,000 square feet of Tasmanian oak
for the floors of Isington Mill given by Kilndried Ltd., of Tasmania,
to a beautiful hand-carved lampstand presented by the Maoris of New
Zealand. There were boomerangs, badges, inkstands, walking-sticks,
blankets, travelling-rugs, writing-desks, dining-room furniture, tall
boys, Maori tikis, food parcels, shoes, socks, and even pink woollen
underwear. But, above all, there was that incredible good will and
warmth of affection. I had met and made friends with the Prime
Ministers, Cabinet Ministers, State Premiers, big industrialists, Chiefs
of Staffs, and with the man in the street. So far as I was aware, no
discordant note marred my stay in either country. Indeed, Mr. Chifley
congratulated me on having not expressed any criticism of Australian
ideas and methods, as some Service visitors had done previously. I will
never forget those two visits.

I had accepted an invitation to go to Japan on my way home, in
order to meet General MacArthur and hear his views on that part of
the world. But while in New Zealand I became increasingly worried
by serious news from London about the man-power and economic
crisis, the run-down of the armed forces, wobbling by the Government
over the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular, and the fact
that my V.CLG.S. (Simpson) was having to bear unaided the full
wrath of the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff on matters
raised by me in Singapore and Australia. I feared that all these things
might have adverse effects on the Army if I was not there to fight its
battles. I therefore decided regretfully that it was necessary for me to
return to England with all speed and I cancelled my visit to Japan.
We left New Zealand on the 3ist July, spent two days in Sydney
clearing up certain doubtful points, had conferences in Singapore and
in Egypt with the respective Commanders-in-Chief , and arrived back
in London on the evening of the 8th August.

AFRICA: 13TH NOVEMBER TO l8TH DECEMBER 1947

In the middle of November 1947 I left London to carry out a tour
of Africa, which embraced the following territories: French Morocco,
the Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Belgian Congo, Union of South
Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt

I talked with many people in every walk of life. During the tour

414 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

an immense number of Army matters came to my notice and requests
were received for decisions or for rulings on policy. It is impossible
to tour Africa without being impressed with the enormous possibilities
that exist for development in British Africa, and the use to which such
development could be put to enable Great Britain to maintain her
standard of living and to compete succesfully in an increasingly
competitive world. But there appeared to be no "grand design" for
the development of British Africa and consequently no master plan
in any Colony. The number of authorities involved was so great that
the effort was patchy and disjointed. There were too many conferences
and committees, and not enough policy laid down by a central
authority. Because of the lack of a grand design or master plan, no
real progress in development was being made. British Africa contained
most things that we needed:

Minerals 1

Raw materials I in unlimited quantities.

Labour J

Food could be grown to any extent desired.

Power could be developed economically, since coal

seemed to be unlimited and could be ob
tained cheaply; there was also water power.

Communications given raw materials, power, labour, and food,
it was then essential to have good com
munications—and these ought to be devel
oped so as to be suitable for economic and
strategical requirements.

The two primary essentials seemed to be, first, to develop the
resources with the necessary capital, capital goods, brains, and man
power as rapidly as possible; and secondly, to effect such a grouping
of British (or Commonwealth) Africa as would break down the many
existing barriers. Economic necessity and sound common sense should
be the yardstick. Africa was a sphere of influence of the Western
Powers; no potentially hostile foreign Power had a footing in that
continent. If ever there was a "show down'* between East and West,
Africa would go with the West; its development was therefore an
important and urgent matter.

In my report to the Government I pointed out all these things. I
said that long-term planning was necessary, based on the grand design;
it would be useless to adopt a short-sighted policy of expansion and
development only where an immediate dividend was likely.

I finally gave it as my opinion that British Africa must be developed
as a definite part of our economic progress. I said that the difficulties

Overseas Tours in 1947 415

would be immense and many would say that what I advocated was
hardly possible; I added that I could easily have written a paper
proving the theoretical impossibility of a landing in Normandy in

1944-

In the first instance I sent copies of my report only to the Prime
Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and I asked the former what
distribution, if any, he would like given to it The Prime Minister very
quickly replied that he wished me to send copies to the Colonial
Secretary (Mr. Arthur Creech Jones) and certain other Cabinet
Ministers. It was obvious to me that the Colonial Secretary would
take the strongest objection to the document, that he would resent the
attack on the (lack of) energy and drive of Colonial administrators,
and that he would raise all sorts of difficulties to the development of
a "Grand Design" for British Africa.

I had anticipated this and had inserted a special paragraph to meet
the situation. An extract from this paragraph ran as follows:

"Immense 'drive* will be required to formulate the Grand Design
and, in fact, to get a move on at all. Many people will say it can't
be done; such people should be eliminated ruthlessly. Belly
aching will assume colossal proportions; it must be stamped on."

The bellyache from the Colonial Secretary came all right! It took
the form of an eighteen-page memorandum in which he disagreed
with nearly all my points; he affirmed that there was no lack of a
plan nor of "drive" in the Colonial administration, and that there was
a good plan already in existence; he ended by saying that I had
exaggerated the potential resources of Africa, My reply to the Colonial
Secretary began and ended with expressions of thanks for all the
trouble he had taken; but I doubt if these disguised the "castor oil"
in the middle, which ran as follows:

"I have read your Memorandum with immense interest. I am
delighted to hear that there is a clear and well-understood policy,
and regional plans, for the development of Africa; I went all
round that continent and failed to discover anything of that sort
myself. Perhaps I am very stupid! I have nothing to add, except
to refer to the conclusions on page 10 of my report; I adhere to
those conclusions.

It is obvious that we disagree fundamentally on the whole
subject; time will show which of us is right"

I enjoyed particularly my time in South Africa, as the guest of
Field-Marshal Smuts and his Government. I had a great admiration
for that remarkable man and I had many talks with him about defence
matters. Before I left I drafted some principles which seemed to me to

416 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

define the position of South Africa in a global war, and got his agree
ment to them. They ran as follows:

*'l. A threat by a hostile power to any part of the African Con
tinent contains a potential threat to the security of the Union
of South Africa.

2. Therefore South Africa is directly interested in preventing
domination in Africa by any potentially hostile power. If such
domination was attempted and it led to war, South Africa
would inevitably be forced to take such action as was neces
sary to keep the threat at a distance.

3. In such circumstances:

(a) The Union would be actively concerned in opening
up and keeping open essential communications for its
security and in dealing with submarine threats to ship
ping round its coasts, and generally in lending a hand
to keep open the sea routes in the Southern Atlantic and
in the Indian Ocean.

(b) The country would become a great supply area in the
struggle and would develop a powerful munitions in
dustry.

4. The development of peace-time forces should be carefully
balanced with the general economy of the nation and be such
as will be best suited to the development in war-time of the
strategy outlined above."

I finished my tour of Africa with a visit to the British troops in the
Canal Zone of Egypt. While there I received a message to say that
David had passed out of the Royal Armoured Corps O.C.T.U.* at
Bovington top of his batch, and had been awarded the "Belt of
Honour." I at once decided to speed up my business in Egypt and get
back to England in time to take the Passing Out Parade myself, so that
I could fasten the Belt of Honour on my son. David was receiving a
National Service Commission; he never had any desire to make the
Army his profession, so far as I am aware. On completing his period
of National .Service he was to go to Cambridge in October 1948, and
was to read for an engineering degree. I arrived back in England on
the i8th December 1947 and had the immense pleasure of giving
David the Belt of Honour at the Passing Out Parade on the soth
December.

Our tour had involved a complete circuit of Africa, and the experi
ence gained was of tremendous value to me. Wherever we went—
whether it was French Morocco, British Africa, the Belgian Congo,
Ethiopia— the local inhabitants were enthusiastic in their welcome.
They seemed anxious to see someone whose name they knew
* Officer Cadets' Training Unit.

Overseas Tours in 1947 417

but whom they had previously seen only in pictures or possibly in the
cinema. Now they saw him in the flesh. I used to hope they were
not disappointed.

I was told in Nigeria that it was the first time a C.I.G.S., or even a
member o£ the Army Council, had ever visited British or African
troops in British West Africa.

As in previous tours I returned laden with gifts, the more so as I
had celebrated my birthday, the i/th November, in the Gold Coast
(now Ghana).

CHAPTER 29

Storm Clouds over Palestine

No ACCOUNT of my time as C.I.G.S. would be complete without
mention of the troubles in which I became involved over the
Palestine problem. I explained in Chapter 26 how I had visited
that country in June 1946, before beginning my duties in Whitehall
and had been disturbed by what I saw and heard. In telling the story
from that time up to the final evacuation of the British forces in the
summer of 1948, 1 will deal only with the military side of the problem
—the use of the Army in aid of the civil power. A political decision was
needed in Palestine. What that decision should have been was not my
business. But infirmity of purpose in Whitehall, and the lack of a clear
political policy, resulted in the death of many young British soldiers; it
was against these things that I fought. There is much to be learnt from
a study of how the problem was handled by the Labour Government
of that day— chiefly how not to handle such matters.

Since my visit to the Eastern Mediterranean in June 1946, Dempsey

had succeeded Paget as C.-in-C. Middle East; Barker was still in

command of the troops in Palestine. The general situation in that

country had deteriorated. Following various outrages the Army had

swooped on the Haganah and the Jewish Agency at the end of June

1946, and a number of the leaders of both organisations had been

arrested and detained. Later, after the blowing up of the King David

Hotel in Jerusalem, in July 1946, another swoop had been made in Tel

Aviv directed against the Irgun, and more suspects had been arrested.

This had led to a tense situation; troops were going about armed, and

; stringent precautions were being taken to protect men and buildings

| against terrorist attacks.

1 Towards the end of October 1946 the Colonial Secretary (Creech

418

Storm Clouds Over Palestine 419

Jones ) came to the conclusion that if we released from detention the
leaders of the terrorist campaign whom we had arrested, and "laid off"
further searches for arms, a better atmosphere would be created;
indeed, it was even stated that if we acted thus the Jewish Agency
would denounce terrorism and call upon all right-minded Jews to fight
it Accordingly the detained terrorist leaders were all released early in
November, and searches for arms were suspended except after actual
terrorist incidents. As a result of this concession by the Labour Govern
ment, more and more restrictions were placed upon the troops in
Palestine regarding their activities in the maintenance of law and order.
Meanwhile, British soldiers and British members of the Palestine Police
continued to be killed and wounded.

I became exasperated at this state of affairs. I had arranged to fly
to Palestine on the 28th November 1946 and I "faced up" to the
Prime Minister on the subject before my departure. I said that since
the ist October, 76 soldiers and 23 police had been killed or wounded.
Murder and sabotage was on the increase; rail communication was at
a standstill. The Palestine Police Force was 50 per cent below strength
and it needed 3000 recruits quickly. Since the recent release of detained
terrorist leaders, the general incidence of terrorist activity had increased
—not decreased, as the Colonial Secretary had said would happen. I
challenged the existing policy in Palestine, from the point of view of
the right use of the Army. The whole situation was rapidly deteriorat
ing. A large army of 100,000 men was being maintained in Palestine;
it was suffering casualties at the average rate of two per day and was
not allowed to take appropriate action against its assailants. The Army
was being misused, a great portion of it being employed on purely
defensive tasks. The only way the Army could stamp out terrorism
was to take the offensive against it, and this was not allowed. We
had, in fact, surrendered the initiative to the terrorists. The Colonial
Secretary seemed to think that this did not matter. He kept saying
that there was a real desire on the part of the Jewish Agency to stamp
out terrorism. I finally said that if we were not prepared to maintain
law and order in Palestine, it would be better to get out. I could not
agree to a lot of young British lads being killed needlessly. This state
ment sparked off the devil of a row, and the Prime Minister called
for an early report on the matter. I then left for Palestine.

The High Commissioner in Palestine at that time was General Sir
Alan Cunningham, who had at one time commanded the Eighth Army
in the desert campaign and had been removed from that command
by Auchinleck in 1941* On the agth November Cunningham, Demp-
sey and myself had a conference in Jerusalem about the general
situation. The many political factors involved in the use of the Army
were not discussed. But from the -military angle even Cunningham
had to agree that proper military action was not being taken in

420 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Palestine, and that the Army was not able to assist the Police Force to
maintain law and order because of the restrictions placed upon it.

The more I examined the situation in Palestine during that visit,
the less I liked it. The High Commissioner had at his disposal certain
forces with which to keep law and order— the Police and the Army.
Neither was being used properly, with the result that the total effort
was ineffective. The Police in no way resembled my conception of a
Police Force. Instead of the tolerant, good-natured, British policeman
in whom the whole community had complete confidence, and who
carried out his duties unarmed, the Palestine Police Force was armed
to the teeth and a large part of it was organised in the form of mobile
columns with armoured cars. In other words, it was a bad imitation
of the Army— and in that role its personnel could never be any better
than third-class soldiers. It was able to carry out the duties neither of
a normal Police Force nor of a normal Army. In consequence it com
manded neither the respect nor the confidence of the population, many
of whom were prejudiced against any Police Force anyhow— owing
to their experiences in central Europe.

Then again, the High Commissioner seemed to think that provided
we took no executive action against lawlessness, the Jewish Agency and
the Haganah would suppress it. He also reckoned that we could not
stop lawlessness by offensive action, and that if we tried to do so we
would merely annoy the Jews and make matters worse; in other
words, we could no longer govern Palestine except by sufferance of
the Jews. In that case, I said, let's get out.

A good example of what was going on occurred when I was actually
in Jerusalem during my visit At 6.30 p.m. one night a police station
was attacked by armed Jews, who had laid mines in certain streets
to cordon off the area. The attack was repulsed; troops arrived and
picked up the mines; normal life was then resumed. A conference
was held the next morning to decide whether to search the area in
which the outrage had taken place. If the matter had been properly
handled, mobile columns of troops would have been on the scene
within ten minutes and few of the terrorists would have escaped. The
only firm and quick decision taken in Jerusalem that night was to
cancel a dinner-party at Government House because the mines in the
streets prevented the guests from getting there!

I reported my views on the situation by cable to Whitehall, saying
that:

"the whole business of dealing with illegal armed organisations
in Palestine is being tackled in a way which is completely gutless,
thoroughly unsound, and which will not produce any good
results."

Storm Clouds Over Palestine 421

The gloves were now off and all got ready for a showdown between
the War Office and the Colonial Office. The Prime Minister decided
to referee the contest and ordered (in Whitehall parlance "invited")
both Ministries to prepare a joint paper expressing their views on the
situation, with particular reference to the use of the armed forces.

A joint paper was, in fact, impossible, since the two Ministries did
not agree on anything. The paper finally produced expressed in Part i
the views of the Colonial Office and in Part 2 those of the War Office
—the two views being in direct conflict. The paper was to be discussed
at a meeting on the ist January 1947. But on the 2Qth December 1946,
a British officer and three N.C.O.'s were kidnapped and flogged by the
Jews in retaliation for our whipping of a Jewish terrorist youth. This
incident incensed public opinion in England, and it was reflected at
the meeting on the ist January. The Prime Minister came down
heavily on my side, and the Colonial Secretary was routed. The upshot
was that the Colonial Office was instructed, in consultation with the
War Office, to draw up a new directive to the High Commissioner.
To my intense surprise, as we left the meeting the Colonial Secretary
asked me to draft the new directive— which I did. It ran as follows:

"i. His Majesty's Government have decided that further efforts
will be made to stop lawlessness and terrorism.

2. They have also decided that all possible steps will be taken at
once to establish and maintain law and order in Palestine,
using the police and military forces at your disposal as may
be necessary.

3. There can of course be no question of taking reprisals which
would merely bear hardly on innocent people. Apart from
this, the efforts of police and troops should be designed to take
the offensive against breakers of the law and to ensure that
the initiative lies with the forces of the Crown.

4. Such action as you take to implement the policy outlined in
paragraphs 2 and 3 above will receive the full support of
His Majesty's Government."

The directive was accepted and was sent to the High Commissioner.

The next event of note was the kidnapping on the 26th January
1947 of an ex-Army officer and a British judge. The High Commis
sioner immediately announced that if these two citizens were not
returned within forty-eight hours, military administration would be
established in certain areas. This fairly got my goat, and I wrote to
the Colonial Secretary pointing out that to give such notice to the
enemy would merely enable Tifrn to make his plans. I repeated that
it was action of this sort which had led us into the existing un
pleasantness.

422 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

On the 3oth January I sent a hot telegram to Dempsey in the same
vein, emphasising in particular that the new directive by itself was
useless; success depended on the way in which it was carried out. I
added that what was needed in Palestine was a firm policy but that I
had not seen one since I had been C.I.G.S. I ended the telegram by
saying that we must try and inculcate a strong will-power in Palestine
and in Whitehall, and firm determination that we would not tolerate
insults to the British rule from a lot of gangsters; I would do my best
in London and he must do what he could his end.

I now committed a grave tactical error— I sent a copy of the tele
gram to the Colonial Secretary, and it very soon reached the Prime
Minister. It was not well received and I expected a kick in the pants;
but, in fact, Mr. Atdee was very decent about it. I was summoned to
No. 10 the next morning and told that if my views became generally
known considerable embarrassment would be caused to the Govern
ment; this might lead to a critical situation in the debate on Palestine
in the House of Commons which was to take place shortly. The Prime
Minister then said he would be obliged if I would withdraw the tele
gram in case it was seen by eyes other than those of Dempsey. I, of
course, complied at once and told Dempsey to cancel the telegram, and
destroy all copies. But, no doubt, it had been seen by many eyes
already!

As I did not know where the Government policy might lead us,
I ordered that no more Army families were to be allowed to go to
Palestine. A day later the High Commissioner adopted an even more
drastic policy, ordering that all Brtish women and children, and all
non-essential British male civilians, were to be evacuated from Palestine
at once. The decks were now cleared for action.

When the struggle in Palestine was at its height, attacks on persons
and buildings were made by various illegal organisations. One organ
isation, called the Stern Gang, even sent a party to Europe and it
had succeeded in blowing up the British Embassy in Rome.

Since it was considered that I might be a target for Jewish attack,
a policeman was posted outside my flat in No. 7 Westminster Gardens;
and whenever I went to Hindhead for a week-end with the Reynolds
family, a policeman from Haslemere was sent to watch the house.
Personally, I did not think police protection was necessary. However,
one day my ADC answering the telephone in my office heard a
voice at the other end say: "Is that the War Office? This is the Stern
Gang speaking."

He replied: "Good. What can I do for you?'*

The voice said: "Tonight, for the Field-Marshal, a bomb/'

My ADC said: "Thank you. I will let him know/'

The voice: "Are you trying to be funny?"

The ADC said: "No. I thought you were/'

Storm Clouds Over Palestine 423

The voice: "Did you? Then there will be a bomb for you too/'
After which parting shot it rang off.

No bombs arrived that night, or later. Perhaps it was because of
tibe policeman.

In February 1947 the Government decided to place the Palestine
case before the United Nations, without any British recommendation
about what the answer should be. That organisation appointed a fact-
finding committee to report to the General Assembly by the ist
September, not only factual information relevant to the Palestinian
problem but also suggestions for its solution. At the same time Russia
championed the cause of the Jews and urged the ending of the British
Mandate. It might have been expected that reference of the case to
the United Nations would have brought about a temporary lull in
terrorist activities, but this did not happen. However, the Government
was now committed to a firm policy and for the moment showed no
wish to withdraw from that attitude.

The problem then became how to preserve law and order during
the next six months, and in this connection it was suggested that it
might be necessary to impose martial law over the whole country.
I was against this. Such action would tend to paralyse economic life
and to cause unemployment; it would bear hardly on Jew and Arab
alike, and, overall, would be damaging to the country. The High
Commissioner already possessed very great powers under the Defence
Regulations, and these were adequate— if he had the courage to use
them. It was therefore decided in March 1947 not to impose martial
law on the country.

We had a difficult time in Palestine during the summer of 1947
and it gradually became clear that, whatever the United Nations might
say, the Government was determined to lay down the Mandate and
withdraw all British forces from Palestine by the ist August 1948.
But, in fact, at the end of November 1947 the General Assembly voted
in favour of the partition of Palestine as between Jews and Arabs, and
arranged that a Commission should decide the frontiers. Consequent
on this decision, the Government decided in December to terminate
the Mandate on the i$th May 1948 and to complete the withdrawal
of the British forces by the following ist August; this latter date was
eventually changed to the ist July.

Beginning in December 1947, the situation in Palestine began
rapidly to deteriorate. The Jews started to secure all the tactical
advantages that they could during the period before the Mandate was
ended. The Arabs on the other hand, with the exception of their Arab
Liberation Army, did not advance to battle immediately; they spent
the time in collecting their regular forces, trying without much suc
cess to agree on a system of command for the coming contest, and
in issuing threats to the Jews as to what would happen to them after

424 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the isth May 1948. By mid-March fighting was in progress between
Arabs and Jews on a considerable scale; the High Commissioner got
"windy" and asked that the termination of the Mandate should be
advanced to the end of April. There was some wobbling in Whitehall
but eventually we managed to persuade the Government to stand
firm on the date originally agreed (the isth May).

The fighting in Palestine between Jew and Arab had, curiously
enough, brought relief to the British troops since they were no longer
the target for attack by the Jews— as they had been for so long. We
ceased to suffer casualties. Instead, the troops were chiefly engaged in
holding the ring and trying to ensure a fair deal for both sides. A good
instance of this occured in Jaffa towards the end of April 1948. Heavy
fighting was taking place in the town and reports indicated that the
Arabs were getting the worst of it. Jaffa was the only Arab port in
Palestine and I was asked by the Government to take all necessary
steps to ensure that it did not change hands before the isth May.
I gave orders accordingly, and said that if the Jews captured Jaffa, our
troops must retake it and hand it back to the Arabs. The C.-in-C.
sent troops and tanks in to Jaffa on the 28th April and these, supported
by Spitfire aircraft, pushed the Jews out and brought about a truce in
the town. We had one British soldier killed.

The three main areas which we decided to hold until the isth May
were Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa. The final evacuation was to take place
from Haifa.

I must now relate the story of my row with Ernie Bevin. I had
an enormous respect, admiration, and liking for that very great man,
but we had a proper showdown as the Palestine situation moved to a
close.

On the 22nd April 1948 a flood of Press reports came during the
day describing heavy fighting in Haifa where, it was said, a massacre
of Arabs was taking place. At 7.30 p.m. that night, just as I was leaving
my flat for the Mansion House to deliver a speech in support of the
Army Cadet Force, I was sent for by the Prime Minister. At No. 10
were also Ernie Bevin and the Minister of Defence (Mr. A. V.
Alexander). The P.M. opened the ball by asking if I had read the
newspaper reports about the fighting in Haifa. I replied that I had, but
that I did not believe all I read in the papers; I relied on reports from
the generals, and I had received none. At this Ernie became very
worked up; he said 23,000 Arabs had been killed, and the situation
was catastrophic; he demanded to know what I was going to do about
it I said that as the War Office had received no reports, it was clear
to me that he must be greatly exaggerating the situation in Haifa. I
added that the first thing to do was to get an accurate report, and that
until we had it it was useless discussing the matter further. I then went
to the War Office and set in motion the machinery to obtain the report

Storm Clouds Over Palestine 425

that was needed. I was, of course, somewhat late at the Mansion
House.

At 9 a.m. the next morning I went again to No. 10. Ernie Bevin
was even more agitated than he had been the night before. He said
that the Army should have stopped any nonsense in Haifa and that the
massacre of the Arabs had put him in an impossible position with all
the Arab States. I replied that all reports received up to date went to
show that the whole affair was grossly exaggerated, and at no time
had the situation got out of hand. Ernie then blew up, and concluded
his outburst by saying that he had been "let down by the Army." I
got very angry and said that he would have to withdraw the insult

I at once reported the incident to my colleagues on the Chiefs of
Staff Committee, informed the Secretary of State for War, and cabled
the C.-in-C. Middle East A few days later I went to see the Minister
of Defence and asked if the Foreign Secretary had withdrawn his insult
to the Army; I did not ask an apology; I merely wanted to know if
he stood by the remark. Mr. Alexander pooh-poohed the whole thing;
he said there was no need to worry as the remark had not been made
in public. I replied that the whole Army now knew about it. This
shook him badly and he angrily said that I should not have passed it
on. I then went right off the deep end. I said that the Army had not
forgotten Mr. Bevin's previous statement that he staked his political
reputation on the successful solution of the Palestine problem. He had
consistently refused to listen to the Army's views, he had been led
down the garden path by the Colonial Secretary and the High
Commissioner, he had made a proper mess of the whole business, and
that now he was trying to make the Army the scapegoat I was not
going to put up with this. Either the Foreign Secretary stood by his
remark, or he did not He (Alexander) must find out If they wanted
to sack me it would be O.K. by me; I could say a jug-full in the House
of Lords about the Government's handling of the Palestine situation
since I had been C.I.G.S.— and would be delighted to have the oppor
tunity to do so.

This fairly put the cat among the pigeons. No more was said. I
decided to maintain the pressure. The next morning, the 3rd May,
I wrote Mr. Alexander the following note:

"On the 23rd April last Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, stated
that he had been let down by the Army in Palestine/ You will
doubtless remember the incident since you were present at the
time, though you did not intervene to refute the statement

Will you please ascertain from Mr. Bevin, and let me know if
this statement still stands, or not?"

I was invited to attend a meeting at No. 10, at 5.15 p.m. on the
7th May, with the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Minister of

426 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Defence. I duly arrived at the meeting and found a fourth person
there— Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, complete with
pencil and pad.

Atdee began by asking Ernie Bevin to make a speech. He was his
old self again by now, full of fun, and we had always been very
good friends. He said it was a new experience to be hauled over the
coals in the Cabinet room; he had nothing against the soldiers, who
were all doing their best in difficult situations. Atdee then intervened
to say that many things were said in the Cabinet room compared with
which the matter then under discussion was insignificant. He was sure
that my anger, roused in the heat of the moment by an unfortunate
remark, would be forgotten just as soon as the remark itself. Ernie
said, "TSar, 'ear." We all then laughed. Attlee handled the situation
beautifully; and it was impossible to be angry with Ernie Bevin for
long.

But all was not yet finished. Mr. Alexander piped up and produced
from his pocket the letter I had sent him on the 3rd May; he read it
out in a threatening tone and asked what I meant by the phrase "you
did not intervene to refute the statement." I replied that I meant
exactly what I had written.

But the Prime Minister had had enough; he intervened and changed
the subject. I have often wondered what Sir Norman Brook wrote on
his pad about that meeting!

We handed over the Mandate to the United Nations on the isth
May 1948 and got the troops all safely away by the ist July.

The result of being driven out of Palestine was to weaken our
overall strategic position in the Middle East, and that of the Western
world generally in the struggle between East and West By this time
we had lost India, that sub-continent having been partitioned, and we
were on the way of being driven out of Egypt. A firm position in both
the Sudan and Libya was now more than ever important, and this I
emphasised continuously to Ministers.

CHAPTER 30

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall

OF ALL the troublesome matters that came iny way during my
time as C.I.G.S., I would place in the forefront the struggle
with the Government to save the Army from decline. The two
factors that influenced all decisions were man-power and money.

THE FIGHT FOR NATIONAL SERVICE

By September 1946 it had become clear that drastic measures would
be necessary if we were to meet the increasingly serious man-power
situation, brought about by the rapid rate of release from the Army
at the end of the war. The introduction of National Service in peace
time was essential.

It had been hoped by the Government that our commitments
would decrease when the war ended; but they did not, nor did they
show any signs of doing so. We were likely to be in Venezia Giulia
and Greece for some time. Palestine was in a state of grave unrest.
Egypt was on the boil due to tibe delay in the Treaty negotiations.
Trouble threatened in the Persian Gulf oilfields. Internal strife loomed
ahead in India. In fact, an uneasy peace brooded over the world.
Voluntary recruitment was not producing the number of men we
wanted; service in the Army is never popular, especially directly after
a war,

On my return from America in September 1946 I reached the con
clusion that a showdown with the Government over the whole man
power question was imperative— to include National Service, reserve
liability, and the future rate of release. My colleagues on the Chiefs

427

428 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

of Staff Committee were not too keen to face this issue. The Navy had
little use for National Service, the First Sea Lord saying it would
merely be a "millstone round the neck of the armed forces." This
did not deter me and in October 1946 I submitted a comprehensive
paper to the Chiefs of Staff Committee proving the need for National
Service in peace-time for the Army. After much argument my paper
was forwarded to the Government with a note pointing out that,
while it dealt only with the Army, the principle of conscription applied
equally to all three Services.

There were some stormy meetings before the need for National
Service in peace-time was agreed by the Government Sir Stafford
Cripps led the opposition. He said at one meeting that the War Office
paper was sketchy and that sufficient thought had not been given to
the matter. I attacked and routed him, with the help of the Prime
Minister with whom I had had several private talks on the subject
Later, the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Bellenger) advised me to
leave the handling of Ministers to him, saying that he knew how to
deal with them and that it was unwise to make enemies. I said that
I would never let anybody get away with an unjustified accusation
against the War Office.

The general feeling in Governmental circles at that time was that
compulsory National Service in peace-time was inevitable if we were
to meet our commitments. But nobody liked the idea very much and
the majority of Ministers, always excepting Attiee and Bevin, would
have been glad to find some excuse for postponing a decision. No
such act of God was forthcoming. The Cabinet approved, and on
the 6th November 1946 the proposals were announced in the King's
Speech on the Prorogation of Parliament. It had taken us six weeks
of hard fighting to get Governmental agreement that we needed
National Service in peace-time. But we were by no means out of the
wood even then, as we will now see.

Early in March 1947 the Government introduced in Parliament the
National Service Act which embodied all the War Office proposals.

The whole idea of conscription in peace-time being repugnant to
British traditions, it was not surprising to find that the Bill received
considerable opposition— particularly from the Labour benches. When,
therefore, the Bill came up for a second reading at the end of March
the stage was set for a first class row— which duly materialised. Many
Labour M.P.S opposed the Bill and the Government found itself faced
with a crisis arising from differences within its own party. The Minister
of Defence (Mr. Alexander) got the wind up and asked the Chiefs of
Staff, at ,a hurriedly summoned meeting in the House of Commons
on the 2nd April, if they would agree to reduce the period of active
National Service from eighteen to twelve months. If this could be

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 429

agreed, all opposition to the Bill would fade away. I said that I
couldn't understand why the Government was windy about a few
rebels; they would still be left with a large majority, and anyhow the
Conservative M.P.s would see the Bill through for them. This last
remark was not popular.

All three Chiefs of Staff made it clear that eighteen months was the
period needed. I said that if the period was reduced to one year, we
would have to re-deploy the Army. This re-deployment would be
possible only on condition that our commitments overseas were all
liquidated at the latest by January 1949. I gave it as my opinion that
the reduced period of one year could be accepted by the Army pro
vided the commitments were so liquidated that no further ones mate
rialised. If this did not happen, we would have to come back to the
Government and ask for the period of whole-time National Service to
be stepped-up again to eighteen months, or even two years. Mr.
Alexander agreed with this condition. To make sure, I wrote him a
letter in which I asked for his written agreement that the conditions for
twelve months' National Service as expounded by me were clearly
understood by the Government I got his written agreement The fact
of the matter was that the Government, to meet a crisis in its own
ranks, made a sudden change of face. As I pointed out to Mr. Alex
ander, the reduction in the period of whole-time service from eighteen
to twelve months was made solely for political considerations; there
were no military considerations existing at the time which could justify
such a reduction. Because of the shortage of regulars, we would have
to send the National Servicemen overseas to Austria, Greece, Palestine,
Egypt, Gibraltar, Malta, and to the Far East; we could not do this if
we were only to have them for twelve months in the Army.

The National Service Act, 1947, was passed by Parliament and re
ceived the Royal Assent in July. It was to come into operation on the
ist January 1949. From that date all men called up were to do one
year's full-time service, and thereafter six years in the Reserve or
Auxiliary Forces with a liability for part-time training. Men who were
called up between the ist January 1948 and the ist January 1949
were to have periods of service laid down which would decrease pro
gressively from two years to one. All this had been agreed by the
War Office on the basis that our overseas commitments would be
liquidated, that no more would arise, that there was no enemy to
fight, and that there was no need for any unit of our field force to be
kept immediately operational— in other words, full peace-time condi
tions.

But the winter of 1947-1948 unfortunately witnessed grave develop
ments in the international field, culminating in the Russian blockade of
West Berlin which began on the 24th June 1948. It was now dear

430 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

that "full peace-time conditions" could not be expected for many years;
at the least, a struggle for power was likely during the next year. What
about our man-power situation?

The Government answer to this question was to propose that all
releases from the Services should be stopped for six months. I said
that this would lead to an impossible situation. It would be illogical
to impose this ban and at the same time begin the operation of the
National Service Act on the 1st January 1949. The legal position would
then be that a man called up on the 3ist December 1948 would be
liable for up to two years* service, whereas a man called up one day
later (ist January 1949) would only be liable for one year.

The only practical way to solve the Army problem would be to
link releases to a two-year cycle of National Service with the Colours,
until we could see our way more clearly. I told the Prime Minister
that what the Army wanted above all was stability. The Army man
power requirement could be satisfied fully only by the institution of
two years' National Service from the ist January 1949, and the Govern
ment should amend the National Service Act accordingly.

The remainder of the story about National Service can be quickly
told* I came to the conclusion that we would not get the Government
to agree to a period of two years' National Service with the Colours.
We could present a case for eighteen months which was unassailable.
We would fight for that.

I assembled the Military Members of the Army Council on the
igth October 1948 and asked them if they were all prepared to resign
in a body, led by me, if anything less than eighteen months* National
Service with the Colours was decided upon by the Government. They
all agreed. I notified the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Emanuel
Shinwell). He was a bit startled; he obviously had to inform the
Prime Minister that he was about to lose his Army Council. The
matter was urgent, since the National Service Act (giving only one
year with the Colours) was due to come into operation in a little over
two months (on the ist January 1949). A member of my staff rashly
bet me us. 6d. that a Governmental decision would be given by the
ist November. I was due to leave the War Office on that date to be
come Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee of the
Western Union. I reckoned that the Cabinet would wait till I had
departed, and would then settle for one year— knowing that the
Admiralty and Air Ministry would raise little objection. I won my
half-crown. The decision was not taken until late in November. But
in the interim I had put-my successor (Bill Slim) in possession of all
the facts, and he got the eighteen months. I don't know whether he
had threatened to resign.

When all is said and done, one must pay tribute to the courage of
the Labour Government in introducing National Service in peace-time,

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 431

in the face of great opposition within its own party. Attlee and Bevin
pushed it through for us.

THE PARLOUS STATE OF THE ABMED FORCES

Discussions on the overall strength of die Armed Forces began to
have serious repercussions in the summer of 1947. It was because of
them that I cancelled my visit to Japan and hurried home from New
Zealand, as was explained in Chapter 28. Early in August 1947 the
Minister of Defence (Mr. Alexander) announced that the Prime Min
ister wished an immediate examination to be made of the possibility of
reducing the total strength of the fighting Services, He said that the
total defence expenditure must be reduced to £600 million. No
headway was made on this proposal. Then came a threat of arbitrary
cuts to reduce the Navy to £160 million, Army to £270 million,
R.A.F. to £170 million. The War Office strongly deprecated this
method of arbitrary cuts; I said we in no way accepted that way of
reaching a reduced total. However, the Minister of Defence instructed
us to work on the assumption that £600 million would be the maxi
mum annual expenditure of the Armed Forces, and that it must be
accepted that this financial limit would entail taking serious risks. On
this the Chiefs of Staff submitted their recommendations, under strong
protest These gave the Army ceiling as follows:

i April 1948 i April 1949

527,000

This entailed drastic reductions, e.g.:

a heavy cut in all Arms (infantry battalions cut from 113 to 72,

of which only 24 would be operational ) ;

heavy cuts for new production, maintenance, and so on,

and leaving us with no Regular armoured division.

Try as we would, the War Office was unable to prevent the Govern
ment from approving these figures— which was done early in October

1947-

An interesting debate took place in the House of Commons on
the 27th October 1947. At the end of it, Mr. Alexander gave his
priorities for the development of the Armed Forces. I did not hear
the debate but I read it in Hansard the next day, and found his views
were contained in Column 652 as follows (the italics are mine):

"In the light of the circumstances with which we are faced, my
own view is that the first priority, which must not be interfered
with, is defence research. The second, in the light of the present

432 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

developing situation, must be to maintain the structure of the
Royal Air Force, and its initial striking power. The third priority
is for the maintenance of our sea communications, and, therefore,
for the most efficient Navy we can get in the circumstances, and
then we will do the best we can -for the Army."

I was now thoroughly alarmed. The cold war was "hotting up"
and the main load had to be carried by the Army; the Navy and the
RA.F. were essentially "hot war" Services. If we won the cold war,
there would be no hot war. But Mr. Alexander put the Army as last
in the order of priority— "We will do the best we can for the Army/'

The situation was now so serious that I decided it was necessary to
remodel the British Army and work towards a conception of one
national Army. The Regular and Territorial Armies would each have
to be composed of regulars and National Servicemen, with a volunteer
element in the Territorial Army. What was lacking in the Active
Army would have to be provided on mobilisation by the Territorial
Army. The two Armies must be re-designed to form together a
balanced national Army.

Mr. Shinwell had come to the War Office in the Government
re-shuffle in October 1947 and the recommendation for this "new
model Army" was almost the first I made to him. He accepted it

Early in January 1948 the Minister of Defence circulated a paper
in which he asked for a decision that the total Defence Budget in
1949-50 should be £600 million (less terminal charges) and that he
should be empowered to divide this up in accordance with the
priorities he had already laid down in Parliament on the 27th October

1947-

I protested vigorously against these priorities and demanded that
the word "priority" should not be used when assessing inter-Service
roles; I won my point about this.

However on the 14th January I was informed by the Ministry of
Defence that the Army share of the £600 million was to be:

Money £222 million

Regulars 185,000 (including women)

National Servicemen 105,000

This involved further most drastic cuts in the organisation of Army
units. We refused to accept the total of 185,000 Regulars and said the
total must be 200,000; this was agreed. A Defense White Paper was
issued in February 1948 and we then had to plan the Army for 1949-
1950 and subsequent years on the basis of the above figures.

During the period between August 1947 and February 1948 I had
continuously protested about the impossibility of producing a decent

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 433

Army on the money and manpower allotted, having in view our com
mitments. We were moving towards a situation in which we would
be unable to produce an effective fighting force of any appreciable
size, should events demand it The Army would progressively de
teriorate until by the ist January 1950 more than one-third of the
men in the active Army would be only eighteen years old, and have
less than one year's service. The fighting units would be heavily
diluted with immature soldiers. This was quite unacceptable.

During the early months of 1948 the international situation became
gradually and steadily worse, and the blockade of West Berlin by the
Russians began on the 24th June— as I have akeady said. At a meeting
with the Minister of Defence on the 7th July I suddenly shot at him
the question:

"Is the Government prepared to go to war for Berlin?"

This was a real "yorker." I gained the impression that in Mr.
Alexander's view I had committed the unpardonable offence of asking
him to give a decision. I pointed out that if the answer to the question
was "Yes," the Government must realise that the Army was not
ready for war in any way. If war was contemplated, then certain steps
were essential at once; without such action, we would merely suffer
a series of appalling disasters when fighting began. I received no
answer to my question, neither then nor later.

During all this wrangling I was becoming more and more "fed-
up" with the Minister of Defence. It was my view that he always sat
on the fence, never committed himself, and never gave a decision.
I am sure he disliked me intensely; but he couldn't say that I sat on
the fence, or never committed myself to a definite course of action.

After a particularly exasperating conference on the 15th July 1948,

I put it to the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff that Mr.
Alexander was a "passenger"; I asked them to form up with me in
a combined approach to the Prime Minister and ask for his removal,
on the plea that we had no confidence in him. To my immense
astonishment they both agreed! It was duly arranged that we would
all three meet in the Air Ministry (since Tedder was our chairman)
at noon on Tuesday the 2Oth July to decide the tactics of our approach
to the Prime Minister.

I had learnt over the years that on such matters the important things
are timing and tactics— as, in fact, they are in war. All seemed set, and
each day passed without any signs of cold feet on the part of my
colleagues. Came Tuesday the zoth July. The hours passed-io a.m.,

II a.m., 11.30, all seemed good. But at 11.40 a.m. Tedder came through
on the telephone. He said that he had been talking the matter over
with the First Sea Lord; they agreed that none of us had any con
fidence whatsoever in the Minister of Defence, but they both thought

434 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

that the action I proposed was unconstitutional and would undermine
the future position of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. They could not
associate themselves with it. Since I found myself alone on the battle
front, the matter had to be dropped. I have often wondered if Mr.
Alexander knew what was going on.

My next step was to produce a paper on the situation in Western
Europe and the British Army problem arising therefrom. This paper
made it clear that the Army was in a parlous condition, and was in a
complete state of unreadiness and unpreparedness for war. The other
Services were little better. The situation was, in my view, very serious.
I therefore suggested to the Chiefs of Staff that we should, collectively,
inform the Government that the state of the defence Services of
Britain gave cause for "grave concern," and that unless steps were
taken to put the matter right we could look forward only to great
disasters if we became involved in war. This was agreed and the Prime
Minister was informed accordingly on the agth July 1948. This caused
the very devil of a stir. But it soon became clear that Ministers were
not prepared to take any steps that might be considered provocative.
It was however agreed that steps could be taken to place the Armed
Forces in the best possible position to fight in the event of war, pro
vided such steps could be taken without publicity and without serious
impact on the economy of the country. This did not help; practically
nothing could be done without publicity, or without cost in terms of
money or materials.

I continued to push things along and tried to infuse a sense of
urgency into defence matters. All this nettled the Minister of Defence
and one day he spoke disparagingly about me to Mr. Shinwell, saying
I was a very difficult person and asking whether he had started
thinking about my successor!

We now come to momentous days.

On the loth September 1948 the Chiefs of Staff had a first class row
with the Minister of Defence. Curiously enough the battle was started
by Tedder, who was usually not at all bellicose on such occasions.
I quickly rallied to his support and, between us, A.V.A. was utterly
routed. It happened in this way.

Mr, Alexander wanted to discuss a statement about release from
the Services which was to be made in Parliament on the 14th Septem
ber. Tedder at once asked that reference should be made in the state
ment to the need for giving every possible encouragement to regular
recruiting, as it was the "regular content" of the Services which was
the hard core of our fighting efficiency; we depended on the regular
for our technical efficiency, tradesmen, and so on. But Mr. Alexander
informed him that he was not prepared, for political reasons, to do
this.

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 435

Tedder then got very angry and said that the Government had
never given the Services any help in this very difficult matter, and had
given no lead to the nation about the importance of a good response
for regular enlistment in the fighting Services. This upset the Minister
of Defence. He said that no Government in British history had ever
done so much for the Services as had the present Labour Government,
and he instanced particularly two points:

(a) The pay code for the Services, which had been acclaimed as
a major achievement

(b) National Service.

I then chipped in and said that in the Army whenever the Pay
Code was mentioned everyone began to curse. Married officers had
used up their war gratuities and were now getting into debt The
statement in Parliament that married personnel received quarters, or
an allowance in lieu, had caused intense irritation in the Army because
it was untrue— the allowance in lieu being inadequate to get any
reasonable accommodation. The pay of the Services had not increased
with the increased cost of living, as had been the case in civilian pro
fessions. I concluded by saying that far from being a major achieve
ment, the Army regarded the Pay Code as first class nonsense. As
regards National Service, everyone knew that we had had the hell of
a fight to get it, and the Government had "wobbled" badly at the
last moment I then said that I agreed entirely with the views of the
Chief of the Air Staff about the need to encourage regular enlist
ment and to give the reasons. I said I could not understand the refusal
to include this in the statement to be made in Parliament Was the
Government frightened to do so?

Mr. Alexander was now getting really angry. He said the Govern
ment were frightened of nothing. The real trouble was we were
making a mountain out of a molehill. To this Tedder made a very neat
riposte, saying that the Minister was using the molehill in his statement
and was refusing to recognise the mountain; the crying need today was
a better "regular content" in each Service, and this was not going to
be mentioned in the statement. I chuckled (audibly I fear!) at this
riposte and chipped in again, saying that I agreed entirely with Tedder.
I then said that I had been forty years in the Army and I had never
known the Services reduced to such a parlous condition in relation to
their commitments. I said we had sunk to the lowest depths.

This fairly put the cat among the canaries. Mr. Alexander was so
angry he could not speak for several seconds. He then said that state
ments had been made which would have to be taken up again in
another place. I said I would gladly repeat my statement in any place
and in any society— in the House of Lords if he liked.

436 The Memoks of Field-Marshal Montgomery

The First Sea Lord (Lord Fraser) said practically nothing. He had
only just taken over at the Admiralty and this was, I think, his first
attendance at the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The proceedings seemed
to astonish him— as well they might!

It was commonly said in Whitehall that the Minister complained
to his friends that he had been "stabbed in the back" by the Chiefs
of Staff. I warned the War Office to get ready to deal with snipers,
and possibly to repel boarders. If I had learnt anything at all in White
hall, it was that after such a squall the Chiefs of Staff must at once
justify their attitude; this could only be done by submitting state
ments giving the condition of the Royal Navy, Army, and Royal
Air Force and the principal factors which affected them. We did this
on the 2ist September. Certain adverse factors were common to all
the Services, and all of them had to be remedied in some degree if
the state of the Armed Forces was to be brought to a position com
mensurate with all their commitments— present and foreseeable.

These common factors were:

(a) The lack of regular recruits, particularly in the Army and
R.A.F.

(b) The adverse effect of the length of service under the National
Service Act, 1947.

(c) The pay and conditions of servicemen, which did not provide
sufficient to meet the existing cost of living. This reacted
against the morale of the Forces and against any improvement
in recruiting.

(d) A complete lack of balance, and practically no reserves of
fighting equipment

The War Office statement proved -that the Army could not meet
its commitments with the man-power, and financial and material
resources allotted to it.

The Chiefs of Staff paper ended with a statement that the present
state of the forces gave cause for the "gravest alarm." I doubt if any
British Government had ever before been told by its professional
Service advisers, twice within the space of two months, that the state
of the Armed Forces gave cause for "grave concern* (2Qth July), and
the "gravest alarm" (sist September).

When the Minister of Defense discussed our paper with us, I told
him in very clear terms that we could not make proposals to him for
three balanced Services within -the limits of £600 million, I said
that "it simply was not on." I added that the Government seemed to
think that the problem was merely one of what could be bought for
£600 million. But the problem was not so simple as that We needed
"security." That meant preparedness, and in modern times real pre-

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 437

paredness was necessary as never before. To obtain this it would be
necessary to get our man-power, our production, and our mobilisation
plans so organised that the nation could take the strain efficiently and
quickly in an emergency. This would cost money. It was useless
trying to buy security on the cheap. There is no doubt that all this
plain speaking was having some effect; we had definitely worked up
considerable alarm in Government circles.

Mr. Alexander made a speech in the House of Commons on the
^3rd September 1948 in which he announced that, in view of the
international situation, steps were being taken to review "the whole
of the problems of man-power and equipment of the Services in the
light of the changing circumstances." At long last it did seem that
we might get a dividend from the uphill fight we had been waging
with the Government for the past two years. But it was not to be.
There now began a series of meetings, wrangles would be a better
word, about virtually everything affecting the shape and size of the
Armed Forces. The wrangles went on all through October (my last
month as C.I.G.S.) and by the time I left the War Office on the sist
October 1948 they were still raging with rather more vigour than
previously— and no decision had been reached.

DEFENCE ORGANISATION IN WHITEHALL

When I went to the War Office in June 1946 I soon discovered that
the Chiefs of Staff Committee as a body was not the efficient machine
that it had been in the past. The departure of General Ismay, Sir Ian
Jacob, and some prominent members of their staff, had severely
weakened the Secretariat. At one time I even considered asking my
colleagues to agree that Sir Ian Jacob should be asked to return and
take over the reins; I did not do so since I knew that they would not
agree and would attribute to me some arri&re pensee. This inefficiency
of the machine did not make for ease of working in other directions.

First, Mr. Alexander, although he had had a long term of office
as First Lord of the Admiralty, for some reason proved quite incapable
of getting a grip on his job as Minister of Defence. We considered
that he had "risen above his ceiling"— to use an Army expression.
He made a very poor showing in Parliament during the debate on the
National Service Act, and at no time did he give any sign that he
understood the problems of Imperial Defence and how to set about
tackling them.

Secondly, there was not harmony and mutual confidence among
the Chiefs of Staff themselves. This was largely my fault. Before and
during my period of office I toured extensively, visited the seats of
trouble, investigated the fundamental problems, exposed all wrong

438 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

action, and telegraphed instructions to my Vice-Chief at the War
Office to take the matter up at once in Whitehall This was not my
colleagues' method. They were content to let things go along quietly
and to deal only with problems put before them by the Secretariat
in the Ministry of Defence, and then to refer such problems to the
Joint Planning Staff for investigation and report. Since the Joint
Planners consisted of the Directors of Plans from the three Service
Ministries, the resulting reports always contained a compromise
recommendation. The result of this procedure was to give the Joint
Planning Staff a competence it did not, and never could, possess.
Sometimes the Joint Planners were asked to resolve problems about
which the Chiefs of Staff themselves were unable to agree!

My soul revolted against this way of doing business, and I fear I
made that very plain. My colleagues seldom produced any original
ideas; they expected these to be given them by the Secretariat. They
therefore resented those put forward by me, and their resentment was
not lessened by the fact that my proposals were, in the end, often
accepted. I used to insist that any matter which I considered really
important should be referred to the Prime Minister for final decision,
and on more than one occasion the decision was in accordance with
my recommendation. Good examples were the arguments that devel
oped about the location of headquarters in the Far East, and the
problem of British Service representation in Australia (both referred
to in Chapter 28); in each case Mr. Attlee decided in favour of my
recommendation, much to the annoyance of my colleagues.

I can recall only one case of real unanimous agreement in die
Chiefs of Staff Committee and that was when I put forward a pro
posal in July 1948 that we should ask the Prime Minister for a new
Minister of Defence. But that agreement came to nothing, since my
two colleagues declined to face the music on the day of battle. In all
other cases agreement was reached only by compromise. I suppose
this was not surprising; money and man-power were in short supply
after the war, and the tendency of each Service Ministry was to fight
for its own interests.

Looking back on those days, I would therefore cite four main
reasons for the lack of efficiency and harmony in the machinery of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee:

l* A poor Minister of Defence.

2* An inferior Secretariat in the Ministry.

3. Incompatibility of temperament among the three Chiefs of
Staff.

4. The tendency of each Service Ministry to fight for its own
corner when money and men are scarce.

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 439

All these considerations forced me to the conclusion that the
system of compromise inherent in any form of committee system of
management was not the best way to conduct our defence affairs. It
worked in the war partly because Winston Churchill was Minister of
Defence, and partly because from 1942 onwards the Chiefs of Staff
had as Chairman a man of outstanding character in Alanbrooke. But
Churchill had gone, and so had Alanbrooke. And the next Minister
of Defence after Churchill was incapable of ever coming down firmly
on one side or the other. We would always have "had to accept a
decision eventually, but we never got one. But one must be fair to
Mr. Alexander. He very seldom got clear and unanimous advice from
the Chiefs of Staff. A Minister of Defence in peace-time must be a
skilled politician, and able to handle the political side of Service affairs.
But it was unlikely that such a man would understand defence
problems sufficiently well to guide, direct, co-ordinate, and settle the
great issues of policy with which his Chiefs of Staff would have to
grapple. Some of the problems were too serious for a compromise
solution. The Minister needed to know the right answer from the
larger and national angle; compromise solutions might be dangerous.
And he would get that right answer only from an independent military
adviser of great experience. At least that is how I saw it in peace-time,
when money and men are in short supply.

In March 1948 I came to the conclusion that the situation was too
serious to permit of further delay and I drafted a memorandum in
which I recommended that a Ministerial committee should examine
our Defence organisation in Whitehall. I sent copies privately to the
Prime Minister and to the Minister of Defence, and asked for their
agreement that I should submit the memorandum to the Chiefs of
Staff Committee; it would be bound to create a stir in Whitehall
and I did not want it to come as a surprise to the Government Mr.
Attiee replied the same day, agreeing that I should do so.

The memorandum (dated the i6th March 1948) ran as follows:

"i. I submit the following views on the Chiefs of Staff Commit
tee and the organisation of our Defence system.
2. The Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence was set up in 1924 for the purpose of ad
vising the Cabinet jointly and individually.
Ten years or so later it had shown itself to be a useful instru
ment for high-level inter-service consultation in times of
emergency, and also in day-to-day matters of a minor
role.

But it had conspicuously disappointed the main hopes which
had been centred in it

440 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

As Lord Trenchard pointed out in 1935:

*it has done very little to explore, and still less to settle,
larger problems of defence policy. Lord Hailsham, speak
ing for the Government, claimed it as a merit of the Chiefs
of Staff Sub-Committee that the Government "in almost
every case gets a unanimous report from the three pro
fessional heads" and that any great question of difference
about strategic questions was "very unlikely to arise.5* I fear
that, under pressure of work and from other causes, unanim
ity has been too often reached by tacit agreement to
exclude vital differences of opinion, to avoid issues on
which such differences might arise, and to restrict the scope
of the Committee's reports to matters on which agreement
can be reached by "give and take." What is wanted in the
higher examination of defence policy is not that the
Government should get unanimous reports but that means
should exist for the examination of defence requirements
untrammelled by Departmental compromises. We want to
promote free discussion and not drive differences of opinion
underground/

3. The remedy which Lord Trenchard proposed in 1935 was that
there should be a whole-time Ministerial chairman of the
Committee of Imperial Defence who would preside regularly
at meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee. This Minis
ter should have a ^Permanent Secretary* for the C.I.D.,* and
a separate staff consisting largely of promising officers from
all three Services. These suggestions were not, so far as I am
aware, adopted even though it was later found necessary to
appoint a special Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence—
who was entitled to summon the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Com
mittee for consultation from time to time.

4. The system of a Minister for Co-ordination of Defence con
tinued into the war period up till April 1940, when a special
responsibility was assigned to Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the
Admiralty, with power to give guidance and directions to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee and for this purpose to summon
them for consultation at any time. This arrangement was
transformed after Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister, for
he became also Minister of Defence: in which capacity he
presided over a Defence Committee at which both the Service
Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff regularly attended. The
Minister of Defence also presided in war-time at meetings of

* Committee for Imperial Defence.

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 441

the Chiefs of Staff Committee and he had his own special
representative on that Committee.

5. There is no doubt that the arrangements adopted in war-time
by Mr. Churchill worked well, and that high-level matters of
strategy and operational policy were dealt with expeditiously
without there being any inclination on the part of the Chiefs
of Staff to suppress fundamental divergences*

The White Paper of October 1946 clearly recognises this,
though it equally clearly points out the shortcomings of the
system which had prevailed in peace-time and up to April
1940. The aim of the White Paper of 1946 was to produce a
system in peace-time which would ensure a unified defence
policy and in pursuance of this end it recommended the crea
tion of a separate Minister of Defence: whose relations with
the Chiefs of Staff were to be very much like those laid down
by Mr. Churchill in April 1940.

6. The question now arises whether the arrangements recom
mended in 1946, and adopted, have succeeded in their main
object of securing a unified defence policy. I have no hesita
tion whatever in saying that they have not

I examine below why they have failed.

7. I start by the obvious platitude that war and peace are very
different, even though the peace may be in fact a 'cold war.*
In peace-time the demands of the Services for men and money
and materials are certain to be severely limited. Though it
may be a truism that a certain minimum of defence expendi
ture ought to be a first charge on a nation's resources, it will
very rarely happen that the three Services will get all, or even
the bulk, of what taken separately they regard as the indis
pensable TTnirmmiTn. And this will be especially the case when
the nation has not sufficient materials and labour and external
resources to maintain its existing standard of living. This
restriction operates very much less in time of war because the
needs of defence must and do take priority over all other
requirements: save the provision of the minimum food and
clothing which will serve to preserve the life, health and
efficiency of the civilian population.

It may well be that Britain's unaided resources, especially
those of foreign exchange, will never suffice to enable her to
wage war as vehemently and ruthlessly as we should like.
But in the last two Great Wars we were abundantly helped
by the vast good will and productive power of the U.S.A.
and, as a consequence, it could be said that few if any military
demands were neglected at the outset as not being justifiable:

442 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

though in practice no doubt it became necessary for some to
be given a higher priority than others. In these circumstances
the Chiefs of Staff could easily achieve unanimity by con
ceding the justice of the demands of their colleagues; their
disputes could in the main be confined to the question of
who came first

8. In a time of limitation from the start, quite different con
siderations prevail.

The three Chiefs of Staff are the professional heads of their
own Services. They are not only the advisers of the Cabinet
on policy and strategy; each is also the guardian of the present
and future interests of his own Service and in some ways the
custodian of the prospects of every member of it. Naturally
each fights for his own cause and will compromise on noth
ing. One of the three is Chairman of the Committee; this is
a most invidious position for a Chief of Staff to be in; he is
asked to be an impartial Chairman; this is humanly impos
sible as he naturally has his own strong views to press on
everybody.

9. And so in the end we arrive at the state of affairs described by
Lord Trenchard in 1935 and to which I have referred in
para. 2, above.

I consider that his description applies almost word for word
to the present day.

10. I do not however think that the remedy is to be found in Lord
Trenchard's proposal for a whole-time Ministerial Chairman
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

I consider that what we now need is to adopt the device of a
Chief of Staff-not, be it noted, a Chief Staff Officer-to the
Minister of Defence.

Such an appointment would be a great step forward towards
our final aim.

This Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence should be ex-
officio the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Com
mittee.

11. What the Minister for Defence wants is for the Chiefs of Staff
organisation to produce for his consideration and for subse
quent recommendation to the Cabinet a coherent defence
policy which shall:

(a) be within the compass of the resources which the
Cabinet is prepared to allot for defence,

(b) lay down clearly and unequivocally the parts in it
allotted to the three Services and to the relevant civilian
organisations, and

(c) be mutually compatible as to its various elements.

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 443

At present what he tends to get is nothing at all on the wider

aspects of defence policy— for the reason that the three Chiefs

of Staff are so divergent that they take refuge in not reporting

at all, or in furnishing wishy-washy recommendations which

lead nowhere.

Something would be gained if the Chiefs of Staff furnished

the Minister of Defence with an agreed statement of their

differences, but more is really needed.

The Minister of Defence needs to get out of the discussions

of the Chiefs of Staff Committee a plan which hangs together,

which is workable, and which is easily explainable to the

laymen who have to decide it.

If he has a Chief of Staff who is also Chairman of the Chiefs

of Staff Committee, he can at all events get two things:

(i) a dispassionate statement of all the conflicting views,

and
(ii) a viable plan which takes account of the limitation of

resources, which is reasonable and balanced, and

which does the least violence to the recommendations

of the three individual Services.

12. I realise that the perfect Chief of Staff to the Minister of De
fence will not be easy to find. But that in no way affects the
principle; we should first decide whether we will accept the
principle and need the appointment; the man can be found
later. To perform the present task he must be a man with a
wide practical experience of modern war, he must have held
high command, and he must be receptive to new ideas.

13. I am convinced that we must begin to make some progress
towards balanced national Defence Forces. It is now nearly
three years since World War II ended; we have made no
progress, in fact we have tended to drift backwards.

14. Each Service has developed within itself a system which pro
vides for specialisation where it is wanted, and yet ensures
overall unity in direction.

But the fact remains that we have not achieved for the three
Services in combination a system which is comparable to that
which each Service has evolved for itself. The specialisation
is there, it is true; but there is not that junction in the higher
ranks that alone can give the strategical skill we seek. We had
glimpses of the possibilities during World War II when
Supreme Commanders were appointed; but these have faded
out, and we are back with our triumvirates of specialists
wherever inter-service affairs have to be dealt with. It is rather
as if a ship was commanded by a committee consisting of the
Gunnery Officer, the Major of Marines, and the Engineer

444 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Officer, each of whom had under him one third of the crew,
and each wearing a different uniform.

15. There are several reasons why we should not allow this situa
tion to persist

In the -first place, the tasks of the three Services are not nearly
so differentiated as they used to be; the Navy flies, the Air
Force devotes much of its efforts to crippling the enemy's
army and transporting our own; all three Services are equally
committed in an invasion.

Secondly, the advance of scientific discovery has produced
ideas and weapons which do not fit neatly into the picture of
three separate Services; they tend to unify warlike operations,
and it is more important than ever before that objective minds
should examine the application of science to war.
And thirdly, our nation is very hard up and we can no longer
afford the luxury of duplication and the waste which comes
from adding together the demands of three Services.

CONCLUSIONS

16. We need a unified defence policy.

We have not got one, and we have no hope of getting one
under our present system.

17. We need to make some progress towards balanced national
forces; we have made no such progress.

18. We need an efficient system of command and control in the
various theatres in peace-time which will enable us to take
the strain and develop our full potential without the disloca
tion caused by changes in that system when the threat de
velops. We have no such system.

19. I recommend that the whole subject be considered by a
Ministerial Committee without delay.9*

I discussed the memorandum with my colleagues at several meetings.

In order to support my contention that the Chiefs of Staff Com
mittee had achieved little on the vital issues, I prepared a statement
showing the major points of fundamental divergence or lack of prog
ress by the Chiefs of Staff. I used this as evidence to support the
points I had made. The statement gave, in each case, the reference to
the official document which proved my case. I confined my arguments
to the following four major points:

National strategy.

Long-term plans for balanced national forces in peace.

Plans for balanced national forces on the outbreak of war.

I Make Myself a Nuisance in Whitehall 445

Organisation for command and control in peace and war in over
seas theatres.

I proved that we had been unable to reach any agreement on these
subjects.

I then waited for the counter-blasts that my memorandum would
inevitably produce— which came quickly enough.

It at once became obvious that no amount of discussion within the
Chiefs of Staff Committee would help to resolve the divergency of
views that existed on this subject. I was alone in wanting the defence
organisation examined; the other two Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief
Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence (General Hollis, a Royal
Marine) were strongly opposed to any such examination or any change
in the system. It was finally agreed that the Chief of the Air Staff, as
our Chairman, should submit the matter to the Minister of Defence
for a decision. This was done on the 14th April 1948.

Five days later came the Minister's reply. He took refuge behind
the majority view expressed by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of
the Air Staff. At least he had given a decision! I said no more. And
so ended my attempt to get a sound defence organisation in White
hall. But I had at least caused the subject to be aired, and forced the
decision to be officially recorded.

The existing system was to stay. Most people in Whitehall believed
it could be made to work provided we had a good Minister of Defence.
But no one pretended that we had. All we could do was to pray for
a really good replacement. It has already been recorded how, three
months later (in July 1948), I made an unsuccessful attempt to unseat
him, with the agreement (initially} of my two colleagues.

In 1955 a beginning was made by the Eden Government to get
some improvement in the machinery of the defence organisation.
But the Minister of Defence was not then given the power of decision
that is essential, nor had he a Chief of Staff. It was not until 1957 that
the matter was tackled energetically. In January of that year the
Macmillan Government gave a clear directive to the new Minister of
Defence (Duncan Sandys), telling him what he must do and giving
him full powers to do it. His first task was to formulate, in the light
of strategic needs, a new defence policy which would ensure a sub
stantial reduction in expenditure and in man-power, and to prepare a
plan for re-shaping and re-organising the Armed Forces in accord
ance with that policy. He was given authority to give decisions on all
matters of policy affecting the size, shape, organisation and disposition
of the Armed Forces, their equipment and supply (including defence
research and development) and their pay and conditions of service.
He was also given powers of decision on matters of Service adminis-

446 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

tration or appointments which in his opinion were of special impor
tance. Furthermore, when a Service Minister or the Minister of Supply
wished to make proposals to the Prime Minister, the Defence Com
mittee or the Cabinet on any matter within the scope of the new
powers of the Minister of Defence, the approach was to be made
through the latter. And finally, the Minister of Defence was to have
a Chief of Staff responsible to him direct; this Chief of Staff was to
be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

CHAPTER 3 1

Beginnings of Defence Co-Operation
in Europe

WHEN i WENT to the War Office in July 1946 I discovered that
there was no clear conception of British strategy in a major
war, nor did my colleagues on the Chiefs of Staff Committee
consider that we should produce a paper on the subject just at present.
I did not agree, and we had some discussion about it. In the end the
War Office produced a paper defining the strategy, and on the 25th
July I submitted it to the Chiefs of Staff (see Chapter 27). The main
feature of the paper was that we must build up the strength of our
potential allies in Europe, and thus establish a strong Western bloc
which would protect us all against another invasion from the East
We ourselves must be prepared and organised to fight on the mainland
of Europe alongside our allies, with all that that entailed.

So far as I am aware this was the first attempt in British circles to
get agreement that we must fight in continental Europe in the event
of war. I was unable to get my two colleagues to agree and, as I was
then a "new boy" in Whitehall, I did not force the issue at that time
(July 1946)— being much occupied with other matters.

The scene now changes to December 1947. The Foreign Ministers
of the occupying Powers in Germany had been engaged in a confer
ence in London on the subject of that country, and it became obvious
that no agreement with Russia could be reached. When I arrived
back from my African tour, Ernie Bevin sent for me (on the 2;jrd
December 1947) and said that he had suggested to the Foreign Minis
ter of France (M. Bidault) that the time had come to begin the
formation of a Federation or Union in Western Europe, and if possible
to bring the Americans into it. He added that Britain and France must
first agree on the military strategy, and staff talks to that end should

447

448 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

therefore take place. He had in mind to initiate staff talks with the
Americans on a unilateral basis, but not until we had cleared our
own minds and discussed the problem of Western European defence
with the French.

On the initiative of the Foreign Office, General Revers, Chief of
Staff of the French Army, was invited to London and I had long talks
with him on the whole problem. Meanwhile Bevin pushed ahead with
the project of a "Western Union/' His plan was as follows:

(a) To begin by concerting an Anglo-French Treaty with the
Benelux nations (Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg). In fact,
to build up the Western Union by bringing in Britain and
France.

(b) Having done that, to consider how best to associate it in a
wider alliance with the other non-Communist States, notably
Scandinavia and Italy.

He then approached General Marshall, Secretary of State in Presi
dent Truman's Administration, who warmly welcomed the idea of a
political and economic union of the Western European and Mediter
ranean countries on the lines suggested. Encouraged by this, Mr. Bevin
suggested that we should now begin private talks with the Americans,
with a view that they might eventually join a wider alliance. This was
not agreed by the Americans. They were not prepared to face up to
Congress at that time on the question of a military commitment to
fight in Europe.

My view on all these matters was that, before we ourselves began
talking with other people, we must first formulate our own ideas on
the overall strategy of the United Kingdom in the event of war in
Europe, leading to global war. I said that the Chiefs of Staff should
produce an agreed paper on the subject; I was willing to start the ball
rolling by submitting at once a paper giving the War Office views.
This was not agreed; the Joint Planners were already producing a
paper for the Chiefs of Staff and we must wait for that It duly
arrived. They had considered three courses of action in Europe:

1. An air strategy.

2. A Continental strategy.

3. A semi-Continental strategy, involving holding Spain and
Portugal and liberating Europe by an offensive through the
Pyrenees.

The paper dismissed the Continental strategy in a few lines and the
choice was left between the air strategy and the Pyrenees strategy.

I blew right up, saying that I disagreed completely with the con
clusions of the report. What was meant by the expression "the best
strategy appears to be the air strategy"? We must defend Western

Beginnings of Defence Co-Operation in Europe 449

Europe, not liberate it; if we allowed it to be overrun from the East,
there would be all too little to liberate.

I said the paper demonstrated once more the futility of letting the
Joint Planners write papers on vitally important subjects without
proper guidance from the Chiefs of Staff. I then said I would submit
a paper containing my own views by the next day. My paper was
dated the soth January 1948 and in it I said:

"We must agree that, if attacked, the nations of the Western
Union will hold the attack as far to the east as possible. We must
make it very clear that Britain will play her full part in this strategy
and will support the battle with the fullest possible weight of our
land, air and naval power.

Unless this basic point in our strategy is agreed, and is accepted
whole-heartedly by Britain, the Western Union can have no hope
of survival, and Britain would then be in the gravest danger."

I discussed the paper with my two colleagues on the 2nd February.
They disagreed, as I had expected. The Chief of the Air Staff and the
First Sea Lord both lined up firmly against embarking on a land cam
paign in Continental Europe. They argued that it was militarily and
economically impossible to do this, and further that it was useless to
discuss our own European strategy until we knew what the Americans
would do. I replied that in the past we had twice gone to war without
knowing "what the Americans would do," and on both occasions they
had finally followed our lead. Maybe they would do so again. In any
case we must do our duty, whatever the Americans did. The meeting
broke up in disorder! But not before I had forced a decision that my
paper should go up to the Prime Minister.

The conference with him took place on the 4th February 1948. I
said it would be mighty difficult to achieve an effective Western
Union if we could not promise support on land in the event of war.
The Prime Minister then weighed in strongly against a commitment
to send our Army to the Continent. I replied that we already had an
Army there, the British Army of the Rhine. Did he propose we should
withdraw it (through Dunkirk!) if the Russians attacked? Such action
was unthinkable. Atdee was then counter-attacked by Ernie Bevin,
and curiously enough also by A. V. Alexander, each of whom sup
ported me in his own way. It was finally agreed to consider the impli
cations of the strategy I advocated, including the effect on the shape
and size of our armed forces consequent on the adoption of such a
strategy. At any rate I had routed the Pyrenean strategists!

Much planning activity then began and continued during March
and April 1948. I continued to "put over** my views to all and sundry
and to build up belief in the Western Union. I was convinced of the
essential need to fight a campaign in Western Europe, whether the

450 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

emergency came in 1948, or ten or even twenty years later. ITie need
was therefore to examine the method by which such a campaign could
be fought.

I argued on the following lines. France and the Benelux countries
had little military value at that time; their forces, and particularly
their land forces, must be reorganised on the right lines and imbued
with the spirit to resist aggression. This would happen only if the
Governments of the Western Union gave a clear lead by ordering
that, whatever situation might arise, any Russian aggression would be
met and resisted with all the strength and means available. All must
fight with whatever was available. As time went on, the military
capabilities of the Western Powers would increase. Unless the doctrine
of full and active resistance to any Russian threat to Western Europe
was adopted, then the Western Union might just as well close down.
I said that of course we needed American help; but unless that country
was convinced that all would fight whatever the situation, we would
not get her help— nor would we deserve it.

My great point was that if France or the Benelux countries suspected
that the British troops then in Germany were to be withdrawn in the
event of war, there would be no hope of our bolstering them up to
play their part. The nations of Continental Europe had been occupied
by the Germans in the war and were now struggling to recover. What
they needed most was inspired leadership. Britain must put her foot
in Europe and provide that leadership. If we held back, France and
the Benelux countries and Western Germany would all collapse
against the growing Communist pressure from the east—and we would
then lose the peace.

I was, of course, doing exactly what Smuts had told me I should
do when I lunched with him in London in May 1944 (see Chapter 13).
But I do not think I had his remarks in mind. I was doing it because
it was so obviously the only right and proper course of action. It all
bore good fruit. At a conference with the Minister of Defence on the
loth May 1948 I got agreement "on the essential need of fighting a
campaign in Western Europe," with all that that decision entailed.
This was a great triumph.

The situation in Europe deteriorated rapidly during the first half
of 1948. I had won agreement that we would fight in Europe if the
need arose; it had been a hard fight which had lasted over four months.
Now something more was needed— a proper set-up for effective com
mand and control of all the forces involved. The hard facts of war
were that without such an organisation, you merely suffered disasters,
A proper set-up in the realm of command would also put us in the
way of solving other problems, such as the infusion of a fighting spirit,
the national organisations which were to produce the forces required,
and so on. Many questions remained to be answered, e.g.:

Beginnings of Defence Co-Operation in Europe 451

Who would take command of the land armies in Europe?

Who would decide how the armies should be grouped with regard
to the geographical features of the ground?

Who would decide where the left flank should rest, or the right
flank, or where the line must be strong and where a chance can be
taken?

Who would decide what strength must be held in reserve for
counter-attack?

Who would weld the armies of the West into an effective fighting
machine?

The answer to all these questions was the same— there was no one.

On the ist June 1948 I put these points to my colleagues but got
little response. The First Sea Lord did not think the matter was very
urgent and reckoned that possibly something analogous to the old
COSSAC organisation might do the trick. I asked how an interna
tional committee of staff officers sitting in London could be of the
slightest use in solving the problems I had raised. In the end the
matter was referred to the Joint Planners for investigation! Time went
on and by the 23rd June we were still arguing the toss, the majority
view inclining towards a planning authority in London similar to the
old COSSAC. I gave my opinion on this point of view in no uncertain
voice, saying that there must be a clear-cut and simple set-up for
effective command and control of the forces of the Western Union,
and that we must create the organisation at once.

On the 24th June 1948 the Russians began the blockade of West
Berlin. The effect in London was immediate. On the 28th June the
Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Government that the most effec
tive way to convince both the Russians and the nations of Western
Europe of our determination would be to appoint a Supreme Allied
Commander for the forces of the Western Union. But at a conference
later that day the First Sea Lord insisted that the proposal to create a
Supreme Allied Commander was merely a political gesture in connec
tion with the Berlin crisis— which, he said, already showed signs of
easing. He again stood out for a form of COSSAC. The bonhomie was
not very good when the conference ended!

However, after the meeting I got hold of the Chief of the Air Staff
(Tedder). We had seen a lot of hard fighting together in the war,
and he agreed with me that the establishment of a proper command
organisation had now become a serious and urgent matter. Some
further conferences took place and on the gth July the Government
agreed that we needed to establish:

(a) A Western Union Defence Committee, composed of Ministers
of Defence.

(b) A Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee.

452 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

(c) A command organisation; the actual form of the command
authority to be decided later.

So yet another "Battle of Whitehall" had been won, but only after
the direct intervention of the Russians in Berlin.

Moreover, there were still some "mopping up*' operations to be
undertaken. On the 1st September 1948 I told the other two Chiefs
of Staff that there was an urgent need for some one man to give a firm
lead in military matters to the Continental nations of the Western
Union. It was necessary to agree on what was needed, to get them
to do something about it, and to co-ordinate their actions. The two
vital points were, first the fighting spirit and the determination to
fight for the defence of their home lands, and, secondly, the organsa-
tion to produce the necessary forces for the purpose. To my astonish
ment the Chief of the Air Staff raised difficulties. He thought that all
we needed was a Land C.-in-C. and an Air C.-in-C.; they would take
all the action required, and the need for some one man to direct their
activities was not established. However on this occasion the First Sea
Lord (Sir John Cunningham), who had in the past always opposed
practically everything I had suggested, agreed with me on all counts;
he weighed anchor and rammed Tedder— sinking him! It was Cun
ningham's last appearance, since he was to leave the Admiralty on
retirement I was grateful to him.

Events were now reaching a climax.

On the 2Oth September 1948 I was summoned to see the Minister
of Defence at 12.45 P-111- T^6 hour was unusual and there was specu
lation in the War Office about the reason for the summons. Some
thought I was to be ticked off for my behaviour at the meeting on
the loth September, at which I had referred to the parlous condition
of the Army. Others thought that the Minister had heard about my
attempt on the isth July to unseat him, as described in Chapter 30.
But all prophets were confounded^ Mr. Alexander offered me the
appointment of Chairman of the Western Union Commanders-in-
Chief Committee.

The next day the Minister met the Chiefs of Staff in Committee.
He told us that with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, the
Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Lord
President of the Council, he intended to propose the appointment of
a Chairman of the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief . He intended
to nominate me for that appointment.

I replied that if it was the unanimous wish of the Government, of
my colleagues on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the other Govern
ments of the Western Union that I should take up the appointment,
then I accepted— indeed I could not refuse. I made, however, one
stipulation. That was that I must remain a British officer and on the

Beginnings of Defence Co-Operation in Europe 453

books of the War Office; I had been looked after by the War Office
for forty years, and I was not prepared to have my personal affairs
transferred to some international organisation. This stipulation was
agreed. In subsequent discussion, the question was mentioned of a
Supreme Commander if war broke out I said that if this happened
during my tenure of office of Chairman, I would at once step down.
In the event of another World War the Supreme Commander in
Europe must be an American officer, and it would make things easier
for me if it could be agreed that I would never be considered for the
top post. This was agreed.

On the 27th September 1948 my appointment was unanimously
approved by the Defense Ministers of the Five Powers of the Western
Union, meeting in Paris. It was announced in the Press on the 3rd
October.

At last we had achieved that for which I had been fighting— a
decision that in the event of war the British Army would fight on the
Continent of Europe, and something concrete in the way of a Com
mand organisation. But it had taken months of intense effort, and I
then found myself given the task of organising the details.

I often think that A. V. Alexander "took his coat off7 to ensure that
I got the job. I must have been an awful nuisance to him during my
time as C.LG.S. Socially— off parade as it were— we were very good
friends. But in defence matters I just couldn't get on with him. It
was probably my fault

I have made it more than clear that by now there were plenty of
people anxious to see the back of me. When I recall those days I often
think that Whitehall was my least happy theatre of war. It did not
provide "my sort of battle." I have never minded making myself an
infernal nuisance if it produced the desired result. I don't know in
this case whether it did— sufficiently. It is true that I managed to force
agreement on certain fundamental issues, but only after terrific
battles. And as a result of it all I was pretty unpopular when I left
Whitehall to become an international soldier.

CHAPTER 32

The Unity of the West

BEFORE closing this book of memoirs I must make clear my
point of view about the future— a sort of final testament. In fact,
I want to take this opportunity to state categorically— as I pull
out from active employment— how I think the land should be made to
lie. This may involve a change of "tone" from the rest of the book,
but that will not matter— provided that I explain clearly what is in my
mind. The title of this chapter indicates very simply the goal which
has to be reached if the Western Alliance is to flourish; we have a long
road to travel before we reach it.

To understand the attempts to achieve unity and co-operation in
Western Europe in the post-war years we must go back to 1945. When
the German war ended in May of that year, the nations of Europe
began to drift apart. Later, however, a number of treaties were made
as the beginning of collective security in Europe. The first was the
Treaty of Dunkirk in March 1947 between France and Britain; this
was aimed expressly against renewed German aggression. The last
and most important was the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

By the spring of 1945 many of the nations of Europe were in a bad
way economically. It soon became clear that outside help would be
needed. And speed was necessary too, since Russian Communism
was beginning to spread westwards— where fertile soil existed for this
insidious disease.

This was realised in the United States and on the 5th June 1947, at
Harvard University, General Marshall made his famous speech about
aid for Europe— known thenceforward as Marshall Aid. This offer was
seized by Ernest Bevin with both hands, and he organised a confer
ence in Paris the next month, July, to work out the details. At that

454

The Unity of the West 455

conference the Russians said that they did not want Marshall Aid for
themselves or for any of their satellite countries, although General
Marshall had made it clear that it could be given to all the countries
of Europe and some of the satellites had started by welcoming it
This was a clear indication that the Russians did not want Europe to
recover. They preferred a disrupted and dismembered Europe; recov
ery might impede the spread of Communism. I regard that date,
July 1947, as an important one in the post-war era, since it was then
that the Russians definitely showed their true hand— beyond any doubt.

However, notwithstanding the Russian refusal, Marshall Aid was
made legal in the United States on the yd April 1948, and the Mission
to implement the scheme was set up in June 1948 under Averell
Harriman. The free nations of Europe owe a very great debt of grati
tude to the U.S.A. for that aid— which was freely given and which
has contributed so much to their recovery. The plan was intended to
provide aid for economic reconstruction and was visualised as being
operative only for a limited number of years. Marshall Aid under that
name has now ceased, but the plan still continues under the title of
Foreign Aid.

When the Russians refused Marshall Aid in 1947 the cold war,
which had been going on for some time, took a turn for the worse.
A group of nations in Western Europe than began to get anxious about
the growing threat from the East, and the need for unity was realised
in order to be able to stand up to the threat. Benelux (Belgium,
Netherlands, Luxembourg) was the first organisation to be formed,
the treaty being limited initially to economic measures. Then the need
for some wider organisation became apparent and the United King
dom and France joined with Benelux to form the Western Union—
which was brought into being by the Treaty of Brussels, signed on
the 17th March 1948, This treaty was at first also limited to economic
matters, to the furtherance of democratic principles, and so on.

Soon after the Treaty of Brussels was signed the Russians began,
in June 1948, the blockade of West Berlin which was finally defeated
by the tremendous feat of the air-lift. This created great tension in the
Western world, and considerable alarm; plans for the defence of the
West were considered necessary and Defence Ministers and Service
Chiefs of the five Brussels Treaty nations met to consider man-power
and equipment problems. Then in September 1948 it was decided to
create a Western Union Defence Organisation which would prepare
plans for combined action in case of attack. I was appointed perma
nent Chairman of the Land, Naval, and Air Commanders-in-Chief
Committee of the Western Union. We set up our headquarters in
Fontainebleau, the short name for our combined headquarters, being
UNIFORCE.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic talks had been going

456 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

on about the need for a single mutual defence system, which would
include and supersede the Brussels Treaty. It was realised in the U.S.A.
and in Canada that, if real security was the aim, they themselves and
certain other nations must be brought in— in order that the Atlantic
Ocean could be made secure for getting help to Europe. Preliminary
talks had begun in Washington in July 1948, shortly after the start of
the blockade of West Berlin, and they continued throughout the year.
Finally on the 4th April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed,
by which twelve nations joined together in a defensive alliance to
maintain international peace and security and to promote stability and
well-being in the North Atlantic area. It was called the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, known for short as NATO.

As planning proceeded it became obvious that the Western Union
military organisation must be absorbed into the NATO set-up— and
this was done. Then on the 2nd April 1951 General Eisenhower
assumed operational control of the military forces of the defensive
alliance. Later, on the i8th February 1952 Greece and Turkey joined
NATO and we became fourteen nations. The last to join NATO was
the Federal Republic of Germany, in May 1955, and we then became,
as we remain today, fifteen nations.

We must now return to the early days of the Western Union and
see what happened when the nations of Western Europe were required
to co-operate closely together in defence matters. They soon found
it was going to be difficult; I sometimes wondered if it would ever
be possible.

When I was appointed Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Com
mittee, I went to live in France— near Fontainebleau. My colleagues
and I travelled all over Western Europe examining the problem. We
made plans to defend the West against aggression. But none of the
plans could be carried out because the nations were unwilling to
produce the necessary forces— properly trained, with a sound com
mand structure and a reliable communication system. It was the more
difficult as there was no true unity, and no nation was willing to make
any sacrifice of sovereignty for the common good.

The emphasis was on economic recovery. It was not understood
that economic strength without military strength is useless; both are
necessary, with a proper balance between the two. Military strength
is necessary in order to have power behind the politics; power is
essential when dealing with the Communist bloc. I quickly saw how
difficult it was to obtain economic fusion and to build up military
strength until the political association between the group of nations
concerned had first been clearly defined and agreed. It was one thing
for a number of Foreign Ministers to sit round a table and sign a
Treaty, followed by luncheons and dinners at which sentiments of
friendship and unity were exchanged. It was quite another thing to get

The Unity of the West 457

Governments to do anything about it, as the Ministers very soon
found when they got back to their own countries.

An intense national feeling existed among the nations of Conti
nental Europe; one had to live over there, as I did, to appreciate it
Their countries had all been occupied by the Germans and their
armed forces disbanded. When the war ended they had to begin to
build up their forces again from scratch; in many cases their senior
officers had spent the war either in London or in German prison camps.
There was a tremendous lack of knowledge about the land of organisa
tion needed to produce the armed forces suitable for modern war.
Few of the generals had seen modem war. We were asking the
nations to get their affairs so organised as regards man-power, pro
duction, and mobilisation that they could take the strain easily and
quickly if a war crisis should arise.

This involved clear thinking on the subject of armed forces, and
these had to be organised within the limits of financial possibilities.
To do this economically, joint defence within the alliance would be
necessary. But each nation wanted everything. It was not understood,
and is not today, that if every nation wants self-sufficiency there is
little value to be got from the alliance. Then again, money was tight.
The nations wanted peace above all. I used to tell the Governments
that peace in the modern world cannot be assured without military
power, and this costs money. That fact might be sad, but it is true.
Peace was, in fact, a by-product. The real need was for freedom and
justice— freedom within the law—with a right of every man to live his
own life. A nation which worked for these things, and was prepared
to risk a war to defend the Western way of life, would have peace.
What was the use of peace if you lost your soul to Communism? I
reckon the Prime Ministers of Western Europe got pretty fed up with
me in those days. They were never allowed to escape from the prac
tical realities of the problem that faced them about the defence of
their peoples and territories against aggression. It was a very frustrat
ing time. It was necessary to become international, and few could. I
used to say that though I was of course British by birth, it was my
duty to draw my sword and die for France, and for the other nations
in Continental Europe, just as much as for Britain.

After a few months I came to the conclusion that drastic steps
would have to be taken if we were to organise any sort of defence at
all in Western Europe. Our defensive lay-out must include Western
Germany. But the forces available made this impossible; it was
doubtful if we could even hold the line of the Rhine. I therefore went
to see Ernest Bevin in January 1949 and I asked him to set in motion
measures which would aim at bringing Western Germany into the
Western Union, and ultimately into the wider North Atlantic Organisa
tion which was then under discussion. Bevin was somewhat startled.

458 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

I pointed out to him that the Western Union countries had neither
the man-power nor the resources to build up the necessary military
forces without "busting" themselves economically and financially. Our
plans were based on conventional weapons and we would need strong
forces if we were to match those which could be deployed against us
by Russia. Without the Germans, we could not hope to produce those
forces. In November 1949 I went to the United States and preached
the same doctrine to the national Chiefs of Staff, to President Truman,
and to General Eisenhower— who was then President of Columbia
University. My argument was that existing forces, or those which could
be foreseen, were wholly inadequate to give effect to a "forward
strategy"— one which would aim at defending the whole of Western
Germany as a necessary part of Western Europe.

The long struggle to get Western Germany (now the Federal Ger
man Republic) integrated politically and militarily into the Western
camp is well known. The pace quickened in June 1950 when the
Korean war began. I reported that month to the governments of the
Western Union, in writing, that:

"As things stand today and in the foreseeable future, there
would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in
Western Europe if ever we were attacked by the Russians.'*

Following on this statement, the problem of German participation
in Western defence was discussed in the NATO Council in September
1950, and met with heavy opposition from the French. There will be
no need to remind readers of the proposal of the Pleven Government
in October 1950 for the formation of a European Army in which there
would be <ca complete fusion of all the human and material elements"
of the proposed force. Such a conception was, of course, utterly im
practicable. The NATO nations argued the toss continuously for nearly
four years, and the arguments finally ceased only with the rejection of
the plan by the French National Assembly on the 30th August 1954.
In the end, Federal Germany joined NATO as a full member for all
purposes on the gth May 1955— over six years after I had made the
approach to Mr. Bevin in January 1949. It had been a long up-hill
struggle.

Then there was another problem, involving the United Kingdom.

After I had been on the job for a few months I realised that there
was deep suspicion of the British in political and military circles in
Continental Europe. There were three main causes:

First. The United Kingdom would not state firmly the contribution
it proposed to make on land in Continental Europe in the event of war.
Ministers would talk about the main contribution of Britain as being
air and sea power. This cut no ice at all in Europe.

The Unity of the West 459

Secondly. In defence discussions, British delegations referred contin
ually to the vital importance of the "security of the U.K. Base'' if ever
war broke out again in Europe.

Thirdly. British delegations continually stressed the importance of the
Middle East, and never the importance of Western Europe. Nobody
knew the relative priority they proposed as between the two areas.
My view was that you could lose the Middle East and still win the
war, although you might have to re-conquer it before you finally
won. The same could not be said in the case of Western Europe.

These three factors gave the impression on the Continent that the
British were concerned with a battle in Western Europe only in so
far as it would provide a cushion for the defence of Britain. Hence
Continental nations were deeply suspicious of British intentions. This
suspicion was greatest in France, where it was commonly hinted that
the British would stage another "Dunkirk** for any forces they had
in Europe.

I became so alarmed at this attitude that I had a meeting with the
British Chiefs of Staff on the 2nd December 1948. I told them that
French morale would not recover unless that nation could be con
vinced that Britain would contribute a fair quota of land forces to the
defence of Western Europe. There was already the British Army of
the Rhine in Germany but it was not battle-worthy and all units were
under strength. Would the British Chiefs of Staff recommend to the
Government that in the event of war the British Rhine Army would
at once be reinforced? Only if this were done would there be effective
resistance. Without it, the battle would be lost before it ever began.

The British Chiefs of Staff would not play. They considered that
if war broke out in the near future, before the Continental nations had
built up their forces, any additional forces would be lost. I could not
but agree. But the factor of morale demanded some reinforcement.
I would not insult them by asking for a reinforcement of one battalion.
Would they recommend a reinforcement of one infantry brigade
group? They would not

I then wrote a paper on the subject and discussed it with the British
Chiefs of Staff on the 5th January 1949. I pointed out the suspicion in
France about British intentions. I agreed that the reinforcement of
the British Rhine Army by one infantry brigade group would not
affect the battle to any degree; but the promise of such reinforcement
was the only way to convince our Continental allies of our determina
tion to fight alongside them. The C.LG.S. (Field-Marshal Slim)
swayed opinion to my viewpoint, and the Chiefs of Staff agreed to
recommend to the Government that a reinforcement of one infantry
brigade group should be sent to the British Rhine Army in the event
of war. But the recommendation contained so many arguments against

460 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

the proposal that the Government had no difficulty in turning it
down— which it did on the loth January 1949. This very quickly be
came known to the nations in Western Europe; it resulted in immense
harm to the cause of Western unity, and I doubt if we have ever
properly recovered from it

We cannot wonder at the Continental attitude. The suspicion is
directed against the Americans just as much as against the British. In
two world wars Europe has seen the United States watching from the
touchline during the first two years of the war; the European nations
do not want this to happen again.

In spite of all the troubles and frustrations which I have outlined,
General Eisenhower, on arrival in Europe, found that the Western
Union Command Organisation had already studied the European
problem, and had prepared plans which could serve as a basis for
future work. We had done our best in the face of every conceivable
difficulty and obstruction. But the forces available were still totally
inadequate for our purpose. However, all-in-all we had laid solid
foundations on the military side.

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the direct
descendant of UNIFORCE, was opened in Paris on the 2nd April
1951* with General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. I joined bin?
as Deputy Supreme Commander.

He had given me the following directive on the 12th March 1951:

"I trust that you realize how delighted I am that the British
Government has agreed to make you available for duty in SHAPE,
in which you are hereby designated as the Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander. In this capacity, you will have a most important
role to play in the development of an integrated force for the
defence of Europe, which is our objective.

You will act, during any temporary incapacity of mine, as Su
preme Allied Commander, Europe, under the authority invested
in me by the North Atlantic Council. Your principal normal duty
will be to further the organisation, equipping, training, and readi
ness of National Forces contemplated for later allocation to this
command, and through and in co-operation with subordinate com
manders, to perform a similar function for troops already allocated
to SHAPE.

These duties will require your direct contact, in my name, with
the several governments, military staffs and agencies of NATO
nations, and with principal subordinate headquarters established
by competent orders of SHAPE. I suggest that you acquaint your
self with the terms of the directive issued to me by the Standing
Group, particularly those provisions that authorise direct com
munication between this headquarters and the several govern-

The Unity of the West 461

ments of NATO. For assisting you in this work, the entire SHAPE
staff, through its Chief of Staff, will be at your disposal. Any execu
tive instructions to subordinate commanders are, of course, to be
issued through the staff."

I should explain that the Standing Group is a small executive sub
committee of the Military Committee of NATO. It is in permanent
session in Washington.

From the start Eisenhower was determined that all staff officers at
SHAPE must forget they belonged to a particular nation or Service.
All were to be international and inter-Service. The headquarters was
to be bi-lingual, all work being done in English and French. He
never quite succeeded in the second objective; SHAPE is still very
much an English-speaking headquarters and an officer who cannot
speak English (or understand American) does not achieve much.

In peace-time SHAPE is occupied mainly with the problem of
readiness for war. This subject embraces the organisation of the active
and reserve forces of the NATO nations, their mobilisation, provision
of equipment, training, logistic support, communications, and Air
Defence system.

In war SHAPE would leave the handling of tactical battles to the
subordinate commanders-in-chief, devoting itself mainly to strategical
direction, forward planning, intelligence, logistics, and the control of
the air and missile arm.

Conferences are held in English and in French. Papers and signals
are in both languages; which are taught to all ranks in the head
quarters. All work is on a strictly international basis. For instance, it
is possible to find a Turkish Air Force officer working on a problem
concerning the lines of communication between England and Scandi
navia for the support of the Norwegian Army.

I have served at SHAPE under four Supreme Commanders— pos
sibly the only officer who has done so.

Eisenhower was the first of them. As time went on he became very
fully occupied with the Presidential campaign which loomed ahead in
1952, and he left a good deal to General Gruenther— his Chief of
Staff. He had no qualms about this, nor had anyone else. Al Gruenther
was a Chief of Staff par excellence, most able, with a quick and clear
brain, and very approachable. At that time there was a crusading
spirit in the atmosphere at SHAPE, which took much of its inspiration
from Eisenhower. Under him and Gruenther, SHAPE soon developed
into a very happy headquarters. Then Eisenhower retired from the
United States Army and left us; he had decided to run for President.
I knew that he was being pressed by the Republican Party to run,
and we used to have long talks on the subject. He tells a story of how
I changed my mind about it— which, he says, is not my habit It

462 The Memoks of Field-Marshal Montgomery

happened this way. I had told him he must not go; we needed him
at SHAPE, and Europe needed him too. Later, European defence and
co-operation began to run into difficulties; we seemed to be in the
"doldrums/* becalmed in an area where nothing much happened
except an occasional squall. I of course was well used to this, having
by now been in the game since 1948. Then one day I walked into
Ike's office and said, "Ike, I've changed my mind. You must go back
and run for President. European co-operation is in the doldrums and
the only man who can get things moving is the President of the
United States. You can do more good to us in the White House than
you can here." He went But we had to pay the price.

General Ridgway arrived in Paris on the 2/th May 1952, and took
over from Eisenhower on the soth May. He was a fine battlefield
general and had done magnificently with the U.S. Eighth Army in
Korea at a most critical time. I knew him well; he had served under
me as a Divisional and Corps Commander in the campaign in North-
West Europe from Normandy to Berlin. I knew he was not the right
man to succeed Eisenhower and I opposed the appointment, both to
members of the NATO Council and to the British Chiefs of Staff.

I wanted Al Gruenther to succeed Eisenhower; so did most others.
But the British Chiefs of Staff said Gruenther had never commanded
anything in his life, and they asked for Ridgway. The United States
Chiefs of Staff agreed. Ridgway didn't fit into the set-up; his merits
as a fine battlefield commander were wasted in a role which didn't
suit his temperament. He surrounded himself with an all-American
personal staff; we got the feeling that there was too much "United
States Eyes Only" in the headquarters. Morale began to decline. The
crusading spirit disappeared. There was the sensation, difficult to
describe, of a machine which was running down.

Ridgway left Europe on the nth July 1953 and Al Gruenther be
came our new Supreme Commander. He is a most human and sympa
thetic person, very popular, and a quick worker. He soon eliminated
the over-Americanisation which had tended to distort the atmosphere
of the headquarters. Under him and his brilliant Chief of Staff (Gen
eral Schuyler) SHAPE regained its former morale and prestige. Al
Gruenther did a terriffic job in Europe and at SHAPE, first as Chief
of Staff to Eisenhower and Ridgway, and finally as Supreme Com
mander himself— a total period of nearly six years. I became devoted
to him and to his wife. The letter he wrote me when he left SHAPE
is one which I shall treasure all my life. Here it is, dated the igth
November 1956.

*Dear Monty,

It has been a tremendous comfort to me to have you here
during the period I have been the Supreme Commander. You

The Unity of the West 463

have never failed me. Your loyalty and your integrity of character
have always been unchallengeable. The contribution you have
made to our unity has been a major one.

For all of these things I am deeply grateful to you. Your role
in the NATO cause has placed the entire Free World in your debt

I wish you all possible success for the future. May you even
climb higher— although how that can take place, I cannot imagine.

A thousand thanks for everything, Monty. My service with
you will always be one of my fondest memories.

With warm regard—as ever— Al."

Gruenther was succeeded in November 1956 by General Norstad,
a brilliant officer of the United States Air Force— a very firm friend,
and I gladly served on under him.

Under Eisenhower's guidance, and that of his successors, our mili
tary strength gradually increased; furthermore, the progress of science
gave us nuclear weapons in ever-increasing quantity, making us all
the stronger. Two developments then began to influence our strategy.

First, the nuclear weapon gave us the power to destroy to an extent
never before envisaged. That power could be developed into such a
powerful offensive weapon that it was clear that no profit from war
could come to any nation; an aggressor nation might inflict tremendous
destruction on Western civilisation but would itself suffer equal or
even greater damage. Here then was a new key to our strategy, the
nuclear deterrent— an offensive nuclear capability which could be
launched by aircraft and missiles from air, sea and land, and which it
would be almost impossible to knock out by a surprise attack provided
it was suitably dispersed.

Secondly, the NATO nations had been building up conventional
forces with which to defeat an enemy attack. It became clear to me
that if we relied only on such forces, then we could never match the
strength which could be brought against us; to do that would need
greatly increased forces, and this would "step up" defence budgets
to a degree which nations were not prepared to face. The only alter
native was to state publicly that if we were attacked we would use
all the resources at our disposal against the aggressor, including the
nuclear weapon— even if that weapon was not used against us in the
first instance. After some discussion with General Gruenther, I said
this at a talk I gave in Paris on the 24th May 1954, and repeated the
statement at a lecture which I gave at the Royal United Service
Institution in London on the 2ist October 1954. There were the
usual questions about me in the House of Commons, But in the end
the NATO Council had to agree that all our operational plans could
be based on doing what I had said— it being laid down that the final
decision to use the nuclear weapon was to be kept in political hands.

464 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

This may not seem altogether satisfactory to Service Chiefs. But there
are many other types of conflict in which we might become involved,
ranging right down the scale to so-called police actions in undeveloped
countries. A commander should use whatever strength is necessary
to deal with the problem that confronts him, and no more. World
opinion today is such that before using the nuclear weapon he must
decide whether to do so is strategically desirable, tactically profitable,
and politically acceptable. Political leaders in their turn must realise
that if they retain in their own hands the power to use the nuclear
weapon, the slightest delay in agreeing to the military demands for its
use in an all-out global war could result in much of the NATO
territory being overrun by enemy land forces.

As time went on our strategy therefore gradually became to use
the nuclear weapon at once if we are attacked; and that is how we
stand today, in 1958. It was a big change to go over to basing our
defence organisation on nuclear weapons; but it had to be, and I
suppose I played some part in bringing it about. I have always thought
that the Russians made up their minds from the very beginning they
would only fight a "cheap" war. Our tactics will now make a war
very expensive for them, since they would suffer great damage and
much loss of life— equally as great as we would. Therefore they will
not attack us, so long as we remain strong and retain the ability to
react instantly with nuclear weapons.

There was no alternative to this deterrent strategy except an agree
ment on disarmament, and this we could not get. We now have the
deterrent and it is a good one; it has prevented a major war. But it is
doubtful whether the deterrent is also a good defence. One thing
cannot be denied— we have no sure defence in a major war in which
nuclear weapons are not used. A third major war need not necessarily
be a nuclear war ( gas was not used in the second World War, although
both sides had large stocks). The crux of this matter can be expressed
very shortly— we have a good deterrent against war, but no sure de
fence if the deterrent fails and we are attacked.

There is one further point about the deterrent which should be
mentioned. Over the years confidence has been restored in Continental
Europe and there is slowly growing up a determination to resist
aggression with all the means at our disposal, even if this should lead
to nuclear attack against Western cities.

The overall deterrent against attack includes this sturdy determina
tion. There is also a growing consciousness that a nation must not
recoil from any sacrifice-however great it may be. This is right. For
the nation which sets itself a limit beyond which it will not go will
abandon the struggle when that limit is reached, and will then in
evitably succumb.

All these things have happened during the past ten years, since

The Unity of the West 465

1948, in spite of the frustrations and obstructions which we experi
enced in the early days. The sacrifices which have been made, financial
and otherwise, to build up military strength have prevented a third
World War; they have therefore been well worth while. But what are
we to do during the next ten years? And where are we going? This is
the problem we face in 1958 and certain beacon lights seem to me to
point the direction in which we should seek for the solution.

First, we must understand that Russia is just as frightened of attack
by the Western Alliance as we are of attack by her. She therefore has
her deterrent. Part of her overall security is the belt of satellite nations
in eastern Europe. Any move by the Western nations which suggested
that they might help the satellite countries to regain their freedom
would meet with instant counter-action by Russia. Similarly on our
part, if Russia should bring pressure to bear on any part of the NATO
area. It is a curious situation and fascinating to study— the deterrent
versus the deterrent.

Secondly, it is clear that the launching of war by Russia against
the Western Alliance can be considered unlikely in any future that
we can foresee, provided we do not reduce the overall deterrent
against attack which we have created. This qualification is important.
We have reached the stage where Russia has counted the cost of
armed aggression against the Western Alliance and has found it likely
to be too expensive for her— for the time being at any rate. She has
therefore re-aligned her policy. Her new policy aims to stir up the
countries of Asia against their former "imperialist" masters; it includes
the fomenting of Arab hatred for the Jews in the oil-producing and
oil-transit areas of the Middle East and of directing it "at one remove"
against the Powers which were dominant in that area before Hitler's
war. In this way Russia aims to outflank the NATO area and to
threaten its oil supplies in the Middle East. The new Russian policy
made considerable headway in 1956— succeeding in damaging the
good relations which existed between Britain and France and the
United States, not only on the immediate measures to be taken to
counter Russia's outflanking action but also over the appropriate long-
term policy to be pursued towards the Arab world. This Russian
success will go much farther unless the Western Alliance realises what
is going on and adjusts its policy and plans accordingly.

And thirdly, Service Chiefs must realise the general trend of West
ern political thought in 1958. Although confidence in our ability to
deter armed aggression, and determination to resist if we are attacked,
have been restored in the NATO area in Europe, there is nevertheless
a feeling that we should now examine the NATO military structure
and see whether we cannot get an equally good defence far more
cheaply— which, in my opinion, is definitely possible.

Then there is another point When the war ended in 1945 the

466 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

geographical and strategical position of the West vis-ti-vis the Eastern
bloc was good; today, 1958, it can only be described as bad. We
have lost our former positions in Indo-China, India, Palestine, Egypt,
the Sudan, and in much of North Africa. The Middle East is in a
disturbed state. Nationalism is in the ascendancy. It is true that we
have a United Nations Organisation to handle world problems, but
it is not united and not organised; perhaps it needs a new name. The
future of world civilisation really depends on the Western Alliance;
if that is neither united nor properly organised the future will indeed
be grim.

For these reasons, those NATO nations with world-wide commit
ments and responsibilities must consider carefully the strategical posi
tion of the entire free world, agreeing amongst themselves those areas
which must be retained in the Western camp at all costs, and giving
political backing to the nations responsible for such areas. All the
NATO nations must widen their horizon and cease to take a major
interest only in their own affairs. They must understand the possible
repercussions of events outside the NATO area— being prepared, and
ready for instant action, when such events threaten their own security.

Now that the main object, the prevention of war, has been achieved,
the time has come for a thorough overhaul of the whole NATO
organisation. We should begin by stating without any qualification
that the contribution made by NATO to the security of the free world
has been tremendous. There are two other regional organisations, the
Baghdad Pact and the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation.

Of the three, NATO is by far the most important; indeed, it is
the only answer to the political and military problems of the free
world. But we must not be complacent and think that the organisa
tion cannot be improved; there are many improvements which could
be made, making for greater efficiency, greater security, less waste and
far greater overall economy. At present (1958) NATO is in the dol
drums. It needs a roll of drums and a clarion call— to put its house
in order while the going is good. If it neglects to do so, NATO will
become ineffective in a few more years—like the United Nations
Organisation has become— and it could disintegrate.

The conference of Heads of Governments in Paris in December
!957 was assembled for the purpose of putting a new sense of unity
and determination into a hesitant NATO. It achieved only moderate
success and much still remains to be done. It is particularly necessary
that member nations should learn to look outwards at what is going
on in the world beyond the NATO area-and not just inwards at
their own parish pumps.

Let me indicate some of the more positive measures which, if taken,
would tend to make NATO more effective.

I have already stated that a major war can now be considered

The Unity of the West 467

unlikely—in fact, the "test match" (in American "the World Series")
is postponed indefinitely because of the deterrent strength of the
Western Alliance. But limited and cold war activities outside the
NATO area are likely to increase— what might be called "village
cricket" (in American "sand lot baseball"). These local matches on
overseas fields must be handled firmly so that they do not become
the forerunner of a test match; the major contribution of certain
selected nations to NATO defence could well be to produce forces
which are organised and equipped for these contests. In fact, national
contributions to NATO must now be balanced. First, direct contribu
tions to the deterrent in the NATO area to prevent a test match;
secondly, indirect contributions to handle local matches and preserve
peace outside die NATO area. We have reached the stage when,
provided the NATO machinery is reorganised and made more effec
tive, and the deterrent forces are properly organised and deployed,
the indirect contributions to NATO are becoming increasingly impor
tant. No European nation could be expected to make both direct and
indirect contributions of any significant size.

The politico-military structure of NATO needs a searching examina
tion; at present it is top-heavy, expensive, and does not work well.
The NATO Council is in permanent session in Paris, each nation
being represented by an ambassador; its military advisers, the Stand
ing Group (the executive body of the Military Committee of NATO),
are in Washington. How can two organisations co-operate closely and
efficiently if they are 3000 miles apart? If the Standing Group is
required at all it should be in Paris, alongside the permanent Council.
There is no organisation for the higher direction of any war in
which we might become engaged.

National organisations for producing the forces we need in peace
and war are unsound in the case of many Continental nations; they
are mostly based on the levee-en-masse system, which is out of date.
Simplicity and decision, two absolute essentials in war, have disap
peared from the NATO military organisation. We are producing
commanders trained in the art of compromise.

The staffs of the major headquarters have grown beyond all possible
peace-time needs; they should be ruthlessly pruned.

The output of paper is tremendous; so much time is taken with
reading it, that few officers have enough time to think; all work
suffers accordingly.

The high cost of defence is not being seriously tackled, except in
the United Kingdom— where the Defence White Papers of April 1957
(Outline of Future Policy) and of February 1958 (Britain's Contribu
tion to Peace and Security) are steps in the right direction.

There are many ways in which the overall cost to the NATO nations
can be reduced. One is that when the German contribution is complete

468 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

we should aim to get a proportion of the armed forces of the other
Continental nations back into their own countries, thus saving ex
penditure on foreign currency. It is always expensive to keep your
forces in another country. I exclude from this plan the forces of the
U.S.A., Britain and Canada; these nations must continue to maintain
some forces in Germany for the time being in order to give confidence,
but the size of their contingents is not now so important as formerly.

Then we must think sensibly about surprise. Total readiness to meet
a surprise attack at any time would mean very high defence budgets;
furthermore it is unnecessary. Surprise could of course be obtained by
air and missile attack only, but this means unlimited war— with the
certainty of devastating retaliation. Victory in war can come only
as a result of the maximum efforts of all land, sea, air and civilian
forces in truly joint operations; a nation which plans aggression must
know that unless it is ready for these operations before the first strike,
it may never be ready. The steps Russia would have to take before
launching unlimited war might not be mobilisation as we have known
it in the past; but she would have to take certain measures which
could not be hidden. Furthermore, no nation would risk general war
in a missile age unless it had an adequate defence against such
weapons; and today (1958) there is no known defence against the
ballistic missile.

Linked to this is the problem of mobilisation. Mobilisation as known
to us during the last two world wars looks archaic against the back
ground of nuclear war. The word brings to mind an entirely erroneous
picture— a picture portraying an effort spread over days, weeks, and
even months before completion. A new word is perhaps required for
mobilisation in a nuclear age. We need a system which is effective in
a matter of hours— following national radio warnings. It must not be
dependent on vulnerable communication systems. It must be based on
a decentralised method of call up and dispersed equipment depots.
It must be founded on a body of men and women all of whom know
in peace-time exactly where they go in war, and what they do.

It is clear that the whole question of mobilisation requires a new
look. We are not paying sufficient attention to this vitally important
part of national and allied defence.

A very efficient way to reduce defence expenditure would be to
have collective balanced forces for NATO as a whole, rather than on a
national or regional basis as at present. Indeed, only by so doing can
NATO develop integrated and effective armed forces which are within
our means in peace-time but which at die same time are adequate to
meet our requirements. It is an obvious necessity if we are to eradicate
waste, inefficiency and duplication. Another advantage of balanced
forces for NATO as a whole is that such a system would tend to bind
the nations more closely together, since they would be dependent on

The Unity of the West 469

each other; it would be joint defence in the true sense of the word.
Under such a scheme, each nation would be asked to produce those
forces most suited to its geographical location, its national character,
its economic situation, and so on— all working towards a balanced
whole. I first drew attention to this need in 1949, in the Western
Union, but practically no progress has been made since then. National
sensitivity is the trouble, and this is a great bar to progress. A further
trouble in the realm of defence is that nations don't trust each other;
no nation is willing to be dependent on another nation in the Alliance.
There is no doubt that when the threat of war lessened and fear began
to disappear, Western unity began to weaken,

It will be clear from what I have said that NATO is an organisa
tion in which there is a tremendous waste of money and effort, and a
great deal of unnecessary duplication. Much of the thinking is mud
dled and confused. The global aspect of defence is disregarded. De
fence problems have got into the hands of the Foreign Ministers;
these know little about the subject, and, furthermore, they are not
responsible for defence. There should be a NATO Defence Commit
tee, on which sit a few selected Defence Ministers; this committee
would deal with all defence problems and make recommendations
to the full Council.

In 1956 the NATO nations spent over twenty thousand million
pounds on their defence budgets— a vast sum. If we can design a
simple and effective structure for NATO, and eradicate waste and
duplication, we could have an equally good defence for fax less cost.
We now have the time to do this— to re-organise, re-group, re-design
where necessary, regain the flexibility we have lost, and so on. The
object will be to achieve an organisation which is less complicated
than the present set-up, is less costly, which works better, and is
equally effective. And the resxilt— more money available for hospitals,
education, roads, industrial development, and to reduce taxation. Also,
and very important— more money available for fighting the cold war
and for dealing with incidents outside the NATO area. There cannot
be a major war which is confined to the NATO area. If war comes it
will be global, and it could have its beginnings in some incident else
where. We must therefore ensure that we have forces available, and
mobile, as a strategic reserve—ready for instant use anywhere in the
world. In this re-organisation, it will be vital to ensure that the launch
ing of war will always be expensive to the aggressor— equally ex
pensive as it would be today (1958).

Then there is the question of disarmament. Basically, the real
answer to the international arms race is to work for some future form
of disarmament. But we have a long way to go before we get general
agreement on how this is to be done. No nation will agree to any
plan which makes it give up something. Russia has much to hide; the

470 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

West little. I do not see Russia agreeing that mobile inspection teams
from Western nations should have the freedom of her country!

We cannot see into the future accurately. But we can at least ensure
that we do not disregard the lessons of the past: only a madman
would do that. Twice in my own lifetime an enemy has attempted to
exert his will by force, and has plunged the world into war. We now
have a powerful weapon, the nuclear weapon, which will make this
form of activity very expensive for similarly minded rulers in the
future. It has been suggested that as a first step towards general dis
armament European nations, including the United Kingdom, should
not manufacture nuclear material or possess the weapon. Surely this
is tantamount to allowing the United States and Russia to divide the
world between them, with Europe as a cushion in the middle? In
my view it is vital that one of the Western European nations should
have the nuclear weapon, with all the means of using it; as things
stand today that nation must be the British. On no account can we
allow our nation, and Western Europe, to become a sort of "hedge
hog" between two great giants who alone have the latest weapons.
The British nuclear capability can be small; but we must have one.

It is so important to understand the tremendous change that has
taken place in the realm of defence in the NATO area during the past
ten years that, at the risk of repeating myself, I will summarise the
main features of the progress.

In 1948 my colleagues and I in the Western Union defence organisa
tion pleaded for a strong British contribution in Continental Europe,
and devoted all our energies to building up strong forces to defeat
attack. We had no nuclear weapons to stiffen our defence, and no
nuclear delivery capability to deter an aggressor. Western Germany
was unarmed.

By 1958 we had nuclear weapons integrated into our defensive
system and had built up a strong nuclear deterrent against attack;
also, Federal Germany had become a member of NATO (in 1955) and
had begun to re-arm. A direct attack on NATO Europe had now
become the most unlikely thing that could happen; the dangers lay
elsewhere.

I would sum up in this way. Having averted war, in the NATO
area, we must now examine the strategical and political situation
throughout the world— since our present plans are based to a large
extent on unreality. So long as we are reluctant to face the facts, thus
long will we not achieve a more effective NATO or a more economical
overall defence organisation.

It is essential to understand the global problem. Western Europe,
including the United Kingdom, is the centre of a world-wide economic
system. It has no large supplies of raw materials, except possibly coal,
and large imports of food are necessary to support the populations.

The Unity of the West 471

The sources o£ raw materials, particularly of oil and food, are sensitive
to threats of a "cold war" nature; these sources must be protected,
together with the bases and communications from which they are
controlled. Failure would lead to the collapse of the whole economic
system, and ultimately to the loss of NATO Europe to international
Communism. Russia will strive for success in this direction rather
than by armed aggression against the NATO front in Europe, since
the latter action would lead to her own destruction. Nonetheless, the
front in Europe must be guarded in peace, and plans made for its
security in war— but not to the exclusion of all else. Here, then, is a
nice problem— to determine within the limits of man-power and finance
the level of armed forces necessary for the two conflicting tasks, re
membering that the problem is further bedevilled by the rival eco
nomic demands of modern socialism, welfare states, and a hotly
competitive world market.

The war we shall have to fight for the next ten years will not
include a shooting war in Europe; we have managed to postpone that
for the time being by what we have achieved during the past ten
years. We now face an economic and financial war, directed at the
very foundations of our civilisation and standard of living; if we lose
it, international Communism will gain a bloodless victory. What is
the use of "busting" ourselves financially in preparing for a major
war in Europe which is unlikely to take place, and neglecting the real
dangers which lie elsewhere? Preparations for the two must be care
fully balanced in proportion to the risks.

Obviously we must do some new thinking if we are to have a sure
defence against the changed threat— and for less cost. We will not get
the right answer by keeping our eyes fixed on every tree in NATO;
we must be sure we never lose sight of the global wood.

Our new thinking should be based on the following principles.
From the earliest days, the great lesson of history is that an enemy
who is confined to a land strategy is, in the end, defeated. The second
World War was fundamentally a struggle for control of the major
oceans and seas— the control of sea communications— and until we had
won that struggle we could not proceed with our plans to win the war.
Therefore, in the event of war between the Communist bloc (led by
Russia) and the Free World, our strategy must be based on confining
Russia to a land strategy and ensuring for ourselves the free use of
the sea and air flanks. Any other strategy will be of no avail.

This entails a global approach to the problem. We now have bal
listic missiles with ranges up to 5000 miles and more, with nuclear
warheads; man-made satellites circle the earth. The nuclear offensive
and all defensive problems, need to be viewed globally. We must
have a global early warning system and centralised global planning
for air defence. The need is vital for some central organisation to plan

472 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

and direct all these activities, and to control the satellites, which is
above the level o£ the present Supreme Commander. Every day which
passes without such a higher organisation merely decreases the value
of our deterrent

To achieve these ends there must be a greater effort in the political
field, and a more sensible and practical approach to the problem of
defence. The geographical limits of NATO as laid down by the Treaty
of Washington have become too narrow today. The common policies
of the NATO countries must be practised on a world-wide scale. The
1949 concept must be broadened. It is ridiculous to suppose that we
can be allies to the north of a certain parallel, and at the same time
pursue our contradictory national policies to the south of the same
line.

It has become a question of striking the right balance in taking
risks. The risk in NATO Europe is small— so long as we maintain
our nuclear deterrent and make it very clear that we will use it to
destroy the country of an aggressor. The risk outside the NATO area
is tremendous. We need a strategy which will give us a sure defence
in any type of war.

This is merely the outline of a very big problem. But the solution
to our difficulties lies in the general direction I have indicated, and
only in that direction are we likely to find reality.

And here I will leave the subject of collective defence in Europe
and in NATO. We are too close to events to be able to comment
further on them; indeed, the events are still unfolding as I write these
words. But what I can say is this, and it cannot be stated too clearly
nor too often.

The Western Alliance was brought into being because of fear of
aggression from the East; fear is the basic component of the cement
which holds the Alliance together. No alliance based on fear alone
has ever lasted, or ever will— because whenever fear recedes the cement
begins to crumble.

The nations of the free world would be well advised to close their
ranks, and co-operate whole-heartedly and unreservedly. If they want
to survive against the relentless pressure of international Communism,
they must cease to pay lip service to Allied co-operation and must
instead embark on a policy of mutual discussion and unselfish solidar
ity. Allied co-operation must become something more than the political
phrase it is today. There is too little political unity among die nations
of the Western Alliance in the true sense of that word, and too much
national sensitivity. True unity involves a willingness to make sacri
fices for the common cause. Yet what nation is willing to do this, or
even to submit its sensitive problems to international discussion? We
need a better cement than fear to bind us all together. An economic
cement would be more permanent than one of fear. In any case, an

The Unity of the West 473

important component of the new cement must be the solidarity of the
English-speaking peoples and their determination to help the nations
of Continental Europe to defend their freedom and maintain their way
of life. The hard core of that solidarity must be Anglo-American friend
ship; if that link breaks, that is the end for each one of us—including
the ILS.A.

Political leaders must understand the differences of outlook in the
three main areas that surround the Communist bloc. In Western
Europe, and generally throughout the NATO area, the enemy is
Russia with her aim of world domination to be achieved by inter
national Communism. Among the Arab nations in the Middle East
the immediate enemy is not Russia, but Israel; the Arabs will not
combine to fight Communism, but only to fight Israel and to prevent
expansion of the Jewish State. In the Far East, if the nations fear an
external menace it is China— not Russia. The overall problem has to
be viewed against this general background, and a sound and consistent
policy pursued.

World leadership in all these matters has now passed to the United
States of America. That nation has not always been in this position.
For many years the British supplied the leadership and they have been
dealing with great world problems for centuries. The U.S. A. has only
the experience of decades. But the Western world must understand
that without the United States of America the Western Alliance would
collapse. This statement may be unpalatable— truth often is. For its
part the United States must exercise convincing powers of political,
economic and military leadership in the free world. Some Americans
are apt to think that the success of their leadership will depend on the
quantity of dollars which is made available for other nations; this is a
false doctrine. History will measure United States leadership not so
much by the quantity of dollars as by the quality, understanding and
sympathy of the leadership provided and by the consistency of the
foreign policy. I often think that the United States foreign policy is
inconsistent. She appears to have one policy in the Assembly of the
United Nations, and another and different one when her own national
interests are involved. She supports the ex-"Coloniar powers in
Western Europe, but works to destroy their influence and strength in
Asia and Africa. These inconsistent policies of the U.S.A. have played
a large part in the weakening of the general strategic position of the
West, to which I have referred already. If continued they .could lead
to the break-up of the Western Alliance.

My experience as an international soldier has taught me that if the
West is to survive it must evolve a far greater degree of common pur
pose and common responsibility than exists today. It needs closer
co-operation in wider fields than the mere defence of national terri
tories. The Western Alliance must be based on unity, hope and courage

474 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

—cemented together by the joint strength of some four hundred and
fifty million people.

"Only be thou strong and very courageous," said God to Joshua,
when appointing him to high command in the field vice Moses.

The Hungarians have reminded the world what can be achieved
by courage alone. If the Western Alliance can have strength and
courage, there is no limit to what it could achieve— provided that its
members also have unity in the true sense.

Western unity is the only thing the Russians fear and all their plans
are linked to one fundamental object— to prevent it.

At all costs the unity of the West must be restored.

CHAPTER 33

Second Thoughts

I HAVE come to the end of my tale. I have certainly enjoyed writing
it As a schoolboy, and possibly also as a young man, I realise
now that I saw little straight and nothing whole, and generally
failed to detect the difference between what is important and what is
trivial. But as I grew older I began to learn these things. Possibly the
factor of the greatest use to me in later life has been the ability to be
able to simplify a problem and expose the fundamentals on which all
action must be based— to concentrate on essentials and to leave the
details to my staff. I also learnt to regulate my life, not to overdo
social activities, and never to worry. Then again it took me some time
to learn that personal matters count for a great deal in this life. Indi
vidual happiness, cheerful loyal service, giving a helping hand to
others, gaming the trust and confidence of those you deal with— it is
these things that matter most, to mention only a few.

In the first chapter I explained how I had learnt before I left school
that of the many attributes necessary for success two are vital— hard
work and absolute integrity. To these two I would now add a third-
courage. I mean moral courage— not afraid to say or do what you
believe to be right.

When you bear tremendous responsibilities it is not always easy to
live up to these ideals and I fear I have often lagged behind. I also
had the mental unrest of seeing certain aspects of the tactical conduct
of the Second World War mishandled, and the British people thereby
made to endure its horrors longer than should have been the case, with
the loss of life which that entailed.

Under these sorts of strains it is difficult to appear always cheerful;
one generally has to work off one's irritation on somebody. That

475

476 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

"somebody" was my personal staff and I fear that at times they suf
fered. I am referring to my ADCs, and those who lived at my Tac
H.Q. with me, and not to the staff headed by Freddie de Guingand.
There were of course other occasions when they themselves were
intensely irritating! But all in all, my personal staff were magnificent;
they were all young and few were soldiers by profession; I cannot
adequately express my gratitude for the part they so thoroughly and
loyally played in such success as we achieved together.

Reference has been made to the team of liaison officers which I
organised to keep me in touch with events on the battle front* These
were young officers of character, initiative and courage; they had seen
much fighting and were able to report accurately on battle situations.
I selected each one personally, and my standard was high. It was
dangerous work and some were wounded, and some killed. They were
a gallant band of knights; they had their own Mess at my Tac H.Q.
and were well known throughout the Armies I commanded.

Sir Winston Churchill knew them intimately and one of his greatest
delights was to sit in my map caravan after dinner at night and hear
these young officers tell me the story of what was happening on the
battle front. One day towards the end of the war, in April 1945, one
was killed (John Poston) and another wounded (Peter Earle); both
had been engaged on the same task, given them by me. The Prime
Minister heard about it and he sent me a message which ended with
the following words:

"I share your grief. Will you kindly convey to their gallant
comrades the sympathy which I feel for them and you. This
marvellous service of Liaison Officers, whose eyes you know and
whose judgments you can exactly measure, will be one of the
characteristic features of the manner in which you exercise your
superb command of great Armies."

I suppose that by the time I withdrew from active soldiering I had
achieved a certain fame— notoriety, anyway! But I had definitely
learnt that the road which leads you there is hard and strewn with
rocks, and the route to the summit is difficult He who reaches the
top will often be misunderstood and the target for much criticism;
this will produce at times a feeling of loneliness, which is accentuated
by the fact that those with whom he would most like to talk will
often avoid him because of his position. The only policy in high
positions is an intense devotion to duty and the unswerving pursuit of
the target, in spite of criticism— whispered or in the open. This is
what I sought to do.

Much of my life has been concerned with the problem of leadership,
and I have already tried to explain how military leadership today needs
a somewhat different approach. Two thousand years ago men obeyed

Second Thoughts 477

automatically because of the "authority" vested in the superior. The
centurion in St. Matthew's Gospel clearly thought that because he had
authority his soldiers would obey, and he was right. But today the
authority has got to be exercised wisely and sensibly, and, if it is not,
soldiers get restless. The first thing a young officer must do when he
joins the Army is to fight a battle, and that battle is for the hearts of
his men. If he wins that battle and subsequent similar ones, his men
will follow him anywhere; if he loses it, he will never do any real good.
The centurion was dealing with regular soldiers who had made the
Army their profession; with such disciplined men, the habit of obedi
ence is strong. But in practically all armies today the bulk of the
soldiers are National Servicemen. These men do not serve for long
and have to be disciplined and taught obedience; some do not take
too kindly to it. My experience of the British soldier, Regular or
National Service, is that once you have gained his trust and confidence,
and won his heart, he is easy to lead. In fact, he responds at once to
good leadership and likes it.

I got into trouble in March 1947 when I was asked to speak on
leadership at the Anniversary Festival Dinner of the London Asso
ciation of Engineers. The people of Britain had been through a most
unpleasant winter, with shortages of everything; we even had to work
by candlelight in offices by day because of power cuts, and everyone
was getting thoroughly fed up with the Government. In my speech
I examined the problem that faced us in Britain at that time, and said
that the solution depended on leadership, on the need to pull together
as a team, and on hard work. I had the following to say about
leadership:

"How do you define leadership?
I would define it as:

'the capacity to rally men and women to a common purpose,

and the character which inspires confidence/
There must be truth in the purpose and will-power in the character,
It is vital today that we should have leaders at all levels in every
walk of life who are able to dominate the events that surround us,
and who will never let those events get the better of us or of the
Nation.

A leader who cannot do this, but who lets 'events' dominate him,
is useless. The good leader will first study the problem and will
then grapple with it."

The Tory Press which was looking for an opportunity to beat up
the Labour Government found it in my speech. In point of fact,
Government leadership was proving itself unable to dominate the
events which encompassed the nation, and we were in a bad way; but
I had not that matter in my mind when I wrote my speech.

478 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

There was a terrific row, in the Press and in Parliament, and in due
course I was summoned to No. 10 and expected the usual ticking off.
But Attlee was very decent about it when I had explained my point of
view. Not so A. V. Alexander; he accused me of wanting to take over
the political leadership of the country— which was nonsense.

Shortly after this excitement I received an invitation from the Wool
Textile Industry to deliver the annual address to the Bradford Textile
Society, the subject being "leadership." In view of the hullabaloo
which followed my remarks on leadership to the London Association
of Engineers, I thought I would have some quiet fun. So I wrote to
Attlee and asked if he thought it would be of value if I gave the
address. He replied that while he thought my address would be most
inspiring, he advised me to decline the invitation!

I would like here to make the point that from the time I first met
Clement Attlee (now Earl Attlee) in 1943 I have developed a growing
respect for his integrity, loyalty and courage. He must have found me
an awful nuisance when he was Prime Minister and I was Chief of the
Imperial General Staff. But he was very approachable and would
always find time to discuss a problem when I sought his advice. He
gave decisions readily. And he was absolutely fair; if he administered
a rebuke it was deserved.

I have several times had to resist invitations to enter the political
field. I do not think that I would make a good politician. War is a
pretty rough and dirty game. But politics!

When the war began to near its end, I received one day a letter
from Margot Asquith (Lady Oxford) asking me to join the Liberal
Party and lead it to better days. I politely declined. About the same
time I received a letter from the Editor of a well-known Sunday
newspaper asking me to write a series of articles for his paper about
what we should all do when the war ended. I replied regretting. that
I could not do as he asked and gave the following reason:

"That subject is nothing whatever to do with me and if I were
to write about such tilings it might convey the impression that I
intended to seek a political career. I have no intention whatsoever
of doing anything of the sort and it would be very foolish to get
mixed up in matters about which I know nothing."

The late Lord Addison, who was Lord Privy Seal in 1948, once
tried to drag me into politics. He wrote to me on the 2nd June 1948
and asked me to go into the division lobby on the side of the Govern
ment at the second reading of the Parliament Bill. This was virtually
an invitation by H.M.G. to the C.I.G.S. to participate actively in
politics. I sent the letter at once to Mr. Attlee; he saw the matter in
the proper light and asked me to take no action on the request I had
received.

Second Thoughts 479

It will be seen that while there were strong currents of opinion
which tried to drag me into politics, I resisted and kept clear— which
I consider was essential while I was serving the Government. The
soldier's allegiance is given to the State and it is not open to him to
change that allegiance because of his political views. When he has
retired, the matter is different; he can then do as he likes in the matter.

Most books have their "acknowledgments" at the beginning— and
so has this. But I have still some acknowledgments to pay, and these
are they. As one looks back over the years I am constantly reminded
of the extent to which my life has been influenced by four men— my
father in my early life, Field-Marshal Alanbrooke in much of my
military life, and Sir Winston Churchill and General Eisenhower in
the later years. My father's influence has been dealt with in Chapter
i; I must now say something about the other three.

I first got to know Alanbrooke ("Brookie" as he has always been
to me) in 192.6 when I went as an instructor to the Staff College,
Camberley; he was already there, as instructor in artillery. I quickly
spotted that he was a man of outstanding character and ability, and
my liking and respect for him can be said to have begun then. He
left the Staff College before me and I did not see much of him until
I was commanding the gth Infantry Brigade at Portsmouth in 1937;
he was then Director of Military Training at the War Office. Our
really close association began in 1939, when I commanded the 3rd
Division in his 2nd Corps, and from that time onwards we were in
constant touch until I finally succeeded him as Chief of the Imperial
General Staff in June 1946. He was well tuned to my short-comings
and often administered a back-hander, sometimes verbally and some
times in writing; in neither case could they ever be misunderstood!
But I suppose he reckoned I had certain good qualities, otherwise he
would not have pushed me along the road in the way he did. He
always stood firmly by me when I was in trouble, and his advice was
the best I knew. After the war I discovered from my staff that he was
their strategic reserve. If I was "hell-bent" on some particular course
which they thought ill-advised, the last card they would play was—
"Have you consulted the C.I.G.S., sir?" If that ultimate censor had
concurred, they knew that the game was up and opposition crum
pled.

Brookie is not an easy person to get to know. But once you have
managed to penetrate his quiet reserve, you find there the splendid
qualities that one is so conscious of lacking oneself.

I remember how angry I was when Eisenhower described him as
a person who lacked the ability to weigh up conflicting factors in a
problem and, like General Marshall, reach a rock-like decision. My
feeling was that in strategic matters Brookie was generally right and
Marshall wrong. However, any anger which developed in me against

480 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

Eisenhower during the war years has long since evaporated; I now
have a deep devotion for that great man.

It is my opinion that Alanbrooke and Winston Churchill together
did more to ensure that we won the Second World War than any other
two men. They were a great pair. And in spite of all that he is and
all that he has done, Brookie is the most retiring and modest man I
have ever met.

Then there was Winston Churchill. I have described how we first
met in the Brighton area in the summer of 1940, after Dunkirk. It has
been my privilege and honour to be associated closely with this very
great man from that time onwards. We did not always see eye to eye;
I doubt if any soldier ever has done with his political chief, and
certainly not with that one. But we did not have in the Second World
War the rows that developed between soldiers and politicians in the
First; that was due to Churchill. It was also due to the fact that we
had in existence the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, a constitutional
body responsible direct to, and effectively tied-in with, the War
Cabinet. In the 1914-1918 war we had no such body and one has
only a read Lord Beaverbrook's book Men and Power to learn of the
appalling rows and intrigues which went on between the "Frocks" and
the "Brass-hats" in those days.

Whatever may have been his private views, I personally know of no
case in which Churchill insisted on his own ideas being carried out
once he was opposed by the united British Chiefs of Staff— provided
they stood firm and did not retreat when bullied. And they did not
retreat.

It has always seemed to me that Winston Churchill combined
within himself— within one man—almost all the qualities which we
humans can possess, and, as with all humans, they were not by any
means all good. Of all his remarkable traits I would put "domination"
as the most prominent. He must dominate. He certainly dominated
the events and persons surrounding him in the war years, as should
all good leaders; you could look out for squalls if he was prevented
from doing so. As time went on I ceased to regard him as my political
chief. He became my friend. We were "Winston" and "Monty," and
so it is today and will be ever after. When he was presented with his
portrait by the Cinque Ports, he being the Lord Warden, I was asked
to attend the ceremony and propose his health— I being a Freeman of
Hastings (where the ceremony took place) and also of Dover. The
speech I then made explains better than anything else I can say what
I feel about Winston Churchill. It went as follows:

"I have been given the great honour of proposing the toast of
the Lord Warden, and nothing could be a greater pleasure. Dur
ing the late war Sir Winston Churchill was my Chief; as we got

Second Thoughts 481

to know each other, he became my friend; today he is chief
among all my friends.

As Lord Warden he holds the Office of Admiralty within the
Cinque Ports.

I would like to remind him that I once served as his shipmate in
an operation of war, when we crossed the Rhine together in a
naval craft in March 1945 and later got heavily shelled for our
misdeeds. It was he who suggested we should make the crossing!
The association between die Cinque Ports and Sir Winston
Churchill, which has reached so charming a climax today, is
singularly appropriate. For what could be more suitable than
that the towns which once provided most of the men and ships for
the King's Navy should know and harbour a 'Former Naval
Person? In far off but still memorable days the Ports and their
Lord Warden were the active practitioners of that eternal vigilance
which is the price of freedom.

In much more recent and even more memorable days, the present
Lord Warden showed himself to be the incarnation of the tradi
tional spirit and duty of the Ports. To him more than to any other
man we owe the fact that the citadel of freedom was kept in
violate.

This is one of the occasions, I think, on which it is right and
proper to break through the reserve of the English heart, and to
say in that tongue of which he is so unquestioned a master why it
is that his portrait exists not only on canvas but also in the souls
of free men throughout the world, and in the souls of many not
so free. First, because he is a Man.

There is not one of us who has had the privilege of sharing his
work and his thoughts who cannot say with Mark Antony:

'He was my friend, faithful and just to me.*

He has seen, undismayed, truth 'twisted by knaves to make a
trap for fools/

He has met 'with Triumph and Disaster* with equal serenity.
He has filled every 'unforgiving minute* with 'sixty seconds* worth
of distance run.'

The capacity to do these things was Kipling's definition of a Man.
He qualifies.

Let me remind you of his own prescription for conduct in the
great adventure of life:

In War: Resolution.

In Defeat: Defiance.

In Victory: Magnanimity.

In Peace: Goodwill.

Surely he has practised -what he thus preached.
It may seem strange to some of you to hear a soldier praising a

482 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

politician! The two professions have not always hit it off. Indeed,
this politician deliberately abandoned my profession at an early
age. I am grateful, because if he had not it might have been he
who won at Alamein.

But whatever the soldier may sometimes in his wrath say about
the politician, I would exempt this particular one, For he redeemed
himself by being often and for long periods the politician who was
best hated by other politicians. I am told that some of them called
him 'turn-coat/ 'untrustworthy/ even lacking in judgment.*
How small, how shame-faced, they must feel today?
We soldiers think of him as Wordsworth's happy warrior, 'that
every man in arms should wish to be/ I would like to repeat to
you some of the lines.

' Tis, finally, the Man, who, lifted high,
Conspicuous object in a nation's eye,
Or left unthought of in obscurity—
Who, with a toward or untoward lot,
Prosperous or adverse, to his wish or not—
Plays, in the many games of life, that one
Where what he most doth value must be won/
It seems to me that these words exactly fit Sir Winston.
And what is it that the Lord Warden

'most doth value'?

Here again a soldier finds a kindred spirit in the definition which
he himself has given of the aims and purposes of his career:

'The maintenance of the enduring greatness of Britain, and
the historical continuity of our island life/

But we are met to commemorate not only what he did to win
wars, but also what he did to prevent them. And therefore I would
add what he said only a few years ago:

'Peace is the last prize I seek to win/

Nobody knows better than a soldier the overwhelming value of
that prize—because nobody knows better than a soldier the mon-
, ster called War.

Nobody knows better than a British soldier how a strong Britain
and an untarnished British spirit are the prime ingredients of peace.
A few final words about the Lord Warden in one other capacity—
that of a national leader in times of crisis.

Our British leaders are not 'Fuhrers/ 'Duces/ or Caesars. They
are potent, but not potentates; guides, not dictators; too human
to pretend to be super-human. They do not put themselves above
the rules. Power does not go to their heads. They receive it with
modesty; they lose it with resignation, if not with exhilaration.
But when weighed in the balance they are not found wanting.

Second Thoughts 483

Never has any land found any leader who so matched the hour
as did Sir Winston Churchill.

When he spoke— in words that rang and thundered like the Psalms
—we all said:

'That is how we feel'

and

That is how we shall bear ourselves/

He gave us the sense of being a dedicated people with a high
puxpose and an invincible destiny. There was— there is— a moral
magnificence about him which transforms the lead of lesser men
into gold; he inspired us all.

He was once good enough to refer to me as a Cromwellian figure
no doubt because I have always tried both to praise the Lord
and to pass the ammunition. Let me therefore conclude with the
words which Cromwell used about the men whom the State
chooses to serve her:

'So that they render good service, that satisfies/
Sir, you have rendered good service.
Sir, we are satisfied.
I give you the toast of:

Sir Winston Churchill

Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Lord Warden of
the Cinque Ports, the greatest Englishman of all time."

And last is Eisenhower, a remarkable and most lovable man. I first
met Ike in the spring of 1942, in England, but only for a few minutes
and he made no great impression on me at that time. The next
occasion was in Tunisia in April 1943. The Eighth Army, having
fought its way from Alamein, was about to join hands with his forces
which had landed in North Africa in November 1942. I was now
under his command. This time he stayed a night with me and made
a very definite impression. He had never seen a shot fired in war till
the landings in North Africa on the 8th November 1942, and he had
never before commanded troops in battle. We talked much and I was
greatly impressed by his quick grasp of a problem and by the way
he radiated confidence and kindness. He was a very heavy smoker
in those days and at breakfast in our mess tent he lit a cigarette before
I had begun the meal. We were sitting together and I at once moved
my seat to the other side of the table. He quickly sensed that I did
not like smoke circulating around me at meal times and apologised,
throwing away his cigarette!

I remained under his command from those days until the end of the
German war in May 1945. The reader will have noted that we did not
always agree about the strategy and major tactics of the war in which

484 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

we were engaged But history will do no harm in talking about honest
differences o£ opinion between us, provided, as in our case was the
fact, it does so under the shadow of the great truth that Allied co
operation in Europe during the Second World War was brought to
the greatest heights it has ever attained. Although it may be true to
say that no one man could have been responsible for such an achieve
ment, the major share of the credit goes to Eisenhower— without any
doubt

I would not class Ike as a great soldier in the true sense of the
word. He might have become one if he had ever had the experience
of exercising direct command of a division, corps, and army— which
unfortunately for him did not come his way. But he was a great
Supreme Commander— a military statesman. I know of no other person
who could have welded the Allied forces into such a fine fighting
machine in the way he did, and kept a balance among the many
conflicting and disturbing elements which threatened at times to
wreck the ship.

It was not until the war was over that I began to know him really
well, and also his charming wife Mamie. He was then Chief of Staff,
United States Army, and I was C.I.G.S. I stayed with him in Wash
ington in October 1946 and we had long talks about the post-war
world. Later, in 1951 and 1952, we served together in Europe again—
he as Supreme Commander of the NATO forces and I as his Deputy.
Then he went away to become President of the United States of
America. I have visited him regularly since he has been in office,
always staying with him and Mamie— either in the White House or in
his home at Gettysburg. Our friendship has grown and developed,
and today I have the very greatest admiration and affection for him.
I have read a good deal of American history and it is my belief that
historians will record that Ike reached his greatest heights as President
of the U.S.A. Where does his strength lie? He has a good brain and
is very intelligent. But his real strength lies in his human qualities;
he is a very great human being. He has the power of drawing the
hearts of men towards him as a magnet attracts the bits of metal.
He merely has to smile at you, and you trust him at once. He is the
very incarnation of sincerity. He has great common sense. People and
nations give him their confidence. Whenever I go to Washington I
visit the Lincoln Memorial, where Abraham Lincoln sits in an impos
ing setting looking out over the city. I never visit that Memorial with
out gaining inspiration; it is the same when I visit Ike. He has tried to
be the President of all Amercans, irrespective of party or politics. I
am devoted to him, and would do anything for him. He is a truly
great man, and it is a tremendous honour to have his friendship. He
has done a great deal for me, in difficult times and in good, and I

Second Thoughts 485

can never adequately express what I owe to his personal kindness
and forbearance.

During my life abroad since the autumn of 1948 it was my privilege
to get to know intimately the Prime Ministers and Cabinets of the
Western Powers. I was constantly on the move between Norway and
Turkey, and crossed the Atlantic every year to visit the United States
and Canada. When I returned to England from the Eighth Army in
January 1944, an accurate log book began to be kept of my air travels.
The log shows that from January 1944 to September 1958 I have
flown over 400,000 miles, and my flying hours have been over 2200.
It has been hard work, but possibly my contribution to the cause of
peace has been of some value.

I count among my friends such differing personalities as His Holi
ness the Pope and Marshal Tito, both of whom I have visited often.
I value greatly my friendship with Dr. Salazar, Prime Minister of
Portugal. With such friends all ovek. the Western world, it is obvious
that I must have led a very full life and learnt much that I did not
know before. My contacts with so many nations have led me to certain
conclusions.

Each nation has its own views on certain matters, which must be
understood and respected by the others. You can't sell refrigerators to
the Eskimos. Again, American boys are brought up to believe certain
things; they grow up in the shadow of those beliefs, and nothing will
ever change them. The British people will never follow a dominant
personality, or leader, unless they are frightened; at other times they
are frightened about where he may lead them. Winston Churchill is
a good example.

Over all, the true and ultimate strength of a nation does not lie in
its armed forces. It lies in the national character, in its people, in their
capacity to work, in their virility.

Surveying then the international field, it seems to me that a nation
needs two things if it is to survive and not become engulfed in cen
tralised control and mediocrity. Those two things, which are basic and
fundamental, are:

(a) A religion.

(b ) An educated 6lit e, who are not afraid to take an independent
line of thought and action and who will not merely follow the
"popular cry/*

Perhaps I had better explain what I mean by a religion. The out
standing influence in my life has been a deep sense of religious truth.
It can best be expressed by quoting the last sentences of my address at
the unveiling of the Alamein Memorial in the desert on the 24th
October 1954:

486 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery

"And let us remember when all these things are said and done,
that one great fact, the greatest fact, remains supreme and un
assailable. It is this. There are in this world things that are true
and things that are false; there are ways that are right and ways
that are wrong; there are men good, and men bad. And on one
side or the other we must take our stand; one or the other we
must serve.

A great Commander once dismissed his troops after a long cam
paign with these words:

'Choose you this day whom ye will serve; as for me and my
house, we will serve the Lord.9 JOSHUA 24, 15

These words seem to me to be the foundation of the whole matter,
and it is my belief that they ought to be impressed on every young
person from the earliest days. We can only secure a better world,
and abolish war, by having better men and women; there is no
other way and no short cut/'

The last word in the Foreword to this book is "truth." I have tried
to write the truth. I suppose everyone claims that about his memoirs 1
Most official accounts of past wars are deceptively well written, and
seem to omit many important matters— in particular, anything which
might indicate that any of our commanders ever made the slightest
mistake. They are therefore useless as a source of instruction. They
remind me of the French general's reply to a British protest in 1918,
when the former directed the British to take over a sector from the
French which had already been overrun by the Germans forty-eight
hours previously. The French general said: "Mais, mon ami, ga c'est
pour Phistoire"

This book is not written "pour I'histoire" in that sense.

I withdrew from active employment in the Army in September
1958, after fifty years of continuous duty in the service of my Sov
ereign, without a break of any sort. This is a long time. Since 1855,
when the War Office came into existence and the Board of Ordnance
was abolished, no officer has served longer. Lord Roberts had a span
of 52 years between the date of his commission and his laying down
of the office of Commander-in-Chief in 1904; but there was a period
in the 'gos when he was not employed and, what is more, his early
service was not with the forces of the Crown but with the East India
Company. I understand that in the eighteenth century there are one
or two examples of service longer than mine from the Board of
Ordnance. But they were in a rather special position and, in gen
eral, commissions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could
be held by officers at most unseasonable ages!

However, I am informed that despite the conditions of those times
my service still exceeds that of Wellington, Marlborough and Monck.

Second Thoughts 487

I will conclude my military service by paying homage to the British
soldier, my friend and comrade-in-arms during all those years.

The British soldier is second to none in the communities of fighting
men. Some may possess more elan, others may be better disciplined;
but none excels him in all-round character. We require no training in
bravery in Britain; we can trust to our own native manliness to see
us through. So it is with the soldier. It is his natural pride which gives
him his fighting qualities. How often he has stood firm before tyranny
and oppression, die last hope of the free world! In the midst of the
noise and confusion of the battlefield, the simple homely figure of the
British soldier stands out calm and resolute—dominating all around
him with his quiet courage, his humour and his cheerfulness, his
unflinching acceptance of the situation. May the ideals for which he
has struggled never vanish from the world! May he never be forgotten
by the nation for which he has fought so nobly! I know better than
most to what heights the British soldier can aspire. His greatness is a
measure of the greatness of the British character, and I have seen the
quality of our race proved again and again on the battlefield.

I shall take away many impressions into the evening of life. But
the one which I shall treasure above all is the picture of the British
soldier— staunch and tenacious in adversity, kind and gentle in victory
—the man to whom the nation has again and again, in the hour of
adversity, owed its safety and its honour.

Index

Aachen, 239, 266

Abadan, 380

Abdullah, King of Trans-Jordan, 379

Addison, Lord, 478

Africa, Montgomery's tour of, 413-417

Africa, North: plans for landing in, 71,
159; topography of, 84-85; cam
paign in, 98-152, 153-155, 164;
prisoners in, 127, 130, 147, 149; as
an air base, 390

Africa, South, 413, 415

Agedabia, 128, 129

Agheik, 84-85, 101, 144; pursuit to,
127-132; Battle of, 132-133, 141

Air battle, essential before landings in
OVERLORD, 191, 221

AIR FORCE, GERMAN: attacks Al
lied airfields, 278; failure to support
army, 280

AIR FORCE, ROYAL: component
with B.E.F., 50; Advanced Air Strik
ing Force, 50; Battle of Normandy,
217, 222 et seq.y 225-237; Ardennes,
282; Montgomery's message to, on
German surrender, 307-308; close
army co-operation with, 388; threat
ened reductions in, 431
DESERT Am FORCE, 100, 111, 123,
127-128, 129, 130, 133, MS, 145,
147, 158, 168, 185, 186, 230
STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, 180
TACTICAL Am FORCES, 142, 147, 230,
280

Air lift, in Ruhr advance, 246

Air power: in Eighth Army, 100, 127-
130, 133, 142, 145, 146-147, 158,
161-163; long-range killing weapon,
128, 130; integration with land power
at Mareth, 147; in Sicily, 158, 161,
162-163; fo peace time, 213

Air support: Eighth Army, 185; Italian
campaign, 174, 180; OVERLORD, 198,
217, 221

Airborne forces: American near Rome,
175; in Normandy landings, 198;
in advance to Rhine, 246, 247, 252,

272; at Arnhem, 253, 258, 261, 264-
267; under 21 Army Group, 294, 294;
PLUNDER, 294

Airfields: in North Africa, ill, 127-
128, 133; Italy, 177, 180, 183; Sicily,
158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168;
Normandy, 200, 228, 230; Holland
and Belgium, 278; occupied Ger
many, 344

Alam Haifa, 96; Battle of, 96, 98-105,
106, 107, 143; "turning point" in
desert war, 101, 126

Alamein, 93, 95, 96

Alamein, Battle of, 96, 106-126, 146;
plan for, 107-110; "crumbling" proc
ess in, 109, 117-119; deception plan,
110-111; Royal Air Force in, 111,
123; secrecy in, 113; grouping of di
visions for, 114; Operation SUPER
CHARGE in, 120, 121-124; "staff
information" service in, 124-125;
lessons of, 125-126; first anniver
sary of, 180-181; memorial unveiled,

485

Alamein to the River Sangro (Mont
gomery), 117, 165, 313, 3^6, 401

Alanbrooke, Viscount-tfee Brooke,
Field-Marshal Sir Alan

Albert Canal, 56, 247

Aldershot, 48

Alexander, Field-Marshal Sir Harold,
65, 93, 94, 96, 103, 120, 163, 183,
366; commands I Corps, 60, 61; C.-in-
C. Middle East, 71, 72, 86; Mont
gomery's regard for, 87; supports
Montgomery, 107-108, 128, 152;
Deputy C.-in-C. to Eisenhower, 142,
148, 149; and plans for Sicily, 153,
156, 157, 159, 160, 164, 168, 169;
and Italian campaign, 172-173, 175,
176, 198; suggested Deputy Supreme
Commander, 290, 292

Alexander, Rt Hon. A. V. (now Lord
Alexander of Hillsborough), Minister
of Defence, 412, 449; and Bevin's in
sult to Army, 424-426; and conscrip-

489

490

Index

tion, 428; and reduction in armed
forces, 431-437; Montgomery's lack
of confidence in, 433, 437, 438, 453;
appoints Montgomery Chairman of
Western Union Commanders-in-Chief ,
45^-453; accuses him of seeking po
litical leadership, 478

Alexandria, 89, 95, 120, 128, 168

Algeria, 135

Algiers, 153, 158, 159-163, 165, 167,
168, 173, 179, 184, 189

Allfrey, Lieut.-Gen. Sir C., 186, 187

Allied Control Commission, 318-320,
332; Montgomery appointed British
member, 325-326, 345; civilian ele
ment in, 326, 346, 359-360; and occu
pation of zones of Germany, 337-340;
Russian difficulties with, 336-347,
356; first executive meeting of, 352;
deadlock in, 356-358; integration
with Military Government, 358

American Zone of Germany, 318, 352;
refugees in, 319; withdrawal of troops
to, 343-345; communications with
Berlin, 344, 349; Eisenhower Mili
tary Governor of, 348

Amman, 379

Ammunition, American shortage of, 253,
268

Amsterdam, 246, 261

Anderson, General Sir K., 135

Antwerp, 239, 240, 247, 260; captured,
244, 259; opening of, 245, 247,
251, 254, 256, 259, 261, 266, 284;
Montgomery receives freedom of,

3^5

ANVIL, Operation, 198, 199

Arab Liberation Army, 423

Arab rebellion (1938), 43

Arab States, 377, 379

Arabs, in Palestine, 423-424

Ardennes, 52, 238, 239, 245, 271, 272;
Battle of, 257, 275-282, 287, 288,
403

Argentan, 234

Armoured battles: Rommel's plan of,
95, 99, 102, 103; Montgomery's tac
tics, 99-100, 102, 103

Armoured car regiments: at Alamein,
121; co-operation with air arm, 128,
131

Armoured divisions: tactics at Alamein,
108, 109, 117, 118, 121-122; at
Mareth Line, 144-146; German, in
Normandy, 200, 211, 234; Normandy,
211-212, 219, 228-229

Army/air co-operation: confusion in
Sicily, 168; difficulties in Normandy,
230

Army, Belgian, 52, 53, 56, 57; sur
renders, 57

ARMY, BRITISH: command system,
48-54, 90, 240-242; command, Mont
gomery's doctrine of, 74-83; expen
sive life in, 23, 25; faults in, 34, 36-
38, 46-54; fitness in, 65-67; lack of
contact between generals and soldiers,
33-35; lack of training and equip
ment, 46-47, 52-53, 204; morale
in, 76-79, 81-83, 388; officer selec
tion, 78-79, 312; professional chiefs
wrongly chosen, 37, 38; tradition in,
27

In First World War, 3O-35; be
tween the wars, 36-39, 42-45, 46-47;
mobilises, 45, 46; in France, 50-61;
retreat to Dunkirk, 57-61; in England
after Dunkirk, 62-71; and defence of
Britain (1940), 65-69; training after
Dunkirk, 65-70; OVERLOBD plan for,
191, 198, 199; tight War Office con
trol over Army in England, 195-196;
Montgomery's tour of inspection be
fore D-Day, 201-202; his call for
national support for, 204-208; and
control of Germany, 318 et seq.;
fraternisation with Germans, 330-332,
354; National Service in, 358, 427-
431, 435, 436; post-war organisation
of, 374-375, 387-389; tactica* <*oc-
trine for, 374-375; in India and
. Middle East, 376-381, 409; in Greece,
382, 383; Chief of Staff system in,
389; standardisation of equipment
with Canada and U.S., 392, 403-404;
withdrawal from India, 409; Gurkha
troops in, 409; in Palestine, 418-426;
threatened reductions in, 431-437;
Montgomery's plan to re-model, 432;
lack of regular recruits, 434, 435, 436;
pay grievances, 435, 436
ARMY GROUP ai: 105, 120, 179,
248, 276, 284; Montgomery com
mands, 183, 184; H.Q. of, in Lon
don, 192, 194, 200, 210, 211; con
ference on battle fighting, 195-196;
and OVERLOBD, 197, 235; and Seine
crossing, 239-242; maintenance
difficulties, 242, 244-248, 250, 253-
254; advance to Arnhem, 247-248;
advance to Berlin, 250, 251;
Churchill's tribute to, 257; casual
ties in, 268-269; and Rhine cross
ing, 271-274, 294-295; operational
control of, 285-287, 290-292; and
VERITABLE, 288, 289; health of,
292; total prisoners taken by, 293;
leave in, 293; German surrender,
299-305; Montgomery's last mes
sage to, 305-306; occupation of
Germany, 319, 341-342, 358; wives
and families not allowed, 342;

Index

491

ARMY, BRITISH (cont.)

leave and release scheme in, 342,

343
ARMIES

MIDDLE EAST COMMAND, 86, 378
PERSIA-IRAK COMMAND, 86
SouTH-E ASTERN: Montgomery com
mands, 65; defence doctrine in,
68; and Dieppe raid, 69
FIRST, 71; lands in Algeria, 135; in
race to Tripoli, 135-136; final
phase in Tunisia, 148-149
SECOND: Dempsey commands, 196,
200; last tactical instructions to,
211-312; Battle of Normandy,
225-237; GOODWOOD, 229, 230,
232; casualties, 231, 235; enemy
strength opposite, 232; BLUE-
COAT, 233; American criticism
of, 233-235; maintenance diffi
culties, 241, 244-248, 250, 254;
advance to Rhine, 247; MARKET
GARDEN, 248, 259-267; advance
into Germany, 250, 254, 294;
PLUNDER, 294; use of rockets,
295; total haul of prisoners,
298

EIGHTH: Montgomery appointed to
command, 65, 70, 71, 86; low
morale in, 85, 89, 91, 93. 9$; Au-
chinleck's plan for, 87; reserve
corps for, 87-88, 93; Montgomery
takes over, 92; "no withdrawal"
order to, 92, 93; raised morale
in, 96, 102; new H.Q., 96;
Churchill visits, 96-97; Battle of
Akm Haifa, 96, 98-105; equip
ment, training and building up of,
103-105, 108-109; Battle of Ala-
mein, 106-126, 180-181; cas
ualties in, 109, 119, 143* *47>
169; "staff information" service
in, 124-125; pursuit to Agheila,
127-131; Battle of Agheila, 132-
133; Desert Christmas of
( 1942), 133-137; race to Tripoli,
135-136, 137-139; in Tripoli,
139-142; under Eisenhower,
142; Battle of Mareth, 143-147;
joins up with Americans, 147;
troops lent to First Army, 148-
149; in Tunis, 149; crusading
spirit in, 150; Montgomery's sys
tem of command in, 150-152,
155-156; and Sicily campaign,
153-170; Chief of Staff added to
H.Q., 154, 155; "* brotherhood,"
155; must learn to co-operate,
156, 157; George VI visits, 165;
Italian campaign, 171-180; ad
ministrative problems, 173, 178-

ARMY, BRITISH (cont.)

180; lands in Europe, 174-178;
Montgomery leaves, 182-188
CORPS

i: Battle o£ France, 59, 60, 61;
Antwerp, 261; British Zone, 321
2: Battle of France, 58, 59, 60
5: training of, 65, 66-69; Tunisia,

148; Italy, 175

8: MARKET GARDEN, 258-259; Brit
ish Zone, 321
9: 148

10: formation of, 88, 93; new
command, 103; Battle of Ala
mein, 106, 108, 114, 115, 117,
119, 120, 121-122; advance to
Tunis, 128, 132, 133, 138, 142,
144, 146; H.Q. under First
Army, 155; Italy, 172
12: 65; MARKET GARDEN, 258-259
13: new command in, 92, 95, 96,
103; Battle of Alam Haifa, 99,
101; Battle of Alamein, 108,
114-115, 117, 119, 122, 124,
127; advance to Tunis, 128
30: 95, 103; Battle of Alamein,
108, 109, no, 114, 115, 118,
119, 120, 121, 122, 127; advance
to Tunis, 128, 132, 144, 146,
154; in Sicily, 155; MARKET GAR
DEN, 258-259; River Meuse, 277;
British Zone, 321

I ALLIED ABRBORNE: 246, 247,
252; MARKET GARDEN, 258-259,
260, 264, 266, 267
DIVISION, AIRBORNE

ist: Arnhem, 253, 258, 264, 266
DIVISIONS, ARMOURED

ist: 88, 103; Battle of Alamein,
114, 117, 118, 119; Tripoli, 144,
146

7th (Desert Rats): Egypt, 95, 99,

104; Battle of Alamein, 108;

Tunisia, 132, 133, 141, 144, 149

8th: 88; Battle of Alamein, 114

loth: 88; Battle of Alamein, 114,

118
DIVISIONS, INFANTRY

ist S.A.: Battle of Alamein, 114
and N.Z.: 155; Battle of AJamein,
114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122;
Tripoli, 132, 133, 141, 143, 144,
146

3rd: Montgomery appointed com
mander, 44-45; lack of transport
and equipment, 47; training
( 1939-1940 ) , 54-55; venereal
disease in, 55-56; Battle of
France, 56-60, 62-63; re-formed,
62-63; in South Coast defence,
63-64; Churchill visits, 64

492

Index

ARMY, BRITISH (cont.)

4th: First World War, 31-32
4th Indian: Battle of Alamein, 114;

Tunisia, 146, 149
5th: Battle of France, 57
8th: Arab rebellion, 43-44, 45, 91
gth Australian: Battle of Alamein,

114, 118, 120, 123
44th: Egypt, 96; Battle of Ala
mein, 114
47th (London): First World War,

34

49th: 261
5oth: Battle of France, 57; Battle

of Alamein, 114; Sicily, 155
Sist Highland: Battle of Alamein,

114; advance to Tripoli, 132,

139, 141, 142; Sicily, 155; Havre,

261

56th: Sicily, 155
78th: Sicily, 155
BRIGADES, ARMOURED
7th: 123
9th: 114, 120
23rd: 114

20 ist Guards: 144, 149
BRIGADES, INFANTRY
9th: 40, 42, 43, 44
loth: 31-32
17th: 37-38
i3ist (Queen's): 123
Rocket: 295
REGIMENTS
iiTH HUSSARS, 88
ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY: Rocket

Troop in, 295
GRENADIER GUARDS, 144
ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE, 26, 40
ROYAL NORFOLK, 88
ROYAL HAMPSHIRE, 91
ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES, 64
COMMANDOS: raid on Dieppe, 6c-

7*

ARMY, CANADIAN: raid on Dieppe,
69-71; standardisation of weapons
With U.S. and Britain, 392, 403-404
ARMY, FIRST: in Normandy, 193,
200, 235; at Antwerp, 254-255,
260-261, 266; Scheldt estuary,
259; Channel ports, 260-261;
Reichswald Offensive, 289; PLUN
DER, 294; use of rockets, 295
DIVISIONS, INFANTRY
ist: Sicily, 164, 165-166
and: Dieppe, 69-71
3rd: 355

ARMY, FRENCH: B.E.F. under
(*939)> 49-5o» 5*; chain of com
mand, 51-54; breakdown of com
munications, 52-54; Montgomery's
fears about, 55; collapse of, 60-61

ARMY, BRITISH (cont.)
ARMY GROUP

No. i: 52, 53
ARMIES

FIRST: 52, 53

SECOND, 52

SEVENTH, 52

NINTH, 52, 53

ARMY, GERMAN: advance (May
1940), 53, 56-58; in Desert, 85 et
seq.; Italians in, 85, no, 119, 124,
125, 127, 130, 133; Rommel's "corset-
ting" of, no, 119; defeated in North
Africa, 106-151, 215; prisoners taken
in, 130, 147, 149, 255, 269, 294, 298,
309; in Sicily, 158, 164, 167, 169; in
Italy, 174, 175-176; bets concerning,
193; in France, 198, 211-212, 226-
237> 238 et seq.\ strength in Nor
mandy, 232; losses in Battle of Nor
mandy, 236; shows signs of collapse,
238; defence of Berlin approaches,
248; disorganisation not fully ex
ploited, 255; loss of mobility, 270-
271; regains initiative in Ardennes,
275; casualties in, 294; final defeat
imminent, 296; surrenders, 299-305,
318; problem of prisoners, 319, 321,
328, 341, 350; leaders consider them
selves our allies, 328; disbandment in
British Zone, 350, 353; Zhukov's
charge concerning former units in
British Zone, 361-363
ARMIES

FIRST, 294

FIRST PARACHUTE, 294

FIFTH PANZER, 294

SIXTH PANZER, 271

SEVENTH, 294

FIFTEENTH, 294
CORPS

Africa Korps, 93 et seq.; Alamein,
117-126

2nd S.S. Panzer: Arnhem, 266, 267
DIVISIONS, PANZER: in Nor
mandy, 232, 238

15th: Africa, 85, 117, 130

2ist: Africa, 85, 130
Army, Indian, 380, 381; Montgomery

fails to enter, 25

Army, Italian, 85; at Alamein, no, 119,
124, 125, 127; driven from Egypt,
13°> 133; assists Allies in Italy, 174,
175, 177-178

ARMY, RUSSIAN, 107, 198, 199, *34,
249; near Berlin, 294; in Vienna and
Prague, 296-297; foiled of Denmark,
297; in Mecklenburg, 300; barbarity
of, 319; White Russian Army Group,
322-323; ceremonial visits of, 322-
324; living off Russian Zone, 345, 350,

Index

493

ARMY, RUSSIAN (cont.)

356; Montgomery sees tanlcs of, 402;
he seeks post-war friendship with,
402

ARMY, UNITED STATES: early
"greenness" of, 142; links up with
Eighth Army, 147-148; plans for
OVERLORD, 191, 198; troops' confi
dence in Montgomery, 202; in South-
West Pacific, 216; system of command
in, 240, 284-287, 290-292; Mont
gomery's tribute to, 280; standardisa
tion of equipment with Britain and
Canada, 392, 403-404
ARMY GROUPS
6: 263, 269, 372

12: 269, 284, 288; Normandy,
235; north of Seine, 239, 240-
242, 248, 250, 251-252; Ruhr,
260, 262, 265, 271-274; Ar
dennes, 276
ARMIES

FIRST: Normandy landings, 200,
225; last tactical instructions to,
211-212; Battle of Normandy,
225-237; COBRA, 231; hindered
by weather, 231; casualties, 231,
235; break-out attempt, 232;
enemy strength opposite, 232;
maintenance difficulties, 241,
244-248, 250, 253; covers ad
vance to Metz, 244; advance into
Germany, 250, 252, 259, 262,
265, 289; Ardennes, 275-281
THIRD, 248, 260, 265; Normandy
landings, 200; advance to Seine,
242; drive on Metz, 244; coun
ter-attacks on, 252; advance to
north, 263, 270; Ardennes, 276,
277; advance into Germany, 287-
288; on Czech frontier, 297
FIFTH: Italy, 172, 173, 174, 175,

176, 179
SEVENTH, 270; Sicily, 157, 158,

160, 169

NINTH, 273; Ardennes, 276, 277;
and VERITABLE, 288, 289; and
PLUNDER, 294; removed from
Montgomery's command, 297
CORPS
5: 262
7: 262

8: Ardennes, 274, 275
19: 262
DIVISIONS, AIRBORNE

82nd: MARKET GARDEN, 258, 260,

264-265
loist: MARKET GARDEN, 258, 260,

264-265

DIVISION, INFANTRY
36th: Italy, 176

Army Cadet Force, 424

Army Council, 386; congratulates Mont
gomery on German surrender, 308-
309; and his paper on post-war
Army, 387-388; and National Service,

430

Army Troops Company, 111

Arnhem: plan for operation at (MAR
KET GARDEN), 246, 247, 256, 258-
267; D-Day fixed for, 248; Battle of,
253, 264-267, 316; airborne division
withdrawn from, 264; mistakes at,
265-266

Arras, 53

Artillery: in support of Eighth Army,
104; bombing of enemy, 112; British,
at Alamein, 116

Athens, 383

Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement (now Earl),
357, 369, 385, 399, 400, 430, 438,
439; at Potsdam, 351; Montgomery's
good relations with, 365, 478; argues
against Middle East as vital support
area, 390; cool attitude to Mont
gomery's talks with U.S. Chiefs of
Staff, 395; supports his views on
Palestine, 421; and his row with
Bevin, 424-426; objects to commit
ting Army to Continent, 449

Auchinleck, Field-Marshal Sir Claude,
65, 9i, 94, 96, 375, 380, 381, 410;
Montgomery meets him in Cairo, 85-
87; replaced by Alexander, 86; his
plan for Eighth Army, 87

Augsburg, 249, 250

Augusta, U.S.S., 225

Australia: presents timber for Mont
gomery's home, 399, 413; Mont
gomery visits (1947), 408-409, 410-
413; and Pacific responsibility, 411;
and British Service representation,
411, 438; integrated defence with
New Zealand, 412

Australian troops: in Africa, 92; at
Alamein, 114, 118, 120, 123; in
South-West Pacific, 216

Austria, 338; zoning of, 344; British
troops reduced, 383

AVALANCHE, Operation, 171-172, 176

Azad, Maulana, 380

Azerbaijan, 379

Azores, plan to seize, 64

Bad Oldesloe, 298
Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 175
Balkans, 338, 357
Ball, Mardon, 399
Baltic Sea, 297, 298, 299, 320
Ban, 175, 177

Barker, General Sir E. H., 321, 379,
381

494

Index

Barker, Lieut.-Gen. M. G. H., 59, 61

Basra, 379

Bastogne, 277

Bayeux, 245, 246

BAYTOWN, Operation, 171, 172, 173,

174
Beach obstacles, in Normandy, 212,

217, 221

Beaverbrook, Lord, 190
BedeU Smith, Gen. Walter (Chief of

Staff, SHAEF), 147, 184, 235, 241,

248, 283, 290; and plan for Sicily,
160; and OVERLORD, 189, 196; passes
on U,S. troops* tribute to Montgom
ery, 201-202

Bees, Speaker's ruling sought on, 194

Belchem, General, 105, 168, 184, 199

Belgian Congo, 413, 416

Belgium: neutrality of, 54; invasion of
(1940), 56-57; Allied campaign in,
239 et seq.; ports in, 247, 251, 254,
255, 256, 259, 266; Allied airfields
attacked, 278

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J., 385, 428

Ben Gardane, 141

Benelux, 448, 450, 455

Benghazi, 84, 85, 127, 128, 130, 131,
138, 141

Berlin, thrust towards, 244-246, 248,

249, 250-252; Russians near, 294;
Eisenhower does not consider main
prize, 296; Allies forestalled in, 297;
Control Council set up in, 318, 337,
339, 352; zoning of, 320-321, 344-
345, 349^350, 356-357; Allied dec
laration signed in, 336, 338-339; air
corridor to, 344, 349; Big Three Con
ference in (1945), 344, 350-352,
353; Russian blockade of, 433, 451,

455

BERTRAM, Operation, in

Bets, concerning end of war, etc., 169,
192-193

Bevan, Rt Hon. Aneurin, 399

Beveland, 255

Bevin, Rt. Hon, Ernest, 365, 400; at
Potsdam, 351; and Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty negotiations, 376; accuses
Army of letting him down over Pal
estine, 424-426; and Western Union,
447-448, 449, 457-458; and Marshall
Aid, 454

Bidault, M., 447

Billotte, General P., 52, 53, 61

Bit Sadi, in

Bizerta, 135, 149

Blanchard, General G. M. J., 53

Blaskowitz, CoL-Gen. Johannes, 321

Blood transfusion, in minimising casual
ties, 312

BLUECOAT, Operation, 233

Blumentritt, General Gunther, 299, 320

Bogue, 2nd Capt. Richard, 295

Bombay, 29

Bombers: in Normandy, 217

Bombing: before invasion, 70; of enemy
airfields, ill; of retreating enemy
after Alamein, 128; of German cities,
216, 294; of German reserves, 218

Bonn, 254, 262, 272, 273, 287, 288

Bostock, Robert, 399

Boulogne, 260

Bourguebus, 228

Bovington, 416

Bradford Textile Society, 478

Bradley, General Omar, 254, 262, 269,
281, 287, 297; Battle of Normandy,
200, 224, 225, 229, 234; break-out
attempt, 230, 231; and strategy north
of Seine, 239, 240, 241, 245, 246,
247, 248, 251; and thrust to Berlin,
252, 253, 254, 256; on MARKET GAR
DEN, 259; and Ruhr advance, 262;
at Maastricht Conference, 270; Mont
gomery willing to serve under, 272;
and Ardennes offensive, 273, 274,
275-277; opposes control by Mont
gomery, 285, 286; and Rhineland
campaign, 288

Breda, 261

Bremen, 249, 261

Brighton, 63, 64

Brindisi, 175, 177

British Commonwealth: Montgomery's
tours of, 375, 380-382, 398, 408-417

British Zone of Germany, 318; refugees
in, 319, 340~34i» 346, 350, 357, 368;
Montgomery's plans for, 320-322,
325-326, 329-330; Corps Districts
in, 321, 359-360; restiveness in, 328-
329; fraternisation in, 330-332, 354;
problems in, 340-343; Communist
propaganda in, 340, 371; food scarc
ity in, 340-341, 350, 354, 358; trade
unions in, 341, 354, 364, 370, 371;
withdrawal of troops to, 343-345;
German equipment in, 343; com
munications with Berlin, 344, 349;
Montgomery's general policy in, 345-
347» 369-371; reparations to Russia,
346; disbandment of German Army,
35o, 353; evolution of Government in,
359-36o, 368-369; Regional Com
missioners in, 359, 360; alleged re
tention of former German units in,
361-363; Zonal Advisory Councils,
368, 371

"Broad front" strategy, 239-242, 243,
245, 248-257

Broadhurst, Air Vice-Marshal H. (now

Index

495

Air Chief Marshal Sir Harry), 142,
147, 158, 168, 186

Brook, Sir Norman, 426

Brooke, Field-Marshal Sir Alan (now
Viscount Alanbrooke), 38, 56, 65,
86, 120, 196, 439; Corps Commander,
55; Montgomery's regard for, 55,
479-480; ordered back to England
(1940), 58; Commander-in-Chief of
new B.E.F., 63; in Tripoli as C.I.G.S.,
141; in Algiers, 165; influence on
Montgomery, 479-480

Broomfield House (Portsmouth), 211,
214, 222, 223, 224

Brown, Col. D. Clifton (later Viscount
Ruffside), Speaker, 194

Browning, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Frederick,
246, 258

Brownrigg, Major-Gen. Douglas, 48

Brunswick, 249, 260

Brussels, 245, 246, 254, 257. 259, 266;
Treaty of, 455, 456

Buerat, 133, 137

Bulganin, Marshal, 406

BuZoZo, H.M.S., 225

Burg-el-Arab, 91, 97

Burnett-Stuart, General Sir John, 37

Burnham-on-Sea, Mrs. Montgomery's
illness and death at, 41

Busch, Field-Marshal Ernst, 300, 320,
328

Buses, for 3rd Division, 64

Butcher, Capt Harry C., 169, 314

BUTTRESS, Operation, 171, 172

Caen, 200; strategic importance of, 228,
229, 232, 233; plan to break out of,
229, 230-231, 233; airfields of, 230;
GOODWOOD, 229, 230, 232

Cairo, 73, 85, 86, 87, 88, 95, 13*, *33,
155, 157, 159, 167, 168, 375, 378

Calais, 260

Camberley, Staff College at, 35, 36,
37, 48; Montgomery an instructor
at, 38, 42, 104, 479; exercises at, 374

Camouflage, in Desert campaign, 110-
111

Campbell, Rt. Hon. Sir Ronald, 376

Canada: Montgomery visits (1946),
392-394; defence co-operation with
Britain and America, 392, 394-397;
presents timber for Montgomery's
home, 399

Canberra, 410

Cape Verde Islands, plan to seize, 65

Carentan, 200

Carver, Richard, 129

Casablanca, 119; Conference, 142

Caserta, 383

Casey, Rt. Hon. Richard G., 120

Casualties: heavy, in First World War,
34; in Dieppe raid, 70-71; in Eighth
Army, 109, 119, 143, 147, 169; Bat
tle of Normandy, 231, 235; Arn-
hem, 264, 266; British caution over,
266; in 21 Army Group (June-Oct.
1944), 268-269; Ardennes, 282; Al
lied (June 1944-March 1945), 292-
293; enemy (Feb.-March 1945), 294;
minimising, 312

Catania, 156, 162

Catanzaro, 173

Caumont, 233

Chalons, 239

Chamberlain, Rt Hon. Neville, 54

Chambers, S. P., 346

Channel ports, 247, 251, 254, 255,
259, 260, 261, 266, 270

Cherbourg, 197, 200, 228

Chief of Staff system, 389

Chiefs of Staff, British, 291, 392, 398,
498; and Dieppe raid, 70; and North
African landing, 71; and OVERLORD,
212; disagree on future strategy and
planning, 391; and British-Canadian-
American defence co-operation, 392,
394-397; representation in Australia,
411; and peace-time National Serv
ice, 427-431; and Army reductions,
431; conflict with Minister of De
fence, 434-436; lack of efficiency
and harmony in, 437-440; remedies
proposed for, 440-441; Montgomery's
proposals for, 442-446; on course of
action in Europe, 448-449; and Su
preme Allied Commander for West
ern Union, 451; and reinforcement
of British Rhine Army, 459

Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 394; and defence
co-operation, 395-397

Chifley, Rt. Hon. J. B., 399, 411, 413

China, 473

Chiswick, Montgomery married at, 40

Churchill, Capt. C. F. H., R.N., 223,
225, 226

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston S., 72,
76, 107, 149, 165, 233, 257, 278,
312, 314, 3i8, 325, 366*, 400, 476;
Montgomery's first meeting with, 63-
64; visits Eighth Army, 70, 86, 96-
97; in Tripoli, 141; entries in Mont
gomery's autograph book, 97, 149,
187-188, 224, 257, 309-310; in Al
giers, 165; convalesces at Marrakesh,
187, 189-191; and OVERLORD, 189-
191, 210-211, 212, 213-214, 224,
296; dislikes ANVIL, 198; in Nor
mandy, 226; submits Montgomery's
promotion to Field-Marshal, 242; and
"ground force command" problem,

496

Index

290-291, 292; message on crossing of
Rhine, 295; on German surrender,
309-310; and Yalta agreement, 337-
338, 340; on zoning, 344; at Potsdam,
350; loses office, 351; as Minister of
Defence, 439, 440; Montgomery's
tribute to, 480-483

Churchill, Lady, 64, 190, 191

Clark, General Mark, 174, 176

Clay, General Lucius, 344

Cleve, 260

CLOBBER, Operation, 363

Coal shortage, in British zone, 341, 350,
354,358

COBRA, Operation, 231, 232

Cole, Lieut-Col. George, 410

Collins, General J. Lawton, 275, 277

Cologne, 239, 262, 272, 273

Colonial Office, conflict with War Of
fice over Palestine, 421

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 197, 287,
396; plan for Sicily invasion, 156;
plan for Normandy invasion, 197;
Montgomery explains reason for, to
Stalin, 405

Combined Operations Headquarters and
Dieppe raid, 69-70

Comiso, 159, 162

Command: organisation in 1939—1940,
47-54; Montgomery's doctrine of, 74-
83, 3H-317; and morale, 77-78, 79,
82-83; direct and personal, 82, 240;
organisation from Tactical H.Q. in
Eighth Army, 151-152; Montgomery
and Eisenhower differ over system of,
240-242, 283-287, 290-291; nation
alism in, 283, 286; and operational
control, 284-287, 288, 290-292; over
all commander needed, 283, 284, 285;
High Command in war, 311-317; ad
ministration, 312-313; Chief of Staff
system, 389

Commanders: and decision, 75, 313;
and conference, 76; selection of, 78-
79, 312; and immersion in detail,
79-80, 313; and master plan, 80-81;
and religious truth, 82, 485-486;
monetary grants to, 311-312; and in
ner conviction, 316-317

Communications: inadequate in B.E.F.,
47, 52-53; inadequate at Eisen
hower's H.Q., 243, 244; in occupied
Germany, 319, 320

Communism: propaganda in British
Zone, 340, 370; spread to West, 454

Cond£-sur-Noireau, 240, 253

Conference, during active operations, 76

Congress Party, India, 380

Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur,
100, 128, 142, 147* 230

Copenhagen, 320

Corbett, Lieut.-Gen. T. W., 85

Cork, 37, 65

Corps Districts, in British Zone of Ger
many, 321, 359-36o

"Corsetting** of German troops, no, 119

COSSAC, Operation, 229, 230, 451

Coulet, M., 236

Coutances, 230, 232

Crawford, General Sir Kenneth, 382

Creasy, Admiral G. E. ( now Admiral of
the Fleet Sir George), 192, 193

Creech Jones, Rt. Hon. Arthur, 415,
418-419, 421, 422

Crerar, General H. D. G., 193, 200, 255,
276, 321

Crete, 128

Creuilly, 227

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 428

Crocker, Lieut.-Gen. J. T., 321

Cromwell, Oliver, 316, 317

Crowe, Sir Edward, 40

"Crumbling** operations, 109, 115, 117-

H9

Crusade in Europe (Eisenhower), 259
Cunningham, General Sir Alan, 419,

420, 421, 422, 423, 424
Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Sir

Andrew (now Viscount Cunningham

of Hyndhope), 158, 159, 160, 168,

169, 173, 306
Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Sir

John, 374, 452
Cuxhaven, 321
Cyprus, 378, 382
Cyrenaica, 128, 129
Czechoslovakia, 297, 352, 357

D-Day (Normandy): selection of, 210,
214, 221-223; postponed 24 hours,
223

Dakota aircraft, Montgomery's, 167,
187, 192, 278

Dawnay, Lieut-Col., 194, 209

Deception plans, Alamein, 107, 110-
111

Defence: British-Canadian-U.S. co-op
eration, 392, 394, 395-397; begin
ning of European co-operation, 447-
453 (see also Western Union); high
costs of, 467, 469; means of reducing
cost, 468, 469; and surprise, 468;
and mobilisation, 468

Defence, Minister for Co-ordination of,
440

Defence, Ministry of: and Joint Planning
Staff, 438; and Chiefs of Staff, 440-
446; Chief of Staff for Minister, 442,
443, 446; Sandys at, 445

Defence in depth, 68-69

Index

497

Defence organisation: Chiefs of Staff
and, 437-446; weakness of commit
tee system, 439; Montgomery's sug
gested improvements in, 442-446

Delhi, 380-381, 409-410

Dempsey, General Sir Miles C., 186,
187, 254; takes over 13 Corps, 128;
Sicily campaign, 157; commands Sec
ond Army, 196, 320; Battle of Nor
mandy, 200, 224, 229, 232, 233;
and Arnhem, 246, 248, 258, 266; Ar
dennes, 276; Palestine, 419, 422

Denmark, 297, 299; German forces
surrender, 301, 302, 304, 320

Details, danger of immersion in, 79-
80

Deventer, 260, 261

Deverell, General Sir Cyril, 37

Devers, General J. L., 269, 270

Dewing, Major-Gen. R. H., 320

Dieppe, raid on, 69-71

DiU, General (now Field-Marshal) Sir
John, 37, 48, 59, 62

Displaced Persons, 309, 340, 341, 350

Doenitz, Admiral, 299, 318

Domburg, 255

Dominion Prime Ministers, Conference
of (1946), 409

Domitz, 298, 300

Douai, 245

DRAGOON, Operation, 199, 239, 240,
243, 297

Dresden, 249

Druval, Madame de, 227

Dunkirk: evacuation from, 58-61, 174,
276, 403; Treaty of, 454

Duren, 272

Dusseldorf, 289

Dyle, River, 55, 56

Earle, Peter, 476

Eden, Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony, 351

Egypt, 416; Alexander in, 71; Mont
gomery ordered to, 71, 86; defence
of, 93, 127; Germans driven from,
117-131, 133; Treaty negotiations,
376-378, 4*7

Eindhoven, 275, 283

Eisenhower, General D wight D. (now
President), 71, 155, 169, 170, 184-
185, 243, ^68, 343, 389, 395; Mont
gomery's first meeting with, 68;
C.-in-C. North Africa, 142; and gift
of aircraft to Montgomery, 148, 167,
278; and plans for Sicily, 156, 160,
163, 164, 169; bets on end of war,
169, 193; and Italian campaign, 173,
175; Supreme Commander for Second
Front, 183; and OVERLORD plan, 189,
198, 212, 222, 223; and ANVIL, 199;

postpones D-Day for 24 hours, 223;
in Normandy, 225; his report on cam
paign, 229; persuaded of Mont
gomery's defensive-mindedness, 230,
233-234, 235; belief in constant ag
gressive action, 235; differs from
Montgomery in conduct of war, 235;
insists on "broad front" strategy, 241-
242, 243-246, 248-257; and Saar
thrust, 246-248; and Berlin thrust,
248-253, 296; plans for Rhineland
campaign, 251-254, 272-274, 287-
290; and MARKET GARDEN, 259, 265-
266; and Ruhr campaign, 262-263,
265; his humanity, 262; Maastricht
Conference, 270, 272-274; and
Ardennes offensive, 276, 277; British
Press criticism of, 278, 281, 286;
Montgomery's tribute to, 281; and
command problem, 283-287, 290-
292; changed opinion on importance
of Berlin, 296; anxiety over Russian
advance, 297; on Anglo-American co
operation, 313-315; on Allied Control
Council, 319; Order of Victory con
ferred by Stalin, 324; difficulties with
Zhukov, 337, 338; gratitude to Mont
gomery, 348-349; Montgomery's
growing regard for, 349, 483-485;
and weapon standardisation, 394^-395;
and NATO, 456; Supreme Com
mander SHAPE, 460-462; stands as
President, 461-462

El Adem, 159, 168

El Hamma, 144

Elbe, River, 298

Emden, 321

EnfidaviUe, 148

Engineers, London Association of, 477,
478

Erskine, General Sir George, 135

Ethiopia, 413, 416

Europe: Eighth Army lands in, 174-
178; plans for Allied invasion— see
OVERLORD; Smuts* views on post-war,
212; end of war in, 283-310

Europe, Western: danger from Russia,
333, 345, 449-450, 455; building up
of strength in, 390, 447, 455, 470;
Army unprepared for war in, 434;
beginnings of defence co-operation in,
447-453 (see also Western Union);
need to fight campaign in, 448-452;
Marshall Aid for, 454-455; suspi
cion of Britain, 458-460; and nuclear
weapons, 463-465, 470; determined
to resist aggression, 464-465; eco
nomic problem of, 470-471

European Advisory Commission, 337

European Army, France rejects, 458

498

Index

Euston Station, Montgomery addresses

railwayman at, 202,
Ewart, Colonel, 303

Factory workers, Montgomery's ad
dresses to, 202

Falaise, 199, 200, 228, 229, 233

Far East, Naval H.Q. moved to Singa
pore, 410, 438

Farouk, ex-King of Egypt, 376, 377

Faulknor, H.M.S., 223, 225, 226

Fighter-bombers, in Normandy, 217,
226

Fighters, in Normandy, 217

Fighting French: at Alamein, 114; in
Tunisia, 142, 144

Flanders, 239

Flensburg, 299, 302, 318, 33*, 333

Flushing, 255

Flying Fortress, Eisenhower's "gift" of,
148, 164, 165, 167

Foggia, 177, 180, 183

Fontainebleau, 456

Food scarcity: in Tripoli, 140-141; in
occupied Germany, 319, 321-322,
329; in British Zone, 340, 341-342,
350, 354> 358, 367, 368, 371-372;
in Berlin, 344-345

Forbes, Major (Royal Scots Fusiliers),

25

Foreign Ministers: Council of, and
European settlement, 351; London
Conferences of, 356, 447

Formosa, 216

Forward from Victory (Montgomery),
316

Fougeres, 239

Foum Tatahouine, 141

France: in First World War, 31-35;
B.E.F. in (1939), 46«47, 49-56;
command set-up in, 51, 52-53; inac
tion after invasion of Poland, 54; Bat
tle of, 56-61; capitulates, 63; Allied
plans for landing in— see OVERLORD;
Smuts' view of failure, 212-213; Ger
man defeat in, 238-239; and zoning
of Germany, 318, 337; Montgomery's
tribute to, 326-328; reluctant to re
build Germany, 346, 356; opposes
central German administrations, 356,
358; and Western Union, 447-448,
45O, 455; and Treaty of Dunkirk,
454; rejects European Army, 458; sus
picion of Britain, 459

Frankfurt, 248, 249, 256, 273, 274;
Supreme Headquarters at, 324, 342-

343, 350

Franklyn, General Sir Harold, 38
Fraser, Admiral of the Fleet Lord, 436
Fraser, Rt. Hon. Peter, 412

Fraternisation, 330-332, 354

Free French Army, 327; and OVERLORD,

198

Freidel, Major, 300, 302, 303, 304, 305
French Morocco, 413, 416
French Zone of Germany, 318, 337,

346, 347, 352
Freyberg, General Sir Bernard (Baron),

92, 132, 186, 187, 193
Friedeburg, Admiral von, 300, 301,

302, 303, 304, 305
Friesland, 301, 302, 304
Frisian Islands, 301, 302, 304
Fumes, 58

Gabes Gap, 145, 147, 155

Gafsa, 147

Gambia, 413

Gamelin, General M. D.: Supreme
Commander, 50; moves Seventh Army
forward, 52; blame for May 1940 dis
aster, 54

Gandhi, Mahatma, 380

Garzweiler, 260

Gaulle, General Charles de, 198, 326

Gela, Gulf of, 158, 159, 162, 163

George VI, King, 165, 212, 214, 242,

*43

Georges, General A. J., 50, 52, 53
Germany: invades Poland, 46, 54;
attacks in West, 53, 54; bets made on
surrender, 193; fighting on three
fronts, 216; advance into, 238 et seq>;
American troops enter, 259; security
arrangements on entering, 262, 263;
dependence on Ruhr, 266, 270;
bombing of, 294; last British troops
in (1813), 295; faces disaster, 298;
surrenders, 299-301, 318; chaos in,
309, 319; first steps in Allied control
of, 318-320; zoning of, 318, 337-340,
343~345; under Military Government,
318-326, 349-350, 352-353, 359-36o;
Control Council for, 318 et seq.\ "un
conditional surrender," 319; looting
in, 320; restiveness in, 328-329; fra
ternisation problem, 330-332, 354; at
titude of German youth, 333-335,
367-368; National Socialism in, 333-
334, 367-368; use of weapons of,
343; treatment as economic whole,
345-347, 35i-35a, 37i; reparations
from, 346-347, 352; struggle to re
habilitate, 348-364, 366-372; trans
fer of populations, 350, 352, 357;
democratisation and re-education,
354-355, 367-368; central administra
tions opposed by France, 356, 358,
371; bars to Four-power government,
356-358, 371; Montgomery's last days

Index

499

in, 365-372; his memorandum on situ
ation in (1946), 369-372; economic
solution, 367, 369-370; Communist
propaganda in, 371; frontiers of, 371;
Federal Republic (Western Ger
many) joins NATO, 456, 458, 470

Gcrow, Major-Gen. L. T., 275, 277

Gettysburg, 484

Ghazal Station, 122

Gibraltar, 73, 195

Giolia Tauro, 171

Glaister, Pte. Geoffrey, 136, 137, 155

Glasgow University, John's portrait of
Montgomery at, 210

Gold Coast (Ghana), 413, 417

GOODWOOD, Operation, 229, 230, 232

Gort, Field-Marshal Viscount, 56; ap
pointed C.I.G.S., 37, 48; becomes
C.-in-C. of B.E.F., 48; character and
limitations, 48-49, 60-61; his instruc
tions from War Office, 49-5O; under
direct command of Georges, 50; his
plan of communications, 53; faulty or
ganisation of G.H.Q., 53-54; at La
Panne, 58-59; and retreat to Dunkirk,
58, 59, 60-61; decision saves Army,
61

Gott, Lieut.-Gen. W. H. E., 71, 86, 88,

89

Graham, Major-Gen. Sir Miles, 104,
105, 151, 178, 184, 187, 199

Granville, 243, 244

Grave, 253, 258, 261

Great Britain: unprepared for war, 46-
47; inaction after invasion of Poland,
54; danger of invasion, 62, 63, 65-69;
no sense of urgency in, 63; defence
doctrine of, 69-70; Montgomery's
tours of before D-Day, 201-203; war-
weariness in, 203, 243; and a secure
Europe, 213; and plans for control of
Germany, 318 et $eq.-t general elec
tion prospects (i945)> 3^5; and zon
ing of Germany, 336-340; post-war
hardship in, 342; Labour government
in, 351, 365, 373; German labour
force in, 361, 363; Montgomery's
tours of, as C.I.G.S., 375; and India's
freedom, 380-381; defence co-opera-
Uon wit-h Canada and U.S.A., 392,
394, 395-397; suggested military alli
ance with Russia, 4°4-405; withdraws
from Palestine, 423, 424, 4*6; and re
duction in Armed Forces, 431-437;
prepared to fight in Continental Eu
rope, 447, 449, 453, 47<>; and Western
Union, 447-453; must provide Euro
pean leadership, 450; suspicion of, in
Continental Europe, 458, 459
Greece, 382-383; joins NATO, 456

Greek Army, 382, 383; brigade at Ala-

mein, 114
Grigg, Rt. Hon. Sir James, 196, 203,

220, 221

Gruenther, General Alfred, 461, 462,

463

Guingand, Brig, de (now Major-Gen.
Sir Francis), Chief of Staff, 89-91,
92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 105, 117,
118, 120, 135, 150, 156, 157, *59>
168, 181, 184, 186, 187, 192, 193,
195, 199, 240, 253, 286, 476

Gurkha troops, continue in British Army,
409

Habarcq, 49

Haganah (Jewish organisation), 418,

420

Haifa, 43, 44, 168, 424, 4^5
Hailsham, ist Viscount, 440
Hamburg, 249, 261, 359
Hamm, 261
Hanover, 249, 321
Harding, Field-Marshal Sir John (now

Lord), 87, 88, 104
Harington, General Sir Charles, 38
Harriman, Averell, 455
Hasselt, 260, 284
Hastings, 480
Haucourt, 31

Hausser, General d. W. S. Paul, 236
Havre, 245, 259, 261
Heligoland, 301, 302, 304
Herbert, Sir Alan, 194
Herbert, Lieut-Gen. Sir Otway, 199
Herenthals, 261
's Hertogenbosch, 261
Hicks, Brig. P. H. W., 264
Hilversum, 261
Himeimat, 100

Himmler, Heinrich, 299, 333
Hindhead, 422; David Montgomery at,
40, 41, 44, 223, 374; Coif Club,
275

Hinge of Fate, The (Churchill), 72

Hitler, Adolf, death of, 299

Hobart, 410

Hodges, Lieut-Gen. Courtney H., 248,
252, 266, 276, 277

Hoedt, Fr. M. Rafael, 57

Holland, 239, 448, 455; Allied campaign
in, 258-267; ports in, 260, 261; at
tacks on Allied airfields in, 278; Ger
man forces surrender, 301, 302, 304,
321; in Benelux, 448, 45<>> 455

Hollis, General Sir L. C., 445

Hollond, Brig. Tom, 38

Horns, 139

Hong Kong, 410

Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. Leslie (later

500

Index

Lord), 37, 47; his instructions to

Gort, 49-50
Horrocks, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Brian, 96,

99, 100, 101, 103, 108, 124, 127, 128,

133, 138, 149, 258, 277, 321
Hospitals, base, air evacuation to, 312
Houffalize, 277
Hughes, Very Rev. F. W., Dean of

Ripon, 104, 105, 184, 200
Hungary, 352, 474
HUSKY, Operation, 153-155, 191

Ijssel, River, 261

India, 89, 427; Royal Warwickshire
Regiment in, 25, 26, 27-30, 40; Mont
gomery visits (1946, 1947), 380-381,
409-410; British withdrawal from,
380-381, 409; Partition, 410

Indian troops: at Alamein, 114; advance
to Tripoli, 146, 149

Infantry Training, Montgomery revises
manual of, 39

Information, relaying of to H.Q., 124-
125, 276, 476

Inglis, Sir Robert, 346

Intelligence: breakdown in May 1940,
53-54; in Eighth Army, 150-151

Irak, 86, 380

Ireland, Southern, 37-38, 65

Irgun gang, 378

"Iron curtain" policy, 349, 358

Ironside, Field-Marshal Lord, 48, 60

Isington Mill, Montgomery's home at,
39S, 399, 413

Ismay, General Sir Hastings (now
Lord), 72, 73, 437

Israel, 473

Italy: decision to knock out, 153, 165,
171; Germans escape from Sicily to,
164, 167, 169; campaign in, 171-180,
198; armistice negotiations, 173, 175;
Germans in, 175-176; co-belligerency
of, 177; Montgomery's visit to (1946),
383-384; and Western Union, 448

"J" Information Service, 124-125
Jacob, Brigadier (now Lieut-Gen. Sir

Ian), 86, 437
Jaffa, 424

Japan: containment of, 216; Mont
gomery's forecast of defeat, 216, 219
Jasper National Park (Canada), 392
Jebel Akhdar, 84, 85, 127. 128, 133, 138
Jerusalem, 418, 424
Jewish Agency, 418, 419, 420
Jews, in Palestine, 378-379, 418-426
Jinnah, Mahomed AH, 380, 381, 409
John, Augustus, 208-210
Joint Planning Staff: plan for Sicily,
156; no official guidance from Chiefs

of Staff, 390-391, 437-438; on course
of action in Europe, 448-449; and
command in Western Union, 451

Kairouan, 168

Kassel, 273, 274

Keitel, Field-Marshal W., 299, 300, 301

Kenya, 413

Kiel, 249

King, Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, 392,

394, 395

Kinzel, General, 300, 302, 304
Kipling, Rudyard, 66, 481
Kirkman, General Sir Sidney, 104
Kluge, Field-Marshal Giinther von, 236
Knocke, 255
Koniev, Marshal I., 402

La Panne, 58-60

Lancing College, 64

Landing-craft: for AVALANCHE, 172; for

BAYTOWN, 173; for OVERLORD, 191,

198, 199
Laon, 239

Lascelles, Rt Hon. Sir Alan, 242
Laval, 240
Lawson, Rt. Hon. John (now Lord),

385

Le Beny Bocage, 239
Le Cateau, 31
Leadership, Montgomery's doctrine of,

74-83, 112-113, 312, 476-478
Lear, Mrs. A. D., 293
Leclerc, Major-Gen. P. E., 142, 327
Leese, Lieut-Gen. Sir Oliver, 140, 159;

commands 30 Corps, 103, 128; Battle

of Alamein, 108, 118, 127; Sicily,

157; takes over Eighth Army, 184,

187

Lefroy, Captain, 30
Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Sir

Trafford, 230
Leipzig, 249, 295
Lenk, 40

Leopold II, ex-King of Belgians, sur
renders Army, 52, 57
Leopold Canal, 255
Leverkusen, 260
Liaison officers, system of, 35, 82, 125,

276, 476
LIGHTFOOT, Operation, 114-116. See

also Alamein
Lille, 54

Lindemann, General, 320
Lindsay, Major-Gen. Sir George, 37
Lippe Canal, 272

Locomotives, for Ruhr advance, 245
Loire, River, 239
London, passim; 21 Army Group H.Q.

in, 192, 195, 200, 210; bombing of,

Index

501

192; OVEKLOBD planning H.Q. in,
196-197* i99> 22SJ Docks, Montgom
ery visits, 2202

Long Range Desert Group, 144

Longwy, 52

Looting: Montgomery accused of, 236-
237; in occupied Germany, 320

Lorraine, 269

Louvain, 55, 56, 57, *44, 277

Liibeck, 249, 297, 298

Luce, R. W., 346

Lumsden, Lieut-Gen. Herbert, 103,
108, 117, 118, 128

Liineburg Heath, German surrender at,

299-305

Lush, Brigadier, 139
Luxembourg, 273, 276, 448, 455
Lydda, 381
Lyne, Major-Gen, L. O., 321

Maastricht, 260; conference at, 270-274,
285

MacArthur, General Douglas, 413

Macdonald, Colonel C. R., 26

McKell, Rt Hon. Sir William, 411

Macmillan, Major-Gen. Sir Gordon, 387

McNaughton, General the Hon. A. G.
Lu, 165, 166

Magdeburg, 344

Maginot Line, 54, 55

Mainwaring, Brigadier Hugh, 124, 125,
129

Malta, 120, 128, 142, 166, 168, 169,
290, 291, 376, 377

Mansion House, Montgomery's first pub
lic speech at, 203-208

Marble Arch, 133

Mareth Line, 141, 143; Battle of, 143-
147, 3i6

Marlborough, His Life and Times
(Churchill), 17, 76

Marrakesh, 187, 189-192

Marseilles, 272

Marshall, General George C., 254, 283,
286, 288, 291, 406, 454, 455

Marshall Aid, 454-455

Martuba, 120, 127, 128, 129, 133

Matmata hills, 144

Mecklenburg, 300

Medenine, 141, 145; Battle of, 143

Mediterranean: open to Allies, 215;
British interests in, 378

MekJli, 127, 133, 138

Men and Power (Beaverbrook), 480

Merduma airfields, 133

Mersa Matruh, 124, 129

Messe, Field-Marshal, 164

Messina, 164, 169

Messina, Straits of, 171, 172, 173; Ger
mans escape across, 167

Meteren, 32

Metz, 240, 241, 242, 244, 269

Meuse, River, 52, 246, 258, 261, 264,

266, 272, 277, 279

Middle East: Montgomery's tour of,
375-38o; bases in, 376, 377; Russia
and, 379; importance of, 39Q-39i»
396, 459; Western position weakened
by leaving Palestine, 426; Russia stirs
unrest in, 465

Middleton, Major-Gen. T. H., 274, 275
Military Leadership (lecture), 315
Mills, Sir Percy (now Lord), 346
Milne, George Francis, ist Baron, 37
Miteriya Ridge, 118
Mobilisation, in nuclear war, 468
Molotov, Vyacheskv, 406
Montgomery of Alamein, Bernard Law,
Field-Marshal the Viscount: family
background and boyhood, 17-22; at
St. Paul's School, 19-22; at Sand
hurst, 20, 21, 23-26; joins Royal War
wickshire Regiment, 26; in India,
26-30, 40, 74; in First World War,
30-35; his method of fighting a battle,

34-35, 109, H5, 116, 143, 146-147;
dedicated to his profession, 35; at
Staff College, 35, 36-37; in Sinn Fein
struggle, 37-38, 65; instructor at Staff
College, 38-39; rewrites manual of
Infantry Training, 39; marriage, 39-
40; Chief Instructor at Staff College,
Quetta, 40, 74; commands 9th In
fantry Brigade, 40, 42, 43; illness and
death of wife, 41; in Palestine, 43-44;
takes over 3rd Division, 44, 45, 46; in
Battle of France, 54-60; in South
Coast defence preparations, 63-71;
first meeting with Churchill, 63-64;
commands 5 Corps, 65; and South-
Eastern Command, 65, 68, 69; and
Army training, 65-69

Appointed to command Eighth
Army, 70, 71-73, 86; meets Alexan
der, 87; plans reserve corps, 87-88;
appoints de Guingand his Chief of
Staff, 90-91; issues "no withdrawal"
order, 92, 93; plans to strengthen Ala
mein position, 95-96; and Alarn
Haifa, 98-103; becomes Eighth Army
"mascot," 101; rebuilds Eighth Army
103-105; and Alamein, 106-126; pur
sues enemy to Tunis, 127-149; in
danger of capture, 129; promoted
general and appointed K.C.B., 131;
private soldier's letter to, 136-137;
gets aeroplane from Eisenhower, 148;
Eighth Army's confidence in, 150;
system of personal command from
Tactical H.Q., 151; and Sicily cam-

502

Index

paign, 153-170; bets on war lasting
into 1945, 169, 193; and Italian cam
paign, 171-188; encounters adminis
trative difficulties, 178-180; gets a
waterproof suit, 181-182; given com
mand of 21 Army Group, 183; fare
well to Eighth Army, 185-187

Planning of OVERLORD, 189 et seq.;
apparent disregard of War Office au
thority, 196; his method of inspect
ing troops, 201; American troops*
confidence in, 201-202; addresses fac
tory workers, etc., 202-203; appeals
for national support for Army, 204-
208; sits for portrait, 208-210; asserts
authority with Churchill, 213-214;
final tour of armies before D-Day,
214-219; sails for Normandy on ID-
Day, 223-224; and Battle of Nor
mandy, 225-237; and controversy
over strategy in Caen sector, 228-235;
hears of Eisenhower's criticisms, 233-
235; difference in their military out
look, 235; accused of looting, 236-
237; plans for operations north of
Seine, 239; disagrees with **broad
front" strategy, 241-246; promoted
Field-Marshal, 242; and Arnhem,
246-248, 253, 258-267; War Office
concern for personal safety, 263; and
Battle of Ardennes, 268-282; stresses
Anglo-American co-operation, 278-
281, 306; disapproves criticism of
Eisenhower, 278, 281; unfortunate
Press conference, 278-282; and prob
lem of command and operational con
trol, 283-292; receives German sur
render, 299-305

Organises British Zone of Germany,
320-322, 328-330, 341 et seq.; ex
changes visits with Russians, 322-
324; Order of Victory conferred by
Stalin, 324; receives freedom of Ant
werp, 325; British Member of Allied
Control Council, 325; relaxes non-
fraternisation order, 330-352; difficul
ties with Zhukov over zoning, 336-
340; his general policy in British
Zone, 345-3475 Eisenhower's tribute
t°» 349; on treating Germany as eco
nomic whole, 351; plans to re-educate
Germans, 353-355, 367-368; aero
plane crash, 355-356; convalesces in
Switzerland, 355; considers Four-
power government impossible, 357;
on evolution from military to civil
government, 359~36o, 368-369; ac
cused of retaining organised German
units, 361-363; appointed C.I.G.S.,
365; his memorandum on German

situation, 369-372; resolved not to let
Army drift, 373, 374; and conferences
of Army Commanders, 375; tours
Mediterranean countries and India,
375-3S4; at War Office, 385 et seq.
Seeks liaison between military and
civil sides at War Office, 387; his
paper on problems of post-war Army,
387-389; on strategy for a major war,
389-391, 395-396; visits Canada and
U.S.A., 392-397; makes his home at
Isington Mill, 398-399; visits Mos
cow, 399-408; talks with Stalin, 401-
408; seeks exchange of visits with
Russian Army, 402; suggests military
alliance with Russia, 404-405; photo
graphed as a Russian Marshal, 407;
visits Commonwealth countries, 408-
417; objections to his report on Brit
ish Africa, 415; gives his son Belt of
Honour at Bovington, 416; and Pal
estine policy, 419-426; and National
Service, 427-431; objects to Army
cuts, 431-433, 434-437; plans to re
model Army, 432; disagreements with
Minister of Defence, 433-437; abor
tive attempt to remove Minister, 433-
434, 452; memorandum on Chiefs of
Staff Committee and defence organi
sation, 437-446; and Western Union,
447-453, 456 et seq.-t appointed
Chairman of Western Union Com-
manders-in-Chief, 452-453; lives in
France, 456; urges inclusion of West
ern Germany in Western Union,
458; Deputy Supreme Commander,
SHAPE, 460; resists politics, 478-479;
influences in his life, 479-486
ORDERS, ADDRESSES AND SPEECHES:
On leadership and morale before
Alamem (Sept.-Oct 1942), 112-
113; to senior officers (Oct. 1942),
114-115; to Eighth Army before
Alamem (Oct. 1942), 116; direc
tive for SUPERCHARGE (Oct. 1942),
120-123; to Eighth Army after Ala-
mein (Nov. 1942), 130-131; to
Eighth Army (Christmas 1942),
134; to Eighth Army on Tripoli ad
vance (Jan. 1943), 139; to Eighth
Army before Mareth (March
1943), 145; to Eighth Army before
Italian campaign (Sept. 1943),
174; farewell message to Eighth
Army (Jan. 1944), 185-186; at
Mansion House (March 1944),
203-208; to senior officers before
D-Day (May-June 1944), 214-
219; directive for MARKET GARDEN
(Sept. 1944), 259-262; Press con-

Index

503

ference on Ardennes (Jan. 1945),
278-281; to 21 Army Group before
PLUNDER (March 1945), 294-295;
victory messages to 21 Army Group
and Navy and Air Force (May
i945)> 305-308; at British Military
Exhibition in Paris (May 1945),
326-328; to population of British
Zone (May 1945), 3*9-330; to
British Zone on fraternisation ( June
1945), 331-332; to British Zone on
rehabilitation (Aug. 1945), 353-
355; directive on evolution of Gov
ernment in British Zone (Oct.
1945), 359-36o; broadcast to Ca
nadian people (Sept. 1946), 392-
394; at Hastings, proposing health
of Churchill, 480-483; at unveiling
of Alamein Memorial (Oct. 1954),
485-486

VIEWS ON: Command, 74-83, 311-
317; commanders, selection of, 78-
79, 315-316; fitness, 66-68, 112;
hard work, 22, 26, 341, 475; hu
man factor in war, 76-79, 204-205,
313; inner conviction, 316, 317; in
tegrity, 22, 475; leadership, 74-83,
112-113, 312, 476-478; "Maginot-
mindedness," 69; morale, 77-^78,
85, 102, 103, 112; political life,
478-479; religious truth, 82-83,
205, 485-486; school influence, 21;
"scorched earth" policy, 69; team
work, 218, 280, 281; temperance,
27,64

Montgomery, Betty (wife), 19; first
meeting, 39, 40; marriage, 39, 40; ill
ness and death, 41
Montgomery, Brian (brother), 18
Montgomery, David (son), 19, 26, 208,
275, 398; birth, 39, 40; at school at
Hindhead, 40, 41, 44; relationship
with father, 42; at Winchester, 72,
223* 374; passes top out of O.C.T.U.,
416

Montgomery, Donald (brother), 19
Montgomery, Henry, Bishop of Tas
mania (father), 18, 19, 22
Montgomery, Maud (mother), 17-19,

21, 24

Montgomery-Massingberd, Field-Mar
shal Sir Archibald, 37
Moorehead, Alan, 302-303
Morale: importance of, 77-78, 81, 112;
in Eighth Army, 85, 89, 91, 93, 98;
study of, 388
Morgan, General Sir Frederick, 197,

230

Morison, Admiral (U.S. naval his
torian), 169

Morshead, Lieut-Gen. Sir L. J., 92

Mortain, 235

Moscow, 399-408; Conference (1947),

406

Moselle, River, 248, 260
Moses, 316
Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet Earl,

69, 410
Msus, 129
Munich, 249, 250
Munster, 261
Muslim League, 380
My Three Years with Eisenhower

(Butcher), 314

Namur, 277

Nancy, 239

Nantes, 239

Naples, 175, 183

Napoleon, 316, 317

National Savings Committee, 203

National Service, 358, 427-431, 435

National Socialism (Nazism), 333-334,
367-368

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organi
sation): formed, 456; Federal Ger
many joins, 458; conventional forces
of, 463; nuclear weapon decision in
political hands, 464; overhaul of or
ganisation needed, 466-469; and
'cold war," 467, 469; politico-military
structure of, 467; and cost of defence,
467, 468-469; defence progress in,
470-473

Navy, German, 249

NAVY, ROYAL: opening of Tripoli har
bour, 141, 142; Sicily, 161, 163, 169;
Italian campaign, 172, 173; and
OVEBJLORD, 221, 222, 225, 226; Mont
gomery 's message on German sur
render, 306-307; little use for Na
tional Service, 428; threatened cuts
in, 431

Navy, U.S., in Normandy landings, 225

Neder Rijn, River, 253, 258, 264

Nehru, Pandit, 409, 410

Nelson, Lord, 316

Neuss, 289

New Zealand: helps to furnish Mont
gomery's home, 399; Montgomery
visits (1947), 408-409, 412-413; in
tegrated defence with Australia, 412

New Zealand troops: in Africa, 88, 92,
99, 100; at Alamein, 114, 117, 118,
119, 120, 122; Tripoli, 132, 133, 141,
143, 144, 145, 146; man-power prob
lems, 155

Nieuport, 58

Nigeria, 413, 417

Nijmegen, 253, 258, 261, 264, 272, 289

504

Index

Nile, River, 87

Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., 395

Nofilia, 133

Normandy: plans for invasion of, 189-
191* 196-200, 210-219, 221-222; in
vasion of, 222-224; Battle of, 225-
237, 3i6

Normandy to the Baltic (Montgomery),
400, 401

Norstad, General Lauris, 463

North Atlantic Treaty, 454, 456; Organ
isation— see NATO

Norton, Sir Clifford, 382

"Notes on Command in Western Eu
rope" (Montgomery), 283

Nuclear deterrents, 463-465, 471-472

Nurnberg, 249, 250

Nursing sisters, 312

O'Connor, Lieut-Gen. Sir Richard, 258

Officers: and tradition, 27; German gen
eral's classification of, 36; effect of
Geddes axe on, 38; "dead wood"
among, 66-67; wives and families of,
not to accompany units, 67; selection
of, 78-79; liaison, 82, 124-125, 276,
476

OMAHA Beach, 225, 226, 231

Operation Victory (de Guingand), 117,
118

Opladen, 260

Oran, 119

Orleans, 239

Orne, River, 200, 233

Orsoy, 272, 273

Osnabriick, 261

Ottawa, 392

OVERLORD, Operation: planning of, 189-
191, 196-224; crisis of European war,
198; plan for development after land
ing, 200, 227-229; fixing of D-Day,
210, 214, 221-223; exercises for, 210-
211; tactical instructions for, 211-
212; weather conditions, 221-223,
231; execution of, 225-237; misun
derstandings about, 229-231, 233-
235

Pachino Peninsula, 156, 157, 158, 160,

162

Pacific Ocean, 411; South-West, 216
Paget, General Sir Bernard, 38, 65, 70,
71, 205, 381; Montgomery succeeds
in 21 Army Group, 183, 195; C.-in-
C. Middle East, 195, 376
Pakistan, 410

Palermo, 156, 160, 163, 167, 169
Palestine, 40, 378, 418-426; Arab re
bellion (1938), 43-44; possible
Eighth Army withdrawal to, 87; ter

rorism in, 378-379, 381, 418-425;
United Nations and, 423; Britain ends
Mandate, 423-426

Palestine Police Force, 378, 379, 419,
420

Panzer Battles (Von Mellenthin), 101

Paratroops: eliminated from Dieppe
raid, 70; German, at Alamein, no;
Allied, in MARKET GARDEN, 258, 260,
261, 264-267

Paris, 200; liberated, 238; British Mili
tary Exhibition in, 327; SHAPE in,
460-463; NATO Council in, 467

Pas de Calais, 239, 246

Passchendaele, 34

Patton, General George, 167, 248, 259,
297; bets with Montgomery, 193;
Battle of Normandy, 200; comments
on British, 234-235; advance to Metz,
242, 244, 252, 266; favours double
thrust, 259; and advance into Ger
many, 269-270

PeViers, 232

Persia, 86, 379-380, 427

Peshawar, 26, 27-29

Philippines, 216

Pilsen, 297

Pipeline, dummy, 111

Pius XII, Pope, 485

Plumer, Viscount, 34

PLUNDER, Operation, 294

Pola, 383

Poland, 338; invaded, 46, 54; partition
of, 35O; population transfer, 352, 357

Polish Parachute Brigade, 258

Pollek, Colonel, 300, 304

Pomerania, 294

Poole, Major A. J,, 31

Poona, 40

Population transfers, 350, 352, 357

Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Sir Charles (now Viscount), 307

Ports: securing of, in Normandy, 191,
200; French, 246; Belgian, 247, 251,
254» 255, 256, 259, 260, 261, 266;
German, 249, 250; Dutch, 260, 261

Portsmouth: 9th Infantry Brigade at,
40, 42, 43, 479; Montgomery's head
quarters at, 211, 213, 222, 223

Portugal, 448

Poston, John, 88, 135, 476

Potomac River, 395

Potsdam Conference, 337, 338, 344,
345, 350-352, 353, 36i, 371

Pounsdorf, 295

Pownall, Major-Gen. Sir Henry, 48

Prague, 297

Problem of the Post-War Army, The
(Montgomery), 374, 387-388

Pnim, 271, 272, 273, 287, 288

Index

505

Pyrenees, 448

Quattara Depression, 106

Queenstown, 65

Quetta, Staff College at, 40, 89

Raihvaymen, Montgomery's address to,
202

Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram, 157, 158,
159, 190, 192, 193, 223, 225

Ramsden, Major-Gen. W. H., 86, 87, 91,
92, 103

"Rapier," Montgomery's special train,
71, 201

Rees, 294

Rees, Dai, 275

Refugees, German, 309, 319, 340, 341,
34§> 350, 368

Regensburg, 249

Reggio, 175

Regional Commissioners, in British Zone,
359» 360

Reichswald Forest, 289

Reims, 239

Remagen, 289

Reparations, from British Zone to
Russia, 346

Revers, General, 448

Reynolds, Major and Mrs., of Hindhead,
44, 72, 223, 374

Rheimberg, 294

Rheine, 261

Rhine, River, 239; plan to cross, 245,
246, 247, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257,
261, 264, 272, 273, 287, 289; Allied
advance to, 258, 259, 272-273; cross
ing of, 294-296

Rhineland campaign, 284-298

Rhodesia, Southern, 413

Rhone valley, 238

Richards, Major-Gen. G. W,, 184, 187

Richardson, Major-Gen. C. L., 111

Ridgway, General Matthew B., 275,
277, 462

Ritchie, General Sir Neil, 86, 258

Rizzio, General, 177

Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 486

Roberts, Sir Frank, 406

Robertson, General Sir Brian, 104, 151,
178, 179, 353, 361, 362

Robertson, Sir William, 3$

Rockets, use of, 295

Rockets, V2, 246

Rocky Mountains, 392, 393

Rokossovsky, Marshal C., 322

Rome, 175

Rommel, Field-Marshal Erwin, 72, 73,
84, 87, 106, 107, 109, 164; campaigns
in Africa, 85 et seq.; expected attack
of, 93* 95, 96, 98, 99; his use of

armour, 95, 99, 102, 109; withdraws
at Alam Haifa, 100-102; Montgom
ery's plan to destroy, 109-110, 115,
116; defeat at Alamein, 119-125;
driven from Egypt, and North Africa,
128 et seq.\ his supply tanks bombed,
129; in Italy, 176; plans to defeat
Normandy invasion, 212; wounded,
236
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 318,

337

Rostock, 300

Rotterdam, 246, 260, 261

Royal United Service Institution, 463

Ruhr, 239, 240, 242, 248, 249; thrust
to, 243, »44, 245-247, 250, 251, 253,
255» 270, 272-274; Allied plans to
capture, 258-267; importance of, 266,
270, 271; main objective, 285, 287;
internationalisation, 356, 357

Rundstedt, Field-Marshal Gerd von,
236; attacks in Ardennes, 279

Russia, 216; threat to Western Europe,
333, 45o; and zoning of Germany,
337-347; difficulties with Control
Commission, 336-347, 356, 361-363;
reparations from British Zone, 346;
and Middle East, 379, 382; Montgom
ery's visit to, 399-408; suggested mili
tary alliance with Britain, 404-405;
Montgomery's tribute to, 407; post
war weakness, 408; supports Jews in
Palestine, 423; blockades West Berlin,
429, 433, 451, 455; refuses Marshall
Aid, 455; foments Middle East un
rest, 465; economic warfare, 471; aim
of world domination, 473

Russian Zone of Germany, 318, 322,
324; Allied forces in, 337-340; armies
live off country, 345, 350, 356; access
not allowed to Allies, 349, 358; rail-
•way gauges altered, 357; starvation
in, 358

Ruweisat Ridge, 95

Rybaltko, Marshal, 402

Saar, 55, 239, 240, 241, 242; thrust to,

243-248, 256, 259, 269, 270, 272
St. Andrews University, Montgomery

lectures at, 315
St. L6, 232
St. Mark's Vicarage, Kennington Oval,

Montgomery born at, 17, 18
St. Paul's Cathedral, 164
St. Paul's School, Hammersmith, 19-22,

24; 21 Army Group H.Q. at, 192,

196, 212

S. Sixte, Abbaye de, 57
St. Vincent, Cape, 316
Salamanca, 317

506

Index

Salazar, Dr. A. de O,, 485

Salerno, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,

179

*'Salute the Soldier" campaign, 203

Samaket Gaballa, 111

Sandhurst, 20, 21-26, 29, 48, 195

Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan, 64, 135, 445

Sangro, River, 177

Scandinavia, 448

Scheldt estuary, 255, 257, 259

Schleswig-Holstein, 297, 299; German
forces surrender, 301, 302, 304; Al
lied occupation, 320

Schuyler, General, 462

Scientific research, in Army, 388

"Scorched earth" policy, 69

Scylla, H.MJS., 225

Second Front, 156, 192; preparation of,
183; Eisenhower Supreme Comman
der, 183. See also OVERLORD

Sedan, 52

Seine, River, 200, 229, 239; crossing of,
242, 246, 247; strategy north of, 242-

257

Sequoia, S.S., 395

Sfax, 145, 147, 168

SHAEF (Supreme H.Q., Allied Expedi
tionary Force), 230, 248, 284, 324; on
German defeat in France, 238-239;
and MARKET GARDEN, 265; and con
trol of post-war Germany, 319, 320;
disbanded, 348

SHAPE (Supreme H.Q., Allied Powers
Europe): opened, 460; objectives of,
461; Supreme Commanders of, 461-

463

Shaw, George Bernard, 208-209, 210
Sherman tanks, 88, 143
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. Emanuel, 385, 430,

432, 434

Shorncliffe, 30

Shuaiba, 380

Sicily, 173; plans for invasion of, 153-
164; invasion of, 165-170; Italian co
operation in, 174

Sidi Rahman, 122

Sidky Pasha, 376

Siegfried Line, 55, 239, 245, 259

Signals; inadequate system in Field
Army, 47, 52-53; relaying of in
Eighth Army, 124-125; in Sicily cam
paign, 168; inadequate communica
tions at Eisenhower's H.Q., 243, 244

Simonds,, Lieut.-Gen. G. G., 166, 255

Simpson, Rt. Rev. Bertram, Bishop of
Southwark, 181

Simpson, General Sir Frank, 42, 413

Simpson, Lieut.-Gen. William H., 276,
277

Singapore, 410, 413

"Single punch" doctrine, 244, 257

Sinn Fein, 37-38

Sirte, Gulf of, 84

Sittard, 260

Slim, Field-Marshal Sir William, 430,
459

Smuts, Field-Marshal Jan, 86, 212-213,
415; in Normandy, 226, 227

Sokolovsky, General, 361, 400

Soldier's Story, A (Bradley), 265, 297

Sollum, 129

Sousse, 145, 168

South African troops, at Alamein, 114

Southwick House (Portsmouth), 211,
213, 222, 223

Spaatz, Lieut.-Gen. Carl, 395

Spain, 448

Speed, Sir Eric, 387

Spitfire aircraft, in Palestine, 424

Spooner, Capt, 88

Stalin, Joseph, 198, 318, 324; approves
DRAGOON, 297; and Yalta, 337; on
zoning, 344; at Potsdam, 350; Mont
gomery visits in Moscow, 399-408;
personality of, 407

Steel, Sir Christopher, 346

Stern Gang, 378, 422

Steyning, 63

Strang, Sir William (now Lord), 346

Struggle for Europe, The (Wilrnot),
264, 266, 281

Sudan, 378, 413

Suez Canal, 376

SUPERCHARGE, Operation, 120, 121-125

Supply, Ministry of, 202

Surprise, in unlimited war, 468

Sweeny, Charles, 60

Switzerland, 39, 355

Sydney, 413

Syracuse, 157, 162

Tactical H.Q., system of personal com
mand from, 151-152

Takrouna, 148

Tanks: inadequacy of (1939-1940), 47;
for Eighth Army, 88; Rommel's losses
in, 143; enemy losses in Normandy,
236; German losses to Patton, 252

Taormina, 166, 169-170

Taranto, 175, 177

Tarhuna, 139

Tasmania: Montgomery family in, 18,
19; Montgomery revisits, 410

Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur
(later Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Lord), 223, 246, 374, 451, 452; and
air support at Alam Haifa, 100; C.-in-
C. all air forces in Mediterranean,
142; and Sicily, 159, 160, 168, 169;
and Battle of Normandy, 230; and

Index

507

co-ordination of air operations, 290,
292; dispute with Minister of De
fence, 433, 434-435

Tel Aviv, 418

Tell el Aqqaqir, 122

Templer, Lieut.-Col. (Now Field-Mar
shal Sir Gerald), 54

Ten Chapters (Montgomery), 309

Termoli, 177

Terneuzen, 255

Territorial Army, 432

Thermopylae, 92

TIGER, Exercise, 68

Tilburg, 261

Tito, Marshal, 181, 383, 485

Tobruk, 84, 85, 100, 129, 138, 141

TORCH, Operation, 71, 107, 120

Tozer, Mrs. M. E., 210

Trade unions, in occupied Germany,
341, 354, 364, 370, 371

Trafalgar, Battle of, 316

Trans-Jordan, 378, 379

Transport: inadequate in Field Army,
47; aircraft for, in Ruhr advance, 246;
concentration of, 248; in occupied
Germany, 319, 320, 329

Trapani, 157

Trench-foot disease, 268, 292

Trenchard, Marshal of the Royal Air
Force, Viscount, 440, 442

Trigno, River, 177

Tripoli, 84, 85, 120, 127, 128, 129, 134,
168, 178; plans for advance on, 134-
136, 137-139; Eighth Army in, 139-
143; Churchill visits, 141; King
George VI visits, 165

Triumph and Tragedy (Churchill), 35

Troyes, 239

Truman, Harry S., 74, 344, 395, 39^;
at Potsdam, 350, 395

Tunis, 135, 145, 169; capture of, 149

Tunisia, 142-152; Eighth Army in, 143-
152, 153-155, 158

Turkey, 215-216, 456

Turnhout, 261

Uden, 258

Ukraine, 408

"Unconditional surrender," mistake of,
319

UNIFORCE, 455, 460

United Nations Organisation, 404, 466,
473; and Palestine, 423, 426

United States: Press criticism of British
forces, 233; and zoning of Germany,
337-340, 344; and rebuilding of Ger
many, 346; Montgomery visits, 392,
394-397; defence co-operation with
Britain and Canada, 392, 394, 395-
397; and Western Union, 448; and

Marshall Aid, 454-455; European sus
picion of, 460; and world leadership,
473

Urquhart, Major-Gen. R. E., 264

Utrecht, 261

V2 rockets, 246

Vassilievsky, Marshal, 400, 402, 405,

406, 407
Vasto, 186
Veghel, 253

Venezia Giulia, 383, 427
Venlo, 260, 272

VERITABLE, Operation, 288, 289
Versailles, 253, 427
Vian, Admiral (now Admiral of the

Fleet Sir Philip), 225
Vienna, 199, 296, 297
Vittoria, 317
Vokes, General, 355
Voroshilov, Marshal K. E., 406
Vyshinsky, M., 406

Wadi Akarit, 147

Wagner, Rear-Admiral, 300, 302, 304

Walcheren Island, 255, 259, 260

War Office, 42, 45, 62, 155, 168, 237,
276, 432, 447, 486; manual of In
fantry Training, 39; and letting of
Southsea Common, 43; "emptied" of
professional chiefs, 48; instructions to
Gort, 49-50, 58-59; wildcat schemes
of, 64-65; "scorched earth" policy,
69; and North African landing, 71;
sends Montgomery waterproof suit,
18 1; and his appointments to staff,
184; tight control over Army in Eng
land, 195-196; Montgomery's tribute
to, 220; and his conspicuous dress,
263; and Control Commission, 319-
320; Montgomery at, 373-374, 385-
391, 4^7-446, 447-453; Army Com
manders' conferences, 375; unmarried
officers at, 387; opposed to Chief of
Staff system, 389; conflict with Co
lonial Office over Palestine, 421; and
National Service, 428, 430

Warburg, 260

Warren, Lieut-Col. Trumbull, 302

Washington, Montgomery in, 394-397;
NATO military advisers in, 467

Wavell, Field-Marshal Lord, 43, 375,
380, 381

Wavre, 52

Weapons, standardisation of, 392, 403-
404

Weather conditions: affect D-Day, 221,
222, 223; in OVERLORD, 231; effect on
airborne operations, 261, 266, 267

508

Index

Weeks, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Ronald (now
Lord), 3*6, 344, 346, 350, 352

Wellington, Duke of, 317

Wesel, 272

Weser, River, 320

West Kapelle, 255

Western Union: Bevin's plan for, 447-
448; and need to fight in Europe,
449-452; problems of command, 450-
453; Montgomery appointed Chair
man of Commanders-in-Chief, 452-
453> 455; Defence Organisation, 455-
463; and NATO, 456; Federal Ger
many in, 458; deterrent strength of,
464-465, 467, 469-470; dependence
on America, 473

Westphalia, 321

Westvleteren, 57

Whistler, General Sir L., 381

White Russia, 408

Whiteley, General J. F. M., 289

Wilhelmshaven, 321

Williams, Brigadier E. T. ("Bill"), 104,

105, no, 119, 150-151, 184, 187,

198, 199, 266

Wilmot, Chester, 264, 266, 281
Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir H. M. (now

Lord), 183

Winchester, 72, 223, 374
Wismar, 297, 298, 300, 322, 344
Wood, Capt. R., 29

Woolwich, Royal Military Academy, 387
Worms, 273

Yalta Conference, 290, 337
York, 89
Yugoslavia, 181, 383

Zaltbommel, 261

Zhukov, Marshal G. K., 324, 336-339,

348, 361-362
Zonhoven, Montgomery's Tactical H.Q.

at, 268, 273, 275, 390, 291
Zuider Zee, 258
Zwolle, 260, 261

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